Global Governance After the COVID-19 Crisis

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Abstract

Assessment of the impact of COVID-19 on international institutions and international relations is essential for shaping global governance for the post COVID crisis world. The authors review the actions of the key international institutions in response to the pandemic undertaken in January-March 2020 reflecting on three questions. First, were the actions undertaken by the international institutions adequate, coordinated and timely? Second, could the outbreak have been contained if the global governance system was not in a state of severe strain, with many of the gaps exposed and reforms promised in the wake of the 2009 financial and economic crisis unfulfilled, its key causes unaddressed and unilateralism rising among its key members? In addition, was the COVID-19 crisis exacerbated by the crisis of multilateralism? Third, and most difficult, what is the future of global governance after the COVID-19 crisis ends? The analysis of international institutions performance three months into the crisis leads to authors to conclude that there have been inadequate actions to produce a timely, coordinated international response from all the major multilateral organizations and from the newer plurilateral summit institutions of the BRICS, G7 and G20. The failure of these global governance institutions was due not only to the severe strains from leading members’ unilateralism and competition, but from the very architecture designed in 1945 that now poorly matches intensely globalized world. Global governance in the post COVID world should not descend into the old war-prone balance of power, nor flow from a new Bretton Woods-San Francisco as in 1944–1945 but from an intensification and expansion of G20 governance that will generate and coordinate more comprehensive, stronger multilateral organizations for the benefit of all.

Key words: international institutions; global governance; COVID-19 crisis; IMF; World Bank; WTO; WHO; EU; BRICS; G7; G20


Introduction

It is difficult to assess the impact of COVID-19 on global governance, international institutions and international relations. However, now is the time to start reflecting on three questions as a guide to shaping better answers and outcomes for the post-COVID-crisis world. First, were the actions undertaken by international institutions adequate, coordinated and timely? Second, could the outbreak have been contained if the global governance system had not been in a state of severe

1 The article was written on the basis of the RANEPA state assignment research programme.
strain, with many of the gaps exposed and reforms promised in the wake of the 2009 financial and economic crisis unfulfilled, its key causes unaddressed, and unilateralism rising among its key members? In addition, was the COVID-19 crisis exacerbated by the crisis of multilateralism? Third, and most difficult, what is the future of global governance after the COVID-19 crisis?

Three months into the crisis, three answers emerged. First, there has been inadequate action to produce a timely, coordinated international response from all of the major multilateral organizations and from the newer plurilateral summit institutions of the BRICS group of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, the Group of 7 (G7) and the Group of 20 (G20). Second, the failure of these global governance institutions was due not only to the severe strains caused by leading members’ unilateralism and competition but also to their very architecture, designed in 1945 and poorly matching the needs of today’s intensely globalized world. Third, global governance in the post-COVID world will not descend into the old war-prone balance of power, nor flow from a Bretton Woods-type arrangement as in 1944–45; rather, an intensification and expansion of G20 governance will generate and coordinate more comprehensive, stronger multilateral organizations for the benefit of all.

### Inadequate Actions

The coordinated international response thus far has often been assessed as late and inadequate. Indeed, the first case of a pneumonia of unknown cause was reported to the World Health Organization (WHO) Country Office in China on 31 December 2019. One month later, on 30 January 2020, the WHO declared a public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC) [WHO, 2020a]. It promptly released a strategic preparedness and response plan to support the national and international authorities in developing context-specific national and regional operational plans [Ibid., 2020b]. The plan called for a total resource requirement of $675 million, of which $61.5 million was for the WHO’s urgent preparedness and response activities from February to April 2020. By 29 February, 85,403 cases were confirmed globally, with 6,009 in 53 countries outside of China [Ibid., 2020c]. COVID-19 was rapidly spreading in Europe, which was struggling to contain the outbreak [Beaumont, 2020]. In the face of COVID’s swift assault, the lack of concerted global action by the major multilateral organizations stood out [Grimalda, 2020].

### Global Financial Institutions

Only on 3 March 2020 did the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank Group (WBG) make their first explicit statement that they stood ready to use all available instruments to confront the crisis and its severe economic and financial effects [IMF, 2020]. The following day the International Monetary and Financial Committee endorsed the IMF’s actions. The IMF made available $50 billion through the rapid-disbursing emergency financing facilities for low-income and emerging-market countries. Of this, $10 billion was available at a zero interest rate for the poorest members through the Rapid Credit Facility. At the G20 leaders’ summit on 26 March, IMF Managing Director Kristalina Georgieva announced that the IMF, with the WBG and other international organizations had a combined financial capacity of $1 trillion for emergency financing. She asked for G20 leaders’ support to double it and boost global liquidity through a sizeable special drawing right allocation and by expanding the use of swap-type facilities at the Fund. On 26 March the IMF executive board approved a reform of the Catastrophe Containment and Relief Trust (CCRT). By the end of March almost 80 member countries sought access to rapidly disbursing, low-conditionality IMF emergency facilities to meet the immediate pressures arising from the COVID-19 crisis [Thomsen, 2020].
Simultaneously the World Bank and International Finance Corporation’s (IFC) boards of directors approved an increased $14 billion package of fast-track financing to assist companies and countries to prevent, detect, and respond to the rapid spread of COVID-19. By the end of March projects were being finalized in 60 countries for up to $2.8 billion [Malpass, 2020].

Global Health Governance and the World Health Organization

As the central multilateral organization for health, the WHO, founded in 1948, was slow to act. On 31 December the WHO had been alerted to a potential novel virus by Chinese authorities, described in patients with “pneumonia-like” symptoms. On 22–23 January, its director-general convened an emergency teleconference under the International Health Regulations (IHR) to discuss whether to declare the outbreak a PHEIC [WHO, 2020d]. By that time, cases had been confirmed outside of China, in Korea, Japan, Thailand and Singapore. The Emergency Committee members expressed “divergent views” and advised the WHO “to consider a more nuanced system.” As cases rose and spread throughout Asia to Australia, Europe and North America, on 28 January the WHO said it would send its team to China to support efforts to contain the outbreak there [Rabin, 2020]. On 30 January, the Emergency Committee convened for a second time and declared COVID-19 a PHEIC [WHO, 2020a]. The Committee recommended the rapid deployment of and access to potential vaccines but against implementation of travel restrictions.

On 5 February, the WHO issued a strategic preparedness and response plan for the period between February to April, called for $675 million for its implementation [Ibid., 2020e, 2020f], and announced it would convene a global research and innovation forum on 11–12 February. On 8 February, the WHO assembled a team of experts, which landed in China on 9 February [Allyn, 2020; Ghebreyesus, 2020a; Nebehay, 2020]. On 10 February, Donald Trump, president of the United States – the WHO’s largest donor – slashed the U.S. contribution by 50% in his budget proposal [Hansler, 2020; WHO, n. d., a]. On 15 February, at the Munich Security Conference, the WHO’s director-general warned that COVID-19 had “pandemic potential” that would require an “immediate and large-scale response” [WHO, 2020g]. On 16 February, another WHO-led team of experts landed in China, now on a joint mission with China [Ghebreyesus, 2020b]. More WHO experts landed in China on 22 February [Jaipragas, Zheng, 2020]. On 25 February a joint WHO-European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control arrived in Rome [WHO, 2020h]. On 25 February, the WHO announced there were more new COVID-19 cases outside China than within it [Kiernan, Socrates Bardi, 2020]. On 26 February, the WHO director-general, in his opening remarks to the joint WHO-China collaboration mission briefing, stated that continued vigilance was needed and that using the word “pandemic” brought risks of “amplifying... fear and stigma” and “paralyzing systems.”

On 11 March the WHO declared COVID-19 to be a pandemic [WHO, 2020i]. On 13 March, it said Europe was the new epicentre of the outbreak [Schnirring, 2020].

Regional Responses

Similarly late and lacking were regional organizations, led by the most powerful European Union. The EU Extraordinary Health Council convened on 13 February and called on EU members to act together to increase preparedness and activate existing funding mechanisms to support members’ preparedness [Council of the European Union, 2020a]. But it took several weeks, many more casualties and the Croatian presidency’s decisive consistent push, including the full activation of the Integrated Political Crisis Response (IPCR) arrangements, to coor-
ordinate and enable the needed action. The Eurogroup agreed on an economic policy response on 10 March [Council of the European Union, 2020b]. It launched the Coronavirus Response Investment Initiative package consisting of €37 billion in public investments to mitigate the impact of the crisis, and to save lives, jobs and businesses it also offered flexibility in applying the Stability and Growth Pact rules and extended the EU Solidarity Fund’s scope [EC, 2020a]. The initiative was considered far from adequate. Thus, the EU Council followed up with additional measures allowing flexibility and transfers in mobilizing the European Structural and Investment Funds. An additional €3 billion was mobilized from the EU’s budget to directly support the healthcare systems of its members [Ibid., 2020b]. Nevertheless, the initial delay, national egoism in the struggle for medical goods, responsibility shifting, and an “only-for-me” response left a long shadow over the EU’s spirit of solidarity, even as its members’ death tolls relentlessly rose.

Trade and Global Value Chains

In coping with the consequent trade crisis, the World Trade Organization (WTO) has struggled too. By some estimates, the negative impact of COVID-19 on global value chains, international trade, and investment may be much worse than that from the global financial crisis of 2008–09 [UNCTAD, 2020]. The WTO’s goods and services trade barometers registered continued weakening of world trade in both components [WTO, 2020]. Further declines are expected. The disruptions result from the lockdown measures that states have taken to protect their citizens, but also from trade restrictions and bans on medical and health-related goods. While WTO rules allow members to adopt trade measures necessary to protect public health and public welfare, these measures should be communicated to the WTO, applied in a manner that does not discriminate between WTO members, and not constitute disguised restrictions on international trade. Only a handful of notifications regarding these COVID 19-related trade measures have been received by the WTO [Ibid., n. d.]. The WTO can do little else but monitor any measures to restrict or facilitate trade imposed by WTO members and, in partnership with the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and other institutions, assess the potential impact on global economic growth and development, alert member governments of the consequences, and call on them to minimize and notify restrictions.

The BRICS

The plurilateral summit institution of BRICS, like that of the G7 and G20, has the architectural advantage of being delivered directly at the leaders’ level, with all the authority and comprehensive coverage that they alone command. These institutions have mandates that embrace and integrate the key issues of health, the economy, development and trade, and much more. They have thus moved to compensate for inadequacies of the major multilateral organizations, although not as actively as their unique architecture allows.

BRICS has had health as a priority with an institutionalized foundation. It has a good track record of commitment and compliance dating back to the 2012 Delhi summit. However, BRICS did not come up with a statement of collective response nor hold an emergency summit in face-to-face or virtual form.

The BRICS members did express their solidarity with China, where the COVID-19 pandemic began, and their commitment to work together. At their first meeting on 11 February 2020, the leaders’ personal representatives, or “sherpas,” underlined the importance of avoiding discrimination, stigma and overreaction while responding to the outbreak [BRICS Russia,
The call was timely in view of the Trump administration’s attempt to drive xenophobic sentiment toward China and blame the spread of corona virus on China [Cillizza, 2020]. On 19 March the New Development Bank board approved a RMB 7 billion loan (about $1 billion) under its Emergency Assistance Program in Combating COVID-19 for China [NDB, n. d.].

The issue and possible coordinated actions are being discussed. However, a new breakthrough initiative is unlikely for two reasons. First, the BRICS states already have a long-standing commitment to work together to manage risks related to emerging infections with pandemic potential and to contribute to ongoing efforts to strengthen health sectors, including through the WHO and other international organizations. Second, BRICS supports and is committed to cooperation with the WHO. Thus it is likely that BRICS will build on existing commitments and contribute to the WHO’s key initiatives to combat the spread of the virus, including the COVID-19 Strategic Preparedness and Response Plan [WHO, 2020b], the Country Preparedness and Response Status Assessment [Ibid., 2020j] and the COVID-19 Solidarity Response Fund [WHO, United Nations Foundations, Swiss Philanthropy Foundation, n. d.]. With regard to the economic impact of the outbreak, BRICS will continue to try to coordinate the policy response in the G20.

The G7

The major market democracies constituting the G7 held an emergency virtual summit on 16 March, following emergency meetings of their health ministers on 3 February and their finance ministers and central bank governors on 3 March. At the virtual summit the G7 leaders produced 31 commitments, led by those on health. They committed to act together to resolve the health and economic risks caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and to set the stage for a strong recovery, sustainable economic growth and prosperity [G7, 2020; Kirton, 2020a]. They pledged support for the WHO. But there was no promise of additional, urgently needed money for the WHO, either on a one-time emergency basis or permanently, to put in place the global health infrastructure to control COVID-19 and pandemics still to come [Kirton, 2020b]. The G7 tasked the finance ministers to work closely with the IMF, the WBG and other international organizations to design and implement international financial assistance to help countries facing the health and economic shock of COVID-19. However, they did not make a joint plan or concrete commitments to address the economic recession, international trade disruptions, or unemployment risks. Yet they did tell their health and finance ministers to meet weekly to follow up, promised to meet themselves very soon, and called upon the G20 to support and amplify its efforts.

The G20

This the G20 did. The first G20 statement came on 6 March from the ministers of finance and central bankers. It was followed by the sherpas’ statement on 12 March and a virtual meeting by the ministers of finance and central bankers on 23 March to prepare for the G20 leaders’ extraordinary summit, convened by the Saudi G20 Presidency, on 26 March. The 47 commitments made by the G20 leaders affirmed the G20’s first distinctive foundational mission to promote financial stability, but also gave attention to the G20’s second mission to make globalization work for all. First, the G20 pledged to do whatever it took to overcome the pandemic, along with the WHO, the IMF, the WBG, the United Nations (UN), and other international

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2 As of 18 March 2020, the Fund raised around $153.5 million. China, the only BRICS country to contribute, donated $20 million to the Fund [WHO, n. d., b].
organizations. They promised to ensure adequate financing to contain the pandemic and protect people; strengthen the WHO’s mandate in coordinating the international fight against the pandemic; provide immediate resources to the WHO’s COVID-19 Solidarity Response Fund and strengthen health systems globally, including through supporting the full implementation of the WHO’s International Health Regulations (IHR, 2005).

Second, the G20 committed to inject over $5 trillion into the global economy and use all available policy tools, including large-scale fiscal support, to minimize the economic and social damage from the pandemic, restore global growth, maintain market stability, and strengthen resilience. Third, the leaders reiterated the goal to realize a free, fair, non-discriminatory, transparent, predictable and stable trade and investment environment, and to keep the markets open; they further pledged to continue working together to facilitate international trade and coordinate responses in ways that avoid unnecessary interference with international traffic and trade.

Fourth, the G20 confirmed its commitment to restore global economic stability and lay out solid foundations for strong, sustainable, balanced and inclusive growth. Fifth, the leaders asked the finance ministers and central bank governors to coordinate on a regular basis to develop a G20 action plan in response to COVID-19 and to work closely with international organizations to swiftly deliver the appropriate international financial assistance.

By its concrete and time-bound commitments the statement was somewhat reminiscent of the G20 Washington summit final document. It raised hopes that the G20 would fulfil its potential as the premier forum for global economic governance and harness its political leadership to address the crisis. The G20 finance ministers and central bank governors promptly acted on the leaders’ request to develop the joint G20 Action Plan, which was delivered by mid-April.

The UN

The UN was the slowest to respond in a material or institutional way. It launched a COVID-19 Global Humanitarian Response Plan [UN, 2020a] on 25 March. This was a $2 billion appeal to fight coronavirus in the most vulnerable countries. UN Secretary-General António Guterres called on everyone to act together to address the impact and lessen the blow to people [Ibid., 2020b].

The UN Security Council, which during the Ebola outbreak in Africa in 2014 had produced a resolution, was unable to do so now due to disagreements between two of its permanent five veto powers, the United States and China. The Security Council did not meet at the UN headquarters for three weeks as all of its members self-isolated at home.

The first UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution on the outbreak calling for international cooperation was adopted on 2 April after consideration of two different drafts under a so-called “silence procedure.” By that date almost 900,000 confirmed cases and 45,424 deaths had been registered in 207 countries.

UNGA Resolution 74/270, sponsored by Ghana, Indonesia, Liechtenstein, Norway, Singapore and Switzerland, recognized that the pandemic required a global response based on unity, solidarity, and renewed multilateral cooperation [Ibid., 2020c]. However, it did not contain a pledge to ensure that national protective measures were effective while minimizing the negative effect on people, other states, trade and the global economy; nor did it contain a commitment to refrain from raising trade barriers, imposing new export restrictions or implementing protectionist and discriminatory measures inconsistent with the WTO rules [Ibid., 2020d, Draft Para. 6 and 7]. The Declaration of Solidarity was the lowest common denominator. It came too late, with very little substance or promise of collective action.

Secretary-General Guterres declared COVID-19 to be the most challenging crisis since the UN’s founding in 1945. Yet his call for a ceasefire in all global conflicts so countries could
concentrate on combating the health crisis went unheeded in Syria, Yemen, Libya, Afghanistan, Mali and Colombia, while North Korea launched four missile tests in the month before 5 April. By this time, COVID-19 had infected over one million people and killed over 54,000 in 180 countries and territories.

A deeper UN failure was the refusal of its members to provide funds as they were legally obliged to do. By early April the UN faced a serious liquidity crisis as members paid less of their assessed dues for 2020 than usual, even as U.S. costs to confront the COVID crisis rose. Before the COVID-19 crisis, regular budget contributions had arrears of $771 million at the end of 2019, a 34% increase from the previous year and the highest in a decade. As members used their scarce funds to respond to the crisis, UN contributions dropped sharply in the first quarter of 2020, producing a collection gap of over $220 million and a hiring freeze. The UN had only $1.4 billion for its peacekeeping operations, too little to pay the countries contributing troops and police for the March and June quarters. Guterres thus had to launch appeals for two special funds, one for $2 billion to help COVID-affected countries a second one of $8–9 trillion, or 10% of global gross domestic product, to combat the pandemic.

Preliminary Conclusions

Coordinated collective action by all of the key international institutions was late and insufficient. A key reason for this is that political fragmentation and tensions prevailed in international politics. International institutions entered a phase of weakening, due partly to American withdrawal, partly to discord among major powers, and partly to the unprecedented comprehensive, interconnected speed and scale of the crisis [Duclos, 2020]. A second reason is “irresponsible wishful thinking by political leaders and the obstinate dominance of a nationalistic approach to global problem-solving” [Grimalda, 2020]. A third is that there is no premier forum for global cooperation for the well-being and protection of people. Although established for this mission, the UN fell victim of the crisis in multilateralism and an organizational architecture that may have made sense in 1945 but does not in today’s intensely globalized world. The G20 is much better at coordinating actions on its first foundational mission, to promote financial stability and generate strong, sustainable and inclusive growth, than it is on its second mission to make globalization work for all. Besides “this devastating disease struck the world when the G20 nations’ instinct for multilateralism and global cooperation had weakened; when U.S.—China recriminations were running high on a range of issues, including the name and origin of the disease and ascribing responsibility for its spread; and when the badly under-resourced World Health Organization (WHO) was under fire for its inordinately slow response and unjustifiably delayed declaration of the Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) as a pandemic” [Bhatia, 2020].

It took time and effort for G20 leaders to come together to forge a more ambitious and comprehensive collective response to the COVID-19 crisis and its economic and social impacts. The leaders’ statement of 26 March was criticized for failing to provide guidance on the economic challenges posed by the health crisis, to endorse a fresh allocation of the IMF’s special drawing rights, to increase the permanent base budget of the WHO, or to make a collective pledge to address the root causes of the pandemic and invest in health-security preparedness, addressing a gap that long predates the current crisis [Goodman, Segal, Sobel, 2020].

However, the G20 did commit to mobilize new money for health, economic growth, jobs, and development, and tasked their health and finance ministers to develop a set of G20 urgent actions on jointly combatting the pandemic by April 2020. The also pledged to work swiftly and decisively with the WHO, the IMF, the WBG, and multilateral and regional development banks to deploy a robust, coherent, coordinated, and rapid financial package and to address
any gaps in their toolkit. But a much more decisive and ambitious set of actions was expected. The G20 should deliver quickly on the pledges. By the next meeting they promised to convene as the situation required, which it certainly does now, and that the G20 should forge concrete commitments “to protect human life, restore global economic stability, and lay out solid foundations for strong, sustainable, balanced and inclusive growth” [G20, 2020]. There is no other global leader to take responsibility for safeguarding peoples’ safety, health and well-being. The G20 must fulfil its potential as the world’s premier economic forum and its mission to make globalization work for all people. “Out of this crisis must come not only the reforms to the international architecture left on the table in 2009 but new levels of co-operation that will deliver a quantum leap: a commitment to deliver the global public goods urgently needed by a world beginning to understand that it is both far more interdependent and far more fragile than ever” [The Office of Gordon and Sarah Brown, 2020].

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Globalization’s Implications for G20 Governance

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Abstract

The rapid globalization of money, goods, services, taxation, knowledge, people, political ideas, digitalization, and especially pathogens and ecological pollutants has intensified, along with rising inequality, multipolarity, protectionism, isolationism and geopolitical tensions. Together these factors present new challenges to 21st century global governance led by the systemically significant states which make up the Group of Twenty (G20). G20 governance has expanded in response, but with more success on its old, incompletely globalized economic agenda than on its newer, more globalized digitalization, health pandemics and climate change agendas. The most recent G20 summit in Osaka, Japan on 28–29 June 2019 did make advances on tax and digitalization but not on the looming health risks and the existential threat of climate change. Preparations for the Saudi Arabian-hosted Riyadh summit, to be held on 21–22 November 2020, have made some progress on the latter amidst the unprecedented crisis posed by the COVID-19 pandemic. The crisis shows that the G20’s architecture needs to be further strengthened by institutionalizing G20 environment and health ministers’ meetings; inviting the executive heads of the United Nations (UN) bodies for climate change, biodiversity, the environment and health, as well as the leaders of key outside countries, to the summits; giving the UN and World Health Organization the same G20 status as the International Monetary Fund and World Bank; and holding a second annual summit at the UN each September focused on the sustainable development goals.

Key words: G20; globalization; digitalization; climate change; Sustainable Development Goals


Introduction

The Challenge

The rapid globalization of goods, services, taxation, knowledge, people, digital technology, and above all pathogens and ecological pollutants, along with rising inequality and multipolarity, presents new challenges to 21st century global governance by the systemically significant states which make up the Group of Twenty (G20). Such changes have intensified protectionism, isolationism and geopolitical tensions. They have rapidly made climate change, biodiversity loss and health threats such as the current COVID-19 pandemic the greatest threats...
to strong, sustained, balanced, inclusive economic growth and to the G20’s distinctive founda-
tional missions of promoting financial stability and making globalization work for all [Kirton,
Kokotsis, 2015].

The Debate

These dynamics have inspired a debate among several schools of thought about the dy-
namics of contemporary globalization and the effectiveness of the G20 in response.

The first school sees G20 failure. Martin Gilman [2018, p. 9] claims that “deglo-
galization has become a factor in the internal politics of too many countries” and that its source in
the economic dynamics and policy “in some of the major G20 economies cannot be sustained
much longer.” He writes that “the concerted, post-crisis efforts of the G7 [Group of Seven ma-
jor market democracies], abetted by the G20, to restore the prevailing liberal global economic
framework have been misguided.” He adds that “the G20, especially at the summit level, has
become an anachronistic photo op” [Ibid., p. 10]. He concludes that “ironically the forces of
deglobalization are intensifying almost despite the global reach of the internet — as seen in areas
from security, migration, taxation and trade” [Ibid., p. 12]. He locates the cause in a declining,
disruptive United States under President Donald Trump, the decline of G7 economies, and the
rapid rise of the emerging G20 economies.

The second school sees G20 decline. Harold James [2017] writes: “Each major chal-
lenge — the 1970s inflation and oil price shocks and the recent global crisis — produced some
new approaches to multilateral cooperation and coordination: the G5 in 1975 and the G20
advanced and emerging market economies in 2008. In each case, however, a productive initial
meeting was followed by a process of routinization that sapped the urgency and capacity to
generate major breakthroughs and policy improvements.” He points to Big Data and transpar-
to leaders’ level adjusted the political leadership to the new reality of the global economy... but
international macroeconomic coordination was short lived.” A variant sees a role for the G20 in
confronting the COVID-19 crisis, but only if its most powerful states cooperate and it adds a G4
inner steering group of the United States, China, Germany and France [Stephens, 2020]. Thus,
due to U.S. – China disagreements, the G20 produced only limited results at its emergency
summit on 26 March 2020 [Goodman, Segal, Sobel, 2020].

The third school sees G20 economic success and ecological failure. Stephen Bernstein
[2019, p. 18] see the G20 effectively responding to the 2008 global financial crisis in interna-
tional financial institutional reform, development and trade with their environmental failures,
but not on environmental issues. They see the G20 doing better than either the G7 or the BRICS
grouping of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa in this regard. They conclude “that
much more serious repercussions for the international order follow failures of economic leader-
ship and responsibility than follow failures of environmental leadership or great power respon-
sibility.” In a similar spirit, Michael Motala [2019a] concludes that the G20 and the Organisa-
tion for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) have been a partial success on tax,
with their achievements on first order compliance not extending to enforcement.

The fourth school sees continuing G7 success in governing globalization, even with the
advent of the more inclusive G20 in response to the global financial crises of 1997 and 2008
[Oldani, Wouters, Andrione-Moylan, 2019, p. 5]. However, both the G7 and G20 struggle to
cope with the upsurge in antiglobalization populism in many of their most powerful members.
Others see similar potential for the G20 to induce the United States, China and others to coop-
erate in response to the proliferating COVID-19 shock [Albright et al., 2020; Nye, 2020].