2021. vol. 16. No. 3

From the perspective of power transition theory, international relations system is gradually entering the phase of "power transition" where the United States, as a global hegemon, seeks to maintain the existing world order, and China establishes alternative international formats to reorganize the system of international relations and strengthen its structural power.  Cyberspace and technological sphere are becoming the field of non-violent competition between states, which makes the study of global governance of cyberspace critical for the understanding of the outlines of the "new bipolarity".

The analysis in the paper is focused on U.S. & China approaches to global governance of cyberspace through the prism of Manuel Castells' theory of "network society". The authors aimed to determine the directions of the U.S. and China policy in the course of four types of "power" in cyberspace: networking power, network power, networked power and network-making power.

Article 6 of the Paris Climate Agreement, adopted in 2015, defines three mechanisms that stimulate reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. These are the trading of the results of emission reductions, the implementation of climate projects, and so-called non-market approaches. However, the rules for the application of Article 6 have not been agreed so far. Among the remaining contradictions in the positions of the participating countries are different understandings of approaches to prevent double counting of the results of project activities, mandatory deductions for adaptation purposes, and the transfer of unused carbon units under the Kyoto Protocol.
At the same time, some countries have already initiated pilot projects under Article 6 with the intention that, in the coming years, they will become Article 6 projects.
In November 2021, the 26th United Nations (UN) Climate Conference will be held in Glasgow. Experts link the effectiveness of forthcoming forum with completion of Article 6 negotiations. In this article, the main problematic issues in the negotiations are considered and proposals for the Russian position at the upcoming conference are formulated.

In this article the main aspects of the European Green Deal proposed by the European Commission in December 2019 are analyzed, putting the Green Deal into the broader context of European Union (EU) climate governance in order to assess whether and how it advances the EU’s climate agenda. Four broad and interrelated categories to evaluate the Green Deal are proposed. Its performance depends on whether it is and will remain a policy priority, despite the COVID-19 emergency and the ensuing economic crisis. Second, successful implementation depends on adequate financial endowment, including the shift of public funding from hydrocarbons to renewables and energy efficiency in post-pandemic economic programmes. The legal competence of EU institutions to coordinate and enforce the implementation of the Green Deal is also essential, as highlighted by ongoing discussions concerning governance to achieve zero net emissions by 2050. Furthermore, international cooperation with third partners on issues such as border carbon adjustment, technology transfers, and green industry will influence both the implementation of the Green Deal in the EU and the contribution of other major emitters to the climate agenda. The impact of the European Green Deal on EU-Russia relations is also investigated. In this respect, it is argued that the Green Deal poses a serious challenge to the traditional pattern of EU-Russia energy trade, which has been dominated by fossil fuels. However, the Green Deal also offers new avenues for cooperation and for a more sustainable EU-Russia energy relationship.

The European Union (EU) aspires to become a global climate power. Climate neutrality became the guiding principle, the goal, and the pillar of the EU’s external policy after the Green Deal endorsement. The Green Deal is internationalized through a system of external policy instruments, including financial, trade and investment mechanisms, carbon border adjustment and emission trading, agreements with other countries, development support, and promotion of the EU’s regulation and standards through cooperation in international institutions. The normative documents and proposals on the key initiatives have been put forward, and the formats and plans for implementation are being discussed and defined. In this context, it is important to analyze the EU’s initiatives for internationalization of green transformation goals and to identify risks and opportunities related to their implementation.

This article reviews the array of external policy instruments and initiatives deployed by the EU: the new trade policy of “open strategic autonomy” and the initiative on trade and sustainable development in the World Trade Organization (WTO); the framework for the screening of foreign direct investments and the taxonomy of environmentally sustainable investment and economic activity; new approaches to energy security and the building of global energy markets, including norms and standards for hydrogen markets; and the new neighbourhood policy, including the new strategy for Central Asia and the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument. Giventheinitialstageofthe initiative’s implementation,thestudyfocusesonthe adopted documentsandplanned actions. The author assesses the potential impact of climate policy internationalization instruments on EU-Russia economic cooperation and on EU leadership in shaping global climate governance. Theauthorassertsthatanumberofinstrumentsbearrisksforthe Russian Federation’s economicprojects and proposes recommendations for abating them. With regardtoglobalgovernance, the EU’s commitment to integrate climate goals into the global agenda may serve as a bridge for inclusive governance. At the same time, the EU’s determination to impose its priorities through carrot and stick incentives, including through economic measures, on partners not sharing the EU’s approach may be destructive. The author concludes that the EU’s capacity to build constructive engagement with partners will be a test of the EU’s real leadership. Given that the Green Deal’s external dimension is intended not only to promote EU priorities and values, but also to advance the global public good, controversies arise with regard to the instruments, not the goals. Thus, it is in the interests of Russia, as well as other partners directly affected, not to oppose the export of the EU’s climate policy, but to cooperate to mitigate unintended consequences of its deployment and to shape inclusive global governance.

In this article, the prospectsor changing the status of unrecognized states in Greater Eurasia are analyzed. Status and recognition are close but distinct categories in international relations (IR) theory and international law. Status defines a state’s rank in the hierarchical international system. Recognition is a different category; legally, it defines whether other states recognize a particular state as fully established and sovereign. Sovereignty is a third category related to the issue of recognition but not equal to it since it includes internal and external (international) sovereignty. There are examples of sovereign states that effectively control their territories and collect taxes, but which are not recognized as sovereign by other states.
The analysis in this article focuses on whether an unrecognized state can strengthen its status and improve its position in the international system. It is argued that this is possible, and that the absence of international recognition should not be regarded as an unsurpassable impediment to the economic development of the country.

The World Trade Organization (WTO) is one of the leading institutions involved in global economic regulation. Its purposes are to ensure multilateral cooperation on the liberalization of international trade, harmonize existing standards and requirements, and peacefully resolve trade disputes between countries. Since 11 December 2019, dispute resolution has been handicapped due to the consistent blocking of the appointment of members to the WTO Appellate Body (AB) by the United States. This has reduced the multilateral trading system’s (MTS) predictability and threatens its final decay. 
In this article, the fundamental and formal causes of the collapse are described, and its circumvention mechanisms and effectiveness are discussed. At the same time, an assessment is given of the possibility to overcome the collapse in 2021, considering the change of the U.S. president and other events. Special attention is paid to Russia’s position and its current and potential losses. Finally, the issue of dispute resolution through regional trade agreements is proposed for discussion. The fundamental reasons for the collapse were the shifting balance of power in the world order and the WTO’s inflexibility in adjusting the rulebook and its procedures. The main reasons for the U.S.’ dissatisfaction are objective but based on formalities; the blockage of the AB is an overreaction. Moreover, the U.S.’ position on this issue has not changed with the new president. As a result, there is abuse of the current situation as WTO members file appeals “into the void.” Existing tools to circumvent the collapse are partial and not yet popular among WTO members. Russia needs to resume the AB’s work to complete previously started high-profile disputes and to defend its interests in the future.