

The New G20 Politics of Global Economic Governance

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Abstract

This article demonstrates how the Group of Twenty (G20) constituted a new G20 politics following the 2008–09 global financial crisis through practices of networked global economic governance. This increased the influence of actors other than officials from leading wealthy states, especially developing- and non-state actors, thus augmenting global governance inclusivity and decentralizing authority. The G20 became the principal hub of global economic governance by influencing and engaging with diverse stakeholders on its broad policy agenda. These networked-governance processes expanded aspects of multilateral cooperation, including transversal approaches to policy issues such as sustainable development. This analysis builds on recent literature on transnational actors, governance networks, and the G20; contributes to emerging constructivist literature on the normative significance of practices and social-relational processes in international relations; and includes a significant discourse-analytic focus on repoliticization and legitimizing discourses. This study indicates, in particular, the political and normative consequences of G20 inclusivity practices for integrating global governance networks.

Key words: authority; depoliticization; G20; global governance; inclusivity; networks; politics; practices; repoliticization; transnational

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Introduction

This article demonstrates how the Group of Twenty (G20) constituted a *new G20 politics* of global economic governance following the 2008–09 global financial crisis (GFC). It focuses on the international political and normative consequences of networked G20 governance, especially new inclusivity practices for integrating transnational global governance networks, and their broader effects on global economic governance norms and practices.

The analysis is divided into four main sections. The first explicates the analytical framework, which is broadly constructivist but influenced by multidisciplinary research on global governance authority, networks, processes, and practices; as well as depoliticization, repoliticization, and legitimizing discourses. The second section analyzes the significance of explicitly or implicitly *political* practices of global economic governance, especially constituted through repoliticization, despite the former influence of depoliticization practices. The third assesses the politics of networked G20 governance, especially how global governance networks and political contestation influence global governance. The final section focuses on the political and nor-

mative consequences of G20 inclusivity practices, which are important aspects of the forum's networked governance approach.

The forum's networked-governance processes expanded aspects of multilateral cooperation, including transversal approaches to policy issues such as sustainable development. These network processes had important political and normative consequences, especially by decentralizing authority and integrating more heterogeneous actors in post-2008 global economic governance.

Analyzing the New G20 Politics

This section explicates the analytical approach, which augments current conceptual frameworks for analyzing global economic governance. The present study assesses the G20's significance for contemporary global governance *practices*, foregrounded along with *social-relational processes*, rather than focusing either on macro-structures or individual agency. It argues that the G20 constitutes a new politics of global economic governance through such processes and practices, reinforced by key legitimizing discourses.

The article analyzes the significance of G20 governance networks, while incorporating constructivist insights on the normative consequences of shifting international practices and social-relational processes. This indicates a social-processual and practice-focused approach, fitting David McCourt's categorization [2016, pp. 478–9] of practice-relational constructivism (see [Luckhurst, 2019a]). The empirical focus is how *global governance networks*, which consist of private, intergovernmental, supranational, state, semi-state, and/or non-state actors, influence the new G20 politics of global economic governance. It further indicates the increasing pluralism of the types of actors involved in contemporary global governance.

This analytical approach denotes a broad understanding of politics as involving constellations of practices and processes, through which actors engage in contesting the governance of societies or the world, in the case of global governance and world politics. This study includes a focus on the political and normative consequences of *inclusivity practices* for this new G20 politics, especially how these augmented the influence of more heterogeneous global governance networks since the GFC. It is important also to consider the potential future implications of such normative shifts in global governance, which have reflexive significance for actors' understanding of the contemporary context of G20 politics. The perception that more diverse actors and networks are engaging in global governance could increase demands for inclusion from currently excluded or marginalized actors and networks, on legitimacy and inclusivity grounds.

This networked form of G20 politics is part of the growing trend for increasingly diverse and complex forms of global governance since the 1990s, in terms of organization, actors, and policy areas [Dingwerth, Pattberg, 2006, p. 192; Rosenau, 1992, pp. 1–3]. The United Nations' (UN) 2030 sustainable development goals (SDGs) are a good example of the increasingly complex and transversal contemporary approaches to global governance which substantially influenced the G20's policy agenda. The G20 is congruent with broader shifts in global governance in that it engages with multiple organizations, governance networks, actors, and policy issues. This indicates the forum's function as a global governance hub [Kirton, 2013, pp. 27–52; Luckhurst, 2019b], particularly for the global governance networks that engage with its diverse agenda. This constitutes a new form of world politics, one that is less state-centric and more inclusive of actors other than representatives of leading wealthy states.

This study focuses substantially on the post-GFC inclusion of more heterogeneous global governance networks through engagement with the G20. The latter augmented the influence of more diverse networks on transversal policymaking processes, thus decentralizing global

governance authority. The analytical approach is to examine how such networked governance relations, processes, and practices constituted a *new G20 politics*, through the G20 embedding significant shifts in global economic governance norms and practices.

The G20 and G20-engaged governance networks reciprocally influence each other through shifting processes, relations, and practices rather than unilateral individual agency or macro-structures. This approach is influenced by Emanuel Adler's insights [2019, p. 27 – emphasis in original] on what he terms “cognitive evolution,” and the “*epistemic practical authority*” of some actors to ascribe meaning to practices and “background knowledge” about the world. The notion of epistemic practical authority is similar to other constructivists' emphasis on “cognitive authority” [Broome, Seabrooke, 2015], which the present author integrates in a broader analytical approach to three key dimensions of global governance authority, namely strategic, political, and cognitive authority (see [Luckhurst, 2017]).

Adler [2019, p. 27] asserts that epistemic practical authority “results from processes of epistemic authority contestation between different claims.” He further explains:

international social orders evolve because of the intervention of new social actors and/or the effects that the replacement of one type of political entity and institution by another may have on background knowledge and practices, on the negotiability processes within communities of practice, and on the selection processes between different communities [Ibid., p. 28].¹

This is useful for understanding the analytical approach of the present study. Global governance practices and background knowledge, the latter being commonplace or taken-for-granted assumptions about the world, *evolve through processes – hence ongoing social relations – of contestation*. Consequently, as Adler notes [Ibid., p. 31], they are “socially-emergent properties rather than individuals' property.” This points to important ontological and epistemological insights which are impossible to examine here in detail (see [Ibid.]). Suffice to note that while G20-engaged global governance actors are capable of reflexivity and agency, their agency is context-dependent and exists within complex social interactions and processes; indeed, *agency occurs through social relations*. Individual actors, moreover, are reflexive but not isolated from the consequences of shifting global governance authority, practices, and background knowledge.

This indicates the significance of the final conceptual issues, the influence of *depoliticization*, *repoliticization* and *legitimizing discourses*. The latter has been analyzed by international relations scholars of critical discourse analysis [de Ville, Orbie, 2014]; and by the present author in researching the G20 and other aspects of global economic governance [Luckhurst, 2016a; 2016b; 2017; 2020]. Legitimizing discourses constitute narratives that are instrumentalized to reinforce actors' authority, in the sense noted by Adler [2019, p. 27], to ascribe meaning to practices and background knowledge about the world. This has authority effects *to the extent that others are persuaded*, since authority is constituted through socially constructed perceptions [Hopf, 1998, pp. 178–9; Reus-Smit, 2007, p. 44]. G20-engaged global governance networks deploy legitimizing discourses in processes of political contestation, in attempting to sway global governance norms and policymaking. “Depoliticization” and “repoliticization” indicate processes of increasing or decreasing political contestation of particular policy issues, incorporating practices such as the use of legitimizing discourses and other techniques to augment authority, ascribe meaning and constitute background knowledge.

¹ “Communities of practice” consist of actors that collectively adhere to particular practices, for example specific policy or diplomatic practices (see [Adler 2008; 2019]). Unlike global governance networks, they do not necessarily cooperate as professionally linked networks.

The new G20 politics of global economic governance is crucially influenced by networks, through practices and processes constituted by and constitutive of social relations, rather than through macro-structures or individual agency. This analysis further indicates the significance of the G20 for important shifts in post-GFC global economic governance. The G20 constituted new processes and practices which, due to its authoritativeness as a global governance hub [Eccleston, Kellow, Carroll, 2015], increased multilateral fora and governments' openness, or permeability, to more heterogeneous global governance networks. This contributed to the ongoing process of decentralizing global governance authority since the 1990s, which accelerated during the GFC. The present article examines the significance of such political and normative shifts.

Repoliticizing Global Economic Governance

This section analyzes the influence of the G20 on explicitly and implicitly *political* practices of global governance. It includes a brief review of global economic governance since the 1990s. This indicates how the G20, as a crucial hub for global governance networks, established social-relational processes and normative practices that constituted a *new politics* of global economic governance following the GFC. The G20 thus substantially contributed to the recent *repoliticization* of global economic governance.

Here it is useful to reiterate the conceptualization of “politics” and “political” deployed in the article, especially to denote the *contestation of processes and practices of governance*. This points to the agonistic, or contested and contestable, aspect of politics. The G20's hub role in decentralizing global governance authority contributed to diffusing new norms and practices of global economic governance; in doing so, it also constituted new contexts and practices of deliberation, engagement and political contestation on global governance issues such as financial regulation, macroeconomic policies, sustainable development, infrastructure financing, corporate taxation and gender equality [Luckhurst, 2016a; 2019b]. This is not to claim that the G20 alone politicized global governance, since global governance has always been implicitly or explicitly political. The G20's role as a hub for decentralizing global governance authority instead augmented the heterogeneity of political contestation in this context through its inclusion of more diverse organizations, actors and policy issues.

The notion of *governance* became popular during the 1990s, including in domestic and international policymaking. Some scholars subsequently focused on multilevel governance, indicative of the complex interlinkages between more diverse actors and networks across local, national, regional and global governance settings (see [Bache, 2008; Hooghe, Marks, 2001; Sikkink, 2005]). Other scholars focused on the growing influence of non-state actors and networks in global economic governance, such as transnational advocacy networks and civil society organizations (CSOs), on issues such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) debate on prohibiting capital controls, deliberations on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's (OECD) Multilateral Agreement on Investment, and on the norms of international trade [Hannah, 2016; Keck, Sikkink, 1999; Scholte, 2004; Smythe, 2000]; while others examined the influence of professional standard-setting bodies and private actors on the governance of international professional practices and product standards [Büthe, Mattli, 2011; Coni-Zimmer, Flor, Wolf, 2019]. This was indicative of key epistemic and normative shifts, from emphasizing the political authority of national *governments* to conceptualizing authority within a more heterogeneous context of *governance*. There are different perspectives on what this implies for politics and political agency. Eva Sørensen and Jacob Torfing [2017, p. 40] contrast what they call “the depoliticizing impact of the public management perspective” on governance, with the “political science perspective” that “repoliticizes” it. The former emphasizes governance as a technocratic space of rational decision-making, the latter as a political

space of continual contestation, especially between a growing diversity of actors. The present article broadly fits within the latter category, focused here on international or global, rather than national, politics.

The repoliticization of global economic governance since the GFC, as an increasingly heterogeneous context of political contestation, occurred despite the influence of recent depoliticization practices (see [Sørensen, Torfing, 2017]). The latter indicated the agency of cognitively authoritative expert actors and governance networks, constituting policymaking spaces that were designed to be perceived as technocratic, thus minimizing broader political contestation of their authoritatively prescribed best practices. This signifier “best practice” was professionally and epistemically reinforced by legitimizing discourses, deployed to justify the exclusive influence of certain groups of experts, especially those from global governance networks with cognitive authority on key economic policymaking areas.

Global governance networks that advocated the so-called Washington Consensus and neoliberal deregulation strategies constituted such discursive depoliticization practices, often successfully, during the 1990s. Officials from the IMF, the World Bank, and Group of Seven/Eight (G7/8) governments emphasized the benefits of markets for economic growth and efficiency [Rodrik, 2006; Stiglitz, 2002; Williamson, 1990]. This influenced public and policymakers’ perceptions of politics and the role of the state. Some centre-left political parties also perceived the apparent failings of state-interventionist policymaking strategies as necessitating an expanded role for markets in society [Driver, Martell, 2000; Giddens, 1998; Jessop, 2003].

Critics of neoliberalism sometimes claimed the growing third sector of voluntary, non-profit organizations could complement the economic roles of the state *and* markets [Evers, 1995]. The declining influence of the public sector around the turn of the millennium more often led to an increasing role for markets. This was due to the growing epistemic and normative sway of rational and public choice approaches to policymaking, influenced by New Classical economics, between the 1980s and early 2000s. This situation persisted until the GFC, especially among global governance networks and politicians in several key wealthy states.

Doubts about market efficiency arguments for economic deregulation and liberalization became increasingly prevalent, though, among citizens and politicians in those developing states that experienced financial crises in the 1990s and early 2000s. This was partly because the crises were particularly damaging in developing states such as Argentina, Indonesia, Mexico and Thailand which had followed economic policy advice from the IMF and other Washington Consensus advocates [Graham, Masson, 2002; IMF, 1996; Rodrik, 2006, p. 975; 2012, p. 119; Stiglitz, 2003, pp. 243–6]. This undermined the cognitive authority of the advocates of the Washington Consensus, especially when the World Bank rejected these policy prescriptions in the early 2000s, while the IMF continued to endorse them. This led to open disagreement between the Bretton Woods sister institutions (cf. [IEO, 2003, p. 6; Rogoff, 2002; 2003; Singh et al., 2005; Stiglitz, 2001; World Bank, 2005]), indicating the earlier institutional normative consensus on economic policymaking in global *development* governance had given way to political contestation by the 2000s.

This apparent *return of the political* in global development governance extended to other aspects of global economic governance during the GFC. The latter was crucial for decentralizing authority in key contexts of global economic governance, such as financial regulation and macroeconomic policy coordination [Luckhurst, 2016a; 2017]. The G20 became significantly more important in global economic governance with its elevation to a leader-level forum at its first summit in Washington DC, in November 2008. The G20’s subsequent expansion to include sherpa meetings,² ministerials, working groups, official engagement processes, and *ad*

² The term “sherpa” refers to each G20 leader’s personal representative, or chief negotiator, at the forum.

hoc meetings enabled it to become a “*hub of decentralizing authority* in global economic governance” [Luckhurst, 2019b, p. 7, original emphasis], establishing new inclusivity practices for incorporating more heterogeneous actors and networks [Ibid., 2019c]. This included its role in expanding the membership of the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision (BCBS) and the new Financial Stability Board (FSB) in 2009 to include representatives from the formerly excluded G20 developing states. There was also greater inclusion of non-state actors through the G20’s official engagement forums. These inclusivity practices were important for the new G20 politics of global economic governance, in substantive policymaking terms, and because of their consequences for normative, political and cognitive authority.

The G20 became a focus for political contestation after the GFC, especially with the growing policy divergence on the core macroeconomic goal to augment the global economic recovery. This took the form of persistent disagreements after 2010 on the relative benefits of fiscal austerity and stimulus policies between the leading European Union states, advocating the former, and the Obama administration, the Chinese government, and increasingly the IMF, advocating the latter. The G20’s collective cooperation during the GFC, especially from September 2008 to September 2009, briefly seemed to indicate the potential for establishing an *ad hoc* form of embedded liberalism (see [Helleiner, 2010; 2019; Luckhurst, 2012]), a partial reversion to the more deeply institutionalized multilateral cooperation of the post-war Bretton Woods system. Combined with the potential for achieving a Bretton Woods-style consensus, such an approach would have constituted new *political practices* of economic governance by creating spaces for political deliberation and coordination to achieve socioeconomic goals and reduce negative effects from global macroeconomic imbalances. The G20 accomplished some of these through aspects of its GFC-period coordination, though with more modest achievements since 2010. It subsequently remained a hub of decentralizing global governance authority [Luckhurst, 2019b] despite the post-GFC political and economic constraints. The G20 broadly sustained the status achieved at its Pittsburgh summit of September 2009, when members proclaimed it “the premier forum for our international economic cooperation” [G20, 2009b]. The G20 continued this coordinating role with diverse actors, governments, and international organizations such as the FSB, the IMF, the World Bank and the OECD [Callaghan, 2017; Larionova, 2017; Lesage, 2014; Wouters, van Kerckhoven, 2011].

Despite the growing macroeconomic policy divergence after 2010, G20 inclusivity practices increased the influence of actors other than officials from leading wealthy states. This enabled the leading developing states to make more substantial financial and policy-normative contributions to multilateral cooperation, while also being more inclusive of non-state actors in policy deliberations. These practices were *political*, both in terms of their consequences for the expanded deliberation and contestation of governance practices, and their significance for shaping the processes and policy outcomes of global economic governance.

Trade issues, like economic development, also became more prominent in G20 deliberations after the GFC. The main concern on trade in the immediate aftermath of the GFC was to avert protectionism; this was influenced by the common belief that protectionism had exacerbated the 1930s Great Depression. It was another key policy area that became repoliticized in recent years, especially after Donald Trump won the U.S. presidential election in 2016. Trump’s confrontational and protectionist measures in response to what he claimed were unfair trade practices from several states, especially China, put an end to the erstwhile *rhetorical* consensus at the G20 – by which the forum had consistently reiterated its anti-protectionism pledge at its annual summits. Simon Evenett [2013] had argued that G20 states failed to fulfil their anti-protectionism commitments anyway, but Trump’s willingness to break with the politico-rhetorical commitment to anti-protectionism was indicative of the normative repoliticization of international trade practices.

The Politics of Networked G20 Governance

The G20 influenced the global economic architecture through significant new political *and networked* governance practices [Baker, Carey, 2014; Eccleston, Kellow, Carroll, 2015, pp. 301–3; Luckhurst, 2019c]. The greater pluralism and complexity of post-Cold War global governance, in terms of organization, actors and policy issues, augmented the authority and influence of more heterogeneous actors. This was possible through their inclusion in global governance *networks*, because agency is constituted through social relations.

The focus here on global governance networks, rather than broader civil society inclusion, indicates the limits of this form of inclusivity. G20-engaged global governance networks are heterogeneous but often consist of professional-expert and elite actors [Luckhurst, 2019c; Stone, 2015]; hence, not only state representatives, but also *not all citizens*. These networks often provide links to broader groups and civil society, however, thus increasing the scope for policy engagement and public diplomacy. G20 sherpas play a significant role in this context, as they communicate with the diverse interlocutors and engagement groups, constituting practices of inclusivity and socialization [Luckhurst, 2019; Rewizorski, 2017, pp. 42–5]. The official G20 engagement fora constituted key practices of inclusion, in addition to those constituted through G20 engagement with non-member states and its inclusion of developing states, which augmented their influence on global economic governance.

The G20's policy agenda during the GFC was mainly focused on the perceived immediate threats, especially the need to recover from the economic downturn, but also on reforming global financial regulation to prevent a repetition of the crisis. Despite the narrow focus of the economic governance agenda, there were significant shifts in terms of authority, norms and practices. One was the greater integration of G20 developing states in global economic governance bodies, especially the FSB and the BCBS. Another crucial example was the increasing influence from the global governance network on macroprudential financial regulation. This shifted the G20's agenda on financial-sector regulatory reforms during the GFC, leading G20 members to endorse macroprudential regulation [G20, 2010].

Before the GFC, the prevalent financial regulatory framework advocated by leading western-based officials had been *microprudential* regulation. This emphasized the role of individual firms' internal monitoring of financial-regulation compliance, with a greater focus on individual firms' performance than on potential sectoral-level problems. For several years before the GFC, critics of the microprudential approach had advocated more monitoring and regulation that addressed sectoral risks, through macroprudential financial regulation. This indicated a focus on “factors that could endanger the financial system as a whole, even if they would not be obvious as serious threats when viewed in the context of a single institution” [Elliott, 2011]. The shift to macroprudential regulation had been advocated, especially, by staff from the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) for several years before the GFC (see [BIS, 1986; Crockett, 2000]). The latter undermined aspects of the erstwhile conventional wisdom in global governance circles such that the global governance network advocating macroprudential regulation managed to supplant the epistemic and normative influence of the microprudential approach [Baker, 2013; Luckhurst, 2016a, pp. 149–56; 2017, pp. 92–7]. This global governance shift was substantially influenced by the macroprudential governance network, with coordinated advocacy from officials at the BIS, the FSB, and the IMF (see [FSB, IMF, BIS, 2011]), plus among national policymakers such as financial regulators, central bankers, and staff at finance ministries. The G20 became a crucial global governance hub for steering the macroprudential shift in financial regulation, especially through the forum's instigation and endorsement of the new Basel III Accords in 2010 (see [BCBS, 2010]). This role was particularly influenced by the G20's Working Group on Enhancing Sound Regulation and Strengthening Transparency

which, notably, was co-chaired by the Canadian representative Tiff Macklem and the Indian representative Rakesh Mohan. This combination of key actors from the Global North and Global South further indicated the greater heterogeneity of post-GFC, G20-engaged global economic governance networks.

The macroprudential financial-regulatory shift was *not purely* the result of state agency. It was influenced through broader networked actors and practices of global governance advocacy and authority. Moreover, it was not simply a technocratic process; instead it had important political repercussions for global and domestic financial governance, as well as epistemic and normative consequences. It constituted political shifts in the setting of new regulatory practices. Importantly, this undermined the cognitive authority of policymakers who had advocated decreasing financial regulation to facilitate supposedly rationally efficient market practices, due to their assumption of potential efficiency gains. This had broader political repercussions, including further refuting the prioritization of deregulation and market liberalization in development policymaking, under the influence of the former Washington Consensus. This reinforced the shift in development policymaking to a growing sustainable development consensus.

G20 macroeconomic governance also was substantially influenced by epistemic, normative and policymaking shifts during the GFC. The intergovernmental dissensus between G20 members, noted earlier, was reinforced by contestation between competing communities of practice and global governance networks on how to achieve a global economic recovery, especially advocates of fiscal stimulus versus austerity advocates. There was a Keynesian revival during the GFC [Farrell, Quiggin, 2017; Luckhurst, 2012] which influenced the G20's macroeconomic agenda and agreements in 2009, especially its support for a fiscal stimulus and collective growth-oriented economic policies [G20, 2009a; 2009b]. This was followed by growing contestation from 2010 onwards as advocates of fiscal-austerity measures gained greater sway. These competing networks and practice-communities included diverse actors engaged in political contestation of competing claims on the best approach to macroeconomic governance. The brief resurgence of Keynesian policymaking strategies during the GFC was only possible due to the existence of actor-networks that could influence the G20 and global economic governance once a crisis effect undermined the influence of recent macroeconomic policy norms and practices (see [Widmaier, Blyth, Seabrooke, 2007]). The advent of a new crisis at the end of 2009 and start of 2010, specifically the Greek and then subsequent eurozone crisis, similarly gave austerity advocates an opening to contest the Keynesian emphasis on fiscal-stimulus policies. This included non-state actors contributing to the contestation in favour of austerity, for example Alberto Alesina and Silvia Ardagna [2009] and Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff [2010]. Alesina was particularly influential in the European Union's political debate on austerity and fiscal stimulus. He gave a presentation [2010] on his claims about the benefits of austerity, or "fiscal consolidation," to the European Union's Finance Ministerial meeting (Ecofin) in April 2010.

Heterogeneous groups of state and non-state actors were also involved in global governance networks in other policy areas. A global sustainable development governance network, linked to the broader community of practice on sustainable development, significantly influenced the post-GFC G20 agenda. This had important policy consequences for global development governance, though the G20 was relatively less influential as a global governance forum in this policymaking context. It constituted, instead, a collaborative governance hub to complement the efforts of the UN and World Bank on sustainable development governance. Global authority shifts during the GFC, indicated by the G20's growing inclusivity practices [Luckhurst, 2019c], gave greater influence to the G20's developing-state members but also, significantly, to newly industrialized Republic of Korea. The latter's post-GFC augmented authority was indicated when it became the first non-G8 member, and first non-Anglosphere state, to

chair the leader-level G20 in the second half of 2010. This example of decentralizing global governance authority initiated the G20's agenda expansion over subsequent presidencies, due to the Koreans introducing development issues, which crucially influenced the forum's role and broader global governance norms and practices.

The Korean G20 Presidency was influenced by actors from the global sustainable development governance network, especially those from the influential CSO Oxfam. Oxfam lobbied the Koreans to include development issues in the G20 agenda, thus expanding it beyond the GFC-period focus on economic recovery and financial reform. The Koreans adopted the phrase proposed by Oxfam [2010], "Seoul Development Consensus," as the label for their G20-chair development proposals [G20, 2010]. The latter rejected the prescriptivism of the defunct Washington Consensus and endorsed more sustainable development practices, including a strategic development role for the state.

The Korean G20 Presidency made these proposals in a broader context of shifting global development governance authority. The World Bank [2005] had already abandoned the Washington Consensus before the GFC; others, as noted earlier, also rejected the core macroeconomic principles underpinning the Washington approach, particularly after the Asian financial crisis and during the GFC. Cognitively authoritative actors, such as leading economists and development experts Dani Rodrik [2001], Jeffrey Sachs [2015], Amartya Sen [2013], and Joseph Stiglitz [2002] were part of a broader community of practice on sustainable development that contributed to legitimizing the political shift to sustainable development. The normative and cognitive authority shifts were influenced by the aforementioned political contestation on financial and macroeconomic governance, and by a global sustainable development governance network of intergovernmental, state and non-state actors. These authority shifts swayed the G20's post-GFC development agenda, with the forum's own Development Working Group (DWG) helping to coordinate and consolidate the G20 governance network on sustainable development.

Subsequent G20 presidencies continued to incorporate sustainable development in their agendas [Berger, Leininger, Messner, 2017, pp. 120–1], with the G20 endorsing and advocating the UN's SDGs through their leaders' summit declarations [G20, 2015; 2016a; 2017; 2018; 2019]. The 2016 Chinese G20 Presidency and its Hangzhou summit further consolidated the coordinating role of the G20's DWG in its sustainable development governance network, as emphasized in its post-summit document, "G20 Action Plan on the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development" – the latter also noting the importance of G20 cooperation with civil society and the official G20 engagement groups [G20, 2016b, pp. 14–5; Scholtz, Brandi, 2017, pp. 157–8]. Oxfam and other CSOs have continued to play a significant lobbying and engagement role, including through the official Civil 20 engagement forum that was inaugurated during the Russian G20 Presidency in 2013. This influence of the G20 sustainable development governance network was indicative of the expanded agenda and the heterogeneity of networks involved in the new G20 politics of global economic governance.

In the context of global development and financial regulation, G20 networked governance resulted in the shift to a new policymaking consensus. However, the new G20 politics of networked governance does not always result in comprehensive policy shifts or normative consensus. The macroeconomic *dissensus* since the eurozone crisis, especially, was influenced by competing governance networks, respectively, advocating austerity or fiscal-stimulus policies, such that the G20 was unable to maintain the level of cooperation on macroeconomic policy strategies that occurred during the GFC. There has also been divergence from the Trump administration, more recently, in rejecting the broad consensus among most G20 members on trade and climate norms. This indicates the significant contestatory aspect to the new G20 politics, with global governance networks at the core of macroeconomic political contestation.

Political and Normative Consequences of G20 Inclusivity Practices

The G20's hub role influenced the repoliticization of networked global economic governance during the GFC. New G20 inclusivity practices contributed to the diversification of actors and networks involved. This had broader political and normative consequences, constituting the important normative shift to a process of growing legitimation through the expansion of inclusivity practices in global economic governance.

Analysis of G20 networked-governance processes indicates their substantial political and normative repercussions, also, in expanding the scope of the forum's multilateral cooperation. The G20's post-GFC policy agenda expanded considerably by incorporating issues such as the SDGs and a growing emphasis on complex, transversal policy strategies. This was due, in large part, to political contestation and advocacy from newly included actors and networks in G20 governance processes, therefore a significant consequence of these inclusivity practices. The Korean G20 Presidency, during the second half of 2010, had the crucial normative consequence of initiating the agenda expansion that continued during subsequent G20 presidencies. Advocates of this broader agenda were able to articulate it with the signifier "legitimacy," thus constituting a normative trap [Schimmelfennig, 2001] by rhetorically linking the expanded G20 agenda, including issues of sustainable development, with legitimacy. This was because the expanded agenda was advocated by representatives of developing states, so the increasing discursive imbrication of *global governance legitimacy* with *inclusivity* undermined the capacity of G7/8 governments to ignore the priorities of developing-state governments; hence the former were less able to dominate the G20 policy agenda [Luckhurst, 2019c].

More recently, global governance networks have influenced G20 policy deliberations on broader, transversal issues such as gender equality. The official G20 engagement forums have been influential in this context. The C20 successfully lobbied the 2014 Australian G20 Presidency to incorporate the goal of reducing the gender labour-participation gap in the G20, by 25% by the year 2025 within the Brisbane summit leaders' declaration [Harris Rimmer, Byrne, 2019, p. 174; see C20, 2014; G20, 2014]. More recently, the Osaka G20 summit declaration [G20, 2019] integrated key gender-equality priorities advocated by the engagement forums, especially in two pre-summit joint statements from the C20, L20, T20, W20 and Y20 [2019a; 2019b], one on the gender labour-participation gap and the other on eliminating work-based violence and harassment.

This points to the normative influence from the G20 gender-equality governance network, partly because gender issues were not initially emphasized by the Japanese G20 Presidency. It further indicates how the expansion of G20 policy and political engagement practices contributed to the new G20 politics. The growing inclusion of global governance networks engaged across the expanded G20 agenda increased their capacity to lobby and influence the forum. This further contributed to the development of new "constructed focal points" for cooperation on these broader agenda issues [Keohane, Martin, 1995, p. 45], providing opportunities for such issues to be foregrounded in global governance deliberations. The G20's official engagement processes, in particular, compel the forum members *to engage*, further augmenting the imbrication of legitimacy with inclusivity practices.

There has been substantial scholarly debate on the G20's agenda expansion [Luckhurst, 2016a, pp. 190–6]. This has often been framed in the language of a depoliticizing efficiency discourse versus a repoliticizing legitimacy discourse, the former deployed to advocate more restrictions on inclusivity and the latter to advocate existing or additional inclusivity practices (cf. [Carin et al., 2010; Cooper, Momani, 2014; Slaughter, 2013]). This is a crucial debate in the politics of networked G20 governance; ostensibly about contesting best practice in G20 govern-

ance, it has become a core political divide between networks and actors engaged in the new G20 politics. G20 inclusivity practices contributed to the repoliticization of key aspects of global economic governance, as noted, especially because they expanded the actors engaged and the policy issues and options debated since the GFC. This repoliticization of key aspects of the extended G20 agenda, influenced by inclusivity practices, constituted new normative practices which could be deployed for purposes of global governance legitimization.

The evidence of networked G20 governance indicates the forum's permeability to heterogeneous global governance networks, by contrast with traditional approaches to diplomacy and multilateral economic fora which have tended to be more state-centric and involving exclusionary practices. In this sense, post-GFC authority shifts constituted a new G20 politics of global economic governance in terms of the scope of policy deliberations and practices, plus the greater pluralism and diversity of networks and actors involved. This constituted new inclusivity practices with important political and normative consequences for global economic governance. The new inclusivity practices also had significant effects on the leverage from states' strategic authority, effectively undermining the capacity of key states, for example the G7 members, to dominate the G20 agenda and global governance processes [Luckhurst, 2019c, p. 533]. G20 practices contrasted with the much weaker forms of engagement and inclusivity introduced by the G8 before the GFC, such as the Outreach Five engagement through invitations to the leaders of Brazil, India, China, Mexico and South Africa to attend G8 summits as guests, with the areas of engagement dictated by the G8 [Cooper, Thakur, 2013, pp. 59–62; see Peters, 2019]. These measures had occurred before the elevation of the G20 to a leader-level forum.

The pre-GFC hierarchy in global economic governance engendered a sense of inequality and injustice among several policymakers in leading developing states. This was evident from various public statements, which indicated the normative and political significance of the G20's inclusivity practices. Policymakers from leading middle-income states, especially, were dissatisfied with the pre-GFC hierarchy in global economic governance. Guido Mantega, the Brazilian finance minister in 2008, noted the Brazilian delegation at the first G20 summit would not be attending just to be "mere coffee drinkers" [Partlow, 2008] and wanted to be fully engaged in policy deliberations. Chinese and Indian policymakers made similar comments [Cooper, Farooq, 2013, p. 430; Paulson, 2015, p. 240]. These kinds of statements indicated the important political and normative consequences of the G20's inclusivity practices. Eric Helleiner [2016] noted these practices increased the potential for "cooperative decentralization" by linking compatible Bretton Woods institutional practices with those of new BRICS-based institutions such as the New Development Bank,³ and with post-GFC regional projects such as the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. Cooperative decentralization reduced the likelihood of global economic governance fragmentation into competing organizational architectures, thus contributing to decentralizing strategic, political and cognitive authority rather than splits, especially between BRICS and G7 countries [Luckhurst, 2017, pp. 219–40].

G20 inclusivity practices could have significant political and normative consequences for member- and non-member- states' domestic economic governance, especially through their influence on understandings of sovereignty and political inclusivity. The new G20 politics of increasingly *inclusive and networked* global economic governance provides opportunities for interlocutors to engage in the forum's policy debates, increasing their potential influence in this context. There could also be domestic political effects to the extent that more heterogeneous G20 governance networks could use their augmented international influence, directly or indirectly, to sway domestic policymaking practices and political norms of civil society engagement. This could further undermine state-centric understandings of sovereign authority by normatively legitimizing the role of heterogeneous actor-networks in contemporary governance.

³ BRICS = Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa.

The present article indicates the limited influence of states' strategic authority in a world of increasingly complex, pluralist, and networked governance, where key policy issues are contested by competing governance networks linked through often transnational professional ecologies [Karlsrud, 2016; Luckhurst, 2019c; Seabrooke, 2014]. Even in those states, such as the BRICS members, where governments prioritize sovereign authority and independence, sovereignty does not equate homogeneity or uniformity among policymakers. Competing policy communities and governance networks exist, domestically and among official representatives at multilateral bodies and other domestic global-governance stakeholders, as indicated by David Shambaugh's [2013] analysis of policy divergence between Chinese policymakers. This was evident during the global financial crisis, when Chinese domestic and global governance actors differed on key issues, such as whether China should introduce capital-account liberalization and whether the international reserve-currency role of the U.S. dollar should continue [Davis, Wei, 2013; Luckhurst, 2016a, pp. 69, 225]. Economic policy discourses are influenced by domestic political contexts but are often borderless in terms of the international prevalence of transnationally shaped debates on topics such as digitalization, globalization, gender economic equity and sustainable development.

The new G20 politics crucially expanded the scope, actors and networks engaged in broader contexts of global economic governance. This might undermine resistance to expanding inclusivity processes and practices in other areas of global governance, including security, perhaps even at the UN Security Council. This is only one potential scenario; complex political and diplomatic concerns would be involved in any such shift at the UN. For the moment, while the new G20 politics of heterogeneous and networked global economic governance incorporates an extensive agenda of important issues with sovereignty implications, including digital technology, migration, infrastructure and other transversally linked topics; military security arguably remains the most obvious state-centric dimension of global governance (see [Alexandrov, Stein, 2019]).

Conclusion

The new G20 politics of global economic governance since the GFC had crucial consequences. It established important new inclusivity practices which substantially augmented the post-crisis influence of more heterogeneous global governance networks. These broader networks included more actors from developing states, as well as non-state actors. This also influenced the G20's agenda expansion, especially after 2010.

The first section introduced key aspects of the analytical approach, including the focus on how inclusivity practices and decentralizing authority were influential in constituting more heterogeneous G20 governance networks. The second section indicated the significance of the G20 as a hub and catalyst for the repoliticization of global economic governance during the GFC. This process was augmented by a crisis effect that undermined the cognitive authority of formerly authoritative actors and networks, thus repoliticizing conventional wisdom or background knowledge. The third explicated how G20 governance networks contested policy norms and practices in key aspects of global economic governance, influenced by decentralizing authority. The final section argued that there are important political and normative consequences from the G20's inclusivity practices, influencing the G20 and broader contexts of global governance, including, potentially, domestic politics and governance.

This analysis emphasizes the growing significance of the new G20 politics of global economic governance. This forum and its policy debates are *political*, especially because of its key contribution to repoliticizing global economic governance. The latter occurred despite pre-GFC attempts to depoliticize economic liberalization and the Washington Consensus. The

present article explicates these new political practices and networked processes of G20 governance, including their influence on global governance in the context of decentralizing strategic, political and cognitive authority.

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