2014. vol. 9. No. 3

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia’s potential to contribute politically and economically to the stability of the Russia–European Union Shared Neighbourhood has been systematically undervalued. The regional integration initiated by the governments of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia has created a new institutional and ideological reality. However, the increased risk of political and economic competition with the European Union threatens to split the region into separate competing blocs, potentially limiting further regional development.

One of the negative factors is the long-term decline of the institutional tools that the EU can apply to sustain its presence in the region. As a consequence of previously used unilateral mechanisms, current European regional policy is ineffective. Because no prospects of membership can be offered to the countries in the Shared Neighbourhood, regulatory convergence with the EU depends increasingly on individual political regimes. This principle prevents a multilateral regional framework from emerging. The process is aggravated further by the increased role of irrational factors in EU regional policy, as opposed to security interests, since the mid 2000s.

However, since the beginning of Eurasian integration, the Shared Neighbourhood has entered a new phase of political and economic development, where irrational competition can only jeopardize the strategic goals of Russia and the EU. In the long term, both actors are interested in creating a coherent regional subsystem, based on multilateral formats of regional cooperation.

This article examines the influence of internal factors (such as decision-making processes, political culture, and the connection between government and society) on Russia’s foreign policy toward the European Union in the context of neoclassical realism. Excessive personalization and a closed decision-making structure do not encourage effective reactions to emerging challenges and affect the possibility of cooperation in the post-Soviet space. Institutional mechanisms and their impact on a country’s foreign policy are extremely important in the theory of neoclassical realism. This article also analyses EU-Russia relations over major periods and the role of internal factors in Russian policy.

Despite an orientation toward long-term cooperation between the EU and Russia, a contradiction remains between Russia’s over-centralized decision-making structure and the EU’s decentralized system. In addition, political leaders and elites play less of a role in the EU, where there is a real separation of powers and competencies. These factors hamper EU-Russia cooperation because Russia prefers to establish bilateral relations with each state. As a result of all these factors, long-term relations may be at risk. However, the decentralization of power, increased efficiency of political institutions and the active participation of civil society will improve the level of mutual trust and overcome the current issues in EU-Russia relations.

This article analyzes post-Soviet relations between Russia and the European Union using the theoretical framework of neoclassical realism. It finds that the post-Soviet level of competition between Russia and the EU is higher than required by the international system. The reason is rooted in the influence of a number of internal factors (or intervening variables). Consequently, elites in both Russia and the EU are not able to adequately understand the signals sent by the international system.

There is a wide variety of intervening variables; for example, there are factors caused by the political elites’ perceptions of each other’s intentions and of the international situation, factors related to inadequate information, factors related to the complex institutional structure of the EU and factors related to domestic political issues. In addition, the current international environment, characterized by a high degree of uncertainty, increases the effects of these intervening variables.

These effects result in inaccurate and incorrect processing of the signals of the international system by Russian and European elites. As a result, a subsystem of international relations has arisen in the post-Soviet space, featuring a highly competitive environment. However, there are only two major actors in the region: Russia and the EU. Small countries are too weak, so must choose to align themselves with either Russia or the Euone or the other. This causes a rivalry between Russia and the EU for influence on small and medium-sized countries in the post-Soviet space.

In Central Asia, the water deficit and water-energy problem have been one of among the most acute and conflict-ridden challenges for the sustainable development of the region and for regional security. Key trade and investment partners, including Russia and the European Union, could play a considerable role in influencing this issue, due to the long-lasting status quo, the inability to find a solution through intra-regional dialogue and the region’s rising dependence on foreign trade. Indeed, water-related interactions between Russia and the EU have been developing in a complementary manner. The EU possesses new technologies and its members have access to long-term capital markets, while Russia carries influence through providing security, regulating migration and holding a favourable political position for offering mediation services to the republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.

This article examines EU-Russia relations regarding water issues in Central Asia over the medium term. By analyzing cooperative and non-cooperative strategies used by the major stakeholders in the water conflict (the five republics and the third parties of Russia and the EU), it confirms the continuous complementary character of EU and Russian activities in this context. Russia will take responsibility for moderating the principal questions (as with the construction of big dams such as Rogunor Kambarata), as they relate to the provision of security guarantees. The EU will act through providing support for water companies from small and medium-sized enterprises, and promoting the European Water Initiative principles and by developing its investment policy. The intersection of interests is possible when if Russia will attracts an independent arbiter, such as an actor available to provide guarantees related to the values of professional objectivism, human rights support and environment protection. These issues inevitably arise with relation to big infrastructure projects.

This article analyzes the link between culture and diplomacy between Russia and the European Union, and shows the importance of cultural relations. It examines the common space of science, education and culture introduced at the 2003 EU-Russia Summit in St. Petersburg and the application of the principles of this concept that were established at the 2005 EU-Russia Summit in Moscow. It then considers EU-Russia collaboration on humanitarian action and the challenges that both parties face in this sphere. It also explains the formation of EU domestic and foreign cultural policy, and the role of European institutions and states in cultural affairs and diplomacy, as well as key elements and mechanisms of contemporary Russian foreign cultural policy. In addition, the article focuses on the European side of post-Soviet EU-Russia cultural relations. This cultural collaboration is defined as a competitive neighbourhood. EU and Russian interests collide: while Europeans try to promote their values, norms and standards within the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy, Russia seeks to culturally influence and engage in this region for geostrategic and historical reasons. Finally, the article assesses the prospects for the EU-Russia cultural relations and emphasizes the role of ideology in improving such relations.

Applying a comparative perspective, this article argues that the current crisis of European Union integration cannot be resolved by member states either transferring additional competences to the EU level or strengthening the intergovernmental dimension of integration. The systemic character of the ongoing process is weakening the institutional structure, which affects both the institutions and their power relations. The European Commission (EC), once a highly independent supranational actor on the eve of the integration process in the 1950s, now faces growing competition from intergovernmental elements in the institutional balance. The theoretical approach of historical neo-institutionalism offers new, useful insights into this research area. The articles uses this theory to analyze the EC’s evolution since the time of its creation in the form of the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community, focusing on the links between the gradual changes in its internal structure and its institutional position.

Although the phenomenon of “path dependence” was initially present in the EC’s internal systems, the later development of its competences in the institutional balance provoked member states to limit the commission’s activities in the second half of the 1960s. First attempts were made mainly by appointing weak presidents, but the later reform of the EC’s internal structure, undertaken by Neil Kinnock in the beginning of the 21st centry, directed its further structural development as a more technocratic institution. Consequently, the EC was not able to pursue its aims effectively in preparing for its enlargement to include Central and Eastern Europe. The increased heterogeneity of the member states after the 2004–07 enlargement also weakened the EC’s position in the institutional balance, diminishing its traditional function as the “engine of integration.”

The regional situation in Eastern Europe changed significantly by the end of the first decade of the 21st century. Competitionbetween Russia and the European Union increased during the 2000s, while at the same time both actors were changing their approach to the six states of the former USSR that lie between Russia and the EU – Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. In order to widen and deepen their influence on those territories and to reduce uncertainty about their regional politics, Moscow and Brussels developed their own integration projects and demanded those post-Soviet states define their position in the EU-Russia competition. Russian and European scholars, when trying to analyze the future of the Post-Soviet Six states, mostly examine the attractiveness of the two integration projects. While important, such an approach is insufficient, as it ignores the individual internal environments. To assess the prospects for Russia’s Eurasian Economic Union and the EU’s Eastern Partnership, however, one must look inside the six states, which are so important for both Moscow and Brussels. This article explores the aspects of the European and Eurasian integration projects that may be attractive to the six states. Within this framework, it considers what and how elements of those states’ internal environment might influence their choice by examining and comparing both integration projects. It proposes focusing directly on the countries that are currently facing the dilemma of integration and are expected to choose. Despite a number of internal factors influencing the states’ integration behaviour, research has shown that in such circumstances, a choice (whether it is made) cannot be considered final, given the individual internal environments of the Six. Their further integration will require additional mechanisms of stimulation, which will need to be developed by the centres of integration — namely, Moscow and Brussels.