The increased sanctions efforts of European diplomacy in recent years have formed a new angle of view on the EuropeanUnionʼs external policy towards neighboring countries, since one of the criteria of the EUʼs sanctions policy effectiveness isthe so-called “regional leadership” – third countriesʼ alignment with the EU sanctions regimes. The established academicdiscourse on the topic in Europe evaluates the effectiveness of the sanctions policy on this parameter extremely highly.However, what, in fact, is behind the facade of the postulated successes of regional leadership? In this paper, the authorasks this question in relation to Iceland, a country that has increased vulnerability in the face of external challenges andwhich has incurred incomparably high costs from harmonizing its foreign policy with the EU anti-Russian sanctions regimes.Using the theoretical and methodological frameworks of the shelter theory, this study documents the negative political andeconomic consequences that Iceland has faced and shows that there are no such categories as consideration and leveling ofpossible costs for affiliated countries in the goal setting of the EU sanctions policy. In the Icelandic case, this, in turn, leadsto a reformatting and polarization of the existing ecosystem of relations in the Euro-Atlantic, since the costs Iceland incursfrom harmonization with EU policy are mostly compensated by the United States, although traditionally the U.S. has beenresponsible for Icelandʼs military rather than economic protection. The international political situation in the conditions ofsanctions sets the stage for possible tensions in Icelandʼs relations with the EU and a stronger U.S. direction in its multilateralforeign policy. Nevertheless, despite these tensions, Iceland will continue to synchronize with the EU sanctions regimes, asother options are either fraught with even greater costs (synchronization with the U.S. sanctions policy, which is substantiallytougher than that of the EU) or unrealizable in the international realities after the start of the Special Military Operation(developing its own sanctions regime).

This article was submitted on 14.04.2024