Sanctions in IR: Understanding, Defining, Studying

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Abstract

This article examines the ability of the two leading theoretical perspectives in international relations (IR) – realism and liberalism – to explain various aspects of sanctions implemented against Russia after 2014, as well as Russia's countermeasures. Following arguments developed by Robert K. Merton, the author underlines the importance of middle-range theories in studying phenomena that lie at the confluence of economics, legal studies and political science, e.g. international sanctions. Moreover, the author points out the evident and pressing need to integrate sanctions within a broader theoretical context which would contribute to rethinking the nature of contemporary political interactions.

The author consequently tests liberal and realist paradigms and concludes that sanctions fall into the grey zone of their explanatory capabilities. Finally, the author concludes that scholars should either abandon the idea of studying sanctions in terms of big theories and return to an instrumental understanding or they should reconfigure international realist and liberal explanatory principles — which would probably change the paradigms significantly. A third option is to develop a new ontology of international relations.

Key words: IR theory; political theory; sanctions; economic sanctions; middle-range theory; methodology


Introduction and Preliminary Remarks

The current international agenda is the result of events that occurred in 2014. Ongoing tensions are a challenge for the scientific and expert communities responsible for understanding, defining and studying this agenda. Today, the topic of sanctions is a burning issue which provokes heated debates; however, it seems that Russian international relations (IR) scholars have not created a coherent body of work that could form the basis of a national sanctions studies tradition. This task requires examination of the explanatory abilities of the leading theories in IR, which is an important step toward understanding sanctions: their effects, results and future.

1 The editorial board received an article in March 2019.
This analysis focuses on the restrictive measures introduced after 17 March 2014 against a number of Russian politicians by the EU and the U.S., with other states joining them, which remain valid in the form of the extended package, as well as the countermeasures introduced by Russia colloquially called “countersanctions.” Sanctions have been used as a foreign policy instrument more than 170 times in the period since the early 20th century [Hufbauer et al., 2009, p. 248] and have acquired the status of a routine and technical practice. Thus, imposing sanctions includes numerous different aspects and has a profound background in the relatively recent past. However, the events of 2014 created a qualitatively new situation in the international arena. This situation requires expertise that would involve incorporating and not ignoring the previously accumulated knowledge of sanctions.

The methodological aspects of this study include both the broadest conceptual research frameworks – i.e. paradigms implying an approach, a school of thought or research tradition – and the complex of research methods and practices – i.e. methodology in a strict sense. The analysis considers two dominant IR paradigms – liberalism and realism – but does not address constructivism. This is because, unlike liberalism and realism, “the disputability and the unfinished state of constructivism’s formation as a research track becomes noticeable as soon as one looks into it a bit closer” [Alexeyeva, 2014, p. 5]. This means that a comprehensive preliminary conceptualization would shift the focus of this article away from its stated goal (that being said, such an undertaking may be useful for further studies in this field).

It should be noted that this study does not explore the possibility of a global military conflict, drawing instead on the idea of a “new reality” [Sushencov, 2017] and corresponding logic of reasoning which concludes that the relations between Russia and the western states have entered a state of pervasive but predictable and controllable confrontation. This does not mean, however, that an academic description of this world order through the categories of IR theory is unnecessary.

IR theory is characterized by a competition among dominant schools of thought, each trying to gain monopoly over the interpretation of international processes by either proposing a number of exclusive “business card” concepts (e.g. the realist “security dilemma” or the liberal “complex interdependence”) or by explaining various international political phenomena in completely different ways. Although this competition has become less distinct, it still defines IR theory; this trend, represented in its canonical form by the so-called Great Debates, has determined the segmented current state of IR theory. Thus, the frequently encountered thesis that no international relations phenomenon, including sanctions, can be explained within just one paradigm is not disputed in this article. Further, the following assertions are made. First, the analysis of sanctions in this study requires understanding the strengths and weaknesses of the leading theoretical constructions presently shaping the way that IR experts think, and

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2 For example, liberalism makes a correlation between the growth in the number of asymmetric conflicts in late 20th – early 21st century and the rise of influential non-state actors, while realism generally explains this tendency as being related to proxy-wars that resulted from shifts in traditional state balancing.
achieving such understanding is the aim of this study. Second, theorization, with IR theory being no exception, does not imply building a system of articles of faith — this would contradict the very essence of scientific knowledge. However, it initially comprises actions carried out under the “as if” principle, that is, acting as if the desirable result would allow the best methods possible to fill some gap in our knowledge. In this case, reference is made to the normative element of theory. The analysis of existing grand theories is carried out according to the same principle.

This analysis is undertaken as follows. First, the importance of studying sanctions from the perspective of two major IR theories is discussed, followed by an examination of the explanatory abilities of (neo)liberalism and (neo)realism within the framework of sanctions studies. The article develops several conclusions and identifies trajectories for further discussion.

Following the Ladder of Abstraction

Robert K. Merton, a prominent sociologist and science historian, stated the following in his landmark publication, *Social Theory and Social Structure*: “Like so many words that are bandied about, the word “theory” threatens to become meaningless. Because its referents are so diverse — including everything from minor working hypotheses, through comprehensive but vague and unordered speculations, to axiomatic systems of thought — use of the word often obscures rather than creates understanding” [Merton, 2006, p. 64]. This thesis, which was originally formulated with regard to sociology, has turned out to be seamlessly applicable to political science in general. It has sharply and accurately emphasized the problem of research thinking that between lies between the Scylla of high abstraction and the Charybdis of down-to-earth empirics. The compromise brought forward by Merton in the form of middle-range theories promoted a harmonization of the methodologically segmented knowledge of sociopolitical reality. However, it did not remove the question of how the optimal level of abstraction and distance of the researcher from the research object can be determined on a case-by-case basis.

Moreover, not only does this question fall within the realm of philosophy of science, it also contains a distinct practice-oriented element as some political phenomena are sensitive to research instrumentarium.³

Sanctions are a conspicuous example of such phenomena in that, on a first approximation, they allow for the application of multiple scientific research methods and explanatory paradigms.

The presentation of sanctions as a set of middle-range theoretical constructions is undoubtedly justified. Furthermore, this approach is widespread in the academic field.

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³ It must be mentioned that, unlike essentially contested concepts that are the object of competition between grand schools of thought or ideologies (e.g. fundamentally different interpretations of justice in conservatism and socialism), here the issue is to counterpose the applied methods and practices along the axis empirical-abstract. See Gallie [1956].
The issue addressed by the expert community in this case is to make sanctions “smarter” as economic restrictive measures become universally recognized as one of the most popular foreign policy instruments. Still, popularity does not equal efficiency. Edward Fishman, a member of the secretary’s policy planning staff at the U.S. Department of State, illustrates this point with the following convincing example: “In March 2016, the U.S. secretary of the treasury, Jacob Lew, struck a memorable note of caution in a speech on sanctions. ‘We must be conscious of the risk that overuse of sanctions could undermine our leadership position within the global economy and the effectiveness of our sanctions themselves,’ he said. The more the United States relies on sanctions, Lew argued, the more other countries will wean themselves off dependency on the U.S. financial system — and reduce their vulnerability to U.S. sanctions” [Fishman, 2018].

Zack Cooper and Eric B. Lorber make similar remarks in their publication with a self-explanatory title, “The Right Way to Sanction China”: “…the U.S.-Chinese economic relationship is ‘too big to fail’ and...Washington therefore has little economic leverage with Beijing. Indeed, U.S. policymakers should be realistic that extensive sanctions against China would be unwise and infeasible. Nevertheless, certain limited, conduct-based sanctions may be able to shape Chinese behavior at an acceptable cost” [Cooper, Lorber, 2016]. In other words, the “new sanctions” should be more variable and adaptive than the previous restrictive measures [Feaver, Lorber, 2015] while the initiating state should be at least one step ahead when it comes to assessing their efficiency and consequences. This approach is based on a strong empirical element that is characteristic of middle-level theories. In this case, sanctions acquire an extended meaning, which is substantially close to the notion of trade wars.⁴

Yet even in the era of “smart” sanctions the forecasting of their implementation process and their consequences remains complicated, and this fact gives rise to somewhat different statements at the other end of this problematic area. Daniel W. Drezner, one of the leading American IR experts, reflects on whether the use of sanctions as a foreign policy instrument will endure. Richard N. Haass, who has traditionally been close to the U.S. political establishment, expresses similar ideas: “The United States must show restraint and recapture a degree of respect in order to regain its reputation as a benign actor. This will require some sharp departures from the way U.S. foreign policy has been practiced in recent years: to start, no longer carelessly invading other countries and no longer weaponizing U.S. economic policy through the overuse of sanctions and tariffs. But more than anything else, the current reflexive opposition to multilateralism needs to be rethought” [Haass, 2019]. This is not due to the pessimism of some experts or their idealistic visions of the future, but rather to the necessity of integrating the instrumentalist understanding of sanctions into a broader theoretical context. This point of view is less widespread; still, it deserves careful attention and raises a legitimate question: to what extent is IR theory in its current form shaped primarily by two dominant

⁴Timofeev [2018] points out that differences in terminology resulted in two competing approaches to sanctions: Hufbauer's wide one and Pipe's narrow one, which draws distinction between trade wars and sanctions per se as politically motivated measures.
schools of thought, capable of explaining the character and the nature of the ongoing sanctions showdown (the minimum objective) and forecasting its future (the maximum objective)? It seems reasonable to address this research issue by consecutively analyzing the above-mentioned leading IR theory schools in terms of their congruence.

Behind the Line of Interdependence

The liberal paradigm in its both softer and more distinct forms appears to be more vulnerable in the present situation. One of liberalism’s fundamental assertions stipulates the following: peace is engendered by the balance of interests that form the state of interdependence. This state of interdependence is, in the simplest terms, a rationally comprehensible world order within which losses in a potential conflict exceed the gain from a potential victory [Keohane, Nye, 1987]. Liberalism’s vulnerability can be explained by the fact that this assumption no longer has sufficient explanatory power. Discussing the theory of complex interdependence in 2000, Kenneth N. Waltz explained that it is “a condition in which one party can scarcely move without jostling others; a small push ripples through society. The closer the social bonds, the more extreme the effect becomes, and one cannot sensibly pursue an interest without taking others’ interests into account [author’s note: and by threatening them either with one’s own actions or with attempting to control one’s opponent’s actions]...That interdependence promotes war as well as peace has been said often enough” [2000].

Beyond any doubt, Waltz’s remarks are not autonomous — on the contrary, they are a natural continuation of the full-scale criticism that consists of at least two tracks. On one hand, it is reasonable to analyze cooperation benefits in relative rather than absolute terms, while putting major focus on their distribution between the cooperating participants. In this regard, it is often of more principal importance to a state to achieve a configuration under which it would minimize the benefits of its key opponents instead of maximizing its own gains [Gieco, 1988]. On the other hand, the above-mentioned scheme is mostly inherent to either a bipolar system or a structure characterized by the significantly asymmetric resource potentials and capabilities of the actors involved, while a polycentric system implies an emphasis on gross indicators [Snidal, 1991]. Still, even if we do not take the previously underlined ambivalence of one of liberalism’s key constructions into account, it is impossible to ignore the tendency, or at least some evident attempts, toward neutralizing the consequences of economic cooperation by ensuring the highest possible level of economic autonomy. This includes its radical manifestation — deliberately cultivated economic competition with a corresponding set of sanctions as protectionist instruments. In this respect, we can talk about the erosion of interdependence foundations, when the recognition of potential economic losses

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5 See Introductory Remarks, above.
6 I deliberately do not draw distinction between the “classical” and “neo” paradigms in this study by using general notions “liberalism” and “realism” instead without compromising the quality of argumentation.
in case of confrontation loses its role as a decisive argument and safety mechanism. Sanctions are a vivid illustration of this tendency.

The supporters of liberalism may object and claim that the present situation is essentially neither a paradox nor an anomaly. They may argue that it can be described at least partially by the categories of an adapted cooperative security concept, in which sanctions appear as a pre-emptive or immediate response by a group of states united by their common will and fundamental interests, to potentially dangerous or actually subversive actions of some other actor. However, the case of the sanctions imposed on Russia compromises the integrity of such theoretical constructions by creating a number of internal contradictions. For instance, if we use the interpretation of cooperative security suggested by R. Kennedy, one of liberalism’s founders, we have to admit two important problems. First, the researcher’s focus of attention becomes shifted toward the threats provoked by the possibility of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the potential spread of terrorist and extremist attacks and internal conflicts. That is, in this case the scenario – in which a state carries out unacceptable actions and an adequate response follows – lacks in-depth development [Tsygankov, 2000]. Second, it is crucial for a collective security system to be inclusive. Kennedy regards it as a necessity to incorporate the interests of all participants. Thus, a legitimate but ultimately polemical and thus unresolvable question arises: to what extent were Russia’s interests taken into account in 2014? At that time, sanctions were imposed under the pretext of responding to Russia’s unacceptable actions on the international stage, and the preliminary conditions for averting a similar scenario in the future were established.

A different approach to cooperative security is advanced by R. Kohen, according to whom cooperative security is a symbiosis of collective security and defence that implements the stability projection principle [1999, p. 1]. If we take this as a premise, then we should regard sanctions as an instrument of “compelling the disobedient.” This would mean, in Pavel A. Tsygankov’s apt words, that “it is hard to get rid of the impression that it is all about the security of a small group of some privileged states, and that for the sake of preserving (or promoting?) their interests they should not hesitate to use force against the states that do not participate in this system” [2000, p. 5]. This narrative obviously does not fit into the logic of liberal thought, while cooperative security’s exclusive character, with some international organizations possessing extraordinary powers (in Kohen’s opinion, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is one of these) and pursuing — to say the least — interests that diverge from their institutional basis, creates a legal and political collision. As a result, a considerable number of sanctions are imposed without a corresponding United Nations Security Council decision, which makes their legitimacy disputable.

Liberalism’s second crucial line of argumentation pivots on a notion of international regimes with two general meanings: as a social institution, i.e. a configuration of roles, relations and rules of conduct, and as a specific regulated area of IR that counter-balances broader global structures [Levy, Young, Zurn, 1995]. Even if we dismiss some

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7 This phrase was first introduced by Timofeev [2019].
experts’ critical remarks about the relative weakness of a particular regime’s theoretical framework, as is the case with the arms control regime in particular [Gallagher, 2012], recent developments show that not only some elements of particular regimes become prone to erosion — if not to degradation. It is, probably more importantly, the idea of understanding regimes as universal regulators of international relations, or safety mechanisms active in case of rising tensions, that becomes eroded by international restrictive measures. Initial optimism regarding the capabilities and prospects of regimes has been substituted by moderate wariness, triggered not least of all by the crisis of regimes and by the expansion of the sanctions showdown to areas that have traditionally been perceived as systemically important in terms of the global community’s interests. While, for example, problems with inclusive normative regulation of environmental protection have long been firmly incorporated into the international agenda as sensitive but predictable and generally acceptable here and now, decreasing international cooperation in space exploration, countering terrorism and organized crime causes greater concern in the expert community. Such a state of affairs demonstrates the limits of interdependence and cooperation. Beyond these limits lies the area of unilateral promotion of national interests in the mould of Carl Schmitt’s concept of the political. Although this area is mostly displeasing to liberal theorists, it is crucially important to study and understand it. According to Schmitt’s concept, the polarity of ethics and economy “demonstrates surprising consistency and coherence, and this allegedly non-political or even anti-political system either serves the existing division into groups of friends and enemies or creates a new one; thus it is incapable of avoiding the political as its inevitable consequence” [Vasilik, Vershinin, 2000, pp. 42–3].

Realism’s Early Revenge

Moving from a discussion about liberalism’s descriptive capabilities to the idea of the revenge of the political in the international dimension entails an assessment of the paradigm that embraces the friend/enemy dichotomy at its core, i.e. realism. At first glance, it is realism that appears to best suited to the current state of international political interactions. Moreover, it seems that the description of sanctions is consistent with political realism’s categories, with national interests and pragmatism being most notable among them. When put under scrutiny, the rhetoric of the official Russian and American media regarding sanctions against Russia appears as undoubtedly realist. Consider the following examples:

The Presidential Executive Office has not yet made itself familiar with the essence of countermeasures against the U.S. that have been suggested by the State Duma, but representatives of the Kremlin are sure that countersanctions will not do any damage to the national economy, the president’s spokesman Dmitry Peskov said... Peskov underlined that Vladimir Putin had repeatedly mentioned the priority of Russia’s national interests in case of taking such decisions. The interest of Russian
MPs toward countering anti-Russian sanction policies is explicable and comprehensible, the Kremlin's spokesman claimed. In his opinion, the MPs are working on minimizing the consequences of anti-Russian sanctions and developing countermeasures [Vedomosti, 2018].

The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs previously stated that Moscow reserved the right to respond to the sanctions imposed by Washington on Russian business people and companies. “If American authorities prefer to destroy economic and other ties with Russia, it is their right, as well as we reserve the right to respond” — Russia’s Foreign Ministry claimed...After that Medvedev entrusted the government with developing measures of support for the companies affected by the sanctions. Although economic sanctions are a political instrument, they affect ordinary people, Russia’s prime minister underlined. He specified that this was the reason why state measures of support would be aimed “first of all at preserving industrial objects and jobs and not at compensating the losses of company owners.” [RBC, 2018].

The current conversation about Russia sanctions centers around targeting and scope. Are we punishing the people whose behavior we most want to change? Is there pain, well inflicted, on those individuals responsible for creating chaos in Ukraine and Crimea, for reckless attacks on Sergei Skripal and others, and for wanton interference in Western elections? Can we hurt Russian elites in a way that Putin will notice? Have we done enough? [Twigg, 2019].

Further, Edward Fishman argues in terms of realism and suggests that the U.S. should perform a sort of sanctions exercise: “The United States must prepare itself for the coming economic battles by overhauling its sanctions apparatus...The first step is to build a permanent sanctions contingency-planning process within the U.S. government. Just as the U.S. military draws up detailed plans for wars it might someday have to fight, U.S. officials in the State Department, the Treasury, and other agencies should create and constantly update off-the-shelf plans to impose sanctions rapidly if needed. To practice these plans and signal the government's readiness to use them, they should routinely perform military-style exercises that simulate crises in which sanctions play a central role in the response” [Fishman, 2018].

Yet, it is important to understand: appropriate and even successful (when it comes to policy-advocacy purposes) practices employed in the media and adjacent areas often turn out to be invalid in the narrow terms of academic discourse. In that respect realism’s potential should be assessed primarily by standards of theoretical knowledge and methodology with emphasis on its internal contradictions.

The main problem of realism lies in its interpretation of the drivers of IR. Even if we take certain differences between realist theorists into account — and these differences are mostly related to the limits of using force on the international stage [Elman, Jensen, 2014] — this paradigm remains explicitly state-centric as it implies that states are the only subjects of international relations [Freyberg-Inan, Harrison, James, 2009].
However, an obvious contradiction arises against the background of comparing this core realist thesis with the practice of imposing and implementing sanctions. Sanctions are introduced by states against particular people and companies, which does not fit in the logic of state-centric international relations and reflects instead their more complex structure.

Tables 1 and 2 show the subject-object dimension of international sanctions against Russia.

*Table 1. Sanctions by Sectors*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Sanctions Imposed</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fuel and Energy</td>
<td>Sanctions against fuel and energy companies, their subsidiary and affiliate structures (Rosneft, Transneft, Novatek, Gazprom, Gazpromneft, Lukoil and Surgutneftegas); Prohibiting the export of oil extraction and processing technologies; Freezing existing joint projects in the oil industry sector and pausing the development of new projects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banking and Finance</td>
<td>Freezing financial assets of individuals and business entities; Limiting deposits in foreign banks; Legally limiting banking activities of Sberbank, VTB, Gazprombank, Vnesheconombank and Rosselkhozbank; Limiting access to loan funds; Disconnecting from international payment systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defence Industry Complex</td>
<td>Stopping bilateral arms trade deals; Banning the export of military technologies and dual-use products to Russia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Sectoral Sanctions</td>
<td>Personal restrictions imposed on individuals and business entities; Stopping investment activities and supplying of equipment and materials used in key industrial segments of Sevastopol and the Crimea</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Sources:* [Timofeev, Makhmutov, 2018; Vaslavskiy 2018].

Thus, it must be taken into account that calling these sanctions “anti-Russian” is really a shorthand of academic discourse. The charts show the previously mentioned paradox that confronts realists. They are left with two options: either to admit the insignificance of sanctions and their “decorative” and ignorable role in current international relations, or to conclude that realism in its modern form has problems with interpreting reality.
Table 2. Subject-Object of Sanctions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sanctions Against a State as an IR Actor</th>
<th>Sanctions Against Non-State Actors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Russia’s expulsion from the G8;</td>
<td>• Freezing a number of Russian banks’ operations by such international payment systems as Visa and MasterCard (including freezing bank card operations in the Crimea);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Freezing military technical cooperation with NATO, the U.S. and the EU, including cooperation in the Arctic region;</td>
<td>• Sanctions against the Russian financial and banking system (including the UK Criminal Finances Bill);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Curtailing intergovernmental dialogue within traditional formats such as the U.S.-Russia Bilateral Presidential Commission, the Russia-NATO Council, the Council of Europe;</td>
<td>• Targeted restrictive measures against business people and politicians (including politically exposed persons regulations)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Stopping cooperation in the field of civil nuclear energy projects;</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Stopping cooperation in the field of fighting drug trafficking;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Curtailing counterterrorism cooperation;</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Imposing restrictions on Sevastopol and the Crimea as Russian regions;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Limiting the broadcasting of Russian TV channels</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Sources: [Timofeev, Makhmutov, 2018; Vaslavskiy 2018].

Conclusion and Discussion

Analysis of sanctions through the lens of theory and methodology shows that both currently dominant IR theory paradigms — liberalism and realism in their modern forms — have difficulty interpreting reality due to their internal contradictions.

Liberalism in its general meaning is vulnerable in relation to IR’s economic dimension (complex interdependence) and in viewing international regimes as universal regulators and safety mechanisms in case of rising tensions.

At first glance, realism seems able describe the contemporary phenomenon of sanctions. Still, it also has weaknesses. It is true that sanctions rhetoric often has realist features (primarily due to a more frequent use of such categories as power, national interests and pragmatism), and yet from a strict academic perspective realism requires adaptation. The main problem is that its emphasis on the state-centric character of international relations leaves a researcher with only two options: either to ignore the fact that many sanctions are imposed by states on non-state actors or to reduce the role of states. The latter would inflict severe damage on the very core of the paradigm itself.

As a result, the phenomenon of sanctions ends up in a grey zone of descriptive constructions with a high level of abstraction. Meanwhile, the necessity of comprehending sanctions using more than middle-level theories has obviously become urgent. There are three ways of addressing this issue. The first is a large-scale intervention in the foundations of the two leading IR theories, which would probably seriously affect their future image. The second is to abandon the very idea of comprehending sanctions through the lens of grand theories. This may lead to a shift of academic thought toward classical institutionalism with its set of research instruments and supporting middle-
level theories. The last option is to search for “the third way” which could include addressing constructivism as a basis for establishing a new ontology of international interaction. However, this option is significantly limited by the fragmented state and questionable creative potential of constructivism in its current form.

References


Санкции в теории международных отношений: методологические противоречия и проблемы интерпретации

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Цель статьи — анализ текущего состояния двух ведущих школ теории международно-политической мысли (реализма и либерализма) на предмет их объяснительных возможностей в отношении санкционной проблематики, сложившейся в результате введения санкций против России в 2014 г. и последующих ответных мер. Следуя за выдающимся социологом и историком науки Р. Мертоном, автор отмечает важную роль теорий среднего уровня в изучении феноменов, лежащих на пересечении предметных полей экономики, юриспруденции и политической науки, к которым относятся международные санкции. Вместе с тем обозначается очевидно назревшая необходимость вписать санкции в более широкий теоретический контекст, что позволит внести вклад в пересмысление характера современного международного взаимодействия. Развивая этот тезис, автор последовательно рассматривает парадигмы либерализма и реализма и приходит к выводу о том, что санкционная проблематика попадает в серую зону их объяснительного потенциала. В итоге автор делает заключение, что для решения поставленной задачи академическое сообщество должно либо отказаться от идеи изучать санкции в категориях высокой абстракции и вернуться к их инструментальному пониманию, либо адаптировать объяснительные принципы международного реализма и либерализма (что, вероятно, существенно изменит их облик), либо пойти по третьему пути, предусматривающему создание иной онтологии международных отношений.

Ключевые слова: теория международных отношений; политическая теория; санкции; экономические санкции; теория среднего уровня; методология


Источники


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