http://iorj.hse.ru en-us Copyright 2024 Sun, 15 Sep 2024 16:27:59 +0300 https://iorj.hse.ru/en/2024-19-3/962785232.html Reflecting the timeless pattern of global power shifts favouring emerging powers over established ones, the current state of US-China relations corresponds to this trend. Academic consensus regards shifts since Trump's presidency and the pandemic as dominant factors worsening US-China relations. One of the implications of the US-China rivalry is that issues of global governance are increasingly falling under the purview of geopolitical undercurrents, undermining the ability of the Group of 20 (G20) to deliver global public goods (GPGs). Although embedded within institutions such as the Group of 7 (G7), the G20, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the supply of GPGs is an attribute of global leadership. Theoretical and empirical accounts indicate that the regular supply of GPGs is dependent upon either the hegemony of a single power or the level of cooperation among the multiple centres of power prevailing in the international system at a given point in time. The decline of US hegemony and the lack of US-China cooperation poses questions for the future of G20 leadership and the global supply of GPGs. Given the uncertainty, this article aims to answer the following research problem—can the G20 lead the process of global governance by offering GPGs under the constrained conditions produced by the US-China rivalry? Specifically, this article addresses the following research questions: why the US-China rivalry affects the G20’s ability to deliver GPGs; which actors have led the field of global governance in the past; whether these actors are still capable of leading under contemporary conditions; and what pathways stifle the leadership potential of varied actors inside the G20. The article argues that the leadership crisis of the G20 is a cumulative effect of the declined ability of the G7 to play its traditional leadership role, coupled with its newly developed willingness to counter China’s rise. Moreover, the leadership gap is augmented by the polarization-based strategic pulls faced by middle powers, compromising their customary ability to lead global governance.This article was submitted 18.05.2024 https://iorj.hse.ru/en/2024-19-3/962854337.html This article is devoted to the analysis of key aspects of current changes in the system of military and political planning of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Within the framework of the post-bipolar world order, a complex process of transformation of the strategic priorities of activities and organizational structure of the alliance is underway. Its key meaning is the effective adaptation of NATO to the significant changes that have occurred in international politics since the adoption of the last strategic concept in 2010. At the same time, the further expansion and internal strengthening of the military-political bloc is designed to ensure the formation of an international order consistent with the long-term interests of the United States and its western allies.The dynamics of international processes and growing contradictions of the key trends of global development have necessitated the optimization of the activities of the alliance and the adaptation of its functional mechanism to changing international conditions. This task received its doctrinal formalization within the framework of the new strategic concept of the alliance, adopted at the Madrid summit on 29 June 2022. Scientific analysis of the forms and mechanisms of NATO's adaptation to new operating conditions involves empirical consideration and comparative analysis of the key areas of the activities of the alliance.Within the framework of the undertaken research, based on the application of systemic and structural approaches, as well as the integrated use of general scientific and special methods of political science research, this article analyzes the content of the new doctrinal document both from the point of view of continuity of long-term strategic orientations of NATO's activities and from the position of identifying new components in its military-political planning system. Special attention is paid to the changes related to the conceptually defined priorities of the strategy of the alliance in the sphere of confrontation between the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China (PRC).The analysis of the contradictory processes taking place in NATO and reflected in the content of the NATO 2030 Agenda and the 2022 Strategic Concept seems to be fundamentally significant both in the context of understanding the logic of the development of the entire structure of European and international security and from the point of view of assessing the prospects for further development of relations between the largest military-political bloc and the Russian Federation and other leading actors.This article was submitted 27.02.2024 https://iorj.hse.ru/en/2024-19-3/962855060.html Climate change is increasingly affecting the politics and economies of the world’s nations: its physical manifestations pose numerous threats to human and national security, while its mitigation requires significant investments and regulatory measures which are increasingly transforming socioeconomic systems. Russia’s climate policy, still in its formative stage, is also developing in this context. Contemporary research concerning it focuses primarily on national climate change regulation and its individual aspects, while its international dimension remains under-researched. We use the example of Russia’s discourses within the framework of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP to the UNFCCC) after the adoption of the Paris Agreement to trace the evolution of the external dimension of Russia's climate policy. Several leading narratives are identified within the discourse: the “forest” narrative, related to Russia’s promotion of the international recognition of the importance of carbon sinks; the “sanctions”-related one, within which Russia maintains that foreign restrictive measures impede its capacities to contribute to global climate change mitigation efforts; the narrative on the creation of a universal compliance mechanism for the Paris Agreement; as well as the narrative that concerns developing states and the need to build up support for their green transition. We find that each narrative, as well as the application of such discursive categories as "global", "universal" and "international" are closely interconnected with the state’s overall foreign policy directions. We demonstrate that as the role of climate change in international politics is augmenting, Russia increasingly seeks to position itself more confidently within its framework despite the altered geopolitical conditions that have significantly diminished the impact of some of the most important drivers of the country’s climate policy development. We conclude that Russia’s policy within the COP to the UNFCCC has evolved towards, on the one hand, increased promotion of an alternative decarbonization agenda and, on the other hand, providing greater support, including climate finance, for developing states. Both follow the logic of Russia’s foreign policy orientation towards the establishment of a polycentric world order with increased role of the non-West in decision-making on the key issues related to the international system.external climate policy, Paris agreement, climate policy ambition, factors of climate policy evolution, ecosystems’ absorption capacity, climate finance, sanctions.This work is an output of a research project implemented as part of the Basic Research Program at the HSE University. Support from the Research Program of the Faculty of World Economy and International Affairs at HSE University is gratefully acknowledgedThis article was submitted 13.02.2024 https://iorj.hse.ru/en/2024-19-3/962865073.html Regulation of digital trade is becoming one of the drivers of fragmentation in the world economy. In the absence of a common international standard on digital trade governance, countries take different approaches to regulation. Each country adds a layer to the existing digital trade regimes, resulting in what has been famously described as the “spaghetti bowl” effect. This article investigates Korea’s unique position in the evolving global regulation of digital trade and the added value the country brings to the process of co-creating a common reference for international best practices. The article contributes to the ongoing debate about the dichotomy of global and regional layers of global digital trade regulation by looking at the existing regulation by the World Trade Organization (WTO) and regional agreements. Research indicates that, for many countries, including Korea, digital trade agreements, or free trade agreements (FTAs) with e-commerce chapters, serve as platforms not only to experiment with possible regulations but also to increase their negotiating and normative power in co-creating global standards for digital trade regulation. This article presents evidence that Korea is a proponent of the WTO’s role in providing a common reference for the regulatory standards on digital trade. When it comes to digital trade agreements, Korea is actively engaging with its partners to update existing trade rules. However, its commitments under various agreements show a great variation and heavy use of the national security carve-out, indicating a desire to leave a comfortable space for future policy actions. Also, Korea’s early engagement with strong economic partners on digital trade regulation speaks in favour of its desire to acquire more internationally acknowledged normative power. By assuming a high standard of digital trade regulation, the country can negotiate better deals with other partners—deals that will contribute to its national interests.This article was submitted on 28.02.2024 https://iorj.hse.ru/en/2024-19-3/962865580.html India’s successful Group of 20 (G20) presidency in 2023 has drawn attention to the country’s foreign policy approach in the face of growing great power polarization and the crisis of multilateralism. New Delhi seeks to engage all centres of power and reach out to as many multilateral groupings as possible, while continuing its cautious balancing act in global affairs. Additionally, India is positioning itself as a bridge between East and West, a responsible power capable of providing development assistance to needy countries and acting as a “voice of the global South.”The author argues that the policy of multi-alignment and the positioning as a vishwa mitra (friend of the world) are intended to enable India to achieve a new status in the system of global governance. The study of official documents and literature has shown that New Delhi’s key imperative in this path is to maintain its independence of decision-making, while the main challenge is to address the potential discontent on the part of foreign partners with the opportunistic nature of Indian approaches.The article deciphers India’s policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), a region that has not previously been a priority for Indian foreign policy. The author identifies four aspects of India’s approach to expanding its presence in LAC: strengthening ties with specific states (Brazil, Argentina, Mexico); promoting economic projects in sectors with competitive advantages for Indian companies; developing contacts with regional integration associations (the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), the Central American Integration System (SICA), and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM)) and interaction in multilateral formats (G20, BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, and others), IBSA (India, Brazil, and South Africa), and the Group of 4 (G4)); and exploiting cultural and historical ties and the influence of the diaspora. The growing engagement with the LAC region is a manifestation of India’s more ambitious identity and its intention to make the transition from a “balancing power to a leading power.”This paper has been supported by the grants from the Russian Science Foundation, RSF 22-78-10014, https://rscf.ru/project/22-78-10014/This article was submitted on  11.03.2024 https://iorj.hse.ru/en/2024-19-3/962866205.html Despite lifting the COVID-19 pandemic status, the medical scientific community agrees that similar crises may recur in the future due to climate change, the rapid growth of the global population, and, consequently, the increased anthropogenic impact on the environment. Negative consequences of human economic activity include the destruction of ecosystems and expanded contact with wildlife, which increases the risk of mutations in existing pathogens and the spread of dangerous infectious diseases. Such processes can be classified as a new type of transnational threat and their timely prevention requires the consolidation of international efforts and the activation of global health diplomacy. Under the aegis of the World Health Organization (WHO), a number of legal and institutional mechanisms involving a wide range of participants have been developed to prevent pandemics and respond to related challenges. This article examines their functioning in the context of similar international cooperation programmes and draws conclusions regarding future development prospects. The work analyzes documents that form the regulatory framework of WHO's international pandemic prevention initiatives and presents various perspectives from domestic and English-language literature on the assessment of the organization's activities. The main focus is on the draft of the Pandemic Prevention, Preparedness, and Response Treaty, the WHO Pathogen Access and Benefit-Sharing System, the International Health Regulations, and the activities of COVAX. The author concludes that the results achieved by WHO do not meet its initial plans, and the reasons for the failures are systemic. They include countries' unwillingness to take on commitments that potentially limit state sovereignty, including accountability for breaches of agreements, as well as challenges with funding and limited transparency of international health organizations' activities overall. Practical recommendations are formulated regarding the formation of Russia's position on the future Pandemic Prevention, Preparedness, and Response Treaty.The research was carried out with the support of the Russian Science Foundation grant No. 24-28-01127, https://rscf.ru/en/project/24-28-01127/This article was submitted on 11.03.2024 https://iorj.hse.ru/en/2024-19-3/962865865.html The COVID-19 pandemic and sanctions against Russia greatly influenced the global economy, including developing countries. The first part of this article explores the main macroeconomic trends in emerging economies, including the decline of economic growth rates after the shocks of 2020–22, dynamics of external debt, government deficit, unemployment, and inflation.The hugely increased financing needs of developing countries against the background of financial constraints requires a fine adjustment of the development assistance allocation system, especially from multilateral agencies. The second part of this article highlights the current situation in terms of usage of economic vulnerability as one of the criteria for allocation of concessional finance. This includes the most relevant experience of the Caribbean Development Bank and its concessional body, the Special Development Fund.The absence of economic vulnerability as one of the criteria for aid allocation in most of the institutions increases risks for the global economy as a number of vulnerable countries have an increasing financing gap. The third part of article evaluates potential financing allocation based on economic vulnerability andbrings to a conclusion that most of the vulnerable developing countries are underfinanced by multilateral organizations.Support from the Research Program of the Faculty of World Economy and International Affairs at HSE University is gratefully acknowledgedThis article was submitted on 01.04.2024 https://iorj.hse.ru/en/2024-19-3/962866712.html Today, companies use different pricing, monitoring, and demand and supply analysis algorithms, which, on one hand, increase profits and benefit consumers (for example, personalized discounts), but, on the other, can damage competition in cases of economic entities using algorithms to implement collusion or anti-competitive one-way behaviour or in cases of self-learning algorithms colluding with no human intervention.Much of the subject matter of this article stems from the adoption of special regulations on the use of algorithms in collusion over the past few years. The use of algorithms for the implementation of anti-competitive agreements in 2023 in Russia (amendments to the Code of Administrative Offences of the Russian Federation) is considered an aggravating circumstance. Foreign countries are developing similar regulation; for example, China has explicitly banned the use of algorithms not only in explicit collusion but also in tacit collusion (2021–23). The EU has recognized “collusion by code” as a cartel agreement (2023), and the US has proposed special rules to regulate implicit collusion using algorithms that analyze competitors' data (2024).Researchers have identified the types of harm that may result from the use of collusion algorithms by businesses. This article compares the approaches of countries to regulation of the use of algorithms, taking into account the three types of harm identified by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and used by regulators of countries: whether algorithms are used as a tool to implement explicit collusion in existing agreements between economic entities; whether economic entities do not conclude agreements but nonetheless come to concerted action using similar software that is based on algorithms that generate the same price or market determinations for all competitors; and whether self-learning algorithms conspire autonomously (without human intervention) and without the knowledge of economic agents. Comparative legal analysis will help identify how countries approach the problem of collusive use of algorithms, which has become possible in a digital economy.Methods of research used in this article include comparative analysis of legal acts and law enforcement practices in Russia and abroadthe article was written on the basis of the RANEPA state assignment research programmeThis article was submitted on 24.04.2024 https://iorj.hse.ru/en/2024-19-3/962866813.html This review presents the results of an analysis of the key international organizations agenda on the issue of just transition, its definition, necessary policy measures, and the importance of the cross-border aspect of the problem. The following conclusions can be drawn from the systematization of approaches. The issues of protecting workers in closing industries, improving skills, and retraining the workforce are noted as central elements of a just transition policy by all the organizations reviewed; they note the need for maximum inclusiveness in the development and adoption of decisions and constant social dialogue between the state, workers, and employers.Issues of international justice and the impact of the energy transition on the global gap between developed and developing countries are actively discussed by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the World Bank—they, more than others, pay attention to the debt trap, the poverty trap, the consequences of measures to promote decarbonization taken within jurisdictions,  global markets, and the interests developing and least developed countries. These organizations call for the reconfiguration of the global financial architecture, providing preferential financing for the transition in developing countries and ensuring their access to technology. The International Labour Organization (ILO), the International Energy Agency (IEA), and the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) support various incentive programmes, subsidies, and grants for low-carbon technologies, as this will speed up the phase down of hydrocarbons and create new green jobs. However, these organizations do not consider the possible negative effect of such measures on global markets or labour markets in other countries.There is a consensus on the need for carbon pricing and phasing out fossil fuel subsidies. Cross-border adjustment mechanisms are assessed as unfair by almost all organizations reviewed, and their disproportionate negative effect on developing and least developed countries is noted. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) are promoting the idea of ​​a differentiated global carbon price floor as a measure to prevent carbon leakage.the Analytical Review was written on the basis of the RANEPA state assignment research programme.This article was submitted on 15.07.2024