The article analyzes the strategies of the ruling elites of the Eastern Partnership countries for participating in the European Neighbourhood Policy and the influence of these strategies on policy outcomes. According to game theory, between 2007 and 2014 the ruling elites of the partnership countries, depending on the internal structural and institutional factors affecting those elites, used different strategies to maintain power in their cooperation with European Union institutions. In case of authoritarian countries with presidential systems and a high level of political monopolism, the cooperation is limited and benefits the partner country’s ruling elite more than the EU. In case of a hybrid regime, with a parliamentary system and a low level of political monopolism, cooperation is more extended and equally beneficial for both the EU and the partner country. Therefore, the neighbourhood policy in particular conditions could contribute to authoritarian consolidation, thus achieving the opposite objective than intended. The article consists of a brief overview of the history of the European Neighbourhood Policy, an elaboration of the theoretical framework and an initial comparative analysis of the cases of Moldova and Azerbaijan based on the proposed framework.