http://iorj.hse.ru en-us Copyright 2024 Tue, 26 Mar 2024 23:36:40 +0300 https://iorj.hse.ru/en/2024-19-1/911133247.html With the facilitation of globalization and technological advancements, the growing complexity of global issues has expanded the spatiotemporal scope of their impact. In international relations, sub-units beneath the primary actors—states—have emerged as critical actors with a demand for effective and real-time responses to global affairs. Transgovernmental network governance, operating by the sub-units in a decentralized and centrifugal architecture, has emerged as a diverse and flexible governance model that transcends interstate interactions. Simultaneously, international regimes have expanded based on small-scale cooperation. When niches exist in specific issue areas, major powers have initiated the construction of transgovernmental network governance, positioning themselves as pivotal actors. In the realm of space governance in Asia, China and Japan have each established transgovernmental network governance mechanisms promoting capacity building and cooperation centred around themselves—the Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization (APSCO) and the Asia-Pacific Regional Space Agency Forum (APRSAF). Case studies of the aforementioned organizations further reveal that when plural transgovernmental networks operate within the same issue area, the governance landscape takes on a derived form of coexistence between competition and cooperation, which is the transgovernmental network governance of “co-competition.” Across multiple analytical levels, such characteristics indicate a flexible space of proliferation, expansion, and transformationThis article was submitted 28.09.2023 https://iorj.hse.ru/en/2024-19-1/911138995.html The objectives of economic integration requires countries’ mutual efforts to implement them. In fact, the post-crisis recovery demonstrated that there is virtually no alternative to Basel III standards and recommendations to protect against external shocks and strengthen the stress resilience of banks. In the European Union (EU), the Basel III mechanism has become the basis for the standardization of regulatory policies. However, in the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), integration processes are still missing any banking regulation accords, and the variety of the national regulatory regimes hinders integration and slows the process of supranationalization of the regulatory architecture, threatening the exacerbation of systemic risks and, ultimately, the erosion of strategic focus within the framework of the EAEU’s single financial market and the EAEU’s integration at large.In this article, we examine the prospect that financial regulators in the EAEU member states will reach a consensus on the “Mini-Basel III” concept based on the Basel III standards and recommendations aiming at further strengthening the economic basis of integration, including minimization of systemic risks and ensuring financial stability. Based on the analysis of banking supervision standards in the EAEU member states and their quantitative metrics in 2015–24 (that is, from the moment the Basel III standards were phased-in in the EAEU member states), we conclude that different regulatory regimes are the main source of systemic risks, while a single regulatory regime will minimize systemic stress subject to implementation of the Mini-Basel III framework. Furthermore, taking into consideration the increasing uncertainty and risk in the Eurasian financial market, we develop scenarios of financial integration based on Mini-Basel III and without it. At the same time, the dominance of implicit and often apparent advantages of the different vs. single regulatory regimes, as well as sanctions imposed on Russia and the threat of secondary sanctions against the remaining EAEU member states, will impede implementation of Mini-Basel III. The proposed Mini-Basel III concept could be used by financial regulators in developing an EAEU supranational banking regulation mechanism, including for regulation of the prospective regional banking union.This article was submitted 20.09.2023Acknowledgements:This work is an output of a research project «“Mini-Basel III”: An EAEU Supranational Banking Regulation Framework for Financial Stability?», implemented as part of the HSE University Project Group Competition at the Faculty of World Economy and International Affairs.The authors appreciate the contribution of the Project group members Darya Evreeva and Maria Rozhkova. We are also thankful to Vadim V. Kovalev, Ph.D., Head of the Banking Policy Division of the Financial Policy Department of the Eurasian Economic Commission (EEC) and Anastasia V. Podrugina, Associate Professor of the Department of World Economy of the HSE University for their valuable remarks and comments during the development of this article. https://iorj.hse.ru/en/2024-19-1/911146196.html About a decade ago, the global community came to the realization that progress toward sustainable development would depend largely on the successful mobilization of private capital. However, business has not yet proved willing to assume the leading role—especially in “fragile situations”—largely due to increased political risks.This article identifies constants and variables in business’ assessments of political risks over the 2010–20s based on selected serial reports summarizing the results of annual surveys of business representatives—Risk Barometer, by a global insurance company, Allianz, and How Leading Companies Are Managing Current Political Risks, produced by Oxford Analytica for Willis, Tower & Watson (WTW).The article first examines long-term patterns and trends in business perceptions that manifested throughout the 2010s. The article then studies the impact that the COVID-19 pandemic and the increased global turbulence following Russia’s special military operation in Ukraine in February 2022 had on these patterns.The research confirms the hypothesis about the existence of “constants” in the perception of political risks, despite the volatile changes in their geography, and identifies three consistent, yet paradoxical patterns:  first, the clear underestimation of political risks in comparison with other risk categories; second, deprioritization of extra-legal risks and risks of escalation of interstate conflicts over non-military legal-governmental risks; and third, business’ limited ability to foresee the most significant political risks of any type. Neither the COVID-19 pandemic nor the escalation of conflict in Ukraine have reversed these patterns. This can be explained by the lack of in-house experience and insufficient use of external expertise in political risk assessment, as well as by an overrepresentation of developed countries (and underrepresentation of the developing world) in expert pools. Improvements in political risk management and a broader use of political risk insurance (and guarantees) might increase the effectiveness of private sector resource mobilization for international development. However, in a much more competitive global environment, a higher propensity of businesses from the competing powers to invest in high-risk jurisdictions would create additional zones of tension in the Global South—in the same way as do the official development finance flows.The article concludes by suggesting various possibilities of scaling-up fundamental and applied research in political risks (including their complex interactions with international development policies) based on regular business surveys to get results of high importance for Russia’s current foreign and foreign economic policies. This article was submitted 09.11.2023This research has been conducted with a financial support from the Russian Science Foundation, project No 23-28-01060, https://rscf.ru/en/project/23-28-01060/ https://iorj.hse.ru/en/2024-19-1/911195247.html In national carbon emissions reduction targets as well as within the international climate change regime, production-based (or territorial) emissions are taken into account. Such accounting imposes the major responsibility for emissions on leading emerging economies where most of the carbon-intensive industries are allocated. It also provokes carbon leakage: stringent climate policies in one jurisdiction may lead to the reallocation of production and corresponding emissions to others where companies bear lower regulation costs. Consequently, asymmetry occurs. While most developed countries gradually reduce their emissions, they are simultaneously growing in emerging economies, with no significant progress in the mitigation of global climate change. This paper directs attention to an alternative way of emissions accounting—based on consumption. In this regard, emissions are attributed to the particular economy if they are embodied in goods consumed there regardless of where exactly these emissions are generated. This type of accounting supposes that emissions of major emerging economies are not their own choice but also the reflection of the international division of labour and the result of demand for carbon-intensive goods coming from major centres of consumption in developed countries. Regular calculation and disclosure of consumption-based emissions (along with production-based ones) and their gradual integration into the process of emissions reduction target-setting would provide a new perspective on sharing responsibility for emissions, prevent carbon leakage and clearly demonstrate the need for international climate cooperation between exporters and importers of carbon-intensive goods, expand the scope of emissions under regulation, and give opportunities to countries to use the wider range of decarbonization tools. The latter would include those that involve the population in mitigation efforts and better link the price for carbon with the level of household consumption, which is important for coping with carbon inequality and promoting climate justice.This article was submitted 07.01.2024The article was prepared in the framework of a research grant funded by the Ministry of Science and Higher Education of the Russian Federation (grant ID: 075-15-2022-325). https://iorj.hse.ru/en/2024-19-1/915132574.html The BRICS countries have repeatedly expressed their commitment to the goals of multilateral climate and environmental agreements such as the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the Paris Agreement, and the United Nations (UN) Agenda for Sustainable Development. Large developing economies play an important role in global climate efforts, and their potential contribution to these efforts will only increase as their share of the global economy, resource consumption patterns, and greenhouse gas emissions increase.The article examines the BRICS agenda and the national policies of the five pre-expansion countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) in the environmental-climate sphere. The article analyzes both institutional (collective) and national contributions of each of the five countries in comparison with the dynamics of environmental and climate indicators, which allows the identification of both the points of greatest progress and the areas that need additional efforts, including through the expansion of BRICS cooperation.This article was submitted 26.01.2024The article was written on the basis of the RANEPA state assignment research programme. https://iorj.hse.ru/en/2024-19-1/911197530.html The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), established more than two decades ago, is one of the most important international organizations in the non-western world. While attracting the interest of many players in the region, the SCO is still searching for direction, creating new formats, and signing new documents. This process is especially relevant in the current, rapidly changing geopolitical environment, which requires meaningful answers to key issues of security, economy, development of scientific and social spheres, and so on.In this article, the authors identify the key areas of development of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, highlighting the most elaborated security track, the bloc of economic development, projects to strengthen cooperation in the field of energy resources, and issues of scientific and social development, as well as the role of the organization in the formation of the framework of Greater Eurasia. Having analyzed the SCO's activities on the basis of the documents it has adopted and the organizations created within its structure, as well as the narrative at the level of experts and government officials, the authors conclude that, while the SCO has a significant potential in the areas under consideration and has even achieved certain successes in some areas, such as joint security, the organization lacks quality implementation of the documents it has adopted and coherence in the joint implementation of its decisions. Despite this, the SCO has nevertheless become an important element of interaction between the bloc's countries and a key a tool for preserving security in Eurasia.This article was submitted 17.08.2023The study was supported by a grant from the Russian Science Foundation (Project No. 23-28-01830). https://iorj.hse.ru/en/2024-19-1/911207854.html The introduction of economic sanctions by western countries against Russia has stimulated the process of reorienting Russian trade and economic ties toward neutral partners, particularly Turkey and China. This study evaluates the extent to which Russian-Turkish cooperation is becoming a more significant factor in neutralizing the impact of sanctions on the Russian economy and compares the relative importance of Turkey and China as trade and economic partners for Russia during the sanction period. The article explores the comparative potential of Russian-Turkish and Russian-Chinese cooperation.China and Turkey play the role of Russia's key partners in overcoming the negative consequences of sanctions. The authors conclude that at the beginning of the period of applying tough sanctions in 2022-23, Turkey's role in Russia's foreign economic relations grew at a faster pace than China's role in a number of areas of economic cooperation. This was confirmed by faster growth rates of trade turnover, and more active cooperation in the field of energy and tourism.  and Turkey's access to direct investment volumes comparable to China's. Despite this, China continues to be the most significant country in the external contour of economic relations for Russia. In addition, the West's pressure on China under the trade sanctions policy during 2023-24 was felt to a lesser extent than against Turkey. This led to the fact that by the end of 2023, the growth rate of China's trade with Russia again began to outpace the corresponding growth rate of Russia's trade with Turkey. In general, the built anti-sanctions structure of foreign relations, in which trade with these countries plays a much larger role than investment, can be characterized as relatively fragile, since the likelihood of curtailing ties under pressure from Western countries remains high, which is partially confirmed by the change in the dynamics of Russia's trade turnover with Turkey in 2023-24.This article was submitted on 11.12.2023This article was prepared with the support of the Faculty of World Economy and International Affairs of the National Research University Higher School of Economics  https://iorj.hse.ru/en/2024-19-1/911503121.html China has eradicated absolute poverty and has reached the middle level of development. On its way, it crossed the borders of several clusters and surpassed South Africa and Brazil. Its achievements were based on the development of market institutions, world market opportunities, and the maintenance of an exceptionally high capital formation rate. The rapid pace of changes, demographic policy, and the solution of infrastructure problems have created certain issues—we note social inequality, environmental problems, the growth of household debts, and financial problems in the real estate sector, which are largely the consequences of huge social programmes. The transition to a “new normal” with lower (but still high) growth rates in many ways resembles the known effect of a “middle income trap.” The country has been developing along well-known lines but faster and by its own manner. By the horizon of 2035, China is expected to reach the current level of development of South and East Europe.This article was submitted 27.02.2024The authors would like to thank Andrei Evgenyevich Shastitko, Professor at the Faculty of Economics, Moscow State University, for pointing out the insufficient study of institutional aspects of China's development https://iorj.hse.ru/en/2024-19-1/911526756.html Global climate change is one of the main challenges of our time. Rising temperatures threaten the stability of the ecological, socio-economic, and political systems around the globe. Countries in the Global South have the greatest material losses from climate change without having a significant impact on it. The high vulnerability of the group of least developed countries (LDCs) to climate change, coupled with social and economic challenges poverty, and lack of means for adaptation, determine its special rank and status in international climate policy. In it, the LDCs act as a single actor. Over the course of more than 30 years of climate policy, LDCs have initiated the adoption of a number of important documents and the creation of fundamental structures for international climate policy. At the same time, noticeable transformations have taken place to adapt and decarbonize the national structures of LDCs. The purpose of this article is to show the role of the LDC group in the formation of the United Nations (UN) climate agenda, institutional structures, and international mechanisms, to highlight their efforts to restore global climate justice, and to characterize modern national climate policy according to the legal documents adopted by the LDCs. The methodological basis is formed by historical, comparative approaches. The main objective of the article is to study the trajectories of the climate policy of the LDC group, highlight the stages of its evolution, demonstrate centre-peripheral relations to restore climate justice, and examine the internal policies of the LDCs. Policy initiatives of the LDCs played a direct role in the formation of climate finance funds, the group of experts on the least developed countries (LEG), and national programmes and plans for the adaptation of states to climate change. The article concludes that there are two stages in the development of climate policy in LDCs; it is assumed that the use of international mechanisms for adaptation and decarbonization could become a tool for the economic and technological modernization of LDCs and their achievement of the sustainable development goals of 2030. The main obstacles to this are the insufficient financing of available funds from countries of the Global North, high interest rates on loans, and the indebtedness of LDCs.This article was submitted 18.09.2023 https://iorj.hse.ru/en/2024-19-1/911892785.html In the article the authors review the textbook Eurasian Economic Integration: Theory and Practice, written by the authorities and staff of the Eurasian Economic Commission (EEC). The book considers various aspects of Eurasian economic integration and aims at providing readers with comprehensive understanding of the key institutions and activities of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU).The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the author. They do not purport to reflect the opinions or views of organisations he represents.