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2023. vol. 18. No. 2
Topic of the issue: The World at a Critical Juncture: What is the Future of Global Governance and Sustainable Development?
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New Reality, Old Institutes
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7–30
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The war in Ukraine is impacting most countries in the world. Economically, prices of goods and services are rising and manycountries around the world are experiencing energy crises that can be linked to the war in Ukraine. Politically, fracturesare appearing in long-established political structures with many countries around the world deciding on how to respondto the war in Ukraine based on their political, economic, and strategic interests. Surprisingly, Africa is generating a lot ofattention due to the stance of several notable countries – including some seen as key allies of Western countries. Contraryto expectations that most African countries except those ruled by despots would follow the West in condemning and puttingpressure on Putin to end the war, many African countries chose to stay neutral without condemning Russia or supportingresolutions to put pressure on Putin to end the war. This article has explored not only the role of neo-imperialism in shiftingpolitical alliances away from the West as well as a key factor fostering neutrality, but also other factors. It has made use ofUN resolution voting patterns as well as statements made by African leaders as lenses through which the stances of Africanleaders can be understood.
The article “The Case for Neutrality: Understanding African Stances on the Russia-Ukraine Conflict” by Olayinka Ajala is translated and published with permission of the author and и Journal of Military and Strategic Studies, where it was originally published in English (Journal of Military and Strategic Studies (2022), vol. 22, iss. 2). Available at: https://www.mapleleafnavy.com/index.php/2023/02/16/journal-of-military-andstrategic-studies-volume-22-issue-2/.
Translated by A. Ignatov, Researcher, Centre for International Institutions Research, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA).
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31–52
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Climate change, biodiversity loss and human-generated pollution pose an urgent, existential threat to all living things. UnitedNations (UN) scientific reports, and several others, confirm humanity’s destructive impact on the earth’s atmosphere,land and water. They also confirm that climate change creates new problems and exacerbates existing social and economicproblems across all the sustainable development goals (SDGs) in the UN’s Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development. Yet,in their design, the 17 SDGs and their 169 targets make very few explicit links between climate change, specifically, and theother ecological and socio-economic goals. And, on the few key indicators tracked by the Sustainable Development IndexDashboard under SDG 13 on climate change, the developed countries lag well behind developing ones, while progress onmany SDGs has reversed since 2019. The Group of 20 (G20) developed and emerging economies, all systemically significant,comply with their own climate change goals at an average of just 69%. Given its membership profile and vast resources,the G20 has great potential to reinforce progress toward the SDGs. By improving its own performance on climate change, theG20 can help the UN and its members spur progress on SDG 13 on climate change, and thus on other closely related SDGs.The G20 leaders at their summits should therefore make far more ambitious commitments on climate change, explicitly linkthem to sustainable development, SDG 13, other socio-economic SDGs, and the UN’s climate conference. They shouldalso foster more synergies between the UN’s SDG high level meetings, UN climate summits, and special climate summits,and recognize in their G20 communiqués the climate-related, shock-activated vulnerabilities of, and their socio-economicimpacts on, countries in and beyond the G20.
This article was submitted 07.02.2022 |
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53–67
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The European Union (EU) is getting ready for the implementation of СBAM — the world’s first carbon border adjustmentmechanism. This article explores the correlation between intra-European and international facets of СBAM as two sides ofthe same coin: while appending the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, it is equally an instrument of foreign trade, immediatelytouching upon EU relations with trade partners and specialized international organizations. Once such correlation is takeninto account, it becomes evident why the design of the European carbon levy remains capable of improvement as far as fightingclimate change goes.The concept of multilevel governance assists this research as the basis for analyzing СBAM. The institutionalist approachclarifies the specifics of the European carbon border adjustment mechanism. They are important in order to scopeout its true perspective. In particular, the MLG approach helps to expose the blurred lines between market regulation andtax policy in European governance practice.The ways, if any, that СBAM differs from a carbon tax and, at the same time, is similar to a carbon tariff are considered.A reappraisal made in the article of this hybrid measure makes it possible to draw a conclusion that, as envisioned bythe European Commission, it is meant to ensure more favourable conditions for investments in cost-intensive, low-carbontechnologies while suppressing competition from cheaper, high-carbon imports. At the same time, so as to avoid unleashingtrade wars, it is important for the Commission to assure the maximum possible conformity of СBAM to the World TradeOrganization’s (WTO) legal requirements. Compatibility with WTO law would enhance the ecological legitimacy of theregulatory mechanism in question. It would make sure that international partners would not regard СBAM as a form ofgreen protectionism.Further, the subtle aspects of preferences in terms of СBAM design are discussed, as held by the Commission, EUmember states, the European Parliament, and the representatives of European carbon-intensive industries. Particular attentionis paid to the discussion in the EU on the issue of connecting export rebates for inside producers to CBAM. This article was submitted 27.03.2023 |
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68–81
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In the face of climate and environmental problems caused by carbon emissions, China is taking positive actions, such aspromoting the achievement of the emission peak of traditional energy sources, accelerating the optimization of industrial andenergy structures, promoting and improving the construction of the national carbon trading market, increasing investmentand scientific research work to develop new energy sources, and several other actions. The administrative approach plays animportant role in the development of Chinaʼs low-carbon economy. The carbon trading system also greatly promotes energyconservation and emission reduction, contributes to attracting investment in low-carbon technology and transforming theenergy structure and is becoming an important policy guarantee for Chinaʼs carbon emission reduction. However, at thesame time, Chinaʼs carbon trading market faces many practical challenges. For China, the task of reducing carbon emissionsthrough carbon trading alone is unrealistic. Chinaʼs current actions on carbon taxation are not broad enough to regulateemission reductions. With the implementation of carbon trading, there is a need to establish a carbon tax as a policy optionto further strengthen the regulation of emission reduction. The introduction of a carbon tax should consider the relationshipbetween economic and social development and carbon reduction and coordinate the relationship between the carbon tax andcarbon trading system on various aspects, including the field and object of taxation, tax rates, use of tax revenue and therelationship between the authorities regulating the two policies, to leverage their complementary roles.
This article was submitted 27.01.2023 |
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82–105
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In recent years there was a significant of international structures that are being created as platforms for multilateral policydialogue on climate change issues outside the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).Such structures are, for example, the Major Economies Forum (MEF), the Petersberg Climate Dialogue, the on CleanEnergy Ministerial and a wide variety of partnerships. There is no common definition for such formats of cooperation andconceptual ground for understanding their place in international climate governance system. This includes both traditionalinterstate cooperation mechanisms embodied by the UNFCCC, as well as non-state initiatives, climate finance institutions,formats that support a constant dialogue between states, business representatives, academia, and NGOs on climate policyissues. The aim of the study was to clarify the nature of quasi-formal climate governance, to establish a typology and assessof the dynamics of development of quasi-formal entities to better understand the processes of its formation and implementation.I describe three types of quasi-formal entities from the new dataset of quasi-formal entities created in the period from2001–2022: intergovernmental forums, UNFCCC party groupings, and hybrid partnerships. The study reveals an increasein the number of political forums and hybrid partnerships amid stabilization or even reduction of negotiating blocs within theUNFCCC. In complex system of international climate governance, quasi-formal entities are playing an increasing role inthe accumulation and exchange of knowledge and experience between states on the implementation of the Paris Agreement.
The reported study was funded by RFBR, project number 21-514-12001.
This article was submitted 27.02.2023 |
New Institutes and Entrenched Cooperation Problems
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106–121
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With the Western Balkansʼ European integration completely stalled and its future uncertain, a new regional initiative waslaunched by Albania, Serbia and North Macedonia. Initially called Mini Schengen, it grew into the Open Balkan with anambitious goal to form a single market with unhindered movement of people, goods, services, and capital. Despite activeinvolvement of state leaders, the initiative lacks transparency, legal frameworks, and concrete plans to fulfill the strategicvision. It is also difficult to expect it to grow into a classic international organization given the failure to form an implementationbody. In addition, the U.S. only conditionally supports the Open Balkan by demanding the inclusion of all six WesternBalkan actors (which in practice proves to be impossible), while the European Union (EU) only cautiously welcomes activitiesleading to further regional integration, given that it initiated the competing Berlin process in 2014.This article examines the internal and external sustainability of the Open Balkan initiative, its prerequisites, andits projects. It also argues that without support from the U.S. and the EU, an authentic regional integration in the WesternBalkans is hardly feasible. Inter alia, the three countries have modest institutional capacities and incomparably small powerpotential. This article was prepared as part of the research project “Serbia and Challenges in InternationalRelations in 2023”, financed by the Ministry of Science, Technological Development and Innovation of the Republicof Serbia, and conducted by Institute of International Politics and Economics, during the year 2023.
This article was submitted 28.03.2023 |
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122–150
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The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) are two mega free trade agreements (FTAs) in the Asia and Pacific region. However, theireconomic interests are rather deeply divided and related to political and security issues. Trade conflicts between the U.S.and China have continued since 2018. To tackle Chinese expansion, the Biden administration initiated the Indo-PacificEconomic Framework (IPEF) in 2021 instead of returning to the CPTPP. This article reviews the two mega FTAs and theIPEF, as well as East Asian collaboration and competition in the region. It examines the East Asian countries’ economicinterests in participating in the mega FTAs and the IPEF and considers how to overcome the protectionism caused by thetrade conflicts between G2. Finally, it analyzes the roles and strategies of major economies overcoming protectionism as thenew global supply and value chains are reshaping in the region.
The article was submitted 31.10.2022 |
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151–177
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Increasingly expanding international requirements in the field of combating money laundering and terrorist financing(AML/CFT) force the public and financial sector to seek a balance between the rising costs of their implementation andsanctions threats for non-compliance. A number of scientific publications describe regional AML/CFT cooperation in theEuropean Union (EU) as an example of such a balance. Some EU countries coordinate their actions within the frameworkof the Financial Action Tasks Force on Money Laundering (FATF), which is the methodological centre of the global antimoneylaundering movement. Russia is a member of the FATF and its two regional groups: Moneyval, organized by theCouncil of Europe, and the Eurasian Group (EAG) initiated by Russia itself, which unites Russiaʼs neighbouring, mainlyAsian, countries. This study covers the results of assessments of compliance by EU and EAG countries with FATF requirementsin order to study approaches to AML/CFT regional cooperation and to identify problems arising in this process andprospects for international cooperation. The methods of comparative and graphical analysis were used. The authors showthat deep regional integration of lawmaking is not in itself a fundamental factor in achieving equally high rates of compliancewith FATF requirements. Indifference to matters of monitoring compliance with approved regional anti-money launderingstandards allows particular EU countries to act in the national interest, contrary to the 40 FATF recommendations and thegoals of the global AML/CFT regime. On the contrary, the EAG countries demonstrate steady progress in the introductionof legislation and practical implementation of FATF requirements, which indicates their collective awareness of the benefitsfrom financial information transparency and the possibility of exchanging this information at the international level.
This article was submitted on 05.02.2023 |
Strategic Narratives and New Reality
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178–192
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Power in international relations implies not only the possession of outstanding material resources, but also the ability to proposeand popularize attractive ideas, values, and norms and thus control discourse. Scholars note that during the presidencyof Xi Jinping, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has joined the struggle for discursive hegemony. This change in China’sforeign policy requires systematic study, for which the concept of a strategic narrative has analytical value. As defined byA. Miskimmon, B. O’Loughlin and L. Roselle, strategic narratives “are a means for political actors to construct a sharedmeaning of the past, present, and future of international politics to shape the behavior of domestic and international actors.”This article provides an overview of strategic narratives as a conceptual lens to study international relations, summarizesthe existing research of strategic narratives in general and regarding the Chinese case in particular, and suggestsdirections for future studies. The core idea of Chinese strategic narratives is that the PRC is a new type of great power that iscapable of changing the existing unjust and conflict-prone world order. At the same time, China does not propose to radicallyrevise the international system – it portrays the world as divided into great powers and the rest. Overall, China’s strategicnarratives are characterized by a duality that reflects the complexity of China’s foreign policy interests and its attempt toexpand the field of opportunity. Aimed to support different agendas, narratives include references both to the “century ofhumiliation” and the more recent successful experience of China’s modernization. The content of the narratives suggeststhat China is mainly trying to attract the developing countries of the Global South and thus form its own group of followers.However, there is significant variation in communication processes, namely the formation, projection, and reception ofChina’s strategic narratives. The study of this variation, as well as the analysis of the effectiveness of Chinese narratives, isa promising direction for future research. This work was supported by the Russian Science Foundation under grant no 23-28-00994, https://rscf.ru/project/23-28-00994/.
This article was submitted 20.03.2023
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