2025. vol. 20. No. 2

The priorities of sustainable development remain relevant even in a difficult period of external restrictions and sanctionspressure for Russia. Since the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, a number of measures have been taken to lay thefoundation for long-term growth. The policy to build the foundations for long-term sustainable development continues – in2024, a new cycle of work to achieve national development goals began with a presidential decree – a Unified Plan fortheir achievement was adopted, existing state programs and national projects are being finalised and new ones are beinglaunched.
In this article, the current measures of the Russian Federation‘s public policy are reviewed for compliance with thegoals and objectives of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (2030 Agenda). The author analyses strategic planningdocuments and national projects of the Russian Federation, as well as the dynamics of statistical indicators in the keyareas of sustainability – social, economic and environmental.

The article examines how global financial crises and cataclysms that took place in the first quarter of the 21st century affectedthe corporate finance system. Such aspects of corporate finance as the internal control system, corporate governanceprinciples, risk assessment, management and financial reporting are considered. Based on the analysis of publicly availableinformation, statistical data and regulatory documents, the main changes in the above-mentioned areas of corporatefinance that took place after the bankruptcy of Enron in 2001, the crisis in the US mortgage market and the subsequentfinancial crisis of 2008, the impact of the sanctions since 2014, as well as the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic in2019 are identified.
Among the key factors that have influenced corporate finance, the following stand out: the growth in the number anddiversity of regulatory requirements and restrictions (management and monitoring of regulatory compliance has becomea separate and important area in corporate finance); a significant increase in the complexity and multifactorial nature offinancial models and various forms of reporting; a reduction in the “planning horizon”, and an increase in the speed ofbusiness response and readiness for constant and unexpected changes in strategy, operational management, restructuringand rapid adaptation of existing business processes and systems.

This article was submitted 19.07.2024

In the context of digitalisation, the issue of ensuring the security of individuals and the state from threats associated with theunlawful use of information and communication technologies (ICTs) has become particularly important. Despite measurestaken at both international and national levels aimed at preventing and mitigating the consequences of incidents involvingthe malicious use of ICTs – as well as the dissemination of skills and practices to protect against digital threats amongindividual businesses and citizens – the number of recorded cyber incidents and the associated costs continue to grow eachyear. Increasingly, representatives of government authorities and the academic community are voicing concerns about ICTsʼpotential for exerting destructive informational and psychological influence, as well as the risk of militarising ICTs andcyberspace. An important characteristic of modern digital threats is their ability to spread almost instantaneously and on alarge scale, elevating them to the level of global threats and requiring appropriate measures in response.
Russia is one of the key players in the emerging international regime for information security. Russia took the initiativeto launch multilateral negotiations on information security under the auspices of the United Nations and successfullyconveys its perspective on IIS (international information security) in global governance institutions, where it wields significantinfluence—particularly within the BRICS international grouping. In light of the expansion of BRICS membership, theissue of comparing the member statesʼ priorities in the area of IIS has become especially relevant.
Based on the view of BRICSʼs position in the global governance system of IIS challenges as being one of the key informalnegotiating platforms, the author has set the following research objective: to formulate a set of recommendations aimedat making fuller use of the negotiation potential of an expanded BRICS in the process of shaping the international regime forinformation security. In the course of preparing this article, the author conducted a qualitative analysis of statements madeby representatives of BRICS member states during meetings of the UN Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) from 2021 to2025, which to date has been the most representative negotiating platform for IIS issues. Based on the results of this analysis,the convergent and divergent positions of BRIC S members regarding the key aspects of the IIS discussion were identified.These conclusions are supplemented by an examination of the positions of BRICS member states on issues related to theadoption of a UN Convention on Cybercrime.
This article also presents the results of a qualitative retrospective analysis of collective BRICS decisions on IIS issues.Decisions by BRICS leaders, adopted by consensus and recorded in final declarations, have been classified according to thethematic structure of the OEWG negotiations, enabling the author to determine the most in-demand and most challengingareas of cooperation within the groupingʼs IIS agenda. The recommendations developed as part of this study are provided inthe conclusion of the present work.

The article was written on the basis of the RANEPA state assignment research programme.

This article was submitted 29.11.2024.

This study aims to examine how Indonesia’s national interests were represented during its G20 Presidency 2022 through media framing, specifically investigating the balance between national and personal political agendas. By conducting a content analysis of online news articles from seven major Indonesian newspapers—Antara, CNBC Indonesia, CNN Indonesia, Detik, Kompas, Republika, and Tempo—the study explores patterns in media representing and issue prioritization. A total of 753 articles were initially collected, with 724 articles analysed after a careful selection process using MS Excel for manual coding. Findings reveal that Antara, the government-funded media, produced the highest volume of G20-related news articles among the sampled outlets. The study covered primarily centred on economic and socio-cultural themes, with less focus on pressing domestic issues such as inflation and public welfare, despite their direct relevance to public interests. This research highlights how national interests were framed through media narratives, often amplifying state-led success stories while minimizing critical perspectives on domestic challenges. Moreover, the study reveals how media dynamics – especially government-linked outlets – align closely with the administration’s messaging, raising concerns about political influence, limited freedom of expression, and media bias in Indonesia’s public discourse. These findings contribute to the broader understanding of how media framing can shape public perception of national interests during international events, particularly in contexts where political influences media narratives

This article was submitted 05.09.2024

The world is undergoing a period of de-globalisation, shifting the relative balance of power and changing inter-state relations,weakening international organisations due to the declining interest of key members towards effective agreements, andincreasing distrust in the capability of the international institutions to transform and perform effectively and independentlyfrom its majority shareholders. Global competition is intensifying, and a painful restructuring is reshaping approaches tocooperation. Leading world economies are adopting offensive protection policies to reclaim their competitiveness and secureleadership in defining the rules of the emerging economic order. While acting within a realist paradigm of realism, theycontinue to stick to the rhetoric of liberalism, and further amplify it.
The need to modernise global economic governance is feasible, broadly recognised and consistently reaffirmed in thedocuments issued by the UN, G20, BRICS, SCO, APEC and other international institutions. The key question is whetherthe renewed system will foster an equitable and effective economic order and inclusive cooperation aimed at generatingglobal public goods – or instead serve as a mechanism for exerting influence and coercion in the interests of certain countriesand alliances.
The article examines the G7 international initiatives grounded in the notion of economic security, aimed at reshapingthe existing international institutions and rules, establishing the G7-centered cooperation frameworks with like-mindedpartners, and countering strategic competitors unwilling to play by the G7 rules. The author outlines the risks stemming fromredefining trade and economic cooperation, as well as economic governance institutions under the banner of economic security,explores possible models for the future of economic governance, and proposes recommendations for BRICS cooperation.The study is based on content analysis of the G7 policy documents, statements by the G7 leaders, and expert assessments.

The article was written on the basis of the RANEPA state assignment research programme

This article was submitted 14.10.2024

This paper explores the potential of Open Strategic Autonomy to effectively foster industrial policies that boost EU competitivenessand growth. It investigates changes in the global economy and international order, with a focus on two keyconcepts: the “win-loseˮ reconfiguration of globalization and the resurgence of nations as “confrontational states,ˮ markedby interventionism, national sovereignty, technonationalism, and zero-sum thinking. Within this context, a “new industrialpolicyˮ is emerging, driven by a focus on economic autonomy and security. The paper analyzes the industrial strategies andlegislative measures adopted by major powers, which are largely designed to weaponize policymaking and internationaleconomic relations, including the use of tit-for-tat strategies. It situates the EU within this framework and questions thecompatibility and coherence between the emerging European measures inspired by new geo-dirigisme and the principlesof an open economy and multilateral cooperation. The conclusion provides criteria for assessing whether Open StrategicAutonomy can serve as a positive guide for industrial policies, rather than a detrimental one.

Sergio Mariotti (2024) “Open strategic autonomy” as an industrial policy compass for the EU competitiveness and growth: The good, the bad, or the ugly? Journal of Industrial and Business Economics. https://doi.org/10.1007/s40812-024-00327-y

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The confrontation with Russia over the conflict in Ukraine has led the European Union to increased dependence on NATO and the United States, which dominates the bloc. At the same time, a trend advocating for its “strategic independence” in the international arena has become more active in the EU. A number of representatives of this trend go further and call for the construction of a “Power Europe” that could become a world center of power, along with the United States and China. In this regard, special attention is paid to the creation of the EUʼs own military potential, which would be comparable to its economic and financial capabilities. Such a potential should be achieved by promoting “European autonomous defense”, which was initiated by the Maastricht Treaty of 1992. The article touches upon its historical and conceptual aspects, as well as the rather modest structural elements created in the 1990s and 2000s. It is noted that even they were able to appear thanks to the efforts of France, the most committed to the “European idea”, and the cautious but real support of its course from Germany. President Emmanuel Macron has proven himself to be the most consistent lobbyist for both the aforementioned “defense” and the idea of a “Power Europe”. The current situation on the continent has added supporters to him in the EU, but the prospects for the latter to achieve the cohesion necessary for implementation of this idea remain vague.

This Material was submitted27.11.2024