2020. vol. 15. No. 2

Assessment of the impact of COVID-19 on international institutions and international relations is essential for shaping global governance for the post COVID crisis world. The authors review the actions of the key international institutions in response to the pandemic undertaken in January-March 2020 reflecting on three questions. First, were the actions undertaken by the international institutions adequate, coordinated and timely? Second, could the outbreak have been contained if the global governance system was not in a state of severe strain, with many of the gaps exposed and reforms promised in the wake of the 2009 financial and economic crisis unfulfilled, its key causes unaddressed and unilateralism rising among its key members? In addition, was the COVID-19 crisis exacerbated by the crisis of multilateralism? Third, and most difficult, what is the future of global governance after the COVID-19 crisis ends? The analysis of international institutions performance three months into the crisis leads to authors to conclude that there have been inadequate actions to produce a timely, coordinated international response from all the major multilateral organizations and from the newer plurilateral summit institutions of the BRICS, G7 and G20. The failure of these global governance institutions was due not only to the severe strains from leading members’ unilateralism and competition, but from the very architecture designed in 1945 that now poorly matches intensely globalized world. Global governance in the post COVID world should not descend into the old war-prone balance of power, nor flow from a new Bretton Woods-San Francisco as in 1944–1945 but from an intensification and expansion of G20 governance that will generate and coordinate more comprehensive, stronger multilateral organizations for the benefit of all.

The rapid globalization of money, goods, services, taxation, knowledge, people, political ideas, digitalization, and especially pathogens and ecological pollutants has intensified, along with rising inequality, multipolarity, protectionism, isolationism and geopolitical tensions. Together these factors present new challenges to 21st century global governance led by the systemically significant states which make up the Group of Twenty (G20). G20 governance has expanded in response, but with more success on its old, incompletely globalized economic agenda than on its newer, more globalized digitalization, health pandemics and climate change agendas. The most recent G20 summit in Osaka, Japan on 28–29 June 2019 did make advances on tax and digitalization but not on the looming health risks and the existential threat of climate change. Preparations for the Saudi Arabian-hosted Riyadh summit, to be held on 21–22 November 2020, have made some progress on the latter amidst the unprecedented crisis posed by the COVID-19 pandemic. The crisis shows that the G20’s architecture needs to be further strengthened by institutionalizing G20 environment and health ministers’ meetings; inviting the executive heads of the United Nations (UN) bodies for climate change, biodiversity, the environment and health, as well as the leaders of key outside countries, to the summits; giving the UN and World Health Organization the same G20 status as the International Monetary Fund and World Bank; and holding a second annual summit at the UN each September focused on the sustainable development goals.

This article demonstrates how the Group of Twenty (G20) constituted a new G20 politics following the 2008–09 global financial crisis through practices of networked global economic governance. This increased the influence of actors other than officials from leading wealthy states, especially developing- and non-state actors, thus augmenting global governance inclusivity and decentralizing authority. The G20 became the principal hub of global economic governance by influencing and engaging with diverse stakeholders on its broad policy agenda. These networked-governance processes expanded aspects of multilateral cooperation, including transversal approaches to policy issues such as sustainable development. This analysis builds on recent literature on transnational actors, governance networks, and the G20; contributes to emerging constructivist literature on the normative significance of practices and social-relational processes in international relations; and includes a significant discourse-analytic focus on repoliticization and legitimizing discourses. This study indicates, in particular, the political and normative consequences of G20 inclusivity practices for integrating global governance networks.

Since the late 19th century, the international scene has witnessed several waves of globalization that have transformed regulation and cooperation between nations. The current wave – that economists have defined as “globalization 4.0” – is shaped by an industrial revolution that combines digital, physical and biological transformations. Digital technology has a deep structural impact on public and private goods such as health, education, transportation or energy, which changes the terms of the global condition. It disrupts both the organization of societies and the relation between individuals and globalization. Compared to previous waves of globalization, globalization 4.0 affects the international system and runs throughout the global social fabric by increasing throughout the world the level of inequalities and by triggering subsequent polarization and fragmentation. In this global context, our current modes of cooperation and regulation are facing growing issues of legitimacy and efficiency, that are not entirely new, but that are now becoming particularly acute. Those issues of legitimacy and efficiency are furthermore complicated by a shared experience of disconnection from globalization – the rise of the globalization’s so-called “left-behinds” – that could be characterized as a form of anomy at the international level. This complex challenge has not yet been fully embraced by the major institutions of global governance. There have been however responses at the sub-global level: connectivity politics, launched by China and followed by the European Union, is one illustration of the new paths that might be taken by global policy makers.

This article examines and explains the outreach activity of the BRICS group of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. We focus on two research puzzles: a) the motivations and b) the form and degree of the institutionalization of BRICS outreach. We define outreach as collaborative interaction among BRICS and other actors within and outside the BRICS area and focus on outreach to governments of non-BRICS countries and national top officials representing regional organizations. First, we offer a theoretical framework based on the experiences of the Group of 7/8 (G7/8) and the Group of 20 (G20), considering both commonalities and differences with BRICS. Second, we provide a detailed empirical analysis of BRICS outreach over time. Third, we explain BRICS outreach in light of the theoretical framework and enrich it based on our findings. Methodologically, we draw empirical information from official documents, news media and academic literature. We argue that the outreach activity of a major power grouping is reflective of its internal cohesion, as well as of how it defines its own position in the world and how it is perceived by others. This research offers a timely contribution to the ongoing debate on BRICS and the under-researched BRICS outreach process as a part of the overall institutionalization of BRICS.

With their growing economic power and international influence, the BRICS group of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa are paying increasing attention to international development assistance. Although the BRICS countries started later than western developed countries, the speed of their development is staggering and their share in foreign aid is gradually increasing. The BRICS countries continue to innovate forms of assistance and cooperation in their own international development assistance, to strengthen cooperation with recipient countries, and to plan their own foreign aid work through the establishment of relevant institutions and the publication of relevant documents. But, at the same time, the BRICS countries are facing certain challenges in the process of international development assistance. This article examines the historical practice of BRICS’ international development assistance, analyzes the role BRICS plays in international development assistance, and considers the future prospects for BRICS’ participation.

The many recent cyber incidents have shown how cybersecurity has entered the realm of international relations. Several international organizations have taken cybersecurity policy initiatives, notably the United Nations (UN) and the European Union (EU). Both organizations aspire to a leading role in enhancing cybersecurity resilience. To date, however, these initiatives have not resulted in much regulation. This article examines which factors make lawmaking and the regulation of cybersecurity difficult at the international level, and whether some of these impediments are shared at the EU legislative level. Are difficulties in regulating cybersecurity embedded in the normative processes at the UN or the EU, or are they inherent to the high-tech phenomenon of cyber? As for the UN, the article looks at the work of the UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGE). While previous reports of the UN GGE seemed to point to an emerging international opinio juris, recent developments in the UN General Assembly (UNGA) show a strongly divided international community. At the EU level, the article discusses the two main legislative initiatives on cybersecurity that have seen the light of day: the 2016 Directive on Network and Information Security and the 2019 Regulation on the EU Cybersecurity Act.

Nowadays the global financial system faces a triple challenge: the threat of a new systemic financial crisis at both global and regional levels; difficulties of constant adaptation of existing financial business and regulatory practices to intensive technological innovations; direct and hidden consequences of excessive political influence on the financial system through sanctions and selectively applied practices for sanction purposes. Improving the quality of financial regulation will require deeper cooperation between regulators of leading economies and a proactive position of the financial industry, as well as the decentralization of financial regulation. However, it is unlikely that this will happen at the global level. Financial stability became a key goal of global financial regulation in the post-crisis period. We consider financial stability as the «tragedy of commons». The article describes the main trends of financial markets regulation after the crisis: transformation of global financial architecture, anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financing practices (AML/ CT), financial sanctions. The article analyzes the existing failures of modern post-crisis financial regulation: credit crunch, reduction in the effectiveness of monetary policy, regulatory arbitrage, and increased compliance costs (AML/CT legislation, tax legislation, and the sanctions regime). In the future we expect simultaneous trends of harmonization and standardization of requirements in traditional sectors of financial markets (including traditional institutions of the shadow banking sector), but at the same time regulatory arbitrage1 will induce new financial technologies in order to reduce regulatory costs. The crisis triggered by the coronavirus pandemic in 2020 despite its non-financial nature will almost inevitably have a major impact on financial markets and their regulation. Possible steps to eliminate failures in the financial regulation system are proposed, including recommendations for international organizations.

Analytical agencies, as well as international organizations, have identified significant threats to the development of the world economy, increasing the likelihood of a new global financial crisis in late 2020–early 2021. The main challenges to the system come from trade wars that could lead to a crisis in the international system of trade regulation, a decrease in the effectiveness of public policy instruments, and a deterioration in the dynamics of global economic growth. An important factor leading to a slowdown in the global economy in 2020 will also be the coronavirus pandemic, although it is difficult, in the first half of 2020, to assess its final impact. The combination of these negative factors, coupled with the unresolved problems of the 2008 global financial crisis, significantly increases the likelihood of a new global economic crisis which could surpass the Great Depression of the 1930s. This study systematizes the main forecasts by international organizations and analytical agencies for the growth of the world economy and considers various theoretical concepts to identify the symptoms of the impending crisis. Ultimately, this article offers options for reducing the negative impact of the crisis on Russia. In connection with the coronavirus pandemic, preliminary estimates have been made of the likely damage to the world economy and the prospects for its recovery.

Growth in trade has slowed since the global financial crisis in 2008. It seemed to recover in 2017 but declined again after the Trump administration in the U.S. imposed protectionist measures in 2018 which led to conflicts with its major trading partners, including Canada, China, Japan, Mexico, Korea and the EU. Among these partners, the U.S. negotiated amendments to its FTAs with Canada, Mexico and Korea. It is still negotiating with Japan. However, the U.S. government took a different, hard line approach to China in terms of trade based on setting high tariffs on Chinese imports to which China responded by placing high tariffs on U.S. imports. The trade conflict began with criticisms directed at each other, with the U.S. putting its national interest first and China touting a global system of free trade as a key issue. The trade conflict has negatively impacted not only the U.S. and Chinese economies but also the global economy, given that the two economies together as the G2 account for nearly 40% of global output. Therefore, one of the most important challenges for global economic growth is how the conflict might further affect the global economy. This paper analyzes why the trade conflict emerged and how to resolve it. It also focuses on the economic impacts of the trade conflict on the global economy in general, and the Chinese economy in particular. Further, it analyzes how the Chinese government strategically deals with trade negotiations with the United States.

Membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO) and participation in free trade agreements (FTAs) are important instruments for governments to realize national economic interests. The Republic of Korea has been particularly successful in doing so. As the experience of Korea shows, a trade policy mix between multilateral liberalization under the WTO and preferential liberalization through FTAs allows the government to optimally balance national interests and strive for higher levels of social welfare and economic effectiveness, while simultaneously protecting national industries. However, such results seem to be possible only if national economic interests are clearly defined and are synchronized with a country’s goals regarding WTO membership and its strategy for FTAs. During recent decades, Korea has practiced an active long-term planning of trade policy so that trade benefits are not excessively concentrated in a narrow range of trade actors and are distributed more evenly in society. This meant appropriate balancing of liberalization and protection measures, reinforced by special support programmes that neutralized the negative impact of higher market openness. In this article, Korea’s strategy regarding trade policy is analyzed, including the reasons Korea pursued an FTA-centric policy and the benefits it obtained in addition to those it obtained from WTO membership.

Recent years the phenomenon of global value chains (GVCs) has attracted great attention of international organizations. Many of them are involved in the study of GVCs, primarily the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the UN Commission on Trade and Development, the World Trade Organization, the World Bank, the World Intellectual Property Organization and others, including regional international organizations, such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Asia, UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, African Development Bank, etc. The purpose of this article is to identify how the role and position of international organizations in the global market for GVC research has changed, both in terms of specific content and in terms of interaction with individual scientists and other international and national institutions. GVC research by international organizations makes an important contribution to the understanding the contradictory features of international fragmentation, the participation of countries, regions, industries and individual firms in it. The publications of international organizations have a common research paradigm: they all recognize the importance of GVCs for national economic development. A similar conceptual framework for the study of GVCs is combined with the research specialization of international organizations, which reflects the main focus of the activity of one or another organization. The availability of research specialization is accompanied by continuity and coordination of research; the conclusions of international organizations do not contradict, but rather complement each other. The most important feature of all publications of international organizations is also their practical orientation, the focus on elaborating recommendations for national policies aimed at maximizing the benefits of participation in GVCs and minimizing the risks of such integration. A key feature of the research of international organizations is their generalizing nature, which allows highlighting the key trends in the development of GVCs and perspective areas for future research. Conducting large-scale research and the development of expert estimates in the field of GVCs became possible due to the availability of significant financial, intellectual and statistical resources of international organizations, including databases (TiVA, EORA, AMNE). The availability of such resources allows not only to conduct generalizing and comparative studies on a large array of macro and micro data, but also to carry out “pioneering” studies, which are a real increment of scientific knowledge in the field of GVC. Obtaining important generalizing or “pioneering” conclusions became possible due to the development of multilateral research cooperation of international organizations with individual researchers, universities, other international institutes and “think tanks”.