There is a significant probability that the world economy is about to stumble into a period of financial dislocation. Exacerbated by political tensions partly as a consequence of an untethered American foreign policy, the unwillingness and/or inability of the major economic powers to confront the imbalances that led to the financial crisis of 2007–8 have laid the basis for a historical repetition. The danger is that the confluence of slow real growth, low productivity increases, inflated asset prices (notably real estate) and higher public debt in some of the major Group of 20 (G20) economies cannot be sustained much longer. The Bank for International Settlements (BIS), among others, has been expressing its concerns that collectively we have been unable to constrain the buildup of financial imbalances, leading to a progressive narrowing of policy options. Not only are debt levels higher but we have unwittingly helped to entrench the concentration and power of large banks, spurred the development of shadow banking, encouraged a massive misallocation of capital and exacerbated income inequality via financial repression and productivity-sapping bailouts to crippled firms, which have the side effect of perpetuating unsustainable asset bubbles. It hardly seems surprising that deglobalization has become a factor in the internal politics of too many countries. It could well be that in retrospect the past 10 years will seem like a lost opportunity to address serious crisis prevention. Despite efforts to strengthen global governance over these past 10 years, the economic foundation has little resilience.