2019. vol. 14. No. 3

This article examines the origins of the United States’ supremacy in the use of economic sanctions in the context of a wider discussion about the structure of the contemporary world order following the Cold War. Sanctions are understood as an instrument of power relations and a means of forcing “target” countries to fulfil the requirements of “sender” countries. The experience of deploying sanctions suggests that, from the point of view of economic power, the world today retains signs of unipolarity, while a polycentric world order is just one of the possible options for the future. The key research question is: why does the United States continue to have significant leverage in terms of implementing sanctions, despite the growing capabilities of other actors? In addition to U.S. dominance in the global financial system, two other factors are highlighted. The first is the relative weakness of the United Nations (UN) as a key global governance institution. While the United Nations is the only legitimate source of sanctions, it has far fewer institutional capabilities to run a sanctions policy compared to the United States. At the same time, the United States and other western powers successfully use the United Nations to increase the legitimacy of the unilateral measures, or play an active role in the UN Security Council, striving to legitimize their programmes and then supplementingthem with their own unilateral measures. The second factor is the difference in the perception of sanctions by national governments and private companies. While national governments often criticize unilateral sanctions, private business tends to comply or over-comply with U.S. measures, even when the national government tries to protect it. As a result, even the most powerful economic actors cannot convert their economic power into political power to counterbalance the United States. The question of how long the United States will be able to maintain its supremacy, and how effective the sanctions will be, is a focus of future research.

In recent years, the global economy has faced a remarkable increase in non-cooperative practices in trade regulation. An important contribution to this trend has been made by the use of economic sanctions. The doctrine of smart sanctions based on political economy arguments has radically changed the role of sanction-related issues on the agenda of international institutions. First, smart sanctions are now considered to be a substitute for war, rather than its precursor. Second, more countries practice sanctions without the approval of the United Nations (UN) Security Council or complement UN sanctions with additional measures of their own. Third, control mechanisms to prevent shirking in sanctions coalitions have become much more difficult to design. Fourth, smart sanctions appear to be optimal in situations when particular countries cannot stand aside but also have no intention of significantly harming their economic relations with target countries.

In general, these novelties have created incentives for increased use of economic sanctions and the creation of more sophisticated control mechanisms to prevent sanctions evasion. At the same time, international institutions play a lesser role in preventing escalation of sanctions. An increasing number of sanctions initiatives are launched and implemented outside the legal framework of the UN Security Council, and as the World Trade Organization (WTO) is distancing itself from addressing trade barriers associated with sanction regimes, most target countries are forced to run the sanctions race “by one and one and never by two and two.”

The contemporary strategic landscape between Russia and the West is marred by interlocking economic sanctions, despite little tangible evidence that they are effective.  Both Russia and the West seem complacent about the “high incidence-low effectiveness” of their sanctions-related behaviour, and there are no obvious off-ramps to the continuation or escalation of current sanctions policies.  What factors caused this U.S.-EU-Russian sanctions tangle, and what can be done to address it? This article addresses these questions by comparing the sanctions-related discourse of the Russian and western strategic communities as expressed in over 1,000 academic research articles published since 2010.  Statistical analysis of publication output, citation patterns and the textual content of these articles reveals contending Russian and western “world views” according to which each strategic community embraces fundamentally different understandings of the meaning, objectives, processes and legitimacy of sanctions-related behaviour.  This suggests that breaking the sanctions tangle will require that the Russian and western strategic communities deepen their understanding of, and engage with, each other’s world views, and in so doing re-examine the beliefs, objectives and expectations that form the basis of each side’s current use of sanctions.

This article deals with the political and economic implications of sanctions against Russia for the functioning of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), which became operational in 2015.

Assuming that the political conduct of EAEU states is based on political pragmatism, the author concludes that in spite of the fact that they provide official support to Eurasian integration, they also have an interest in acceding to alternative projects that strengthen their sovereignty. Therefore, the major challenge to the Union derives primarily from the political sphere since the number of alternatives to Eurasian integration is gradually increasing, disrupting relations between members and Russia.

In this respect, the correlation between western sanctions and the EAEU’s economic growth rate is of great importance. The principal purpose of sanctions is to limit a country’s ability to pursue its independent and active policy, including the development of foreign economic projects. Consequently, anti-Russian sanctions must have influenced the EAEU and its key members. In 2016, Russia demonstrated a decrease in gross domestic product (GDP) which had an even greater negative impact on Belarus and Kazakhstan. Nevertheless, they have not only managed to regain lost ground on economic performance, but also to achieve some growth in GDP. Such dynamics confirm the author’s hypothesis that the members of the EAEU have room for manoeuvre if some external player influences their political and economic development.

However, the EAEU’s internal capacities for dynamic development should not be overestimated. The Union faces problems such as weak aggregate GDP in comparison with the leading world economies, low GDP growth rates in the member states and a relatively low rate of EAEU population growth. In this context, the Union definitely needs to expand its economic influence in the global arena.

During the Cold War, the Soviet Union and India, although not in a formal alliance, were strategic partners in the full sense of the word. Soviet naval forces operated in the Indian Ocean, limiting the potential of an American presence. The USSR supported India’s policy on the Middle East. Moscow, New Delhi and Baghdad created a “rouble-rupee” triangle which untied bilateral trade from the dollar and created a working mechanism for mutually beneficial trade. With the collapse of the USSR, Russia’s sphere of influence declined substantially. However, in 2000 Moscow announced its return to South Asia, and it has gradually regained its influence in the region since then. There, the new India is expanding its influence, claiming the status of a great power and the role of a regional leader.

 This article discusses the prospects for cooperation between Russia and India in the Indo-Pacific region in the context of the American imposition of sanctions against Russia. The author analyzes promising areas in which the implementation of joint Russian-Indian projects is possible and concludes that opportunities for such projects exist in virtually the entire Indo-Pacific region, including small island states, Africa and the immediate neighbourhood of India. The author divides countries into three categories: potential U.S. allies (from Washington’s point of view), adversaries of the United States and countries toward which the United States does not pursue an active policy. According to the author, Russia should build relations with all three groups of countries while maintaining contact with India. This will help consolidate anti-American forces in the region and will erode the sanctions regime. The most promising areas for trilateral projects are the traditional fields of cooperation between Russia and India, primarily military-technical cooperation and energy projects. In addition, the author proposes to turn to the Soviet experience of using “soft power” in Asia.

This article examines the ability of the two leading theoretical perspectives in international relations (IR) — realism and liberalism — to explain various aspects of sanctions implemented against Russia after 2014, as well as Russia’s countermeasures. Following arguments developed by Robert K. Merton, the author underlines the importance of middle-range theories in studying phenomena that lie at the confluence of economics, legal studies and political science, e.g. international sanctions. Moreover, the author points out the evident and pressing need to integrate sanctions within a broader theoretical context which would contribute to rethinking the nature of contemporary political interactions.

The author consequently tests liberal and realist paradigms and concludes that sanctions fall into the grey zone of their explanatory capabilities. Finally, the author concludes that scholars should either abandon the idea of studying sanctions in terms of big theories and return to an instrumental understanding or they should reconfigure international realist and liberal explanatory principles — which would probably change the paradigms significantly. A third option is to develop a new ontology of international relations.

This review discusses key publications by the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC) on the issue of economic sanctions for the period of 2017–19. Despite being a rather recent topic in Russia’s scientific and expert discourse, sanctions are not a new issue in global affairs. Employing economic statecraft as a means of advancing national interests and foreign policy priorities has been an inalienable part of countries’ policies for a long time. However, several key features, including the rising number of sanctions and secondary sanctions cases, as well as the further institutionalization of the imposition, monitoring and lifting of sanctions, distinguish the current stage of sanctions development from previous ones.

This review analyzes two key reports by the RIAC concerning issues related to sanctions by the U.S., the EU and their allies against the Russian Federation, the design and dynamics of sanctions policies, as well as short-term forecasts. The anthology of Russian expert views on sanctions dynamics is also discussed.