@ARTICLE{26583242_152399576_2015, 
	author = {Helmut Reisen}, 
	keywords = {multilateral development banks, Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, New Development Bank, Bretton Woods, BRICS, China global diplomacy},
	title = {Alternative Multilateral Development Banks and Global Financial Governance},
	journal = {INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS RESEARCH JOURNAL},
	year = {2015},
	volume = {10},
	number = {2},
	pages = {106-118},
	url = {https://iorj.hse.ru/en/2015-10-2/152399576.html},
	publisher = {},
	abstract = {What will be the future impact on multilateral lending shares of the New Development Bank (NDB) and the Asian InfrastructureInvestment Bank (AIIB), two multilateral banks created in 2014 outside the established Bretton Woods system?Will these new institutions led by China and the BRICS help rebalance multilateral development finance away from westerndominance? The answer comes in three parts: first, increasing pressure for the BRICS to exit´ rises with past, present andexpected failure for ´voice´ reform in the established international financial institutions (IFIs); second, excess demand formultilateral soft loans; and, third, a quantification of the potential lending capacity by the NDB and AIIB to assess howmuch relative business - hence political influence - the existing IFIs might lose in favour of the new competitors. The NDBand AIIB combined will likely attract sufficient co-financing to rival the established multilateral development banks interms of annual lending. This article concludes that infrastructure finance will benefit from the creation of the NDB andAIIB by tapping the considerable saving potential in China and other BRICS members. The new institutions should thereforebe supported, not discouraged, by western governments and donors as well. As the new multilateral development banksintroduce choice in terms of funding cost and modalities, borrowers are well advised to join these new institutions rapidlyfor their own benefit. Competition in multilateral development banking may have a negative impact on loan enforcementmechanisms. The IFIs of the existing Bretton Woods system and the new development banks will have to unite by imposingcross-default clauses to safeguard their preferred creditor status.},
	annote = {What will be the future impact on multilateral lending shares of the New Development Bank (NDB) and the Asian InfrastructureInvestment Bank (AIIB), two multilateral banks created in 2014 outside the established Bretton Woods system?Will these new institutions led by China and the BRICS help rebalance multilateral development finance away from westerndominance? The answer comes in three parts: first, increasing pressure for the BRICS to exit´ rises with past, present andexpected failure for ´voice´ reform in the established international financial institutions (IFIs); second, excess demand formultilateral soft loans; and, third, a quantification of the potential lending capacity by the NDB and AIIB to assess howmuch relative business - hence political influence - the existing IFIs might lose in favour of the new competitors. The NDBand AIIB combined will likely attract sufficient co-financing to rival the established multilateral development banks interms of annual lending. This article concludes that infrastructure finance will benefit from the creation of the NDB andAIIB by tapping the considerable saving potential in China and other BRICS members. The new institutions should thereforebe supported, not discouraged, by western governments and donors as well. As the new multilateral development banksintroduce choice in terms of funding cost and modalities, borrowers are well advised to join these new institutions rapidlyfor their own benefit. Competition in multilateral development banking may have a negative impact on loan enforcementmechanisms. The IFIs of the existing Bretton Woods system and the new development banks will have to unite by imposingcross-default clauses to safeguard their preferred creditor status.}
}