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Alexander Simonov

Cooperative Rivalry- a Prospective Alternative to International Organisations on a Global Energy Market: a Case of Russia-USA European Gas Standoff

2022. Vol. 17. No. 1. P. 129–141 [issue contents]
The purpose of this article is to consider the options for settling equilibrium on the world gas market in the absence of international regulating institutions while political instruments of non-market competition are actively being used by European market players. A market analysis from the point view of cost structure and the interests of key suppliers and consumers is undertaken, and an attempt to build a model of market interactions accompanied by sanctions is made. Modelling the internalization of political restrictions is used to ground actors’ motives and their strategies in new conditions. The results of this analysis provide for essential conclusions regarding market change in general as well as changes in the positions of separate players. Mathematically sound results inspire optimism that actors can take optimal and efficient decisions despite non-economic competition and de facto failure of international institutions
Citation: Simonov A. (2022). Cooperative Rivalry – A Prospective Alternative to International Organisations on a Global Energy Market: A Case of Russia – USA European Gas Standoff. International Organisations Research Journal, vol. 17, no. 1, pp. 129–141 (In English).
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