North Korea has been a target of comprehensive sanctions since the dawn of its history. The U.S. first imposed sanctions against the DPRK in 1950 and maintains an overwhelming sanctions regime today. In 2006–17, the United Nations (UN) Security Council issued 10 resolutions and gradually invoked severe restrictive measures vis-à-vis the DPRK to contain its missile and nuclear programme. Regardless of this consolidated and long-term pressure, North Korea managed to avoid economic collapse and has emerged as a de facto nuclear power. This case once again raises a research question, principal for students of economic sanctions—why do restrictive measures work in one case but fail in others or, with respect to DPRK, why sanctions failed to press North Korea to abandon its missile and nuclear programme despite the consolidated efforts of the UN and particular states like the United States. The article explains the failure of sanctions as resulting from a combination of factors, including the negotiation strategy of the DPRK, the role of China and Russia as “black knights,” the utilization of the DPRK’s economic advantages by its leaders, and the moderate policy of secondary sanctions on the U.S. side

This article was submitted on 08.11.2024