This article explores the internal and external factors influencing the compliance performance of the Group of 20 (G20) and the BRICS. The authors start with an overview of the G20 and BRICS compliance patterns using comparative data onthe number of commitments made by the two institutions, the level of institutional compliance, and distribution of commitments and compliance across issue areas. G20 compliance is traced since the leaders’ first 2008 summit in Washington. The BRICS compliance performance record includes data since the third stand alone summit in Sanya in 2011.The study then takes stock of compliance catalysts embedded in the summits’ discourse: priority placements, numerical targets, timelines, self-accountability pledges and mandates to implement and/or monitor implementation. The authors review trends in the use of catalysts in different years and issue areas and identify commonalities and differences.The analysis then turns to external causes of compliance and focuses on demand for collective actions and members’ collective power to respond and deliver on their pledges. Here the study explores whether the self-accountability mechanisms created by the institutions in response to the demand for effectiveness and legitimacy facilitate compliance.The article concludes by highlighting catalysts, causes of compliance and their combinations with the greatest power to encourage implementation, explaining trends in G20 and BRICS compliance performance. The data sets on G20 and BRICS differ in terms of scale. The G20 data set contains 1,511 commitments of which 114 have been monitored, and the BRICS data set contains 231 commitments of which 23 have been monitored.