The Green Deal and the Resilience of EU-Russian Energy Relations
}, journal = {INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS RESEARCH JOURNAL}, year = {2021}, month = {сентябрь}, volume = {16}, number = {3}, pages = {108-123}, url = {https://iorj.hse.ru/en/2021-16-3/517771417.html}, publisher = {}, abstract = {In this article, the influence of the European Union’s (EU) Green Deal on its energy relations with Russia is analyzed. Two models of resilience are identified in the EU’s discourse. One aims at achieving resilience at the level of the EU’s energy sector (the "microsystem" for the purpose of this study) while destroying the system of EU-Russia relations (the "macrosystem"). The other aims at achieving resilience in the micro- and macrosystem at the same time. Empirically, the study relies on EU documents and speeches by its national and supranational representatives. Three cases are studied. The first covers competition of two models of resilience in the principles that the EU defined for its relations with Russia. The second case involves investments that slow down the development of renewable sources of energy in favour of natural gas. This case demonstrates how resilience can be achieved as a return to the previous pattern (bouncing back). Although it can be achieved both at the EU-only level and at the level of the EU and its relations with Russia, it clearly favours the latter. The third case involves the import of hydrogen, which creates possibilities for resilience both at the microsystem alone and at the micro- and macrosystems at the same time. This latter option is achieved through adaptation to new challenges (bouncing forward). The author concludes by comparing the two models of resilience. The model that prioritizes the microsystem’s resilience and challenges the macrosystem is based on the synthesis of environmental and geopolitical logics. The other model is based on economic and market logics, but the EU’s normative leadership is a prerequisite. The EU’s discourse demonstrates the viability of both models and related governance practices. Most likely, the two models will co-exist, but their relative importance will vary over time. This variation will be primarily determined by the EU’s internal constraints. However, Russia’s policy can facilitate the model of resilience, achieved in both the micro- and macrosystem.}, annote = {In this article, the influence of the European Union’s (EU) Green Deal on its energy relations with Russia is analyzed. Two models of resilience are identified in the EU’s discourse. One aims at achieving resilience at the level of the EU’s energy sector (the "microsystem" for the purpose of this study) while destroying the system of EU-Russia relations (the "macrosystem"). The other aims at achieving resilience in the micro- and macrosystem at the same time. Empirically, the study relies on EU documents and speeches by its national and supranational representatives. Three cases are studied. The first covers competition of two models of resilience in the principles that the EU defined for its relations with Russia. The second case involves investments that slow down the development of renewable sources of energy in favour of natural gas. This case demonstrates how resilience can be achieved as a return to the previous pattern (bouncing back). Although it can be achieved both at the EU-only level and at the level of the EU and its relations with Russia, it clearly favours the latter. The third case involves the import of hydrogen, which creates possibilities for resilience both at the microsystem alone and at the micro- and macrosystems at the same time. This latter option is achieved through adaptation to new challenges (bouncing forward). The author concludes by comparing the two models of resilience. The model that prioritizes the microsystem’s resilience and challenges the macrosystem is based on the synthesis of environmental and geopolitical logics. The other model is based on economic and market logics, but the EU’s normative leadership is a prerequisite. The EU’s discourse demonstrates the viability of both models and related governance practices. Most likely, the two models will co-exist, but their relative importance will vary over time. This variation will be primarily determined by the EU’s internal constraints. However, Russia’s policy can facilitate the model of resilience, achieved in both the micro- and macrosystem.} }