http://iorj.hse.ru en-us Copyright 2018 Mon, 22 Jan 2018 13:06:15 +0300 https://iorj.hse.ru/en/2018-13-1/214013060.html The rise of new institutions in response to systemic vulnerabilities, strategic power shifts in the world economy and the slow pace of reform of existing institutions generated heated discussions over the proliferation of institutions and the subsequent fragmentation of global governance. However, this fragmentation does not mean there has been a decline in demand for global governance or reduced efficiency. On the contrary, it can be beneficial, positive and creative [Acharya, 2016].Though essentially different in their missions and collective identities, the Group of 20 (G20), the BRICS grouping of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum each has an important role to play in promoting the inclusiveness, legitimacy and efficiency of global governance. The distinctive features of these institutions are the nature of their summitry, the character of their volunteerism and their recognition of the role of major developing countries in world economic growth and global and regional governance. They are deeply embedded within the system of international institutions and are intensely engaged with international organizations (IOs).This engagement does not directly address the concerns over fragmentation. However, it does stimulate a division of labour which mitigates the risks of fragmentation and competition, facilitating coordination, coherence, accountability and effectiveness in global governance.This paper examines G20/BRICS/APEC engagement with international organizations in fulfillment of their global governance functions of deliberation, direction-setting, decision-making, delivery and global/regional governance development.The study is carried out within the paradigm of rational choice institutionalism. It draws on quantitative and qualitative analysis of documents adopted by the G20, BRICS and APEC to trace dynamics and identify their preferred models of engagement with multilateral organizations.The article begins with a brief outline of the roles of the G20, BRICS and APEC in the system of global governance. Then it presents the analytical paradigm and methodology of the study. Applying the described methodology, it tests the key assumption that summit institutions can resort to a combination of “catalyst,” “core group” and “parallel treatment modes” in their engagement with IOs and that their preferred choice reflects their mission and role in the system of international institutions which may change over time. Reviewing the findings, this article concludes that the G20, BRICS and APEC consistently engage with IOs even while the range of organizations, the intensity, the dynamics and models of engagement differ substantially.The G20, a premier forum for consensus-based economic cooperation, seeks to fulfill the promise of facilitating greater coherence in the system across institutions [Narlikar, Kumar, 2012, p. 389] to forge a new form of institutional collectivism. The G20 exceeds the BRICS and APEC in terms of the number of references to IOs, intensity and scope. It employs all three modes, engaging its key partners — the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Financial Stability Board (FSB), the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the World Bank (WB), the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the International Labour Organization (ILO) — mostly as a core group across the full range of global governance functions from deliberation to delivery. The BRICS, representing a new force in global governance, strives to build a better world order for humanity through a constructive contribution to defining the rules of the game [Duggan, 2015, p. 11]. The BRICS consistently acts as a catalyst stimulating, endorsing, compelling and supporting change of the United Nations (UN), the IMF, the WB and the WTO and building a BRICS-centred institutional system. APEC as a regional premier economic forum and a vehicle of Asia-Pacific engagement in global issues [Morrison, 2014, p. 2] advances inclusive growth regionally and globally. This duality is explicit in APEC’s choice of partners, where the top ten positions are split between global and regional IOs. APEC expedites integration of regional and global agendas, facilitates coordination between regional and multilateral institutions and reinforces their mutual influence.Jointly the G20, BRICS and APEC contribute to more effective global policy coordination. Though there is definitely room for improvement, this is indeed good news, raising hopes for the future of global governance. https://iorj.hse.ru/en/2018-13-1/214014300.html The most important factor in the development of the global economy is the intensification of international innovation processes. The degree of state involvement in the international innovation market determines the overall level of national economic competitiveness. However, the pace and scale of innovation in the Russian economy are insufficient. At the same time, innovation processes are closely linked to integration processes. Currently, the role of international integration associations is increasing; as significantsubjects of the global economy, they directly interact with other associations, states, transnational corporations and international institutions. In this context, this article analyzes the development of innovation in the BRICS grouping of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, identifying and describing the preconditions and prospects for cooperation in this field. In this regard, first, the article investigates the development of innovation in the BRICS countries by analyzing the statistical data using the index method todetermine the key achievements and problems of countries in this field. Second, it identifies the preconditions and prospects for innovation cooperation among the BRICS countries. This article demonstrates that, despite the obvious leadership of China, all BRICS countries have advantages of development.  It also shows that in different years joint research projects of the BRICS countries have been successfully implemented. However, active cooperation began in 2015. The main international agreements are the Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in Science, Technology and Innovation; the Strategy for BRICS Economic Partnership; and the BRICS Science, Technology and Innovation Work Plan 2015–2018. This article concludes by identifying a number of measures aimed at stimulating further innovation development of the BRICS countries. This article extends the knowledge about the innovation development and cooperation of the BRICS countries . https://iorj.hse.ru/en/2018-13-1/214014581.html Recent transformations in the ways that modern sport is managed have fundamentally changed its role in society: previously a simple form of leisure activity and health promotion, sport has become a complex phenomenon and a multibillion dollar business. The combination of sociocultural and economic dimensions makes sport an important tool for the promotion of interests. A leading role in the development of sport throughout history gives the European Union (EU) an advantage in setting the rules for its management, while the size of the sports market in Europe further facilitates the EU’s leading role in developing the regulatory basis in this field. The sports model developed by EU institutions plays an important role in the deepening of regional integration processes, promoting the European model outside the region and also the EU’s transformation into one of the drivers of the development of the global sports management system.The goal of this article is to identify the specificities of the European model of sport, the instruments and resources used by the EU to promote European values in this field and the universal features of the European approach that make it applicable in other regions. The analysis shows that the EU actively promotes its values, norms and interests by entrenching them into the European sport model and then promoting this model to other countries and regions. Practices and norms developed in the European context are being actively transferred to the international level. Sport, and especially football which is the most popular and among the most profitable sports, has become another area in which European management practices demonstrate their consistency and are being actively applied at the global level.The spread of the European sports model is facilitated by the “spillover” of EU law to the organizations and institutions in which it participates. The EU model is promoted through soft power supported by the authority of the European sports federations and the leading position of the European sports market. By elaborating its own sports policy and encouraging its spread to other regions, the European Union is driving the development of sports management practices at the global level. https://iorj.hse.ru/en/2018-13-1/214015136.html Environmental issues form the basis of the Arctic Council’s agenda. Since the first Senior Arctic Officials meeting in 1996, issues related to ecology and climate have been raised at almost every event under the aegis of the forum. A substantial number of structures within the forum’s institutional framework were created to engage in monitoring exercises and scientific research, as well as to harmonize the positions of Arctic Council members on the most pressing environmental and climate change concerns in the region.In this regard, the change in the general course of U.S. environmental policy under the administration of Donald Trump could significantly complicate the interaction between members in key areas of the Council’s agenda. The United States’ withdrawal from the Paris Agreement and the lifting of the moratorium on oil and gas exploitation in the Arctic seabed will certainly impede dialogue within the Council. Nevertheless, there are several aspects of U.S.’s foreign and internal politics which could work to preserve its long-term environmental policy trend despite changes brought about by the Trump administration. Even in the short term, the activities of the U.S. within the Arctic Council and the provisions of the Fairbanks Ministerial Declaration differ from the president’s statements on climate change.The U.S.’s new environmental policy is compared to the priorities of Finland’s 2017–2019 chairmanship which maintains the traditional environmental focus of the forum’s agenda while intensifying cooperation with other international institutions on climate change issues. Thus, the institutional basis established in previous years, and more importantly, a stable agenda and concrete work by the forum’s bodies ensure the effective use and functioning of the Arctic Council. The Finnish presidency and the secretariat of the Arctic Council are not adjusting the agenda to accommodate policy changes of individual members and the working groups have continued their usual activities. https://iorj.hse.ru/en/2018-13-1/214015556.html Multilateral development banks (MDBs) play an important role in world economic processes and global economic governance. Since the establishment of the first multilateral development bank — the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) — MDBs have emerged in three waves, each time as a response to the major changes in the world arena. The creation of the New Development Bank (NDB) and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB)represents the third and latest wave of MDBs. These new development banks have arisen as a consequence of an historic shift in global economic power from developed countries to emerging economies and more specifically of an increase in China’s economic might. This article traces the evolution of China’s participation in MDBs, characterizes various forms of China’s engagement with MDBs at specific periods of history, and explains Beijing’s motivation in establishing new MDBs. During almost 40 years of interaction with the multilateral development banks, China has made a great leap forward from large borrower to creditor status, from ordinary member to the initiator and creator of new MDBs under its auspices. This article identifies the scale, composition and dynamic of MDBs’ assistance to China. It points out that despite its eye-catching economic achievements, China remains one of the largest borrowers from MDBs. Yet, in the process of China’s participation in MDBs there have been two turning points: in 2004–2005 when China turned to become a creditor, and during the 2008 global financial crisis when China set a course for promoting the reform of global governance system and creation of new China-dominated financial bodies. The creation of new financial institutions is evaluated in the article as indicating Beijing’s foreign policy ambitions to assume a leadership role in the global economic architecture, while the fact that China is acting both as a creditor and a borrower in MDBs reflects the incomplete nature of China’s modernization efforts and its elevation to the status of a great power with global outreach. Overall, the establishment of new multilateral development banks is evaluated in the article as effective in promoting Beijing’s efforts to solidify its position in the world economy and the international system. https://iorj.hse.ru/en/2018-13-1/214015811.html Since its establishment, the New Development Bank (NDB) has been actively seeking to establish cooperation with other multilateral financial institutions. This strategy was stimulated by the fact that projects funded by multilateral banks often require large-scale investments and significant expert resources, or are associated with risks that a single lender cannot undertake independently.The purpose of this article is to study the mechanisms of cooperation between the NDB and “traditional” multilateral banks, as well as the national development banks of the BRICS grouping of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa.  This article seeks to forecast the future of cooperation in order to better understand the overall prospects of the NDB. To do so, existing formats of engagement between the NDB and other development banks are analyzed, as are their approaches to participation in joint projects.The article finds that the NDB, despite its differences from the “traditional” banks, seeks to establish an effective division of labour and cooperation with them, primarily because of their common goal of reducing the large-scale deficit in infrastructure investments. Despite the fact that none of the projects approved by the NDB so far involves other multilateral development banks, the launch of official cofinancing with them is expected in the very near future. Depending on the scenarios of NDB expansion, its joint loan portfolio with other multilateral banks in five years could reach $58 to $82 billion. As for national development banks of the BRICS, the NDB has also laid a formal framework for cooperation with them, even while it has not yet resulted in any concrete projects. Thus, in order to successfully implement its strategy of engagement with other financial institutions in the future, the NDB needs to intensify practical cooperation with national banks in the areas identified in the relevant declarative documents. https://iorj.hse.ru/en/2018-13-1/214016092.html The eradication of extreme poverty in fragile states is one of the central problems of global governance at the present time. Development of these states is hindered by instability, weak public and social institutions or ongoing conflicts and violence. The World Bank (WB) is a key partner of fragile states, which account for almost a third of the world’s population.This article is a continuation of research exploring the evolution of conceptual and practical approaches by the World Bank to cooperation with fragile states. Its methodology is based on a multilevel analysis of the securitization of foreign aid as proposed by J. Lind and J. Howell of the London School of Economics. The main focus of this examination is on the dynamics of the change of scale and structure of the World Banks’s aid to fragile states in comparison with global armed trends of providing aid to fragile states as well.This article concludes that statements about the priority of the Bank’s work in fragile states have not yet been realized in practice. The Bank remains committed to the standard approach to working with this group of recipients, which involves serious risks. The World Bank leans toward supporting projects in fragile states which increases volatility and reduces aid predictability. This trend undermines the development perspectives of recipient states.Attention is drawn to political factors influencing aid flows to fragile states and particularly to the tendency of increasing the share of aid provided to fragile states through Multi-Donor Trust Funds rather than through the mechanisms of the International Development Association. This trend indicates that the Bank is no longer a central point of aid distribution to the recipients, pointing to the lack of trust of donor states in the existing mechanisms and rules of aid distribution. It also reveals the expanding role of donors’ strategic interests in the process of choosing recipients of World Bank aid. https://iorj.hse.ru/en/2018-13-1/217748233.html https://iorj.hse.ru/en/2018-13-1/214016482.html Twenty-five years have passed since the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), which led to the disruption of the regional check-and-balance system aimed at resolving national issues and political and socioeconomic contradictions.  It also resulted in a number of armed conflicts, including those in the Chechen Republic, Nagorno-Karabakh, Transnistria, Tajikistan, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and later in the South-East of Ukraine.Immediately following the collapse of the USSR, key international actors paid special attention to the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) region while trying to secure own interests. This led to the further stratification of the CIS region. A “geopolitical pluralism” started to form there, marked by the fragmentation of nation-state sovereignty over the territory.The concept and policy of “geopolitical pluralism” as developed by Zbigniew Brzezinski meets the interests of the United States by making the CIS region more manageable, while at the same time making it more difficult for Russia to implement its own strategic tasks there. The key goal of Russia is the creation of an integrated economic and political union able to take a rightful place in the world. Only the development of deep and comprehensive integration with the CIS states can ensure the competitiveness of Russia’s position in the world as well as the positions of its partners in the former Soviet space.The purpose of this article is to assess the level of geopolitical pluralism in the CIS space taking account of the membership of the CIS countries in international organizations and their voting on UN General Assembly resolutions. The study is based on the interconnection of quantitative and qualitative methods of analysis of international relations and world politics.During the past quarter century following the collapse of the Soviet Union, a regional system of international relations has formed in its place. Despite the fact that the CIS is a kind of linking element which unites most of the former Soviet republics, a certain competition between the new states has become the characteristic feature of the political relations in the region.The policy of the west (primarily the United States) became a kind of a branched, diversified strategy aimed at the phased development, transformation and fragmentation of the region. The diversity of foreign policy priorities among the CIS states and the presence of many actors in the region makes mutual understanding and good-neighbourliness between these countries difficult to achieve. To the contrary, this diversity seriously complicates and slows down the development of deep and comprehensive integration, making it more unstable and ineffective.The research was carried out with the financial support of the Russian Foundation for Basic Research in the framework of the scientific project RFBR-CASS No. 17-27-21002. https://iorj.hse.ru/en/2018-13-1/214016579.html Historically, the central principles of international peacekeeping have been formulated by western powers due to their political and ideological domination in international institutions, including the United Nations (UN) family. It is only recently that emerging powers, among them Russia and China, have started to formulate their own policies of peacekeeping and to implement them in practice. While the general objectives of peacekeeping as understood by western nations and emerging powers are similar, there are differences of emphasis. Recent developments in Syria and the active involvement of Russia in these events have underscored the nuanced views these two approaches hold on peacekeeping in general and on outside involvement in peacekeeping operations.For the United States and many European countries, the goal of peacekeeping and conflict resolution is to protect individual rights and freedoms and to accomplish a “democratic transition” by replacing authoritarian regimes with liberal-democratic alternatives. For Russia as well as many other emerging powers, the goal of conflict resolution and peacekeeping is to preserve and strengthen the local state structures so that they can support law and order on their territory and stabilize the situation in the country and the region. The western approach assumes that donor countries know better what to do with regard to local problems, while a “rising powers” approach is far less dogmatic and recognizes the right of actors to make mistakes along the way. This article focuses on Russia’s approaches to peacekeeping as they are defined theoretically and practically. https://iorj.hse.ru/en/2018-13-1/214016921.html This article analyzes the soft power of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in Mongolia from 2009 to 2016. To determine the scope of Chinese policy in this area, the author analyzes the indicators of two other influential actors in the region: the Russian Federation and the United States. The author uses a comparative approach to evaluate the effectiveness of China’s soft power and a quantitative method to calculate a soft power index based on the system proposed by the author drawing on the experience of a British think-tank, the Institute for Government.Four components of the soft power toolkit are analyzed: foreign policy principles, a successful economic model, a successful social model and cultural and civilizational values. This analysis reveals which of the components is most actively used by the state-subject and which has the greatest degree of influence on the formation of a positive image of China in Mongolia. Based on this analysis, the author identifies flaws in the projects of the PRC, Russia and the U.S. in Mongolia which clearly demonstrate the ineffectiveness of policy in this area. The dominance of China is demonstrated in several ways, from its economic influence to its penetration of the national language and culture. China is gradually increasing its emphasis on cultural and civilizational values within the framework of its soft power policy due to the lessening significance of a successful economic model as a component of soft power. This is due not only to a slowdown in the growth of the Chinese economy but also to the economic crisis inside Mongolia.Nevertheless, the author concludes that, despite quite good indicators, the PRC also experiences certain difficulties with the implementation of its soft power policy. Sinophobia is prevalent in Mongolia, and as a result, the most important part of soft power — the formation of a positive image — is absent. https://iorj.hse.ru/en/2018-13-1/214017175.html This article examines the historically contradictory development of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) following its 15th anniversary, and evaluates its political potential from the point of view of its assigned mandate. The evolution of international stability at the beginning of the century forced the contracting parties of the CSTO to formalize their mainly declarative interactions through the creation of a valid regional security organization. This new collective security forum enriched the cooperation mandate by establishing additional areas for mutual coordination including counterterrorism activities, measures to combat illegal migration and drug-trafficking, strategies to respond to natural disasters and cyber-security. The creation of the multitasking Collective Rapid Reaction Forces was the first significant step on the way to the practical realization of the CSTO.The Collective Security Strategy for the period ending in 2025 organizes the CSTO instruments of international cooperation within the CSTO crisis management framework and thus works to reduce the fragmentary nature of the CSTO. Despite the availability of the Collective Rapid Reaction Forces and the Collective Peace-Keeping Forces, the CSTO’s crisis management approach gives priority to the political approaches and negotiation.Consequently, the multifunctional mandate of the CSTO predetermines its strategic role in Eurasia and allows it to achieve its political goals related to conservation of the common military and strategic area, the creation of a constraining effect, the facilitation of cooperation among law enforcement and intelligence agencies and the ability to contribute to the settlement of regional and local conflicts.  https://iorj.hse.ru/en/2018-13-1/214017604.html This article reviews the key strengths and debatable issues in Thomas Piketty’s Capital in the 21st Century. The authors fully agree with the view that Capitalis the most significant book in economics published since the start of the 21st century but consider that this appreciation is based more on its persuasive style of argumentation than on the introduction of new ideas. The article notes that Piketty’s central thesis about inequality is based on a huge research database in terms of global coverage and retrospective. The database was compiled through years of work with tax statistics archives, a method of gathering data that is not typical for mainstream economists. Another notable feature of Capitalis the text itself — it is not overloaded with formulas, which makes Piketty’s arguments even more persuasive. The authors point out that Piketty revives the political economy tradition of socio-economic analysis in a broad context and successfully combines it with modern methods of data analysis.The authors also point out the debatable ideas in Capital, particularly Piketti’s aspiration to find universal principles of economic development. As a result, modern capitalism looks like the economy of the 19th century.  This leads to an underestimation of the role of human capital and innovations in economic development and an excessively pessimistic forecast of the world’s economic development. The authors consider doubtful Piketty’s recommendations for counteraction to spiral of increasing inequality.  The authors suggest that proposed measures could go against technological and institutional development when new technologies and “good” institutions enjoy a huge potential egalitarian effect.