2022. vol. 17. No. 2

This article offers an updated, systematic assessment of the BRICS evolving institutional dynamics, performance, and contribution to co-operation among its members of Brazil, Russia India, China and South Africa, and to global governance as a whole.  Using qualitative and quantitative methods, it identifies the major achievements of each of the BRICS’ 13 annual summits through the three five-year hosting cycles, the leaders agreement on 933 collective commitments and their countries compliance with them at a level of 77% overall. It highlights the Group’s agenda expanding into 34 subjects, the process of building the intra-BRICS institutionswith the New Development Bank as its hallmark and its extensive second tracknetworksincluding Business, Think Tanks and Academic, Trade Unions, Parliamentarian, Youth and Civil BRICS.

How and why does the Group of 20 (G20) work, both alone and together with the United Nations (UN), to advance the effective global governance of climate change, especially in 2021 and beyond? G20 summit performance on climate change has increased since 2008 as measured by the six major dimensions of governance, but not by the results in net emissions reduced. G20 efforts to spur performance at subsequent UN climate summits has varied, from substantial at G20 Pittsburgh for UN Copenhagen in 2009, to limited at G20 Antalya for UN Paris in 2015, and to strong at G20 Rome for UN Glasgow in 2021. G20 efforts have been spurred by the physical climate shock-activated vulnerabilities experienced by G20 members in the lead-up to G20 and UN summits, especially from escalating extreme weather events, but have been constrained by diversionary shocks from finance in 2008–09, terrorism and migration in 2015, and COVID-19 in 2020–21. Also important were the personal commitments of, and domestic political support within, G20 and UN summit hosts, especially regarding the G20 and UN summits uniquely chaired by Group of 7 (G7) members Italy and the United Kingdom in 2021. Yet, the unprecedented combined G20-UN supply of global climate governance in 2021 fell even further behind the proliferating global demand to control climate change. To close the gap, the G20 should invite the heads of the major multilateral environmental organizations to participate in G20 summits, hold more environment ministers’ meetings each year, and mount an annual climate-focused summit at the UN General Assembly.

The paper has been supported by the RUDN University Strategic Academic Leadership

A strong partnership between the United Nations (UN) and the African Union (AU) is essential to achieving strategic convergence and coherence as well as effective solutions to complex peace and security challenges in Africa. This article examines the UN-AU peacekeeping nexus through the research of peacekeeping operations in Africa. The author makes an attempt to analyze the key challenges in the UN-AU partnership for peacekeeping, including the lack of clear regulation of actions in conflict, despite attempts to develop common approaches to peacekeeping by the UN and the AU; necessity of establishing equal, full and constructive participation of women in the peacekeeping process; the problems in the relationship between the UN Security Council and the Peace and Security Council of the African Union.

The main objectives of the research article are to analyze the institutional structure of the African peace and security architecture, the evolution of the UN-AU partnership through the implementation of joint peacekeeping missions, the challenges to their cooperation, as well as to assess the effectiveness of UN-AU cooperation.

Based on a structural analysis of the African security architecture, quantitative methods of assessment and comparative analysis of the UN and the AU statistics on partnership peacekeeping, as well as on women's participation in peacekeeping operations in Africa from 2003 to 2019, the voting patterns of the A3 countries to UNSC resolutions on African peacekeeping, the author concludes that there is a direct correlation between the deteriorating security situation in Africa and the level of strategic partnership between the UN and the AU; and that, in the long term, the priority will be to help national governments to prevent the causes of conflicts, which will make it possible to take into account the local specificities of African states in resolving and preventing conflicts.

In this paper, the development and status of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the Western Balkans is examined. NATO’s regional expansion can be considered a part of the general expansion of NATO to the East. Unhindered eastward progress lasted until 2006, when Russia came back on the Balkan scene with the strategic South Stream pipeline project. The unexpected appearance of a new actor led to an intensification of NATO’s membership expansion process. Further, Russia’s presence indirectly initiated other meaningful events on the peninsula, such as the self-declaration of Kosovo’s independence. 
Today, Russia remains the primary irritant for NATO and collective western policy on the Balkans. Allies put considerable pressure on regional actors to avoid closer economic and political ties with Moscow. There are apparent efforts underway to bring all kinds of interaction with the Russian Federation under overall control. Since 2014, local NATO members and candidates have pursued strongly pronounced anti-Russian policy.
Russia relies on its traditionally strong relationship with the Balkan states. Moscow brings an alternative model of economic cooperation and development. Both bids raise questions. The Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) has not proven its viability and effectiveness in either the medium- or the long-term perspective; regardless, it competes with a highly desired but elusive European Union (EU) membership. 
All this together requires more efforts from NATO and the West to maintain a dominating role and position in the region; it downgrades previously achieved capabilities in terms of global governance on the Balkan scene.

The article examines the role of the World Customs Organization in the implementation of the Agreement on Trade Facilitation (Agreement, TFA), which is one of the important areas of modern multilateral regulation of the international trading system. The article-by-article analysis of the Agreement and the Kyoto Convention, as well as an assessment of the potential and real impact of the WCO instruments on its implementation, was carried out. There is a lack of methods and a system of indicators for evaluating the effectiveness and efficiency of such work, which does not allow assessing the quality and effectiveness of the activities carried out. A key issue in achieving qualitative changes in the implementation of the Agreement would be a detailed diagnosis of the state of affairs in developing and least developed countries, the specification and digitization of data on priority areas, volumes and deadlines for providing them with all types of assistance and support. In conclusion, the importance of adequate self-assessment by countries of their readiness for the implementation of the Agreement, the relevance of the development of the potential necessary for the implementation of the Agreement, as well as bilateral and multilateral cooperation with donors is substantiated. Proposals have been formulated to improve the work of WCO and WTO to ensure timely implementation of the Agreement.

The Group of 20 (G20) brought together leaders of the key advanced and emerging market countries to manage the 2007–08 financial and economic crises, reform the international architecture, devise a new global consensus, ensure recovery, and promote strong, sustainable, and balanced growth.  Established as an anti-crisis mechanism and designated by its members as a premier forum for international economic cooperation, the G20 transformed into a global governance hub.   Since its first summit, the G20 has generated high expectations and has become a subject of research and assessment for analysists, mass media, and the general public. Each summit’s deliberations, decisions, and engagements have been scrutinized.  Critics of the G20 claim it has lost relevance and was not capable of responding to the degradation of multilateralism, or the COVID-19 pandemic and the crisis it induced.