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2020. vol. 15. No. 1
Topic of the issue: Challenges and Opportunities of Cooperation for Sustainable Development
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7–30
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In recent decades, economic growth in developing economies and the growth of the middle class lead to a surge in energy consumption and greenhouse gas emissions. Within the framework of the United Nations (UN) sustainable development goals established in 2015, the solution to poverty and inequality thus comes into conflict with climate change mitigation. The existing international system of climate regulation does not address this contradiction. Today, global climate governance relies on estimates of aggregate emissions by countries without considering their level of development and the distribution of emissions among income groups within each country. Emissions from production are being monitored, while consumption-related emissions, albeit known to experts, rarely underlie decision-making. Meanwhile, income distribution has a higher impact on consumption-based emissions in comparison to production-based ones. Decisions on emissions regulation are made at the national level by countries with different development agendas in which climate change mitigation often gets less priority in comparison to other socio-economic objectives. This paper proposes a set of principles and specific mechanisms that can link climate change and inequality within a single policy framework. First, we highlight the need to modify the global emission monitoring system for the sake of accounting for emissions from consumption (rather than production) by income groups. Second, we suggest the introduction of a new redistribution system to address climate change which would include the imposition of a “fine” on households with the highest levels of emissions. Such a system follows the principles of progressive taxation but supports climate mitigation objectives and should be understood not as taxation of high incomes but rather as payment for a negative externality. Third, we outline the need to adjust climate finance criteria; priority should be given to projects designed to reduce carbon-intensive consumption by social groups entering the middle class, or to help the poorest population groups adapt to climate change. A special role in the implementation of these principles may belong to BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), which may view this as an opportunity for a proactive transition to inclusive, low-carbon development. |
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31–62
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The growth of the digital economy has become the most significant trend in global development. The digital economy creates new impetuses for economic growth, but at the same time it deepens global inequality and impacts the growth of countries of the global South. The role of global governance institutions such as the BRICS grouping of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa — the main representative of developing countries in global governance — in the promotion of digital growth has not yet been fully explored. There is also some ambiguity concerning the development level of the digital economy in particular countries. In the context of Russia’s third BRICS presidency in 2020, issues of digital development in BRICS have become particularly relevant. The author analyzes current indicators of digital development in the BRICS countries, drawing on several existing methodologies, ratings, and decisions made by BRICS on issues of digital growth and levels of compliance, and makes recommendations for the further development of BRICS’ digital agenda. According to data provided by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), the World Bank, the World Economic Forum (WEF), the European Union (EU) and the International Development Institute (IDI), the BRICS countries differ in terms of the maturity of their digital economies. They are characterized by a relatively low quality and affordability of digital infrastructure; additionally, the penetration of information and communications technology (ICT) into business and daily activities in BRICS countries lags behind the world leaders, and data on the quality and efficiency of regulatory and innovative frameworks in the BRICS countries is insufficient. However, decisions made by BRICS on matters of digital growth are followed with a high-average level of compliance. Thus, recommendations for the further development of BRICS’ digital agenda are strategic in nature. The author defines three promising areas of cooperation on digital matters during Russia’s 2020 BRICS presidency: facilitation of dialog and exchange of best practices supporting digital growth; development of a common BRICS standard offor the production of digital goods and services and; promotion of a common BRICS position on cybersecurity issues |
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63–83
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The article discusses current trends in the Russian practice of international development assistance (IDA). Despite international isolation, the Russian government continued to increase its allocations for official development assistance (ODA), which, from 2015, amount to about USD1 billion annually. The author identifies key problems in the field of IDA related to monitoring and evaluation, the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and interaction with the business sector. The author describes the actions of the government in its quest to solve these problems. Special emphasis is placed on a comparative analysis of the SDG indicators with indicators of national development goals until 2024. This makes it possible to link Russian goals with international priorities. The theoretical basis of this study is the ‘systemic change’ and ‘scaling up approach’, which are often used in research on development economics. A “large-scale approach” allows us to measure the scale of Russia's participation in construction and installation work in terms of the number of allocated resources, the number of stakeholders involved, geographical coverage, etc. The “systemic change” approach explains how Russia's development cooperation activities are aligned with national goals and the SDGs, as well as the transformation in the structure and dynamics of the system, which leads to an impact on the material conditions or behavior of stakeholders. In conclusion, the author reflects on the prospects for the creation of a national monitoring and evaluation system in the area of IDA, as well as on the possibilities of contributing to the achievement of the SDGs by 2030. One of the directions could be increased participation in the formation of new international development institutions, including the creation of the New Development Bank (NDB) and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) along with the expansion of bilateral programs in the field of international development assistance. |
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84–119
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Implementation of the sustainable development goals (SDGs) is one of the key elements of the current international agenda. But some countries, in particular, the least developed countries (LDCs), face serious difficulties in doing so. Such states have very limited internal resources and cannot ensure their own development; as such, they require the involvement of more developed states. Therefore, a key factor to ensure sustainable development is the facilitation and widening of trade and investment cooperation with partners that can provide financing support for the most urgent investment gaps, demand for export products, and imports of necessary goods and services. Traditional collaboration models with partners from developed countries cannot fully meet the needs of the LDCs in the current international context. This situation provides windows of opportunity as new power centres pursue their economic and political goals. China (PRC) has a special place among these emerging powers. This article analyzes the economic cooperation of China with its 10 key trade partners among the LDCs (LDCs-10). The author suggests various rationales for the PRC’s cooperation with the LDCs, examines the importance of this cooperation for achieving the SDGs, and presents an applied methodology. The first part of the article covers the particularities and general assessment of China’s development finance. The author then analyzes the main aspects of China’s trade policy and its trade and economic cooperation with the LDCs-10. In conclusion, the author considers the dynamics of the key indicators of socio-economic and political development of the PRC and the LDCs-10 and evaluates the relative effectiveness and efficiency of their cooperation through the prism of the SDGs’ implementation. |
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120–134
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Despite efforts by the international community to curb international terrorism, it remains one of the main threats to international security. A main reason for this is that international terrorism has significant financial inflows and their routes transform faster than the international countermeasures designed to stop them. The aim of this article is to identify existing and potential financial channels. The authors analyze antiterrorist legislation to define the theoretical and legal framework for this research and draw on empirical content from the reports of international organizations, the Group of 20 (G20), the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation, and others. This article shows that the main sources of terrorism financing include taxes paid by foreign enterprises functioning in the occupied lands, taxes paid by local populations, profits from resource and goods trade, captured treasures trade, payments from non-governmental organizations, and financial fraud. The authors discuss the role of cryptocurrencies in international terrorism financing and note that while foreign experts deny the possibility and feasibility of their usage, Russians take an opposite view. The authors conclude that the Russian arguments should be heard and carefully considered by the international community. The Russian Federation has significant experience fighting terrorism. For this reason, the authors recommend that the G20 and other international organizations pay more attention to this issue and work out international standards to counter the use of cryptocurrencies by terrorists |
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135–154
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By the end of XX–the beginning of XXI century the importance of humanitarian and social issues in the world has sharply increased. Humanitarian and social means began to be intensively included in military and economic actions and play a significant independent role. As a result, there was an increase in the importance of “soft security” aspects, and an expansion of this field. This has affected the UN Security Council, which began to pay more attention to humanitarian and social issues, which was demonstrated with the statistical method. The range of humanitarian issues discussed by the Security Council and the list of actors sponsoring resolutions on humanitarian issues has expanded. In the late 1990s–early 2000s the Council begins to consider large amount of humanitarian issues: security issues of individuals in armed conflicts (civilians, children, women, UN and humanitarian personnel); civilian aspects of conflict management and peacebuilding; and separate issues of “soft security” (humanitarian assistance and such “soft threats” to security as HIV/AIDS epidemics, food crises and climate change). In addition, the Council also addresses human rights violations. The promotion of humanitarian issues in the Council on separate occasions was facilitated by high-ranking officials who put a premium on humanitarian issues; various UN bodies and organizations, mainly with humanitarian mandates; some non-permanent members of the Security Council who wanted to leave their mark in the Council’s history; various NGOs. In turn, some countries opposed the adoption of measures that they consider to be within the internal competence of their states. At the same time, the expansion of humanitarian and social problems in the world poses a dilemma for the Security Council: whether to include the entire range of these issues on the agenda, or it is beyond the scope of the Council’s mandate. There is no definite answer here. On the one hand, the world is moving along the path of strengthening humanitarian problems and its ever-greater involvement in security issues. On the other hand, an expanded interpretation of security can impede the work of the Council. |
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155–176
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The history of the millennium development goals (MDGs), the achievement of which experienced a major setback with the outbreak of the 2008 global economic and financial crisis, may provide some useful insights on the global partnership for the sustainable development goals (SDGs). There is a vast literature devoted to the MDGs. Most of the analysis is focused on the implementation and progress made toward achieving the MDGs. Fewer authors explore reasons for shortfalls or describe intrinsic limitations to the MDG framework, including limitations in the development, formulation and content of the MDGs themselves. This article reviews cooperation on the MDGs, exploring the priorities of different stakeholders and the challenges to progress inthe broader context of development and global governance.The review focuses on MDG 8, developing a global partnership for development. Added to the MDGs due to Kofi Annan’s leadership, MDG 8 helped to attract support from developing countries which viewed the MDGs as reflecting a one-sided deal favouring the interests of rich countries. Inclusion of the goal to reform the international economic system appeased some critics of the international development goals that were put forward by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and taken as the basis for the MDGs. This article argues that despite the endeavour by the United Nations (UN) General Assembly to steer the development of global partnerships, extrinsic barriers such as lack of political will on the part of the key stakeholders, the financial crisis, and vested interests prevented deliveryon MDG 8’s key target ofdeveloping an open, predictable, rule-based, non-discriminatory trading and economic system. Achievement of this goal is necessary in order to create the equitable and inclusive international order demanded by developing countries for decades. Most markedly, a lack of progress on MDG 8’s goal of addressing systemic issues of global economic governance became the greatest challenge to achieving the MDGs, and the greatest disappointment. Systemic problems were inherited by the SDGs, the achievement of which requires a truly global partnership able to build a new economic order as a foundation for inclusive and sustainable development. This review draws on content analysis of General Assembly resolutions and the official records of its 55th to 70th sessions, documents from the three conferences on financing for development, the crisis summit, reports on MDG results, and public statements and analytical narratives about the MDGs |
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177–189
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This article analyzes Macedonian foreign policy during the process of joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). We use a modified version of Robert Putnam’s multi-level game concept to show the role of domestic actors in determining Macedonian foreign policy. Based on an analysis of the interactions between the main domestic actors, we identify the reasons for the rapid resolution, after a long pause, of the question of Macedonia’s name and membership in NATO. We use a case-study approach and analyze the available data on the ratio of actors within the existing institutions, key events in the political struggle, and programmes through which the parties formulated foreign policy options. Further, we note the reasons for Greece’s concessions using the concept of multi-level games. We identify a number of important conditions for the formulation of Greece’s position: it is important which party controls the cabinet, whether ruling party coalition partners are ready to support the actions of the cabinet, and whether the actions of the cabinet meet the ideological expectations of other parties. We conclude that three simultaneous conditions made it possible for Macedonia to presently be on the verge of accession to NATO. First, Macedonia’s cabinet was formed by a party ready to accept Greece’s conditions. Second, the party opposed to the country’s renaming occupied less than one third of the seats, making a constitutional majority in the assembly possible. Third, because Macedonian bloc alliances are weak, allies of the anti-renaming party were willing to go against the party forming the bloc. |
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190–195
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The review covers the 2018 IMF working paper “Borrowing Costs and The Role of Multilateral Development Banks: Evidence from Cross-Border Syndicated Bank Lending.” It is acknowledged that cross-border bank lending is becoming an increasingly important source of external financing for developing countries and therefore can play a key role in infrastructure development. The working paper examines the impact of participation by multilateral development banks (MDBs) in loan syndicates on the terms of loan deals, with a particular emphasis on loan pricing. The results of the study show that MDB participation is associated with higher borrowing costs and longer maturities, indicating a greater willingness on the part of MDBs to finance projects with higher risks which may otherwise be unattractive to private investors. In addition, MDB participation is associated with lower spreads for riskier borrowers compared to similar loans from private banks. The authors show that MDBs can help mobilize private investment in developing countries, including in infrastructure, through risk mitigation. |
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