2016. vol. 11. No. 3

Various commentators often contrapose emerging development donors to the traditional ones on a number of factors including aid effectiveness. While such distinction can be productive for analyzing development assistance at a global level, it might bring less value when considering development aid milieu at a local level. In this article the author considersthe case of Kyrgyzstan and its main aid donors based on select criteria set out by the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation. It draws on an analysis of databases, official documents, open sources including media and the country’s National Sustainable Development Strategy for 2013–2017. It concludes that traditional and emerging donors do not represent homogeneous groups; for Kyrgyzstan, differences within the group can be as significant as differences among the groups. Moreover, the analysis does not support the notion that assistance from traditional donors has greater effectiveness. On some parameters including alignment emerging donors’ assistance can be more effective. Nonetheless, serious gaps between the two groups remain in terms of transparency, mutual accountability and harmonization. The author also explores the stronger bargaining positions of aid recipient in their interactions with donors due to the increased diversity of sources of assistance, focusing on this trend in Kyrgyzstan. Given Kyrgyzstan’s position as a priority for Russia’s assistance and Russia’s rapidly increasing levels of support, the author also addresses the case of Russian-Kyrgyz Development Fundin detail.

In the modern globalized world, the international relations landscape is like a cake decorated with powder and other toppings. The international agenda is determined by the traditional actors – states (“flour, milk and other ingredients without which the cake could not be baked”) as set out in the theory of liberal intergovernmentalism. But a large number of non-governmental actors (“the decorative powder and toppings, but the cake is edible without them”) present their proposals and initiatives to the states, which states reflect on in their official documents. These proposals and initiatives tend to be mainly aligned with the states’ policies. This dialogue is important in making the international decision-making process legitimate, but does not mean that non-governmental actors are fully engaged in designing the international cooperation agenda. In this article the author tests this hypothesis through studying the APEC Business Advisory Council (ABAC).The author explores how the Asia-Pacific business priorities promoted by ABAC since its establishment in 1996 correspond with the key objectives and policies of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum as well as ABAC’s internal and external communication model to access the ABAC actorness. The official ABAC and APEC documents constituted the evidence base for the analysis. Research methods include qualitative content and comparative historical analyses. The author concludes that ABAC has the characteristics of a formal actor in Asia-Pacific regional governance. It could therefore be considered a full-fledged partner in the APEC leaders’ documents although ABAC has no capacity to change the regional agenda. From an economic perspective, this phenomenon could be explained by the fact that the states and businesses in the region have common interests because states need business-led growth and business needs the robust competition that trade and investment liberalization can provide.

In May 2015, Russia and China coordinated their activities in Central Asia and decided to connect the Eurasian EconomicUnion (EEU) and the Silk Road Economic Belt. This decision seemed to prevent unnecessary competition between these two basically non-conflicting projects. However, in time there appeared a lack of understanding of this combined endeavour and its implementation mechanisms. It is still unclear how further dialogue between the EEU and the Silk Road will proceed. There is no consensuson the participation of the EEU members and the Eurasian Economic Commission. Without a clear strategy, the Russian-Chinese agreement has started to lose momentum. Some non-regional players can benefit from this – of course, in their own interests.This articles attempt to explain the threats posed by delay and inaction in the combined EEU and Silk Road projects, and to describe the potential benefits of actively implementing the combination. It then proposes a concrete format for such a combination, its priority areas, as well as mechanisms for implementation.

The authors analyze current trends in multilateral international cooperation determined by the global stagnation and the changing role of developing countries that reflects their growing political and economic potential compared to developed countries. China is one of the leading actors in the process of modernization of the multilateral cooperation. The authors examine the scale and potential influence of two China-led multilateral cooperation and development initiatives in Eurasia: the Silk Road Economic Belt and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). These initiatives imply a new kind of initiator different from the traditional participant in international multilateral initiatives. China’s growing global role has reached a qualitatively new stage related to the fact that the country has moved into first place among world economies and has accumulated significant financial resources, although per capita income remains relatively low. Furthermore, China’s internationalization model has required it to be more actively involved in the global governance system as a responsible super power. The awareness to address important issues of economic growth, sustainable development and the provision of global public goods forces China to go beyond the standard profit-seeking trade and investment models of internationalization.The explication of its enormous economic potential at the regional (African, Asian and Latin American) and global levels directly or indirectly contradicts the interests of the leading developed and developing countries concerning foreign markets, mineral resources access and political influence in Eurasia. The authors offer an objective assessment of the potential impact of the Silk Road Economic Belt and AIIB on the associated national economies. The Silk Road Economic Belt is an integral part of the “One Belt and One Road” project and involves the construction of transport and logistics infrastructure from East to West across the Eurasian continent. It will be implemented through traditional Chinese economic diplomacy using preferential or free trade agreements with participating countries and funding conditional on the procurement of Chinese infrastructure goods or access to raw materials in the borrowing countries. The AIIB is a regional bank for reconstruction and development promoted by China together with European countries in support of the Silk Road Economic Belt. Based on an analysis of expert opinions and official statements as well as the system of banks for reconstruction and development in Eurasia, the authors conclude that China is making exceptional organizational and financial efforts for its economic expansion into the Eurasian continent using a hybrid model of cooperation and development.

This article explores the internal and external factors influencing the compliance performance of the Group of 20 (G20) and the BRICS. The authors start with an overview of the G20 and BRICS compliance patterns using comparative data onthe number of commitments made by the two institutions, the level of institutional compliance, and distribution of commitments and compliance across issue areas. G20 compliance is traced since the leaders’ first 2008 summit in Washington. The BRICS compliance performance record includes data since the third stand alone summit in Sanya in 2011.The study then takes stock of compliance catalysts embedded in the summits’ discourse: priority placements, numerical targets, timelines, self-accountability pledges and mandates to implement and/or monitor implementation. The authors review trends in the use of catalysts in different years and issue areas and identify commonalities and differences.The analysis then turns to external causes of compliance and focuses on demand for collective actions and members’ collective power to respond and deliver on their pledges. Here the study explores whether the self-accountability mechanisms created by the institutions in response to the demand for effectiveness and legitimacy facilitate compliance.The article concludes by highlighting catalysts, causes of compliance and their combinations with the greatest power to encourage implementation, explaining trends in G20 and BRICS compliance performance. The data sets on G20 and BRICS differ in terms of scale. The G20 data set contains 1,511 commitments of which 114 have been monitored, and the BRICS data set contains 231 commitments of which 23 have been monitored.

In this article the author focuses on the recently established New Development Bank (NDB) and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). It identifies two factors of demand for this new model of multilateral development banks (MDBs), namely a lack of infrastructure financing and the aspirations of developing countries for a greater role in the global financial system. The author also compares the NDB and AIIB according to membership, management structure, distribution of capital and votes, and options for attracting capital in the financial market. Based on this comparison, he forecasts the banks’ credit portfolios growth until 2025. The author concludes that both institutions should accumulate and use the best practices of existing MDBs, improve their image to attract investors and actively engage in sharing expertise and co-financing projects with development institutions as well as commercial banks. By doing so, the volume of their operations could reach $40 billion per year in 10 years, which is close to the volume of infrastructure financing provided by major traditional banks, and could contribute substantially to addressing the financing needs of developing countries.

In this article, the author presents an empirical study of sustainable banking in China and examines the flagship China DevelopmentBank (CDB). The CDB is directly supervised by the State Council of the People’s Republic of China and is one ofthe largest state-owned financial institutions in the country. Its overseas lending is growing rapidly; it increasingly acts as aglobal player, influenced by a variety of international actors. Using the mercantilist framework, the author investigates how the CDB’s social policies diverge from those set by the Chinese authorities. The analysis discusses CDB’s policy variations that are not in line with government interests or prescribed directly by governmental bodies. It concludes that the bank has been active in developing and establishing its own corporate strategy for implementing the concept of sustainable development to promote a balanced development of the economy, society and the environment. That strategy contains the norms and rules set by Chinese regulatory agencies with regard to social and environmental areas, as well as important elements ofthe international practice of corporate responsibility and sustainable funding. The CDB is most likely driven by its desire tobe considered internationally a good corporate citizen and often acts independently from governmental guidance, which insome sense undermines mercantilist perceptions.

For 70 years the United Nations has not fully clarified what kind of decision constitutes a resolution made by its Security Council (UNSC) under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. When is a resolution legitimate and when does it extend beyond the UNSC’s mandate? Can a resolution be mandatory as well as supplementary, or can it change the norms of international law, which operate outside the UN. The vast majority of resolutions are intended to solve a specific situation that threatens international peace and security. Russian and foreign scholars refer to the same documents and decisions of international judicial bodies, but interpret them differently. In this article the author analyzes arguments about the existence of the UNSC’s legislative powers, using a comparative analysis formulated for this purpose. Obligations arising from article 25 of the Charter apply only to UNSC decisions adopted for implementing or controlling existing norms of international law and not newly formulated norms. Article 103 is intended for obligations under the UNCharter, and not for acts made pursuant to basic documents. The Charter does not allow the UNSC to make decisions that require acts and at the same time add or modify international law. The UNSC can create subsidiary bodies that extend the scope of discussions related to threats to peace and security, but cannot change the limits of the use of enforcement measures under articles 41 and 42. The Counter-Terrorism Committee, created by Resolution 1373 (2001), supports UN members’ sovereign efforts to prevent terrorism and the 1540 Committee helps members prevent the trafficking of nuclear material and the use of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons. There is no evidence of any customary rule of international law based on UNSC decisions. The author refutes the claim that Resolutions 1373 (2001) and 1540 (2004) support the universal agreement associated with the Counter-Terrorism Committee or the 1540 Committee. The only undisputed basis for the UNSC making normative decisions is article 43, which grants the power to make international treaties. However, in practice the UNSC does not use this provision.The author concludes that the best way to clarify the UNSC’s true legal position, limits and the basis of its activities under Chapter VII to determine the principles and criteria that guide its authority, which allow it to grant permission for the use of force, is to hold a special session of the UN General Assembly.