http://iorj.hse.ru en-us Copyright 2025 Tue, 11 Mar 2025 10:48:52 +0300 https://iorj.hse.ru/en/2025-20-1/1022180956.html The trade confrontation between the United States and China has led to geoeconomic fragmentation and the disruption of   existing trade and economic ties between states, which formed as a result of the 2008–10 global financial crisis. However, the problems arising in connection with the evolution of this phenomenon, its possible forms, and the consequences for the economic world order remain poorly understood. This article assesses the influence of the economic security factor in the trade policy of the United States and China on the formation of the geoeconomic fragmentation phenomenon, as well as the dynamics of this phenomenon’s development outside the framework of the confrontation between the United States and China.In the course of this study, a composite index was used to formalize the trade aspect of geoeconomic fragmentation. The data selected contain trade indicators for 120 countries from 2008 to 2022.Ultimately, we conclude that the economic security factor in U.S. and Chinese trade policies has indeed become a catalyst for geoeconomic fragmentation and, despite its declining influence on this process between 2018 and 2020, the rest of the world continues to play a smaller role in its evolution and development. Finally, this study is expected to contribute to a better understanding of the geoeconomic fragmentation concept and draw the attention of policymakers and economists to the need to reform multilateral institutions in light of the destabilization of global integration.This article was submitted 07.10.2024 https://iorj.hse.ru/en/2025-20-1/1022191300.html International Monetary Fund (IMF) experts have called geo-economic fragmentation a risky reversal of the process of economic globalization carried out by leading global players. This article examines the instruments of the economic policy of the European Union (EU) in this context. The purpose of the study is to refute the idea formed in official EU documents about the emergency nature of European protectionism and to expand understanding of the rejection of the EU’s economic policy by its member states, despite its de jure approval.The analysis employs a retrospective method that provides a holistic view of supranational regulation, taking into account its past and present. The author uses the knowledge accumulated in Russian European studies, attributing the decisions of recent years to the manifestations of the deep protectionist essence of the EU. The article describes the recent political and legal acts of the European Union regulating its foreign economic relations and then examines documents on improvement within the EU's internal market designed to offset the protectionist drift of foreign economic policy.The collected expert assessments, including from special issues of journals that proposed topics for discussion, focus on the adverse consequences of the current course for the EU’s economy. These include distortion of competition, raw material starvation, the likelihood of a new debt crisis, and the preservation of territorial imbalances. Along the way, the author addresses the mechanism of financial transactions between the supranational level of government and the member states, describing it as an effective way to achieve approval of the EU's economic policy but ineffective against negative results during its implementation.The analysis of the documents, supported by references to the history of European integration, leads the author to the conclusion about the resistance of the member states to strengthening the unity of the European market and to other measures of supranational economic policy to reduce risks to the national economy. Thus, using modern material, the author confirms the conclusion previously obtained by researchers of European integration about the eternal struggle of opposites in the EU—the supranational level of power against the partisan protectionism of the member states.This article was prepared with the support of a grant from the Ministry of Science and Higher Education of the Russian Federation for major scientific projects in priority areas of scientific and technological development No 075-15-2024-551 “Global and regional centres of power in the emerging world order”This article was submitted on 20.07.2024 https://iorj.hse.ru/en/2025-20-1/1022195056.html As global warming leads to the melting of Arctic sea ice, the economic potential and strategic importance of the Northern Sea Route (NSR) as a new sea route connecting Asia and Europe are becoming increasingly prominent. In this context, China-Russia cooperation on the Arctic route has become a crucial component of their economic and strategic partnership. The paper basically follows the SWOT analysis model to conduct a comprehensive analysis of the current status and prospects of China-Russia economic cooperation on the Arctic route. It emphasizes the economic potential and strategic importance of the NSR due to changing Arctic ice conditions and geopolitical shifts. As an important background reference, the paper reviews the policy positions of both countries, identifying common interests and challenges. It also uses data analysis and case studies to analyze the opportunities and potential risks of cooperation. According to official shipping data, it examines the collaborative efforts between China and Russia to develop the NSR as a viable maritime corridor, emphasising that China is an indispensable force in the development of the NSR. Through detailed case studies, the paper conducts a pre-mortem analysis to identify potential risks in the cooperation, such as dependency, coercion, and cybersecurity threats. In light of the current status and prospects of cooperation between the two sides, we propose a long-term co-development strategy spanning ten to twenty years, focusing on confidence-building, joint feasibility studies, and phased execution. The goal is to establish a sustainable and mutually beneficial partnership that balances security and economic development in the Arctic. The successful cooperation between China and Russia in this region is positioned as a model for other countries with interests in the NSR, highlighting the potential for international collaboration in Arctic logistics and infrastructure development.The publication was prepared within the framework of the XI Russian-Chinese Summer School on International Relations at HSE University. We are grateful to the anonymous reviewers for their constructive suggestionsThis article was submitted 22.07.2024 https://iorj.hse.ru/en/2025-20-1/1022992939.html This study aims to contribute to the research of China’s discourse power by constructing a comprehensive outline of the communication channels that the PRC relies on to disseminate its messages globally. In terms of theoretical background, we rely on the concept of strategic narratives, which singles out the process of ideas’ projection and stresses the importance of communication infrastructure used to transmit messages. In the empirical part, we discuss four types of communication channels used by the PRC, which include mass media, social media, international forums and o anizations, and think tanks. We examine and compare these channels by looking at the breadth and type of target audience, type of content they produce, and their connection to CCP. We show that China invests significant resources and applies a multi–pronged approach using both existing platforms and creating its own ones to overcome constraints and be able to play by its own rules. Such a multi-channel approach also reflects China’s attempts to reach different groups within a very fragmented audience. We also make a conclusion about the function each channel fulfills in China’s communication strategy and demonstrate that using various types of channels serves different purposes. For example, in the case of international organizations and forums, the strategic aim is to influence political elites that would support China both at the global and domestic level, while narratives spread through mass and social media are directed at the general public and are aimed at creating a favorable environment for pro-China policies and challenging hegemonic discourse about “China threat”. Overall, the existing global media and institutional environments have influenced China’s attempts to project its narrativesthis work was supported by the Russian Science Foundation under grant no 23-28-00994, https://rscf.ru/project/23-28-00994/This article was submitted 28.05.2024 https://iorj.hse.ru/en/2025-20-1/1023300913.html In recent years, the discourse surrounding shifts in the world order, the factors driving the changes in political, economic, and cultural fields, and the implications of these changes for different countries have emerged as serious topics in the field of foreign policy studies and international relations. The changes are being evaluated at the global level with focus on how countries interact with one another and how international conflicts are resolved. Additionally, there has been a rise in policies promoting alignment and the division of the world into eastern and western camps. Indeed, the alignment of the eastern camp comprising China, Russia, and India, and the western camp consisting of the United States and its western allies, appears to set the stage for the emergence of a new international system. In this situation, by establishing the strategy of looking to the East and trying to create more balance in its foreign relations, Iran has tried to increase its power in foreign policy in various military and political scenes and by exerting influence on other actors. Furthermore, the relations between Russia and Iran, especially in recent years, have always been of a friendly nature and have developed without any particular ups or downs. The leaders of both countries share the same opinion about the current unipolar system, the unilateral approach, and the sanctions-oriented approach of the United States and strongly emphasize the change of the international structure and the creation of a new world order. This article analyzes the subject through an analytical approach focusing on opportunities that the new world order presents for Iran-Russia relationsThis article was submitted 03.07.2024 https://iorj.hse.ru/en/2025-20-1/1023314017.html The multilateral agenda of international relations in the current context is extremely fragmented, and sustainable development remains one of the few issues on which it is still possible to reach a consensus. The achievement of both the sustainable development goals and technological transformation of the economy, which is extremely necessary against the background of numerous challenges, could be best solved with complementary competitive market principles and pro-competitive government regulation. This article summarizes theoretical and practical approaches to the integration of sustainable development and competition (antitrust) policy through the prism of legal regulation.The assumption is made that competition authorities should directly take part in this activity, forming a balance between the application of antitrust legislation and business activities to achieve sustainability. Both “hard” and “soft” law at various levels are considered and the law enforcement activities of antitrust authorities are analyzed. Special attention is paid to the functioning of international organizations and integration associations such as the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), United Nations Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC). It is argued that one of the most rational forms of achieving synergy between issues of sustainable development, technological transformation, and competition is the harmonization of approaches at the regional level, for example, within the framework of integration associations’ and international organizations’ activities. In this regard, some ways of applying the studied experience in the Eurasian Economic Union are suggested.This article was submitted on 28.08.2024 https://iorj.hse.ru/en/2025-20-1/1023814015.html North Korea has been a target of comprehensive sanctions since the dawn of its history. The U.S. first imposed sanctions against the DPRK in 1950 and maintains an overwhelming sanctions regime today. In 2006–17, the United Nations (UN) Security Council issued 10 resolutions and gradually invoked severe restrictive measures vis-à-vis the DPRK to contain its missile and nuclear programme. Regardless of this consolidated and long-term pressure, North Korea managed to avoid economic collapse and has emerged as a de facto nuclear power. This case once again raises a research question, principal for students of economic sanctions—why do restrictive measures work in one case but fail in others or, with respect to DPRK, why sanctions failed to press North Korea to abandon its missile and nuclear programme despite the consolidated efforts of the UN and particular states like the United States. The article explains the failure of sanctions as resulting from a combination of factors, including the negotiation strategy of the DPRK, the role of China and Russia as “black knights,” the utilization of the DPRK’s economic advantages by its leaders, and the moderate policy of secondary sanctions on the U.S. sideThis article was submitted on 08.11.2024 https://iorj.hse.ru/en/2025-20-1/1023815295.html The relevance of this study is determined by the fact that the harmonization of approaches to a just transition within the Group of 20 (G20), taking into account the position of both developed and developing countries, can ensure the development of more effective tools to promote a climate and energy transition while maximizing benefits and minimizing risks and negative consequences for all, including the most vulnerable populations and countries. The purpose of this study is to highlight the main aspects of the G20's just transition agenda and the stages of its transformation. Based on the results of the study, the author concludes that, although the term “just transition” was only introduced in the G20 agenda in 2021, a number of decisions reflected its most important aspects before then. The appearance of the term in the outcome documents of the Italian presidency reflects the tensions that are escalating between the developed and developing economies that make up the institution. Developed countries want to force developing countries to follow the same path of decarbonization, providing it with the same instruments, regardless of economic model and available resources. Developing countries want to make developed countries comply with the commitments made in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Paris Agreement on finance, technology, consideration of their national circumstances and the possibility of at least catching up on their own strengths, an equal right to determine the rules, and not using climate as a pretext for protectionism and protection of their economies. As a compromise, the language on a just transition was included in the Rome summit outcome documents. Since 2022, developing countries have made the fairness of energy and climate transitions a top priority of the instituteThe article was written on the basis of the RANEPA state assignment research programmeThis article was submitted on 08.11.2024 https://iorj.hse.ru/en/2025-20-1/1023829278.html Given the limited scale of reforms to the international monetary and financial system (IMFS) and international financial institutions (IFIs) and constant delays in these reforms, as well as economic restrictions against Russia introduced in 2014 that led to a de facto halt in Russia's interaction with the Bretton Woods institutions, there is a growing urgency to strengthen the interaction of the BRICS states (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, and others) at specialized multilateral platforms, including the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank Group and, accordingly, to increase BRICS’ role in the IMFS, as reflected in the priorities of Russia’s 2024 term as BRICS chair.This article assesses the challenges and prospects for strengthening BRICS cooperation in reforming the IMFS and its institutions in the context of its membership expansion. The author reviews the dynamics of BRICS’ institutional agenda for IMFS reform and the difficulties in its implementation and analyzes the challenges and opportunities associated with the priorities of individual BRICS states on these issues to make conclusions and recommendations on further cooperation.The author concludes that reforming the IFIs is impossible without developing cooperation with partner countries in related areas, such as strengthening the role of national currencies and creating mechanisms to ensure currency liquidity, improving payment infrastructures, and so on. The interests of Russia and other BRICS countries on these issues largely coincide, but country specifics and a comparatively lower economic potential prevent some of the states that joined the BRICS in 2024, in particular, Ethiopia and Egypt, from acting fully independently in relation to their sources of external capital and financial assistance, including the IMF, the World Bank, and other financial institutions controlled by advanced economies.Based on the analysis, the author develops recommendations for further strengthening BRICS cooperation in the financial and economic domains, including currency diversification and development of payment systems, as well as the creation of their own unit of accountThe article was written on the basis of the RANEPA state assignment research programmeThis article was submitted on 17.12.2024 https://iorj.hse.ru/en/2025-20-1/1023816909.html Since 2024, the interstate association of countries with dynamically developing economies, BRICS, has been a platform for the development of multilateral and mutually beneficial cooperation between Russia, China, Brazil, India, the Republic of South Africa, Iran, the United Arab Emirates, Ethiopia, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. The second wave of expansion along the South-South track (the first being the accession of South Africa) leads to the establishment of a new format of interaction within the expanded BRICS membership. Considering the accession of such countries as Ethiopia, Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to the association, we can predict intensified interaction within the framework of the association of even more countries in the future. In this regard, the question arises of searching for possible promising areas for cooperation between countries within the expanded BRICS, one of which may be cooperation in the Arctic—a strategic region for many countries given that climate change there affects the interests of those seemingly far from region of the Far North countries. In the current conditions of decreasing efficiency of the regulatory function of the Arctic Council, the agenda includes the search for and study of new international flexible formats for cooperation between countries in the region. In this context, the BRICS format seems quite promising for research in the above-mentioned vein. Within the framework of this article, through the prism of key scientific works and documents, the interests of BRICS countries in the Arctic are examined with an emphasis on the new BRICS member countries through an analysis of their existing or emerging Arctic agendas. Promising areas for their cooperation in the region are identified and a conclusion is formulated that the BRICS format can contribute to the development of cooperation in the Arctic region, especially taking into account the expansion of its composition in the context of the transformation of global governance in the new geopolitical realities and the obvious decrease in the effectiveness of the Arctic Council in fulfilling its roleThis article was submitted on 05.07.2024 https://iorj.hse.ru/en/2025-20-1/1023846249.html In the context of rapid digitalization, states and alliances create norms, institutions, and standards to regulate the development and application of digital technologies. Parameters of future digital governance will have long-term economic and political implications and will define the balance of power in geopolitical and economic relations. Hence, competition to influence the construction of global digital governance, which was clearly manifest in the negotiations and final text of the Global Digital Compact.The Group of 7 (G7) defined the goal and undertakes coordinated actions to build a new digital order based on common democratic values, digital solidarity, norms, and the  institutions the members set up. The Group of 77, China, Russia and their partners in the BRICS (Brazil, India, South Africa, and others) promote digital governance development led by the states, especially developing states, opposing coercion of laws and regulation with exterritorial effect. Sharing similar approaches, developing countries do not have a platform for consolidating and advancing their positions, while the G7 members and their like-minded partners intensify concerted efforts to shape a system of digital economy governance that would safeguard G7 members’ interests and influence.This article reviews G7 initiatives aimed at shaping global digital governance. The analysis focuses on the G7’s decisions and actions and the rules and standards it promotes through the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and on the digital economy agenda of the Group of 20 (G20), in which BRICS and the G7 constitute two core groups representing the interests of emerging market and developing economies and advanced economies [IMF, 2023], respectively. Drawing on the results of the G7, G20 and BRICS documents analysis, the author presents inferences on the state of the G7’s influence on the establishment of new rules and institutions and the risks associated with consolidating advanced economies’ weight and competitive advantages in global governance. The review concludes with recommendations on possible BRICS actions to build a multilateral, fair, inclusive, and effective digital governance architecture in the interests of the world majoritythe article was written on the basis of the RANEPA state assignment research programmeThis review was submitted 02.12.2024