2016. vol. 11. No. 1

The fraught history of energy governance means that despite the oil shocks of the 1970s and ongoing resource price volatility, today there are no effective global mechanisms for cooperation between energy -producing and energy-consuming countries. Furthermore, there are two conflicting challenges at the heart of energy governance — ensuring energy access for all and transitioning to a low-carbon future.

This article argues that the current global energy institutions are illequipped to provide the impetus for energy governance cooperation, and the solution will have to come from collective political will at the leader level. The Group of 20 (G20) could be part of the solution as the economic forum for the world’s largest advanced and emerging economies, including both energy producers and consumers.

The article gives a brief history of energy governance and the institutions that emerged in the second half of the 20th century. It explores the strengths and weaknesses of each institution, including the well-established International Energy Agency (IEA) and Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, as well as more recent players such as the International Energy Forum and the International Renewable Energy Agency. It goes on to explain how the lack of progress in reaching global solutions led to G20 interest in energy governance, and what that forum has achieved on energy cooperation so far, notably the G20 Principles on Energy Collaboration in 2014 and the meeting of G20 energy ministers in 2015.

The article focuses mainly on how the G20 can progress the energy governance agenda, and what pragmatic options are available for the forum. In particular, it discusses how the G20 might spearhead reform of the IEA, support new initiatives and pursue a new platform for discussion within the G20.

This article presents the results of an integrated study of the current state of the natural gas market in Europe and its prospective development. It examines energy policy, demand, the competitive ability of gas suppliers, and the dynamics of external supply. It focuses especially on the impact of the European Union’s current and prospective gas market legislation, which, in effect, forms a radically different gas market architecture and changes the operating conditions for all gas suppliers, including Russia. In order to assess market stability, the article evaluates future changes in the European market using economic and mathematical optimization modelling as well as the influence of various external and internal factors on the market. It offers conclusions on the priority aspects of energy policy that apply to Russian gas exports to Europe.

The end of the commodity boom in 2012 once again exposed Indonesia to the vulnerability of the commodity price shocks. This article reviews how Indonesia managed its natural resources in 2001–12 and when the commodity boom ends. What are the lessons learned? Indonesia’s experience is similar to that of other countries  rich in natural resources, including the crowding-out of non-commodity sectors, protectionist trade regimes, fiscal inefficiency, slow skill accumulation, rising inequality and environmental damages. In the aftermath of the global financial crisis of 2008–09, the early trade -policy response at the end of the commodity boom is inward-looking and protective of domestic markets and industries and aims to increase the added value of commodities by downstreaming. This trend is clearly reflected in the 2014 Trade Law, the 2014 Industry Law and the mineral export ban, which was introduced in 2009 through the 2009 Law on Mining of Coal and Minerals and took effect in 2014. Indonesia should learn from other countries in managing its resource revenues, such as through a commodity fund designed to fit its domestic specificity. Reindustrializing, increasing agricultural productivity beyond palm oil and tapping the country’s potential in the services sector including tourism and creative industries are also necessary to promote diversification in production and trade. Resource management policy should also include stronger environmental regulations.

China retains a bilateral and regional cooperation approach or a geopolitical strategy to secure its energy security, while it seeks to embrace global energy governance and more actively participate in global climate change negotiations. It has also been focusing on developing clean and renewable energy since early in the 21st century. China’s new Belt and Road initiative contributes to a 2.0 version of its current geopolitical strategy to secure its energy supply. Although China’s emphasis on energy security still corresponds to its geopolitical strategy, its weak participation in global energy governance is due to the fragmented global energy governance system that it sees as neither authoritative nor credible, as well as to the lack of willingness or impetus for its own domestic energy institutions to join the system. Taking into account the difficulties and potential of current global energy governance, this article suggests it is reasonable to seek a limited goal for coordinating regimes instead of creating coercive institutions in this field. Attainable goals in the near future should focus on promoting a transparent international market and establishing data-sharing mechanisms between governments and energy intergovernmental organizations and between producers and consumers. There should be emphasis on climate change and clean energy governance under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. The Group of 20 (G20) of  should play an increasingly significant role in global energy governance. China, with its positive attitude and active participation in the G20 and as host of the G20 summit in 2016, should participate more actively, perhaps even playing a leading role in global energy governance under the G20 framework.

This article considers the interconnection between the institutional change in the sphere of security and China’s smart power in the Asia-Pacific region. It explores the practical dimension of China’s smart power in the region after the Cold War, and analyzes the multilateral interaction on security issues in the Association of the Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN). The appropriate mechanisms in which all the major actors participate are the basis and essence of the macro regional security architecture. This article identifies the links between China’s smart power and the macro regional security institutionalization. It begins by describing the ideological dimension of Chinese foreign policy since the establishment of the People’s Republic. It considers the main theoretical concept constituting China’s international strategy and its economical methods of spreading soft power in the Asia-Pacific region. It goes on to analyze the process of multilateral interaction in macro regional security after the Cold War, recognizing that despite the promotion of cooperation in non-traditional security issues there are still challenges for China, the United States and ASEAN in the realm of traditional security. Moreover, the effective and efficient use of smart power in the ASEAN mechanisms helps China counteract the efforts of other countries in the region to limit its politics. The article concludes that regional multilateral security institutions have reached their limit of effectiveness due to their design and the politics of the main actors. To sustain an acceptable level of security in the region, all participants need to develop new institutions or radically reorganize the existing ones.

Recent decades have witnessed dramatic changes all over the world. One major trend is the proliferation and diversification of actors, forums and their arrangements to address global governance challenges, which has led to fragmentation in global governance. However, such contested multilateralism has a positive dimension, as the emergence of informal multilateral institutions claiming a major role in defining the global governance agenda creates alternatives for providing common goods. New arrangements acquire their own actorness and place in the system of global governance. In certain policy areas, there is a clear trend for the new summit institutions’ leadership. The most visible recent cases include the Group of 20 (G20), the BRICS group of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, with APEC gaining importance regionally and globally. These new informal groupings work on their own agenda. They also engage with established international organizations to steer global governance processes. Taken together, the transformative trends in international relations, the emergence of new actors, tensions between exclusive and inclusive clubs, and demands for the legitimacy and effectiveness of the international institutions define the relevance of the study, systematization and comparative analysis of the effectiveness of this model of cooperation among international institutions. This article builds an analytical framework by undertaking three tasks. It first reviews the key concepts. Second, it argues for a rational choice institutionalist approach. Third, it puts forward a hypothesis for research: to compensate for their inefficiencies, summit institutions engage with other international organizations in a mode they regard most efficient for attainment of their goals. The modes of those institutions’ engagement with other international organizations as reflected in the leaders’ discourse should thus indicate the role of those institutions in the global governance architecture, which is imputed at their launch and subsequent evolution. The hypothesis further suggests that the “governing in alliance” mode enhances the effectiveness of the summit institutions; however, those institutions’ use is not mutually exclusive. The modes of engagement with international institutions coexist in the engagement of informal summit institutions with other international organizations. The choice is defined by the policy area and type of organizations. The article concludes with a case study of BRICS engagement with international institutions. The results confirm that the choice of engagement model reflects the forum’s role and place in the global governance architecture. To maximize benefits from cooperation, the BRICS engages with relevant international organizations on agenda priorities at different institutional levels. Two types of engagement are typical for the BRICS: catalytic engagement (exerting an influence for changes in international organizations through endorsement or stimulus, or compelling them to reform) and parallel treatment (creation of the institution’s own mechanisms). By establishing new institutions, the BRICS consistently strengthens its cooperation with other international institutions. Its choice of model depends on the policy area, where it is developing cooperation and the perception of the organization’s relevance to BRICS objectives. BRICS engagement with United Nations organizations and the World Trade Organization follows the model of catalytic influence, whereas with the G20, BRICS engagement based on the model of governance in alliance with multilateral institutions remained unrealized.