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2015. vol. 10. No. 1
Topic of the issue: Trends in International Cooperation
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Cooperation for Development
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7–30
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Research is now organized according to a global science system, articulated by English-language journals, that partly subsumes national systems and is the source of most innovation. To be effective, national science institutions must closely and continually engage in, and contribute to, this global system. “Science and technology in one country” is no longer a strategic option. Russian science is characterized by very low rates of publication, citations and joint international authorship, relative to system and university size. The total number of papers produced each year is declining. Only Lomonosov Moscow State University (LMSU) is ranked in the first 750 universities in the world on the volume of published science in English. Between 1995 and 2012, the number of internationally co-authored papers increased by 168% worldwide but 35% in Russia. The closed international door is a legacy of the Soviet period. The situation in Russia contrasts with the spectacular growth of science in China and East Asia, powered by active and focused states with a drive for internationalization. This article discusses the trajectory of East Asian science. While Russia cannot replicate the East Asian family or political culture, a vigorous internationalization policy would kick-start the transformation of national science. |
Instruments of Soft Power
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31–55
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Soviet, later Russian, relations with the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), notablyits Development Assistance Committee (DAC), have oscillated over the decades, along with profound shifts in the worldeconomic balance and in the relative strength of the Russian economy. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union rejectedMarshall Aid but later sought to join the OECD. While the OECD could have been a place to pursue East-West economicinterests and mutual benefits, political tensions limited the scope for collaboration. Toward the end of the Cold War, theSoviets sought increasing cooperation and this continued into the 1990s when the OECD played a key role in supportingthe former Soviet Union countries, especially the Russian Federation, and aiding their transition to a market economy. TheRussian Federation has since become a candidate for accession to the OECD, although this process has now been postponedbecause of political tensions related to Ukraine. This postponement does not preclude stronger collaboration in the area ofdevelopment cooperation.Development cooperation has been an area of both competitive and collaborative relations between the RussianFederation and OECD members. The DAC has its origins in U.S.-inspired attempts to counter the perceived threat of Sovietcommunist influence through aid by expanding and improving the collective aid effort of the West. The DAC collectedstatistics on Soviet bloc development assistance, the accuracy of which was always disputed, and succeeded in promotingonly limited in-country coordination between the Soviets and western donors. During the late 1980s, this began to change asthe Soviets struggled to maintain their development programs and sought ever more cooperation. Thereafter DAC membersbecame donors to the former Soviet Union. Twenty years later, the Russian Federation straddles a unique middle groundbetween developed and developing countries and has a re-emerging aid program. This article reviews Soviet/Russian-DACcooperation and suggests a 21st-century Russian- |
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56–79
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Russia’s system of international development assistance (IDA) is still in the making. Among other things there is a need toestablish a system to evaluate its effectiveness. Donors usually focus such evaluations on the results of individual projects andprograms. Today, the field of IDA as a whole or its specific policies are increasingly the object of evaluation, which raises thequestion of articulating the expected effect or a goal of IDA from the donor’s point of view.This article considers the relationship between the underlying purpose of IDA and its evaluation criteria based on areview of the goals of main donors as stated in their policies and criteria outlined in evaluation manuals. It compares thosefindings with related research results.Most donors use evaluation criteria related to the positive impact of IDA on the socioeconomic development ofrecipient countries. The declared goals of IDA include fighting poverty, supporting sustainable development, promotingrespect for human rights, and ensuring peace and security. At the same time, the donors’ political and economic interestsnever cease to play an important role. The global financial crisis has narrowed the gap between words and actions as manydonor countries must justify their IDA budgets to their taxpayers. Not only have the declared goals of IDA changed, butthe criteria for evaluation its effectiveness are also being reconsidered. Donors are now trying to assess the political andeconomic effectiveness of IDA for themselves. However, only a few countries manifest these changes and so it is still early tospeak of a common trend. |
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80–117
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This article considers the main features of the network of Confucius Institutes (CIs) and Confucius Classrooms (CCs)as an instrument of China’s soft power policy in Great Eastern Asia region. The first part examines linkages between thesoft power policy and the evolution of the existing system of international relations. It notes the importance of soft powerin preventing an erosion of state sovereignty and considers the model of spreading soft power as well as China’s officialapproach. The second part of the article considers the main principles and features of the CI and CC system and the majorpoints of its development. It analyzes the influence of the CI and CC headquarters on their development and function. Thethird part examines the main functions of CI and CC including education and other soft power ways to promote China. Thefourth part considers the network’s existing finance mechanisms. The fifth part analyzes the main methods of CI and CCwork and the reasons of their successful effectiveness. The sixth part examines the spread of the network in Great EasternAsia and the United States, including challenges and successes. In conclusion, the author summarizes the results of thisanalysis and offers recommendations to promote similar soft power mechanisms for Russia. |
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118–142
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This paper deals with history, evolution and working methods of Goethe-Institut – one of the key German soft power actors.It examines the institute’s activities following the main functions assigned to it by the German Ministry for Foreign Affairs(promoting German language and supporting cultural events) and provides a thorough study of Goethe-Institut’s projects in15 European, Asian, African, North and South American countries, namely in Argentina, Brazil, Great Britain, Germanyitself, Italy, India, Kazakhstan, China, Mexica, USA, Uzbekistan, Ukraine, France, South Africa, Japan. It has beendiscovered that forms and methods of work in the regions under investigation are generally similar. Specific features arecharacteristic of Great Britain, USA, Japan, India and South Africa only.This analysis allows to develop valuable recommendations for Russian cultural centres. The author argues thatplacing centres for learning Russian as a foreign language in small towns with vast historical and cultural heritage as well aswith developed infrastructure and good transport accessibility in Russia, using non-conventional and innovative languageand cultural interaction methods and partnering with other educational, scientific and cultural institutes – libraries,universities, foreign cultural centers, etc. – is crucial for Russian cultural centers as subjects of Russian soft power. |
Global Governance Development
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143–158
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This article outlines the main achievements and failures of the informal institutions such as the Group of Seven, Groupof Eight (G8), Group of 20(G20) and the BRICS group of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa in global andregional energy governance. While a plethora of different specialized and general institutions either promotes the interestsof segments of the participants in global energy interaction (such as the International Energy Agency or Organization ofPetroleum Exporting Countries) or tries to manage an aspect of the energy mix (hydrocarbons, alternative or renewables),none of the existing formal international organizations is able to perform the role of harmonizing the differing interestsof all those actors. The only existing organization that could potentially claim that function – the International EnergyForum – remains largely ineffective and without a proper mandate. At the same time, informal gatherings of the “club”type, while not able to fill in that gap, could at least generate consensus on the urgent steps to be taken to create a stable, fairand inclusive energy governance architecture. Since its recent action against Russia, the G8 has lost its possible influencein order to achieve that goal. The G20 thus seems to be the most appropriate forum, with BRICS within it being the mainengine for generating the necessary acceptable rules and providing a skeletal architecture for global energy governance andexisting formal institutions serving as the foundation for further progress. |
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159–181
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Deepening economic integration in Eurasia brings up issues of compliance with national development priorities andassessments of the impact of integration on economic development. This article examines the economic development prioritiesof the countries in the Eurasian Customs Union as determined in their national strategic documents. A comparative analysisof national long-term development goals reveals their conceptual similarity. Along with the relatively low likelihood of allstrategic goals being achieved, this analysis confirms the relevance of economic cooperation among Belarus, Kazakhstanand Russia within the Eurasian Economic Union. The implementation of cooperative measures will likely promote theachievement of national development goals by creating new opportunities and providing additional competitive advantagesto the residents of the countries. The author also proposes possible cooperative measures in the main fields of economicdevelopment: business and investment, modernization and innovation, energy, export, transportation, and internationalcooperation.In spite of the conceptual similarity among long-term development goals, the specific economic development indicatorsused in Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia are different. Therefore the tasks of comparing the effects of integration on economicdevelopment by country and determining appropriate cooperation measures require the development of an economic strategyfor the Eurasian Economic Union and the introduction of new comparable indicators into national strategic documents. |
Article and Book Reviews
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