2015. vol. 10. No. 3

In 2015, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) will expire and a new global development agenda will be adopted with a deadline of 2030. One key innovation will be the inclusion of peace, security, rule of law and good governance targets in the new Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). However, this very innovation has already proven to be a subject for lengthy and vigorous debates among the member states of the United Nations, and the prospects for a unanimous consensus over SDG 16 remain bleak. This article aims to unveil the substance of this debate not yet covered in Russian political science. The first section identifies the specificity of achieving the MDGs in fragile states and the key phases of work on integrating peace, security and governance in the global development agenda within Open Working Group on Sustainable Development Goals. The second section summarizes the arguments of both proponents and opponents of SDG 16 and examines the key issues in monitoring and financing peacebuilding and statebuilding efforts after 2015. The conclusion assesses the justifiability of alarmism expressed by the emerging powers, including the Russian Federation, regarding SDG 16 and emphasizes that the prospects for progress in ensuring positive peace and human security, especially in fragile and conflict-affected states, will depend not only on the clarity of targets and indicators or on successfully mobilizing financial resources for these goals, but on the balance of power between developed and developing countries and on domestics politics within donor countries.

This article examines the position of four of the most influential Emerging Market Economies — Brazil, China, India and South Africa — on issues that require global action featuring in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) agenda, recognizing that these play a pivotal role in the implementation of this new global agenda. It focuses on the five issues of global finance, technology transfer, trade, climate change and global governance. All except climate change are included in the 17th SDG, and most featured in the discussion at the third International Conference on Financing for Development, held in Addis Ababa in July 2015.

The article is based on four country -level background papers conducted by institutions in each country, and draw on interviews with local policy makers. It also draws on content analyses of country statements from the different negotiating forums, further interviews with experts and a literature review.

The first section provides a summary of the countries’ engagement in the negotiations and national policy developments related to the SDGs to date, as an (imperfect) signal of their interest in implementation. The Next section analyses what emerging economies stand to gain or may be asked to bring to the table for each of the five issues, while the final section summarizes the key findings.

The United Nations Post-2015 Development Agenda, the successor to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), calls for the effective means of implementation, especially a data revolution to inform decisionmaking, monitor implementation and promote governmental accountability. Although the developed world or the economic North attaches great importance to the data revolution, most of the developing world or the economic South is unaware of it, with Africa as an exception. Current debates focus exclusively on technical rationality, ignoring the huge political risks of data revolution, intentionally or unintentionally. The Data revolution is not only about the transformation of data collection and the analysis, dissemination and use of the data; it also has significant political implications for government accountability, global data partnerships, the data division of labour between the North and the South, and even standards of civilization in the international community. For a reasonable and balanced data revolution, the international community should balance technical rationality and political risks, universal and divergent focuses, and common but differentiated responsibilities, and build a global partnership for development data. As a rising great power, China could play a bridging role between the North and the South, promoting a reasonable and sustainable data revolution through global partnership building and political risk management, and facilitating the implementation and monitoring of the Post-2015 Development Agenda.

As World War II came to an end in the mid 1940s with the result that the Allies would prevail, America and Britain began plans for the post-war reconstruction of Europe and for what would become the basis of the Northern development discourse. The planning, deliberation and implementation of such a post-war development network was steeped in English language and thought. Major institutions of the architecture for reconstruction and development formulated at that time – e.g., the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (now the World Bank) – communicated their programmes and goals almost exclusively in English, and continue to do so. Indeed, as the concept of “development” has formed and progressed in the North over the last 70 years, a specialized variant of English has propagated the literature, the practice and the discourse. Certain development practitioners have scrutinized this, especially in formal discussions and forums held over the last several years. This study continues that scrutiny on the effect that this specialized use of language could have on the shaping of the post-2015 global sustainable development agenda.

In most OECD countries, the gap between rich and poor is at its highest level since 30 years. Today, the richest 10 per cent of the population in the OECD area earn 9.5 times the income of the poorest 10 per cent; in the 1980s this ratio stood at 7 : 1 and has been rising continuously ever since. However, the rise in overall income inequality is not (only) about surging top income shares: often, incomes at the bottom grew much slower during the prosperous years and fell during downturns, putting relative (and in some countries, absolute) income poverty on the radar of policy concerns. This paper explores whether such developments may have an impact on economic performance.

Drawing on harmonised data covering the OECD countries over the past 30 years, the econometric analysis suggests that income inequality has a negative and statistically significant impact on subsequent growth. In particular, what matters most is the gap between low income households and the rest of the population. In contrast, no evidence is found that those with high incomes pulling away from the rest of the population harms growth. The paper also evaluates the “human capital accumulation theory” finding evidence for human capital as a channel through which inequality may affect growth. Analysis based on micro data from the Adult Skills Survey (PIAAC) shows that increased income disparities depress skills development among individuals with poorer parental education background, both in terms of the quantity of education attained (e.g. years of schooling), and in terms of its quality (i.e. skill proficiency). Educational outcomes of individuals from richer backgrounds, however, are not affected by inequality.

It follows that policies to reduce income inequalities should not only be pursued to improve social outcomes but also to sustain long-term growth. Redistribution policies via taxes and transfers are a key tool to ensure the benefits of growth are more broadly distributed and the results suggest they need not be expected to undermine growth. But it is also important to promote equality of opportunity in access to and quality of education. This implies a focus on families with children and youths – as this is when decisions about human capital accumulation are made - promoting employment for disadvantaged groups through active labour market policies, childcare supports and in-work benefits.

The process of creating a Russian framework for assistance in international development remains incomplete. Consequently, Russia uses aid delivery channels that primarily belong to and are managed by international organizations, and its own channels for implementing aid programmes are weak. Despite significant government and private sector expenses to support international development objectives over the last decade, Russia has not yet achieved the level of benefits expected to correspond to these expenditures in the form of the positive development of relationships and economic relations with some neighbouring countries. The major result of two conceptual documents on international development assistance adopted by the Russian president in 2007 and 2014 has been an understanding that development assistance should be an element of foreign policy. The most important objectives articulated in the conceptual documents are of a global, altruistic or vague character and can hardly be achieved with limited resources. Because of the significant momentum created by ongoing operations, Russia’s bilateral partnerships with aid recipients are based on ad hoc decisions without any long-term planning to achieve targets. This article analyses the Russian framework for international aid through an examination of its major elements — legislative base and terminology, goal setting, planning, methods of decision making, channels for aid delivery, accounting and evaluation, as well as informational support. The article finds that although the creation of this framework began in the mid 2000s using instruments of soft power, key components remain unformulated. Using a comparative analysis of legislative acts, the article suggests ways to create the missing elements to help increase the efficiency and effectiveness of Russia’s international development aid.

This article analyses Brazil’s development assistance, which includes scientific and technical cooperation as well as, along with humanitarian aid and participation in peacekeeping operations. Scientific and technical cooperation involves promoting education, health and agriculture, applying new technologies in production and eliminating hunger and poverty in the developing countries. Brazil’s policy began with a series of steps, starting with supporting national liberation movements in Africa and Asia, supporting the Non-Aligned Movement, increasing its participation in the North-South dialogue, and contributing to the formation of a new international economic order. Brazil promotes becoming an important instrument of foreign policy, which is based on principles of equal cooperation, respect for international law and non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries. Improving the mechanisms for development cooperation includes making sure aid is transparent, expanding partnerships in promoting development, attending to the needs of developing countries, moving away from direct transfers of money, and attracting and training the population of the recipient country. There are more than 100 federal government institutions in Brazil involved in international cooperation, which reflects the diversification of the country’s foreign policy. The Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs plays an important role in systematizing the process of cooperation, defining the concept and implementing projects in the framework of bilateral, trilateral and multilateral cooperation and assistance to the countries of the world, especially in Latin America and Africa. For Brazil, promoting development is not limited to exchanging experiences in successful programme implementation, but also includes developing new models for scientific and technical cooperation that are the basis for innovative, complex projects that expand opportunities for national growth, the transnationalization of Brazilian business and increased foreign trade. ABC has been pursuing a new cooperation strategy since 2008 that involves a logical matrix for each project to evaluate the effectiveness of the Brazilian model of development assistance. Brazil’s role in promoting development and its transition from donor to mediator is notable.