2023. vol. 18. No. 4

Brazil has a strong potential to achieve national climate goals and can also be an important decarbonization partner for other countries, especially in the supply of green hydrogen and critical raw materials for the production of new climate-neutral technologies. This article highlights the main tools and policies for Brazil's decarbonization and identifies potential areas in which the country can not only achieve its nationally determined contributions (NDCs), but also ensure innovative green economic growth.
Low carbon intensity energy sources can ensure a low carbon footprint for industrial products, which can make goods more attractive in the face of increasing requirements and the introduction of measures such as the European Union’s (EU) carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM). Extensive deployment of renewable energy creates opportunities for the country to produce sustainable hydrogen, which will be in demand both domestically and globally. The main challenge for Brazil's decarbonization is its extensive agriculture, as well as widespread deforestation, the rate of which increased under the Bolsonaro administration. For agricultural products, which make up a large share of exports, deforestation regulations like those adopted in the EU would be a real barrier and could close European and other markets. The mining and processing of critical raw materials could be a potential breakthrough for the country's economic growth due to the widespread decarbonization of the global economy. The low carbon intensity of the country's industry, including mining, due to renewable energy sources appears to be a significant advantage.

Lula's return has given the international community hope that, at least in forestry and agriculture, significant efforts can be expected from Brazil, including international support, financing, and auditing.

The article was written on the basis of the RANEPA state assignment research programme

This article was submitted on 21.08.2023

Russiaʼs model of economic development, based on hydrocarbon exports, initially determined the countryʼs scepticism towardlow-carbon transformation. However, the growing negative effects of climate change, manifesting in increased naturaldisasters (floods, fires, extreme heat), as well as extraterritorial measures imposed by major trading partners, which couldpotentially limit market access, led to a transformation of the perceived climate change challenge and the adoption of arange of policy documents and regulations to articulate and implement a low-carbon development policy in Russia. Thetargets and measures have been criticized for lacking ambition and rigour, but still pushed the processes without which theeconomy would continue to face the negative effects of climate change and increasing constraints in global markets. Thegeopolitical crisis of 2022 and widening sanctions have significantly constrained Russiaʼs ability to meet climate targets.Despite this, mechanisms to promote decarbonization in key sectors continue to be developed. In addition, opportunities forcooperation with some major non-western economies have not closed.This article analyzes Russiaʼs strategic documents and key low-carbon development policies, including the activitiesof major companies. It provides perspective on the role of forest climate projects as well as their drawbacks and risks, theSakhalin experiment to achieve carbon neutrality in the region and how it is implemented through concrete initiatives, theprospects and limitations of the hydrogen industry, the challenges and tools for decarbonizing transport, state of play in thecarbon capture, use and storage technologies, the criteria for green projects, and the situation on the green bond market.It also identifies two important areas which gain importance as the climate transition scales up: nuclear power and the extractionand production of critical raw materials. Based on the analysis, recommendations are given on promising areas ofcooperation between Russia and its BRICS and EAEU partners.

India is one of the largest emitters of greenhouse gases in the world, largely due to its high dependence on coal. However, since the early 2000s, New Delhi has introduced various tools to help reduce greenhouse gas emissions. In 2022, a new climate plan was adopted that, for the first time, set a goal to achieve carbon neutrality by 2070. To achieve the goal of reducing greenhouse gases in the energy sector, India is using several market-based schemes, which will become the basis of the Indian emissions trading system in the nearest future. Environmentally friendly transport is actively developing. Insights from research in the field of industrial decarbonization, carbon capture, and storage systems and forest protection and afforestation programmes are being implemented. However, the implementation of the identified areas is fraught with difficulties, leading to the implementation of controversial measures on the part of the state which are economically justified but contrary to the climate strategy. This study examines the main directions of Indian climate policy, and prospects and difficulties in their implementation to achieve the goal of carbon neutrality.

South Africa is the one of leading African economies and the one of the major global greenhouse gas emitters. Actively participatingin international climate and energy frameworks, South Africa sets an ambitious goal of achieving net zero emissionsby 2050. The climate agenda is a sphere of crucial importance for South Africa due to explicit systemic vulnerabilitiesof the national economy in the face of expected changes. This article analyzes problems and prospects in achieving SouthAfricaʼs climate policy goals, as well as the availability of resources necessary to achieve these goals.The analysis finds that South Africa does not possess the resources to achieve its climate goals. South Africa remainsdependent on polluting fossil fuels, especially coal, due to enormous available natural deposits. Climate financing coversonly a portion of necessary financial placing. In the long run, established international agreements may aggravate thecountryʼs international debt problem. South Africaʼs leaders recognize the necessity of climate-related policy measures, butsuch measures cannot be characterized as the main drivers of the countryʼs development.

The article was written on the basis of the RANEPA state assignment research program. 

This article was submitted 29.09.2023.

The problem of climate change is a global challenge that requires a joint solution at various levels—global, regional, national, and individual. At the same time, modern global and economic processes are characterized by two significant trends: the growth of regionalization and the intensification of deglobalization, which cannot but affect the architecture of the climate agenda. In this article, we review the current state of the multilevel climate agenda and discern the factors of this agenda that affect the activities of multinational enterprises in the context of deglobalization. We conclude that we should expect further fragmentation in the climate regulation system at the global level, which will affect the configuration of global value chains (GVC) of companies. The regionalization of GVCs increases the importance of regional interaction and building relationships between business and government on climate issues to ensure economic competitiveness along the entire value chain from upstream to downstream

The study was supported by the Russian Science Foundation grant No. RSF 22-28-20430 and, financial support of the Region (“grant from the St. Petersburg Science Foundation in accordance with agreement dated April 14, 2022 No. 39/2022”), https://rscf.ru/en/project/22-28-20430/ 

This article was submitted 05.09.23

This article reviews the changing priorities and commitments of the Group of 7 (G7) and Group of 8 (G8) on climate changeand energy security and highlights the trends of their influence on the global climate agenda. The main research method iscontent analysis of the groups’ documents adopted from 2005 to 2023. The study reveals that, at all stages of cooperation,the G7 endeavoured to secure commitments from emerging market and developing countries to increase their contributions toemissions reduction and accelerate the transition to a low carbon economy. As early as 2009, the advanced countries soughtto prevent carbon leakages, regarding a comprehensive climate agreement in Copenhagen as a possible solution.The main principles, priorities, and tasks for attaining global energy security were defined in the 2006 leaders’statement on global energy security and the St Petersburg action plan. The G7’s Rome and Hamburg initiatives on energysecurity, adopted after the G8’s suspension, in essence continued the course toward building competitive, diversified,sustainable, and low carbon energy systems, but without Russia. The new paradigm determined a different hierarchy ofpriorities: promotion of flexible gas markets, including more integrated liquified natural gas (LNG) markets, regulatory andpublic funding support of investment in energy infrastructure that cannot be built according to market rules, developmentof oil and natural gas resources from unconventional sources, and enhanced cooperation on critical infrastructure, transitroutes, supply chains, and transport. This course was consolidated in subsequent years and entered a new stage in 2022.Since 2021, the G7 has been increasing efforts to renew the global rules and to shape new mechanisms and institutesof global climate governance. The establishment of the climate club, Just Energy Transition Partnerships (JETPs), thePartnership for Global Infrastructure Investment (PGII), adoption of the principles of high integrity carbon markets, andthe setting up of new engagement and containment platforms increase the risk of a fragmentation of the established climategovernance system and its gradual substitution by a new order functioning in the interests of the G7 and its allies.In view of these risks it is necessary to deepen cooperation with the BRICS+ group led by Brazil, Russia, India, Chinaand South Africa and other emerging market and developing countries to coordinate and promote within the key multilateralinstitutions, including the United Nations (UN), the Group of 20 (G20), and the World Trade Organization (WTO), a concertedposition on the inadmissibility of eroding the existing global climate governance system with the United Nations FrameworkConvention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) at its centre or the use of climate goals and regulation as protectionist anddiscriminative instruments, and to advance practical implementation of the principle of common but differential responsibility

The article was written on the basis of the RANEPA state assignment research programme.

This review was submitted 15.11.2023.

Since 2021, the G7 has been increasing efforts to renew the global rules and to shape new mechanisms and institutes of global climate governance. The establishment of the climate club, Just Energy Transition Partnerships (JETPs), the Partnership for Global Infrastructure Investment (PGII), adoption of the principles of high integrity carbon markets, and the setting up of new engagement and containment platforms increase the risk of a fragmentation of the established climate governance system and its gradual substitution by a new order functioning in the interests of the G7 and its allies.

In view of these risks it is necessary to deepen cooperation with the BRICS+ group led by Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa and other emerging market and developing countries to coordinate and promote within the key multilateral institutions, including the United Nations (UN), the Group of 20 (G20), and the World Trade Organization (WTO), a concerted   position on the inadmissibility of eroding the existing global climate governance system with the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) at its centre or the use of climate goals and regulation as protectionist and discriminative instruments, and to advance practical implementation of the principle of common but differential responsibility. 

The article was written on the basis of the RANEPA state assignment research programme.

This review was submitted 15.11.2023