http://iorj.hse.ru en-us Copyright 2026 Tue, 16 Jun 2026 00:14:10 +0300 https://iorj.hse.ru/en/2026-21-2/1169882916.html This article examines the theoretical underpinnings and initial practical implications of contemporary US economic policy for the global economy. It also notes a significant increase in the role of subjective factors in global economic development, which are highly dependent on the individual characteristics of individual government leaders, as well as on their circle of confidants and aides.The ideologist behind Donald Trump's trade policy, dubbed "Trumponomics," was Peter Navarro, Senior Advisor for Trade and Manufacturing in the Presidential Administration. These policies included a critique of classical trade theories, primarily Ricardo's 200-year-old theory, the WTO, and China's foreign trade policy. To address the situation, Trump proposed increasing import tariffs to reduce imports to the US, strengthening the manufacturing sector and re-industrialising the country, and increasing government revenues.By initiating a global tariff war that affected more than 180 countries, Trump effectively launched a mechanism for a large-scale reformatting of the global economic space. This policy has sparked criticism from many prominent economists, including J. Stiglitz, P. Krugman, J. Sachs, C. Bone, M. Obstfeld, and K. Hendricks. This criticism is based on the premise that the trade deficit is not the result of unfair competition from foreign trading partners, but rather the result of previous economic policies that created an imbalance that is offset by imports. High import tariffs will increase the costs of American consumers and reduce markets for American exports.D. Trump's tariff policy has already significantly impacted the global economy, stimulating national isolationism, disrupting old supply chains and creating new ones, and redirecting trade and investment flows. Protectionism and current US policy are not creating a new global economic order, but are destroying the existing one, contributing to geopolitical fragmentation. This is a significant blow to globalisation, but it does not kill it.  Rather, it is leading to its transformation and the development of new formats of interaction. This is evidenced by the accelerated formation of interstate economic unions without the participation of the United States itself.This article was submitted 05.09.2025 and approved for publication 27.02.2026 © Boris Kheyfets, Veronika Chernova, 2026Materials are distributed under the CC BY-NC 4.0 license https://iorj.hse.ru/en/2026-21-2/1169884339.html In its foreign policy, China proceeds from the realities of the transformation of the world political system. For Beijing, this is expressed in decoupling, and a trade and sanctions war with the United States, which actively uses the military infrastructure of the Philippines to contain China's defense activity in the South China Sea and the Pacific Ocean.  The result is geopolitical spaces of clashes of global strategies of two great powers. In response, China is shifting the focus of its foreign policy to Southeast Asia and the island states of the Pacific Ocean, considering such international regional structures (in which China is not a member) as ASEAN and the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) as priority areas of peripheral diplomacy and the Asian vector of foreign policy.Other regional institutions with which China has not yet established relations, such as the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation, and the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, may be viewed by Beijing as a promising area of ​​its diplomacy. China's interaction with the Eurasian Economic Union looks special, with which it signed a cooperation agreement (which entered into force in 2019), but did not develop in specific areas for various reasons, including geopolitical ones (the Chinese side's fears of secondary sanctions from the United States).In 2013, China held its first working meeting on peripheral diplomacy, and also proposed a "China-ASEAN community of common destiny" and the "21st Century Maritime Silk Road" initiative. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) not only serves as a format for China and ASEAN countries to establish a closer partnership, but also plays an important role in promoting regional connectivity, trade cooperation and cultural exchanges, helping to achieve common development and prosperity. In the new era, China's peripheral diplomacy is no longer driven solely by economic considerations but is more driven by the need to address security concerns and is becoming an important part of the country's overall global strategy. Its goal has grown from simply maintaining stability in the periphery to building a community of peripheral destiny as an ideological basis for interaction with countries in the region.The purpose of the article is to use the key postulate of the balance of power of classical realism as an analytical approach in examining the relations between China and the United States in Southeast Asia and the Pacific Ocean, and the relational theory of world politics by Qin Yaqing in studying China's relations with neighbouring and island countries, and quantitative methods (the results of which are displayed in the tables provided), to identify the logic of origin, narratives, and tools of China's peripheral diplomacy in the context of regional international institutions, which themselves are becoming a means of expanding China's geopolitical influence in Asia and the South PacificThis article was submitted 18.04.2025 and approved for publication 26.02.2026 © Evgeny Grachikov, Manqi Zhang, 2026Materials are distributed under the CC BY-NC 4.0 license https://iorj.hse.ru/en/2026-21-2/1169885180.html The idea of EU taxes has taken a prominent place in the discussions concerning the future of the EU's own resources system. Following years of discourse on the impracticability of deepening fiscal integration, the Next Generation EU programme reflected a new political consensus among member states, which made it possible to create a large-scale instrument for the redistribution of funds between them. It was replenished, inter alia, by increasing the common debt assumed by the EU itself. Starting in 2028, this debt will have to be repaid via the EU budget over three decades, using the resources which have not been determined yet.The analysis is aimed at finding out whether the current situation will push towards the emergence of strong supranational tax collecting powers. The author's hypothesis is that no radical changes are expected in this regard. Firstly, fiscal integration in the EU is developing predominantly in the decentralised form of fiscal regulation. Secondly, in the political and legal reality (understood from the point of view of J. Searle's social ontology), EU taxes do not exist, having no institutional status in EU law, although the European Commission is making timid attempts to change this state of affairs.The research methods employed combine the study of official sources related to the EU (treaty provisions, legal acts, court decisions, memoranda and reports of the European Commission, etc.) with a comparative analysis of the European and American experiences, which are fundamentally different, in building a fiscal union. While the American Constitution grants the federal government the right to levy taxes, the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU says nothing intelligible about the existence of similar powers at the European level. Since the building of a Single Internal Market is a general competence, the Union has the right to determine the level of financial resources aimed at achieving this goal. However, due to the principle of unanimity in tax matters, Brussels has not of late received any new sources of "own" income, with the exception of an environmental fee for unrecycled plastic. Seemingly, it is easier to achieve consensus in the Union on the borrowing powers of the supranational centre than on its direct tax collecting powers.This article was submitted 21.05.2025 and approved for publication 23.02.2026 © Marina Strezhneva, 2026Materials are distributed under theCC BY-NC 4.0 license https://iorj.hse.ru/en/2026-21-2/1169885424.html This article is devoted to the study of the development conditions and policies of the BRICS member states (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, the UAE, Egypt, Iran, Indonesia, and Ethiopia) in the field of artificial intelligence (AI) technologies. It presents the results of an analysis of the specific features of the digital development of the member states, including such aspects as the level of digital infrastructure development, the availability of basic hardware components required for the development of data center infrastructure, the resilience of energy infrastructure, the availability of trained personnel, and public and business attitudes toward AI-based solutions. Drawing on the comparative analysis method, the author then moves from examining individual BRICS member states’ experiences in AI to analysing the risks and opportunities for multilateral cooperation within the grouping in this area.The study finds that, for all BRICS member states except China, the problem of ensuring stable access to the basic hardware components required for equipping data centres is particularly acute. In a number of BRICS countries, the development of high-performance computing infrastructure is associated with energy security risks (Brazil, Egypt, Iran, and South Africa). To some degree, all BRICS countries face a shortage of qualified personnel in the field of AI. It is noted that many BRICS member states rely on a multi-vector approach in building international partnerships in AI, concluding agreements both with partners within the grouping and with Western countries. Joint efforts are needed to fill the declared priorities of multilateral BRICS cooperation in AI with practical, project-oriented initiatives, to work on attracting investment and strengthening business ties, and to formulate a common BRICS position for addressing the challenges arising from AI development on an equal footing amid the high level of activity of pro-Western negotiating platforms.This article was submitted 05.03.2026and approved for publication 10.06.2026the article was written on the basis of the RANEPA state assignment research programme© Alexander A. Ignatov, 2026Materials are distributed under theCC BY-NC 4.0 license https://iorj.hse.ru/en/2026-21-2/1169885895.html This article analyses the BRICS trade and investment cooperation agenda and the positions of member countries on trade issues in order to identify opportunities to strengthen the collective contribution to the multilateral trading system reform. Despite the wide range of issues on which a collective BRICS position has been agreed, a number of problematic topics stand out.  In particular, these are: participation in multilateral formats within the WTO, issues related to the application of agricultural and other subsidies, the problem of customs duties in digital trade, as well as the rejection of the possibility of discussing trade-related issues from adjacent subject areas, such as climate change and development assistance within the WTO by some BRICS members. The expansion of BRICS in 2024 and 2025 also complicates the search for consensus on trade and investment issues within the BRICS agenda and in the framework of member countries' participation in other multilateral formats.the article was written on the basis of the RANEPA state assignment research programme.This article was submitted 11.03.2026 and approved for publication 10.06.2026© Andrei Sakharov, 2026Materials are distributed under theCC BY-NC 4.0 license https://iorj.hse.ru/en/2026-21-2/1169886192.html Artificial intelligence has become a major factor in transforming economic growth models. AI is changing the power distribution in economic, technological, production and other spheres; it affects economic decisions, security and geopolitical strategies of states. The need to maximise benefits and control AI related risks resulted in the emergence of numerous multilateral initiatives on AI governance. Standards and norms setting processes abound in existing IOs and new collective mechanisms. The AI role for defining power balance in the future geopolitical and economic relations system intensifies competition over the influence on the AI global governance parameters.The article reviews multilateral processes aimed at shaping AI governance. It aims to systematise the main initiatives, reveal the risks related to the contestations over the dominance in the future system and identify cooperation perspectives for Russia and its partners. The author explores the goals, regulation scope, membership and character of major global and regional processes, including Global Dialogue on AI Governance at the UN, the Hiroshima process on AI, the Partnership on Artificial Intelligence and AI summits initiated by the G7,  the EU Regulation laying down harmonised rules on artificial intelligence, the Council of Europe Framework Convention on Artificial Intelligence and Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law,  cooperation on AI governance issues in the G20, BRICS, the Shanghai cooperation organisation, the Eurasian Economic Union and ASEAN.The analysis highlights that despite a formal universal support of the aim to create a just, inclusive and equal AI governance, which takes into account interests of all countries and puts the UN at its centre, the members pursue very different goals. Contradictions are manifested on multilateral platforms, including the UN and G20. G7 members pursue a strategy of developing AI norms based on their values and interests and promoting them through the key international institutes. BRICS countries realise risks of a fragmented approach and overlapping plurilateral initiatives, where policy narratives by a small group of countries dominate and interests of countries with middle and low income are ignored. Non-western institutes strengthen dialogue on the quality of global AI governance. However, so far, their coordination lacks scope, consistency and forcefulness.In conclusion, the review presents proposals for strengthening Russia’s cooperation with its partners to promote realisation of the National Strategy on AI Development and building a fair and inclusive AI governance.the article was written on the basis of the RANEPA state assignment research programme.This review was submitted 27.02.2026 and approved for publication 25.03.2026. © Marina Larionova, 2026Materials are distributed under the CC BY-NC 4.0.