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Multilateral Institutions under Stress?

When Cooperation Fails: the Global Governance of Digital Trade

O. Biryukova, A. Daniltsev

Abstract

International trade is in continuous development that results in need of development of adequate answers from the international economic institutes participating in her regulation. The authors conclude that the initiatives of international organizations in the global regulation of e-commerce are far behind business practices. Despite the dynamic development of the digital economy, international institutions have not yet been able to work out control mechanisms at the multilateral level. Therefore, today the WTO and a number of other international organizations are facing the need to develop new mechanisms for regulating trade in the conditions of digitalization. This will largely depend not only on the new rules of trade policy, but also on the future of these organizations, their placement in the hierarchy of influence of international institutions.

The article shows that countries manage to regulate various aspects of e-commerce more comprehensively at the bilateral and plurilateral levels. The use of digital trade regulations developed at the regional and plurilateral levels, as well as the cooperation of countries at other sites (APEC, OECD, G20), may facilitate the creation of future WTO agreements governing digital trade.

Key words: digital trade; e-commerce; global governance; World Trade Organization; international economic organizations

Introduction

The development of international trade in the context of globalization has undergone three important stages of qualitative and structural change.

The first stage, called “traditional trade,” developed as a result of reduced transport costs that provided new opportunities for the separation of places of production from sites of consumption. Consumers began to benefit from wide access to new and more competitive prices for goods from foreign countries. Trade was mainly in final finished goods.

The second stage in the development of international trade was associated with the active expansion of global value chains. This stage was characterized by the continuing deepening of specialization and the reduction of transportation and coordination costs which allowed business to implement the fragmentation of production across national borders and to use comparative localization advantages. This was the critical driving force that caused a wave of globalization in the 1990s characterized by a significant reduction in tariffs and the removal of strict restrictions on foreign investment [Klochko, 2015].

The third stage of the transformation of international trade is associated with digitalization. The driver of trade was the further reduction of transportation and administrative costs, along with simplified processes for exchanging ideas through the transfer of data and information. This modern stage, characterized by the highest connectivity, is due not only to the expansion of digital exchanges but also the preservation of traditional trade and the activity of global value chains. Various forms are interconnected more than ever thanks to digital communication which has made foreign markets much more accessible to foreign firms.

As digital trade has become an important component of trade flows, its importance in the trade policy of many countries has significantly increased. E-commerce, as the key segment of digital trade, has developed rapidly in recent years. Developed economies, as well as a number of developing ones, have the necessary conditions for the development of e-commerce and have received significant benefits from it. However, not all countries can take advantage of e-commerce opportunities due to poor infrastructure, low levels of education and relevant skills, and institutional and regulatory disorder [ICTSD, 2017].

This digitalization gap between the countries could grow significantly if multilateral rules for overcoming the barriers to the general growth of e-commerce are not established. Thus, the international community faces an urgent need to regulate this sphere.

This article assesses the ability of international institutions and regional groups to regulate digital trade. The analysis relies on the work of researchers from international institutions [Baldwin, 2016; Kirton, Warren, 2018], materials from international organizations – the World Trade Organization (WTO), the Group of 20 (G20), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the United Nations.
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) — and the provisions of trade agreements including the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTTP), the European Union (EU) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

Regulation of E-Commerce in the World Trade Organization

Existing multilateral WTO rules were largely established long before the active development of the digital economy and thus have little effect on the regulation of information flows. The toolkit of multilateral agreements such as the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) can be partially used, but in general the possibilities to regulate e-commerce through them are limited.

**General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)**

GATS is the most relevant tool for regulating data flows of all WTO multilateral agreements. An important feature of GATS is its “technological neutrality.” It allows for provisions previously applied to only physical trade to be extended to digital space. Despite the fact that the agreement contains obligations in telecommunications and financial services (which are crucial for e-commerce), regulatory provisions do not cover digital trade, information flows or various barriers to trade. Since GATS is based on the “positive list” approach, the coverage of services commitments varies considerably among countries.

**Information Technology Agreement (ITA)**

The ITA aims to eliminate tariffs for information technology products. Initially, the agreement was concluded in 1996 in the form of the Ministerial Declaration on Trade in Information Technology Products. This was the first sectoral agreement after the Uruguay round of trade negotiations. At the tenth ministerial conference of the WTO in 2015, the scope of the ITA was expanded and a new version, the so-called ITA-II, came into force in 2016.

The ITA-II is an agreement between 54 developed and developing WTO members that together account for more than 90% of global trade in information technology products. Some members, such as India and Viet Nam, are parties to the first ITA but have not acceded to the expanded agreement. As in the first agreement, the benefits of an expanded agreement are extended among WTO members on the basis of the most favoured nation treatment. The ITA-II will eliminate tariffs for 201 additional products worth more than $1.3 trillion per year. This will include many consumer electronics products, next-generation semiconductors (multicomponent semiconductors) and medical instruments such as magnetic resonance imaging (MRI).
The expansion of the Information Technology Agreement was perhaps one of the most successful attempts at trade liberalization under the auspices of the WTO since the establishment of the organization. Experts attribute the success of the negotiations as resulting from a combination of four factors: a narrower sectoral coverage without use of the “single undertaking” approach; a limited negotiating group that included interested countries but not all WTO members; discussion focused on tariff rather than non-tariff barriers; and the fact that negotiators avoided confrontations based on nationalism [Winslett, 2017].

It is expected that the implementation of the ITA-II will contribute to the growth of trade in information technology products that are critical to digital trade. At the same time, it should be noted that the agreement does not solve the problem of non-tariff barriers which can create significant restrictions in this area.

**Work Programme on Electronic Commerce**

E-commerce issues have been addressed in the World Trade Organization since the late 1990s. An important result of the negotiation process was the signing in 1998 of the Ministerial Declaration on Global Electronic Commerce [WTO, 1998a].

According to the declaration, the WTO’s general council addresses issues related to trade arising from global e-commerce. For the purposes of the Work Programme, the definition of e-commerce has been clarified and refers to the production, distribution, marketing, sale or delivery of a product or service through the use of electronic means [WTO, 1998b, Para. 1.3].

The Work Programme provided for a temporary moratorium on the collection of customs duties on electronic transmissions and stated the need to explore the possibilities of developing infrastructure for e-commerce. It provided that the work of other international organizations should be taken into account when developing proposals for the programme. No significant progress on the development of rules in the electronic commerce at the multilateral level was observed. At the subsequent ministerial conferences of the WTO, ministers took into consideration reports on electronic commerce and gave instructions to the general council and its subsidiary bodies for further work in this area. The ministers also repeatedly confirmed the need to extend customs duties on electronic transmissions for the next period.

At the 11th WTO ministerial conference in Buenos Aires in 2017, e-commerce was widely discussed, among other issues. The result was a joint statement on the need to develop common rules for regulating electronic commerce in the next round of negotiations in 2018. This decision was necessary because there are no uniform rules to ensure the security of global e-commerce. Seventy-one countries co-sponsored the joint statement, including Russia, the U.S. and the EU. Together, the group accounts for about 77% of world trade [WTO, 2017]. However, the largest player in the digital commerce market – China – did not sign the document.
Russia plans to focus on the development of progressive rules for the protection of online consumers, the development of national Internet sites, the involvement of micro, small and medium enterprises in online trading and ensuring non-discriminatory terms of trade for them. Special attention will be paid to the legality of ensuring the security of citizens’ data and the protection of intellectual property on the Internet [RIA Novosti, 2017].

**Trade in Services Agreement: A Dangerous Attempt to Realize a Dream**

WTO members could not develop a unified approach to the development of the GATS provisions and the further liberalization of trade in services at the multilateral level. Developed countries did not like this situation because their transnational corporations were interested in opening the markets of developing countries and were actively lobbying for relevant negotiations. The United States initiated the formation of a coalition to develop the Trade in Services Agreement (TISA).

Preliminary discussions on TISA began in 2012. A year later, the coalition published a joint declaration that the discussions on TISA had advanced and that the participating countries had reached the level of full-scale negotiations [Biryukova, 2016]. Currently Australia, Hong Kong, the European Union (28 countries), Iceland, Israel, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Liechtenstein, Mauritius, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Pakistan, Peru, the U.S., Taiwan, Turkey, Switzerland, Chile, Korea and Japan participate in this group. Members of this group playfully call themselves “real friends of services.” Other countries in reply ironically call them “true friends of multinational corporations” [Gould, 2014].

Electronic commerce takes an important place in TISA. At presented there are few restrictions limiting the Internet at the global level. The powerful technological elites that create private software, the Internet and electronic equipment also govern the finance, logistic and infrastructure companies which dominate the digital sphere — and they are interested in the preservation of this situation. TISA creates for these companies the tempting prospect of almost absolute power over the global network economy. An important feature of TISA is that its provisions will automatically apply to any new services and technologies that develop in the future. The most stringent obligations contain guarantees for unlimited access to information and financial flows abroad. The agreement under development will also ensure the right to store data anywhere in the world and to keep secret its source codes for both intelligent products and search engines.

American companies are highly interested in establishing such innovative e-commerce regulations through TISA. For them it is important to give effect to these provisions in order to gain footholds as well as to enter new markets due to growing competition from Asian countries, primarily China. Ten years ago, the world’s largest companies by capitalization were American (Microsoft, Exxon Mobil, General Electric, Citigroup and Shell Oil), but the composition is beginning to change. The Ameri-
can companies — leaders (Microsoft, Alphabet which is the head company Google, Intel, IBM, Cisco Systems and Oracle) are under the serious pressure by the powerful and dynamically developing Chinese companies — Tencent (social media) seriously pressed, Alibaba (electronic commerce) and Baidu (search engine). Besides, it is necessary to mention the southern Korean company Samsung.

It is worth noting that in 2017 the digital market remained oligopolistic and predominantly American. For example, Google owned 88% of the search advertising market, Facebook along with its subsidiaries Instagram, WhatsApp and Messenger owned 77% of mobile social traffic and Amazon held 74% of the e-book market share.

Thus, the implementation of the TISA provisions will strengthen the market position of several major players in e-commerce and create risks of transition to a lower level of economic freedom.

Presently, negotiations on TISA are not being held due to the position of the current U.S. administration. The option of signing of the agreement without the main developer — as happened in the case of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement on Trans-Pacific Partnership (CP TPP) — is not being considered by the countries which remain in the coalition. At the same time, a number of states (especially Japan and Korea) are convinced that the agreement can be saved despite the pause in negotiations.

Looking for Alternative Solutions: Mega-Regional Agreements

Significant success in the development of rules of trade in the digital era was achieved when discussing the texts of mega-regional trade agreements developed with the participation of the U.S. and the EU, including the CP TTP and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP). Although neither has entered into force, they certainly deserve consideration in the context of the problems of regulating e-commerce.

Despite the fact that with the arrival of the Trump administration the United States refused to participate in the CP TPP, the agreement’s provisions were developed under the influence of the lobbies of American Internet companies and were largely focused on consolidating their positions in the market of the countries participating in the agreement.

The CP TPP, for example, requires members to allow full cross-border data transfer, prohibits forced localization of data on servers, prohibits disclosure of source code as a business condition and prohibits customs duties on electronic transmissions or taxes on Internet traffic. The agreement also contains strict provisions on copyright protection and prohibited circumvention of technological security measures that reduce the risk of unauthorized access to copyrighted digital products.

Digital trade is one of the key areas of interest of participating countries in the T-TIP negotiations in view of its significance for transatlantic trade. Services that can be provided over the Internet constitute a large part of the mutual supply of services between the U.S. and the EU. The T-TIP negotiations were started by the EU and the
U.S. in 2013 but are currently blocked. However, if negotiations continue, T-TIP can solve the problems of digital trade regulation in a number of areas.

In addition to provisions to expand market access for digital products, the T-TIP planned to include commitments to remove burdensome barriers to digital trade [EC, 2016]. Provisions on cooperation in the field of normative regulation were supposed to include sectoral commitments (for example, for the information and communications technology (ICT) sector) and horizontal commitments (for example, regarding the contribution of stakeholders and transparency).

As became clear during negotiations, the U.S. and the EU have “various legal traditions, ways of regulation, market results” and approaches to development of policy which significantly limit integration of a transatlantic digital economy. Negotiation progress on digital trade between these countries is significantly complicated by the influence of other factors, including the formation of the single digital market in the EU, the new policy of Brussels for confidentiality of data and the Brexit.

### Initiatives for the Regulation of Digital Trade in Economic Integration

Regional integration contributes to the development of digital trade and integration of digital markets. Conceptually, regionalism can solve two problems in this area: it feeds and facilitates intra-regional digital trade and allows for economies of scale to be achieved. Without compatible laws on the Internet, regions with isolated regulatory policy for the movement of digital goods and services have no opportunities to provide cross-border flows, and their companies will not be able to reach a scale similar to that of a multinational corporation. For example, Facebook, Google and Alibaba won because they arose in the largest integrated digital markets [Fefer, Shayerah, Morrison, 2017].

At the same time, common regional regulatory and policy frameworks in areas such as privacy, consumer protection and cybersecurity help to reduce the operating costs of companies in regional markets, encourage investment and the creation of start-ups, and contribute to the expansion of digital networks and services. Such conditions are also important for small businesses, which usually do not have the resources to find foreign markets or to adapt their operations to the complex systems of other countries. In the digital age, a number of efforts are being made to integrate trade and regional markets. The most successful are presented below.

#### Digital Single Market of European Market

In May 2015, the European Commission announced plans to create a digital single market to improve access for consumers and businesses to digital goods and services throughout Europe, to level out the conditions for digital networks and innovative services and to maximize economic growth from digitalization. According to estimates,
the digital single market can provide up to EUR 415 billion a year for the EU’s economy, as well as create hundreds of thousands of new jobs [EC, 2017].

In 2017, the commission announced the latest elements of this strategy, including new regulation in the field of electronic privacy. Brussels also allowed the transfer of online content, permitting EU citizens to access online subscription services while traveling around the EU, thereby stopping so-called “geolocation” tactics.

**ASEAN E-Commerce Initiative**

The ASEAN initiative to form a coordinated regional legal framework for electronic commerce was launched in 1999 when the participating countries approved the e-ASEAN initiative. The 2000 E-ASEAN Framework Agreement promoted regional development by creating an ASEAN information infrastructure.

The ASEAN ICT Masterplan 2020 [ASEAN, 2015a] stated that information and communication technologies are important factors for further social and economic integration. The ASEAN Community Blueprint 2025 [ASEAN, 2015b] also calls for cooperation in the field of electronic commerce, recognizing the importance of facilitating cross-border electronic transactions.

ASEAN legislation focuses on electronic transactions, countering cybersecurity, consumer protection, content regulation, data protection, privacy and dispute resolution in this area.

**Digital Trade in the Context of Eurasian Integration**

In the Eurasian Economic Union, some steps were also taken to develop trade in the new digital paradigm. The objectives for the development of digital space were developed by 2025. Among the main tasks for the progress of the “new” economy, the EAEU sees the development of a regulatory framework that can regulate emerging processes, as well as the creation of wide public access to the Internet, both from a technical point of view and to improve the computer literacy of the population [WB, EEC, 2017].

The development of the digital economy is crucial for Russian trade because this measure will have positive effects for Russian business, for consumers and for the economy as a whole [Plaksin, Abdrakhmanova, Kovaleva, 2017]. Because the digital space offers easier access to the world market and simplified business activities, the digital economy is a chance for Russia to change the orientation of its exports from raw materials to secondary goods and services [Biryukova, Matiukhina, 2018]. In the future, this will allow Russia to increase its share in world exports, which is now quite small.
Dialogue on Digital Policy and Trade Expansion

A growing number of countries at the national level are setting up barriers to the processing, storing and transmitting of data [UNCTAD, 2017]. As a result, many trade agreements contain provisions to eliminate these obstacles between partners. The tools of trade agreements allowing interoperability and the combination of national systems of data protection could help to find balance between the supporting processes of data transmission on the one hand, and the resolution of confidentiality and safety problems on the other.

It is obvious that the potential of such agreements is not yet realized and remains high. At the same time, while at the regional or plurilateral levels the countries manage to take common decisions, at the multilateral level a formal framework for regulation of digital trade remains an unattainable task [Suominen, 2017]. In these circumstances, cooperation between the WTO and other international organizations, as well as discussion of questions of regulation of digital trade on alternative platforms, is important and necessary to find an exit from this impasse.

The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) is a forum that provides a broad opportunity to share best practices and establish principles for regulating the digital economy for countries with different levels of development. The APEC e-commerce working group coordinates the activities of members and promotes a transparent and consistent e-commerce environment.

At the initiative of the ad hoc coordination group, the APEC Road Map on the Digital and Internet Economy was prepared in 2017 [APEC, 2017a]. The importance of the road map was highlighted in a ministerial declaration and a declaration of APEC leaders in 2017 [APEC, 2017b, 2017c]. Finding balance between openness and data security became one of the most sensitive issues in the course of coordination of the document.

Although APEC’s initiatives are focused at the regional level, they can serve as the basis for the expansion of global efforts. Due to its voluntary nature, APEC can serve as a convenient incubator for potential multilateral agreements.

The OECD is another platform for discussing principles and norms for the digital economy. In June 2016, a ministerial meeting was held in Mexico, and the key item on the agenda was discussion of innovation, growth and social prosperity in relation to the digital economy. At this meeting countries discussed an open Internet and data flows, infrastructure and connectivity to the network, and digital confidence and skills.

The ministerial declaration recognized the growth and transformation of the digital economy, along with emerging challenges [OECD, 2016]. The declaration also referred to the need to support the free flow of information, innovation and new technologies, as well as the need to build confidence and reduce obstacles to e-commerce.

The G20 has relatively recently become an important site for defining general principles and individual issues in the field of digitalization. In the November 2015 G20 meeting, the leaders published a statement on the new positions of the Internet econo-
my, recognizing the opportunities and challenges associated with global economic growth and development. Leaders expressed the need to eliminate the risk of theft of IP technologies using ICT for commercial competitive advantage, and also to respect and protect confidentiality. In 2016, China was the host country for the G20 summit and digitalization was an important item of discussion among the parties. Beijing identified the theme of the meeting as “towards an innovative, brisk, interconnected and inclusive global economy,” thus opening up the possibility for further discussion of the digital economy and the development of global regulatory rules. The digital economy continued to be a major topic during the German presidency. In April 2017, the G20 held the first meeting of the digital ministers, which resulted in the adoption of the G20 Ministerial Declaration on the Digital Economy. At the summit in Hamburg in 2017, leaders expressed a desire to ensure the connection of all their citizens to digital communications by 2025 [G20, 2017].

The G20 has considerable potential to address problems of digital transformation. However to avoid risks of unbalanced development and an increased gap between developed and developing countries, the organization has to actively coordinate a strategy for digital economy that can help technologically poor countries [Guo, Ding, Lanhshina, 2017]. The comparatively weak enforceability of summit decisions in practice in the field of digitalization causes serious concern. This creates uncertainty for the future role of this international institution in regulating electronic commerce [Kirton, Warren, 2018].

The main areas of work regarding the development of rules to regulate e-commerce and the digital economy were formulated at the World Economic Forum. They consist of several recommendations. First, instead of trying to negotiate binding trade rules, countries should coordinate their efforts to develop joint declarative statements of mutual interest. These statements should take into account the interests of stakeholders at the national and global levels. At present, efforts to develop principles and best practices for cooperation are being undertaken by several multilateral mechanisms (including the OECD and the G20). A special role should be assigned to UNCTAD as a possible mediator to improve the interaction between different efforts and as a platform for the formulation of “soft law” outside the framework of trade negotiations.

Second, groups of experts including representatives of trade negotiations and the Internet community should come to a consensus on key issues. Achieving consensus is seen as the most important condition for agreement on trade issues in order to develop an open, transparent and inclusive approach to setting the agenda for negotiations while maintaining the authority of governments to make final decisions.

Third, it is necessary to make long-term efforts to regulate trade policy at the intergovernmental level so that measures taken from a wider matrix of analysis and dialogue can be of greater benefit. Reforms that allow relevant stakeholders to track changes and contribute to the development of perspectives and experiences can help to increase their participation and support trade policy developed through trade processes.
In general, the formation of a regulatory system of relevant elements at the multilateral, plurilateral and regional levels, despite the growing role of the digital economy, is hampered by the lack of dialogue between the trade negotiators and Internet communities. As part of this dialogue, the parties need to address issues related to the risks associated with data privacy and security. It is important that trade processes are consistent with the values of transparency, openness and overall equal participation of any interested party [UNCTAD, 2017].

Conclusion

Benefits for economic development from trade are not obtained automatically after the conclusion of trade agreements, both at the multilateral and regional levels. More important is the coherence of the measures which impact certain categories of economic agents.

In practice, it is important to use a comprehensive approach because when opening new markets for trade the benefits should be distributed as widely and fairly as possible for all stakeholders. That is why the development of electronic commerce will largely be determined by the success of trade negotiations. For most developing countries, this will require additional support from the international community.

The most progressive provisions in the regulation of e-commerce are developed in the agreements with a limited number of participants (TISA, CP TTP, T-TIP), which have not been tested in practice, as well as in the framework of integration initiatives in regional economic blocs around the world (EU, ASEAN, EAEU).

Despite the strong development of the digital economy, countries have not been able to develop a coherent set of rules and guidelines on e-commerce and digital trade policy. The WTO remains one of the main regulators of world trade and therefore carries the greatest weight and responsibility in resolving the existing problems. Multilateral trade agreements are far behind the regulation of digital trade. Various aspects of electronic commerce are discussed unevenly and a number of provisions are not even discussed in the WTO.

This is due not only to the complexity of developing new tools in the digital environment but also to disagreements among members. One group of countries continues to support state control, while the other prefers to rely on liberal and international regimes dominated by the private sector.

Only under conditions of close cooperation with other international organizations and the use of best practices derived from regional trade agreements the World Trade Organization has a chance to find compromise solutions and to take a key role in the global e-commerce governance system.
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Когда сотрудничество не складывается: глобальное управление цифровой торговлей

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Международная торговля постоянно развивается, что приводит к необходимости выработки адекватных ответов со стороны международных экономических институтов, участвующих в ее регулировании. Авторы приходят к выводу, что инициативы международных организаций в области глобального регулирования электронной торговли значительно отстают от практики. Несмотря на динамичное развитие цифровой экономики, международным институтам пока не удается выработать механизмы контроля на многостороннем уровне за отдельными ее элементами. Поэтому сегодня ВТО и ряду других организаций необходимо выработать новые механизмы для регулирования торговли в условиях цифровизации. От этого во многом зависят не только новые правила торговой политики, но и судьбы самих организаций, их позиция в иерархии влияния международных институтов.

Показано, что странам удается более комплексно регулировать различные аспекты электронной коммерции на двустороннем и плюралатеральном уровне. Использование положений о цифровой торговле, разрабатываемых в рамках региональных торговых соглашений и в плюралатеральном формате, а также сотрудничество стран на других площадках (АТЭС, ОЭСР, «Группе двадцати») может оказать содействие в создании будущих соглашений ВТО, регулирующих цифровую торговлю.

Ключевые слова: цифровая торговля; электронная коммерция; глобальное управление; Всемирная торговая организация; международные экономические организации


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Abstract

This article studies the interconnection of global and regional security systems using the example of the interaction of the United Nations (UN) with the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). According to the author, their activity is underestimated. These organizations appeared in the wake of the emergence of a pool of regional associations of countries that have become involved in security and peacekeeping activities.

Both associations have a similar composition of members, were established after the collapse of the USSR, are observers in the UN, are engaged in security as one of their key activities, and have similar functions. The CSTO and the SCO prevented new conflicts from breaking out in the post-Soviet space by acting as stabilizing forces within the borders of their regions and the participating states.

This study’s relevance is underscored first, by the special role that regional organizations play in building and operating a global security system; second, by the lack of existing research focused on the interaction of the UN with the CSTO and the SCO; and third, by the need to improve the collective mechanisms for responding to new security threats which become intertwined with existing challenges.

The theory of military-political alliances provides the analytical basis of this research. The article uses quantitative and qualitative methods, including analysis of United Nations documents. The interconnection between the UN, SCO and CSTO is analyzed by counting the number of times the keywords “CSTO” and “SCO” appear in UN documents and defining the context of their use over a period of 15 (from 2002 to 2017) and 16 years (from 2001 to 2017) respectively. An extensive database of UN documents was available from the United Nations Bibliographic Information System (UNBISNET). Based on this analysis, an assessment is made of the contribution and interest of the Russian Federation as a leading player in international relations in the process of strengthening the interconnection of global and regional security systems.

Key words: UN; regional organizations; regionalization; CSTO; SCO; security; peacekeeping; military alliance


1 The editorial board received the article in January 2018.
Introduction

In the context of the globalized development pathway of contemporary international relations characterized by processes that fragment and blur borders outward from the centre, particular importance is attached to the tendency toward political and economic regionalization. Efforts to conceptualize the regional level of intergovernmental cooperation were heavily debated in the 1990s [Voskresenskij, 2012, p. 33]. Researchers insisted on separating the regional level of intergovernmental cooperation into an independent branch for analysis due to the obvious influence of regional actors over the global development of international relations. This influence varied from supporting and strengthening to dismantling and starting certain dramatic global transformational processes. Furthermore, regional organizations play a leading role in arranging regional systems of cooperation between countries and in the nature of the system of international governance and power, exerting influence on the global order.

This article tests the hypothesis that interconnections between global and regional security systems have intensified using the case of cooperation between the United Nations (UN) and two regional organizations — the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). The primary goals of this research are to examine the role of the CSTO (between 2002 and 2017) and the SCO (between 2001 and 2017) in UN documents based on analysis of their citations over a period of 15 and 16 years, respectively; to explain the mechanisms of interconnection between the UN and regional organizations such as the CSTO and the SCO; and to analyze Russia’s point of view with regard to the CSTO and the SCO.

Despite the lack of research on the interaction between the UN and the CSTO and the SCO, there are academic papers, monographs and articles which investigate certain aspects of regional organizations like the CSTO and the SCO. Based on analysis of Russian and international academic resources focused on the activity of the CSTO and the SCO, these can be classified into two groups.

The first group of researchers concentrates on the analysis of certain problematic aspects of the CSTO’s activity in terms of its strategy, goals, the unity of the organization and the members’ viewpoints. See for example A.I. Nikitin, Ju.A. Nikitina and I.Ju. Jurgens [2011], and E.V. Klevakina [2013]. The second group of researchers focuses on the role of the SCO in Central Asia and the issues associated therewith. See for example E.V. Koldunova, N. Das Kundu [2014], S.G. Luzjanin [2013], A.V. Lukin [2011] and Sin Guanchjen [2002].

The primary trend of research focused on regional organizations with regard to security enforcement is either to analyze one or more organizations located in the same region, thereby ignoring the global context, or to concentrate on international policy or economics without being bound to any particular regional process [Lukin, 2011]. In this context, special mention should be made of the theory of military alliances which foregrounds interconnections between regional and global security systems, as well as processes of multilateral cooperation and power balancing between states.
According to American professor J. Liska, it is impossible to discuss international relations without analysis of military alliances [Liska, 1968, p. 3]. By “alliance” Liska means a nominal union of more than one state formed in order to confront any threat coming from a third and more powerful state. The formation of military alliances is triggered by conflicts and is informed by balance of power theory which cautions against allowing the military buildup and empowerment of any state within the international system which may compromise sovereignty and security of other political actors.

O. Holsti, T. Hopmann and J. Sullivan point out three characteristics of alliances: first, there is a formal treaty, whether open or secret; second, the treaty must be related to national security problems; and third, partners must be states. According to them, “an alliance is a formal agreement between two or more nations to collaborate on national security issues” [Holsti, Hopmann, Sullivan, 1973, p. 4].

Reinterpreting the concept of power balance, Stephen Walt, an American political expert, developed the “balance of threat” concept based on the argument that, in determining their foreign policies, states follow the dynamic pattern of the regional power balance rather than the global one. An alliance is seen by Walt as “a formal or informal relationship of security cooperation between two or more sovereign states” [Walt, 1987, p. 12].

A characteristic feature of the CSTO and the SCO is that they operate in several regions. However, similar activity areas and fields of interests establish a solid foundation for interaction with organizations on a global scale, and particularly with the UN.

The charter of the CSTO states that it is “the international regional Collective Security Treaty Organization” [CSTO, 2002]. Currently, the organization is comprised of six states: Russia, Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The charter emphasizes the creation of a regional collective security system as the principal goal of the institution.

According to V. Nikishin, head of the CSTO Information Programs Department, “what’s unique about the CSTO is that it has the aggregate set of tools for security purposes of the member countries and the union at large: from political ammunition to its own military capability” [RIA Novosti, 2016]. A booklet dedicated to the 20th anniversary of the CSTO states that it “became a unique tool able to claim responsibility for the stability and safety of nations in times of peace and in case of any potential aggression as well” [CSTO, 2012]. The CSTO created mechanisms meant to stand against contemporary challenges and security threats, and on a periodic basis the organization undertakes operations such as “Channel,” “Illegal Immigrant” and “Proxy,” aimed at preventing drug traffic, illegal migration and criminal use of cyberspace, respectively. For security purposes the CSTO has signed and ratified 48 international agreements and over 227 resolutions of the Collective Security Council with regard to various aspects of the organization’s activity. In 2016, the CSTO Collective Security Council session approved a list of terrorist organizations which has no equal in any other international organization. In the same year the CSTO paid attention to measures aimed at enhancing the efficiency of counterterrorism efforts as part of the organization’s ac-
tivity. The CSTO’s collective dynamic response forces were supplemented by special operations forces drawn from members’ law enforcement bodies and security structures [Hachaturov, 2017].

The SCO’s official website describes the organization as “a permanent regional international organization established in 2001 by the leaders of Kazakhstan, China, Kirghizia, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan” [SCO, c. a.].

According to N. Nazarbaev, the peculiarity of the SCO is “its ability to solve international issues via political and diplomatic means.” This organization is distinct from other institutions due to the flexibility of the tools it uses — soft power and diplomatic methods — to achieve its goals. Furthermore, Ban Ki-moon, secretary-general of the United Nations, emphasized that the SCO was the leading regional international organization of the Eurasian continent [Nazarbaev, 2011].

According to T. Shaimergenov, the unique character of the SCO is that it serves as “a single dialogue field” which harmonizes claims of other parties and synchronizes regional processes [Akhmetov, 2012, p. 13]. The SCO contributes to the peaceful recovery in Afghanistan and has undertaken groundwork for an anti-drug security belt along Afghanistan’s borders. Since 2002, the SCO has maintained the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure aimed at managing operations associated with searching terrorist training camps and uncovering their financial arrangements. According to the authors of a Valdai Discussions Club report, the SCO unites Central Asia into a single region and more broadly acts “as an element of Eurasian regionalism.” It is against this background that the SCO, while having an institutional structure, does not prejudice the national interests of its members [Koldunova, Das Kundu, 2014].

Since 2004, the CSTO and the SCO have been observers of the UN General Assembly (UN GA); relevant resolutions were approved by consensus. A joint declaration between the UN and the CSTO was signed in Moscow on 18 March 2010 which specifies the format for cooperation between the two organizations and refers to peacemaking efforts in particular. The CSTO expressed its willingness to provide peacekeeping forces in order to participate in joint operations managed by the UN. Two years later, the CSTO and the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations signed a memorandum of understanding related to conflict prevention and peacekeeping activities. The memorandum called for strengthening mechanisms for better cooperation among the peacemaking groups of CSTO members.

On a permanent basis, CSTO members provide advisory services regarding the agenda of UN GA sessions. There is effective teamwork between international organizations and committees, especially with respect to the Counterterrorism Committee of the UN Security Council, the UN Office for Drugs and Crime, the European Union and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe.

A memorandum of understanding between the CSTO and the executive directorate of the Counterterrorism Committee of the UN Security Council was signed on 23 September 2016 in addition to the approved cooperation agreements between the CSTO and the UN.
When UN observer status was awarded in 2009 the UN GA adopted Resolution A/RES/64/183 (agenda item 124) “Cooperation between the UN and SCO” which foregrounded the issues associated with strengthening bilateral dialogue, and the cooperation and coordination of joint efforts. A year later, in Tashkent, the secretaries-general of the UN and the SCO signed a joint declaration on cooperation with regard to information exchange activities. At the request of the UN, the SCO secretariat together with members and the SCO Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure regularly convey information associated with the implementation of UN GA resolutions.

In 2016, on a panel session regarding UN-SCO cooperation, R. Alimov, the SCO secretary-general stated that the SCO, being a multipurpose institution, has 28 mechanisms of practical cooperation which together form a solid foundation for cooperation with the UN in regard to economics and humanitarian assistance, as well as on security activity [SCO, 2016].

The key regulator of UN relations with regional organizations is Chapter VIII of the UN Charter which makes official reference to UN Security Force (UNSF) control and conformity. The charter applies to any and all institutional formations involved with peacemaking and security. The core requirement is to act in accordance with UN principles and to apply enforcement measures subject only to the relevant UNSF sanctions.

Notwithstanding the positive dynamics of cooperation between the UN and the CSTO and SCO, it is worth noting that their development paths face two challenges: first, the lack of any practice related to the management sphere boundary delimitation in terms of security enforcement issues, and second, the fact that the mechanism for taking action is primarily based on cooperation between the organizations’ secretariats, which significantly weakens implementation of any collective measures.

Research Methodology

To investigate the interconnection of global and regional systems of security, UN documents containing references to the CSTO and the SCO were examined for the period of 2002—2017 and 2001—2017, respectively. In the case of the SCO, the starting date coincides with the organization’s establishment. The research data set included documents from the UN GA (reports, resolutions, letters and the verbal notes of UN permanent representatives), the UNSF (communique, letters) and UN agencies; the review made note of the context (subject, part of a document) in which the references to the CSTO and the SCO were made. Based on this analysis, the key subjects in regard to which the UN addressed the regional organizations of the CSTO and the SCO were identified.

Electronic versions of UN GA and UNSF documents published between 2001 and 2017 were compiled. During this period the UN approved 78 documents containing references to the CSTO and 75 documents with references to the SCO. Analysis of these 154 documents shows that in 15 years there were 407 references to the CSTO, whereas there were 755 references to the SCO in 16 years, which is almost twice the
references to the CSTO. Quantitative and qualitative analyses of references of the UN to the CSTO and the SCO activity was carried out.

**Graph Data Analysis**

Figure 1 shows the number of UN documents containing references to the CSTO for the period 2002–2017 and reflects the uneven pattern of interest on the part of the UN towards the CSTO. In 2010 and 2012 references to the CSTO peaked in UN documents, while the lowest number of references occurred in 2002 and 2017. The escalation is related to the expansion of cooperation between the UN and the CSTO, as well as to the 2010 Kirghiz revolution. The decrease in 2002 is associated with the process of formation of the CSTO in the same year (the CSTO charter was adopted in 2002) whereas in 2017 the CSTO predominantly concentrated on military exercises in order to train its operating forces for UN peace support missions. The year 2002 was a bridge year in the history of the CSTO across the two stages of development of the organization, 1992–2002 and 2002–2009; the first period is characterized by lower efficiency and aggravations between members; the second, by increased activity against the background of unresolved issues carried over from the first period [Akulik, Bobkob, Levjash, 2011, p. 289].

![Graph showing number of UN documents with references to the CSTO (2002–2017)](image)

*Fig. 1. Number of UN Documents with References to the CSTO (2002–2017)*

*Source:* compiled by the author based on analysis of documents published on UNBISNET.
In the history of cooperation between the UN and the CSTO, 2012 is marked by the adoption of UN GA Resolution No. 67/6, “Cooperation between the UN and the CSTO,” which formed the legal basis for pragmatic teamwork between the UN and the CSTO.

Fig. 2. Distribution of UN Documents Referring to the CSTO According to Subject Matter (2002—2017)

Source: compiled by the author based on analysis of documents published on UNBISNET.

Figure 2 shows the distribution of UN documents referring to the CSTO according to subject matter over the 15-year period under review. Between 2002 and 2017, the CSTO was referenced in the context of 36 subjects: from security in Afghanistan to UN cooperation. It is apparent that cooperation is the leading context for references to the CSTO. References in the context of terrorism and provision of GA observer status to the CSTO appear in the same number of documents in 2004. The year 2014 was characterized by an escalation of two problematic situations – the Ukraine conflict and withdrawal of the International Security Assistance Force from Afghanistan.

Next follows subject matter related to maintaining peace and security while references to the CSTO in the context of other subject matter appear less frequently.
Table 1. Frequency and Number of CSTO References in UN Documents According to Subject Matter (2002–2017)

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*Source:* compiled by the author based on analysis of documents published on UNBISNET.

Table 1 shows subject themes by year and the number of the CSTO references found in UN documents. Table 1 data have been sorted in descending order for a period of 15 years, from 2002 to 2017. Among the most referenced themes are peace and security, cooperation and provision of GA observer status to the CSTO, followed by terrorism and peacekeeping.

UN GA Resolution No. 65/122 (2010) on cooperation between the UN and the CSTO underlined the importance of strengthening bilateral dialogue, cooperation and coordination, and approved the mechanism of regular counselling with the UN and CSTO secretaries-general by virtue of interagency fora and formats, including annual counselling with the UN secretary-general and heads of regional organizations [UN, 2010]. Furthermore, UN GA resolutions of cooperation between the UN and the CSTO are adopted every two years starting from 2010: 2014 (69/12), and 2016 (71/12).
Issues related to cooperation between the UN and the CSTO were included on the agenda of the 67th UN GA session. Counselling with the secretariats of the UN and the CSTO with regard to building relations between these organizations, particularly in peacemaking activity, took place in May 2011 in New York.

![Figure 3. The Number of UN Documents with SCO References (2001–2017)](image)

*Source:* complied by the author based on analysis of documents published on UNBISNET.

Figure 3 shows that the highest number of references to the SCO in UN documents occurred in 2010, 2009 and 2016. When comparing Fig. 1 and Fig. 3, peak values with regard to both the CSTO and the SCO occurred in 2010. In the case of the SCO, themes include security enforcement and counterterrorism efforts, while the CSTO was mentioned due to the conflict in Kirgizia. In 2009 SCO references in UN documents were related to themes such as security, cooperation with the UN and counterterrorism activity. In 2016 the SCO was most frequently mentioned in UN documents in relation to themes such as peace and security and counterterrorism efforts. In the same year, the UN GA approved Resolution No. 71/14, “Cooperation between the UN and the SCO,” by acclamation; this resolution set out basic mechanisms of cooperation with the SCO. Pragmatic cooperation formats involved communications, joint expert valuation and common arrangements.

Figure 4 details the distribution of UN documents according to the subject matter associated with references to the SCO for the 16-year period under review. There are 15 subject matters, which is 21 fewer than in the case of the CSTO. This leads to the conclusion that cooperation with the CSTO occurs on a greater number of issues with the leading subjects being terrorism, security and events in Afghanistan. These are followed by peace and security, in the same way as for the CSTO in Fig. 2. Provision of GA observer status to the SCO falls even lower.
Fig. 4. References to the SCO in UN Documents According to Subject Matter (2001–2017)

Source: compiled by the author based on analysis of documents published on UNBISNET

Table 2. Frequency and Number of References to the SCO in UN Documents According to Subject Matter (2001–2017)

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Table 2 provides data regarding the themes and number of SCO references in UN documents each year. Table 2 data have been provided in descending order for a period of 16 years, from 2001 to 2017. Among the most referenced themes are peace and security and terrorism and security, followed by control of drugs and provision of GA observer status to the SCO.

The Stance of the Russian Federation in Terms of the Strategy and Activity of the CSTO and the SCO

Russia, being guided by the goal of enhancing cooperation with neighbouring countries — former Soviet Union states — is fully engaged in international processes within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Customs Union, the Eurasian Economic Community, the Common Free Market Zone, the SCO and the CSTO.

During his speech at the UN meeting in 2016 focused on cooperation of the UN with the CSTO and the SCO, B. I. Churkin, Russia’s permanent representative to the UN, noted that cooperation with these organizations is one of the priorities of Russia’s foreign policy. However, he emphasized that such cooperation had a substantial potential but “had not been used to the full extent yet” [Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the UN, 2016]. Furthermore, the speech touched on the issue of limited awareness of the members of the international community with regard to the activities of the these organizations, which may lead to a corrupted understanding of their role in peacemaking and the stability of the region. In addition, there is the issue of marginalization of these institutions as a result of geopolitical competition among several UNSF members.

Crucial issues in the CSTO region include terrorism, and in particular the spread of ISIS’ ideology. Lack of stability in Afghanistan, the related problem of drug trafficking and the spate of criminal activity in the region are also causing concern. The CSTO developed its own tools aimed at combating these threats and risks. Exercises of
the CSTO Collective Rapid Reaction Force, Cobalt-2016, aimed at combatting terrorism and drug trafficking, took place in May 2016. “Channel,” the anti-drug operation, showed good results as well. There is a mutual interest on the part of the UN and the CSTO regarding the development of practical cooperation with regard to peacekeeping, fighting crime and terror. Following proper training, a contingent of peacekeeping forces will participate in UN peace support missions.

Russia assigns high priority to the role of the CSTO regarding security enforcement in the Eurasian region. It has been approved by signing official documents. The 2016 Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation (art. 52) states that the CSTO is “one of the key elements of the current security framework in the post-Soviet space.” Hence, it appears that the CSTO is mostly targeted at regional issues rather than at solving global security issues. Russia seeks to facilitate “proper development of the CSTO into a prominent multifunctional international organization capable of overcoming challenges and threats today’s world is facing amid the growing pressure from various global and regional factors” [Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, 2016].

The 2015 National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation (art. 90) states that Russia advocates for “the quality development of the CSTO and its conversion into a universal international organization capable of confronting regional challenges and military-political and military-strategic threats and also threats in the information sphere” [Official Internet Portal of Legal Information, 2018].

The above-mentioned documents contain references to the country’s stance towards the SCO as well. Art. 79 of the Foreign Policy Concept emphasizes that “Russia attaches importance to further strengthening the SCO’s role in regional and global affairs and expanding its membership, and stands for increasing the SCO’s political and economic potential, and implementing practical measures within its framework to consolidate mutual trust and partnership in Central Asia, as well as promoting cooperation with the SCO member states, observers and dialogue partners” [Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, 2016].

The SCO’s key area of activity is security enforcement within its members’ borders. It faces challenges similar to those faced by the CSTO: terrorism, extremism, drug trafficking, cross-border criminality and the state of affairs in Afghanistan. Russia advocates for SCO capacity building, development of the security agencies as part of the UN and an anti-drug strategy. Other activities include the SCO Programme of Cooperation in the Fight against Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism for 2016–2018, the SCO Anti-Extremism Convention and “Peaceful Mission” counterterrorism exercises.

With regard to the SCO, the 2015 National Security Strategy of Russia (art. 92) states that “the Russian Federation attaches importance to building up the political and economic potential of the SCO and to the stimulation within it of practical actions furthering mutual confidence-building and partnership in Central Asia and also to the development of cooperation with the members, observers, and partners of the organization” [Official Internet Portal of Legal Information, 2018].
According to the Foreign Policy Concept, first, SCO activity exerts influence on the formation of the global collective leadership system; second, the SCO shall become a composite member of regional partnership organizations within the Asia-Pacific region. Third, the SCO together with the CIS, the UN and the CSTO shall play a crucial role in stabilizing Afghanistan after 2014 [Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, 2016].

According to the point of view of Russian experts, the strategic importance of the SCO involves creating an additional security belt along Russian borders [Bailes et al., 2007, p. 44].

Conclusion

The UN, despite the difference of resources, capacities and mandates of the organizations, still focuses on strategic cooperation with the CSTO and the SCO, largely due to the fact that it seems hard to cope with the rising and mutually-dependent threats acting alone. The SCO is more frequently referred to in UN documents; however the CSTO dominates in regard to the number of subject matters. The key subject matters of UN-CSTO cooperation over 15 years include cooperation, terrorism and provision of GA observer status to the CSTO; as to UN-SCO cooperation, the key matters are terrorism, security and events in Afghanistan.

Major mechanisms of cooperation between the UN and the CSTO include regular counselling with the UN and CSTO secretaries-general by virtue of joint fora and formats, including annual counselling with the UN secretary-general and heads of regional organizations; practice related to training of special forces units to participate in UN peacemaking missions and mutual cooperation between the UN agencies occurs by executing memoranda with the secretariats. Key cooperation arrangements between the UN and the SCO include communications, joint expert work and activities (meetings, conferences, summits, etc.), and, in the same way as for the CSTO, cooperating with UN specialized structures by executing memoranda with the secretariats which, according to a number of researchers, is insufficient in terms of achieving the optimum effect of cooperation. Further, the CSTO and the SCO take part in UN GA meetings.

Russia is involved in the activities of the CSTO and the SCO and is interested in strengthening and promoting their strategies with due regard to UN goals and principles. However, the CSTO is more of a military and political element in a security enforcement system, while the SCO is a mechanism of regional cooperation with regard to a number of spheres, including the power industry, economics and humanities.

Against the background of the increasing role of regionalism in international relations, the interconnection between global and regional security systems is strengthening as well, which is evidenced by the interaction between the UN and the CSTO and the SCO, despite the differences in intensity, dynamics and mechanisms of cooperation between them.
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Взаимосвязь глобальной и региональной систем безопасности (на примере ООН, ОДКБ и ШОС)¹

C.А. Бокерия

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Статья посвящена исследованию взаимосвязи глобальной и региональной систем безопасности на примере ООН, ОДКБ и ШОС, выбор которых неслучайен. По мнению автора, их деятельность недооценена. Эти организации появились на волне возникновения пула региональных объединений стран, которые стали заниматься безопасностью и миротворческой деятельностью. Оба объединения имеют схожий состав государств-участников, сформированных после распада СССР, являются наблюдателями в ООН и занимаются безопасностью как одним из ключевых направлений деятельности, имея схожие функции. ОДКБ и ШОС на постсоветском пространстве не дали вспыхнуть новым конфликтам, то есть играют роль стабилизаторов обстановки в границах своего региона и государств-участников.

Актуальность данного исследования обусловлена тремя аспектами: во-первых, особой ролью региональных организаций в выстраивании и функционировании всемирной универсальной системы безопасности; во-вторых, отсутствием исследований в отечественной науке, ориентированных на взаимодействие ООН с ОДКБ и ШОС, что, безусловно, подчеркивает научную новизну и актуальность данной работы; в-третьих, необходимостью совершенствования коллективных механизмов реагирования на существующие вызовы и новые угрозы безопасности, которые становятся взаимозависимыми.

Аналитической основой исследования стала теория военно-политических альянсов. В качестве методов исследования применялись количественный и качественный анализ документов ООН. Взаимосвязь ООН, ШОС и ОДКБ анализируется посредством подсчета количества и определения контекста упоминаний ключевых слов «ОДКБ» и «ШОС» в документах ООН в течение 15 (с 2002 по 2017 г.) и 16 лет (с 2001 по 2017 г.) соответственно. Используется обширная база документов ООН, размещенных на ресурсе UNBISNET. На основе полученных результатов оцениваются вклад и заинтересованность Российской Федерации как ведущего игрока на международной арене в усилении взаимосвязи глобальной и региональной систем безопасности.

Ключевые слова: ООН; региональные организации; регионализация; ОДКБ; ШОС; безопасность; миротворчество; военно-политический альянс


Источники


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Potential for Strengthening the NDB’s and AIIB’s Role in the Global Financial System\(^1\)

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Abstract

New multilateral development banks that became fully operational just three years ago – the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the New Development Bank (NDB) – have actually finished their formation and built large-scale project portfolios. Nevertheless, emerging economies’ needs and new banks’ aspiration for a greater role among international financial institutions pose a number of further challenges.

This article aims to assess the trajectory of the new institutions and to identify their potential contribution to the transformation of the global financial system in accordance with interests of their key shareholders – emerging markets and developing economies.

The authors consider key channels for increasing the NDB and AIIB influence in the system of multilateral banks, assess the progress achieved by the two banks, and identify risks and prospects for further strengthening the positions of the two institutions.

The authors conclude that the NDB needs to integrate a number of additional measures into its medium-term strategy in order to increase its loan portfolio and expand its geography, and also specify the steps the strategy contains to expand the scale of operations, taking into account the identified opportunities and risks. Unlike the NDB, where there is formally no single country leader, the prospects for further strengthening the AIIB positions depend on several key factors, mainly determined by China’s role in its capital and governance mechanisms. According to the authors, the AIIB, compared to the NDB, will be relatively more effective in overcoming the limitations for increasing the scale of operations and gaining influence among other multilateral institutions. However, the transformational potential of the AIIB, and especially the NDB, in the global financial system will remain quite limited in the foreseeable future.

Key words: New Development Bank; Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank; international financial system; development banks


\(^1\) The editorial board received the article in September 2018.

The research was carried out within the framework of the RANEPA research project “Assessing the Role of the New Development Bank and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank in Transforming the Multilateral Development Banking System.”
Introduction

Two recently established multilateral development banks (MDBs) – the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the New Development Bank (NDB) – have quickly completed their formative periods and accumulated large-scale project portfolios exceeding $13 billion in total. However, the needs of emerging market economies and the aspirations of the banks to strengthen their positions in the system of international financial institutions create a number of new challenges for them.

The potential impact of the NDB and AIIB on the international financial system aimed at its transformation in the interests of emerging and developing economies will depend primarily on the ability of these institutions to take positions comparable to that of the “traditional” international financial institutions (IFIs) in terms of operational scale, number of member countries and attractive conditions for borrowers. Accordingly, the transformational potential of the two banks is closely linked with the growth of their loan portfolios, expansion of membership (relevant primarily for the NDB) and development of new approaches to their activities that provide competitive advantages for borrowers in comparison with the traditional MDBs. It should be noted that members of the new banks often occupy different positions in relation to their future development. In particular, China is interested in actively expanding the lending geography of the NDB, while other countries in the BRICS group of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa still consider the bank to be a source of financing for domestic projects. The interests of China, and both developing and developed member countries, are also very different in the AIIB. Thus, the different interests of key members may become an additional obstacle impeding the implementation of measures that could potentially lead to strengthening the positions of the NDB and AIIB in the international financial system.

This article identifies the potential for more active involvement by these new institutions in the transformation of the global financial system for the benefit of their shareholders, mainly emerging and developing economies, and proposes measures to make full use of this potential. It should be noted that the formation of a multipolar global financial system that meets the interests of these countries is only possible if South-South cooperation within this group strengthens. This “is important not only for development and national-sovereignty aspirations and needs of the developing countries and their peoples, but also for these countries’ greater role and influence in the world arena” [Gosovic, 2018]. At the same time, one should not forget about the purely financial aspects of the MDBs activities and the economic efficiency of the investments, which play an important role in evaluating this efficiency. However, concentrating solely on financial aspects within MDBs may lead to an increasing risk of dominance by relatively more economically developed countries (as illustrated by some examples of China’s interaction with developing countries) and, in the case of new IFIs, that they in the end will become quite similar to the traditional institutions under this dominance, with China playing the leading role analogous to that of the United States and other developed countries in the key “old” MDBs. It seems that the optimal
way to strengthen the influence of developing countries in the international financial system should be based on a combination of solidarity and consideration of mutual interests, on the one hand, and the pursuit of financial efficiency on the other. However, as this analysis shows, a clear difference is currently observed: the NDB tends to choose the first approach, while the AIIB’s activities are closer to the second.

Potential Directions for Strengthening the NDB’s Role in the System of International Financial Institutions

In terms of strengthening the NDB’s role in the system of international financial institutions, an important task for the bank is the expansion of its loan portfolio, particularly in conjunction with the geographic expansion of its operations. An increase in the volume of the NDB’s operations requires the expansion of its financial resources. A possible instrument for such growth could be an increase in the volume of the bank’s subscribed capital, as provided for by the agreement on the NDB [BRICS, 2014]. Given that China has the greatest financial strength among NDB members, the most obvious approach is associated with an increase in its contribution to the bank’s capital.

For example, the BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement, created in parallel with the NDB, makes more use of China’s financial resources, which are significantly larger compared to the rest of the BRICS countries. If a similar ratio of member states’ contributions to the capital were used in the NDB, its subscribed capital would be at least twice the current value, greatly increasing resources for financing projects at the current stage of the bank’s development, when the volume of its funds raised in the financial market remains limited.

However, the scenario in which China’s share in the NDB’s capital is increased is associated with a risk of excessively strengthening China’s position in the institution that formally adheres to the principle of equality among its five founding members. This could lead to a repetition of the negative experiences of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank with conflicts of interest among members. Thus, the rest of the BRICS countries will most likely disagree on this method of increasing the bank’s loan portfolio.

Thus, the NDB may use alternative capital expansion options. One such option is to increase subscribed capital provided by new members. Several developing countries, including Turkey and Argentina, have indicated their interest to become NDB members. In the case of Argentina, the issue remained on the agenda even after its right-wing president M. Macri came to power. At the same time, the expansion of the bank’s membership is not associated with the expansion of the BRICS itself. It is quite feasible, with the help of the above-mentioned countries, that the volume of the subscribed capital could increase to $100 billion (this amount is indicated as authorized capital in the statutory documents of the bank). There are no formal challenges to expanding the NDB’s membership and on 1 April 2017 a document on the principles and procedures for accepting new members was adopted [NDB, 2017b].
At the same time, the possible accession of new members to the NDB raises a number of questions. First, the views of BRICS members are different with respect to which countries may participate and the potential scale of their borrowing from the bank. Even if a consensus on this issue is reached within the BRICS, it will create challenges to maintaining the influence of the bank’s founding members.

Currently, according to the agreement on the NDB, the share of the BRICS countries in the total number of votes should not be less than 55%, which is at least 11% for each country under the current equal proportions. Given the use of a special majority voting procedure for making the most important decisions, this rule ensures that the BRICS countries retain veto rights in case of expansion. The remaining 45% of the votes can be distributed among new members. One of the main criticisms by developing countries regarding the IMF, the World Bank and other IFIs is related to their vote distribution systems. Therefore, in order to avoid a predictable conflict, it is necessary to provide for a distribution of votes that is fair, transparent and clear to all members.

The NDB’s vote distribution system could be based, for example, on those proposals by developing countries for IMF voting power reform that were not eventually adopted by the Fund. Most developing countries insisted on using a single indicator — a country’s share in the global gross domestic product (GDP) — to calculate its share of votes. Indeed, this is the most popular and accessible indicator of a country’s role in the global economy. Use of this indicator would mean that new members from the group of developed countries would get larger shares of votes but given the continuing increase in the share of developing countries in global GDP and the fact that this proposal was advanced by this group, it seems quite acceptable.

Another problem that will probably arise in the case of new members is related to the composition of the bank’s governance structures. Currently, according to the agreement on the NDB, the bank has a president, vice-presidents and a board of directors made up of a maximum of 10 people. The president of the NDB “shall head the credit and investment committee, composed also by the Vice-Presidents, that will be responsible for decisions on loans, guarantees, equity investments and technical assistance” [BRICS, 2014]. In the case of membership expansion, it seems appropriate to make changes to the agreement on the NDB in advance. The president and four vice-presidents could always represent the BRICS countries. Positions on the board of directors could be distributed as follows: five places for representatives of the BRICS countries and five more for new members based on the principle of regional groups. The number of places in the latter group could be increased gradually as new states join the bank.

The strategic objective of the NDB, which is not explicitly articulated but is evident given the current role and place of the BRICS countries in the global economy and their ambitions, is to turn the bank into a full-fledged international financial organization that could become a significant analogue of large traditional MDBs. Therefore, a limit to the expansion of NDB membership should be considered. It is in this regard that it is proposed that five seats on the board of directors should be distributed among country groups. It seems that in this case the bank would continue to meet the interests of its founders in its activities.
When expanding membership, the bank will need to address the issue of the participation of least-developed countries. The membership of countries that are borrowers rather than lenders will limit the capacity for accumulating and using the practical experience of national development institutions and for attracting qualified personnel from these countries. This factor could also limit the NDB’s potential to become an institution capable of substantially transforming the international financial system in line with the interests of developing countries.

To address this problem the NDB may propose a list of conditions to reduce the risks of financing projects in least-developed countries. It also makes sense to consider the possibility of establishing a special fund within the bank similar, for example, to the African Development Fund of the African Development Bank Group (AfDB). The founders of the NDB could become members of such a fund, while its funds could be used to finance projects that meet the needs of less-developed members of the bank on favourable terms, as well as provide research and technical assistance.

Developing countries dissatisfied with the principles of the Washington Consensus advocate transformation of the international financial system based on new principles that take their interests into account. However, these countries lack professional resources to develop these principles. Moreover, their previous proposals in this regard related primarily to the IMF and the World Bank, neither of which is interested in changing the current situation. Thus, the NDB, as a new institution using the professional experience of experts from the BRICS countries, can seek to develop and implement a “new Bretton Woods” by becoming the intellectual centre for the design of a new development paradigm for poor countries based on the principles of sustainability, and taking into account their national interests. It is important to note that even though the founding members of the bank have quite recently experienced serious economic difficulties, they have managed to demonstrate high economic growth. Thus, their leading role in the process will be unlikely to cause irritation or invite objection from potential NDB members.

As an alternative to the Washington Consensus, the new paradigm could be based, for example, on the Beijing Consensus (also called the Chinese Model) derived from the experience of China which experienced an eightfold increase in its gross national product (GNP) from the 1970s to the 1990s [Zhang, 2011]. Beijing Consensus recommendations on economic development, mainly aimed at developing countries, include: adherence to innovations and experiments in economic policy as opposed to the universal solution offered by the Washington Consensus; assessment of development progress based not only on GDP per capita growth, but also on other indicators characterizing the stability of the economic system and welfare distribution; and conducting an independent financial policy and developing a sound foreign policy strategy, which, according to the author of the Beijing Consensus, J.K. Ramo, directly affects economic conditions [Ramo, 2004].

Obviously, the Beijing Consensus is unlikely to replace the Washington Consensus in the foreseeable future, in part due to the very discreet official Chinese position on
this issue. At the same time, the attractiveness of its main ideas for developing countries is beyond doubt and is explained by its focus on creating an international economic order that takes into account political and cultural differences between countries, as well as diversity of national approaches to economic reforms [Dirlik, 2006].

Another approach that could potentially contribute to the expansion of the NDB’s operations and the corresponding growth of its role in the MDB system is a more effective use of callable capital. This capital constitutes the major share of the bank’s subscribed capital reaching 80%, or $40 billion. This type of capital is required to cover the NDB’s obligations in case of emergency. At the same time, callable capital does not affect the scale of operations of a financial institution.

Given the lack of any significant examples of MDB calls for paying this type of capital, shareholders of these institutions tend to actively incur the corresponding commitments. The problem is that the agreement on the NDB does not clearly explain in which cases the bank may request the unpaid part of its subscribed capital. This leads to caution on the part of investors and rating agencies in considering callable capital when assessing the financial performance of any MDB. In addition, because of its unclear payment procedure, callable capital has virtually no effect on financial capacities of such institutions.

In order to turn callable capital into a more effective tool to support increased NDB financing, shareholders need to clearly formulate the procedure for requesting its payment, providing for an automatic and more transparent process. Still, the significant financial resources required and the budgetary constraints of member countries will likely make such a reform politically and technically challenging.

In the short term, the NDB could use alternative ways to increase the effectiveness of this financial resource. In particular, in the case of an increase in subscriptions of existing and new member countries, they could provide guarantees instead of a part of new callable capital. For NDB members, such a replacement will not cause any difficulties since both callable capital and guarantees are contingent liabilities, and this approach could be very effective from the point of view of expanding the scale of the bank’s operations [Humphrey, 2017].

At the same time, in order to offer loans at competitive rates, the NDB needs to choose loan currencies in accordance with market conditions, demand from investors and relative costs. Given the advisability of providing loans in the national currencies of the NDB members in line with de-dollarization trends in their economies, the bank should continue raising funds in the relevant markets and rely on the successful issuance of renminbi-denominated bonds. The permanent issuer status in the local markets of the member countries will allow the bank to create a positive credit history, while providing high liquidity and diversification opportunities for investors. Borrowing in national currencies will help the NDB not only to reduce the risks of a mismatch between borrowing and lending currencies, but also to attract financing at an attractive cost using a wide range of instruments in different markets. This flexibility will allow
the bank to respond quickly to changing market dynamics and adjust its borrowing strategy.

Another possible approach to strengthening the role of the NDB and its founding members in the international financial system is to take part in international credit ratings reform. The current credit rating system, dominated by the so-called “big three” agencies, increases borrowing costs for the NDB. These restrictions contributed to intensified negotiations on the establishment of a BRICS credit rating agency. At the same time, the World Bank and other traditional MDBs are also interested in reforms in this area, as they often have to follow a conservative strategy in their investments given the risk of losing their high credit ratings. A better methodology for assigning credit ratings which gives less importance to member countries’ sovereign ratings will allow many MDBs to enhance lending without significantly increasing their subscribed capital [Prizzon et al., 2017]. The entire multilateral financial system may benefit from this process, and the NDB can play an important role.

An important step for the NDB to improve the scale and geographic coverage of operations may be an expansion of the range of operational instruments used. Most MDBs use six main instruments in various combinations: loans, grants, lines of credit, equity participation, technical assistance and guarantees (Table 1). All NDB projects approved to date will be financed through loans. Taking into account the experience of other multilateral banks, it is advisable to start using other instruments provided for in the agreement on the NDB, including innovative ones such as project bonds, as soon as possible. A wide range of instruments will ensure the expansion of operations not only by increasing the attractiveness of the bank for potential borrowers, but also through the use of instruments (guarantees, project bonds) that may attract large institutional investors to project financing.

Table 1. Instruments Offered by Major MDBs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Loans</th>
<th>Grants</th>
<th>Lines of Credit</th>
<th>Technical assistance</th>
<th>Guarantees</th>
<th>Equity Participation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AsDB</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AfDB</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IADB</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Bank</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EBRD</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EIB</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: elaborated by the authors.

Developing practical cooperation with other banks can make a substantial contribution to strengthening the NDB’s role in the international financial system, and
creates opportunities for engaging in co-financing for major infrastructure projects, receiving consultative assistance and accumulating experience. The NDB clearly realizes the need to develop this cooperation, and it has thus signed a large number of documents regulating the parameters and areas of engagement with several multilateral financial institutions, including the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the World Bank, the Andean Development Corporation, the International Investment Bank, the Economic Development Board, the European Investment Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the International Finance Corporation, the Inter-American Development Bank, the Plata Basin Financial Development Fund (FONPLATA) and others [NDB, 2018].

However, given the broad geographic representation of this relatively narrow range of member countries, the NDB needs to enhance cooperation not only with major multilateral banks having considerable experience and expertise, but also with small, subregional MDBs and national development and commercial banks. The operational scale of subregional banks with limited membership is often comparable with that of major traditional MDBs but, like the NDB, these subregional banks advocate the idea of a multipolar financial system. Further, engagement with national banks could provide better understanding of borrowing countries’ specific needs. The operational development of the NDB would be difficult without joint project participation with this group of banks [Shelepov, Andronova, 2018].

It should also be noted that the NDB, despite signing numerous memoranda of cooperation with other institutions, has rarely used the mechanisms of practical financial interaction envisaged by them. Therefore, in the short term the NDB is likely to launch projects officially co-financed with other institutions. At the initial stage, they could be based on standards and practices of partner institutions and carried out with their leading role. In the future, as the NDB accumulates its own experience, its role should be transformed into the main co-financing institution.

Some recommendations for strengthening the NDB’s role in the system of international financial institutions were set as its medium-term priorities at the second annual meeting of the board of governors in April 2017, where the NDB’s Five-Year Strategy (2017–2021) was principally approved. The board of governors, at its meeting on 30 June 2017, adopted the final document [NDB, 2017a]. The adoption of the final strategy means that the NDB has chosen its preferred business model, which it intends to follow in the medium term. The strategy provides for broader sectoral priorities, accession of new members and practical engagement with national and multilateral institutions in the areas of co-financing and knowledge sharing. At the same time, the NDB’s entry into the trajectory of sustainable and large-scale infrastructure financing can help not only narrow the investment gap, but also strengthen the bank’s position in the process of reforming the global economic governance system and expand the rights and influence of emerging economies and developing countries. Some steps to strengthen the NDB’s role in the international financial institutions system and relevant progress assessment are presented in Table 2.
Table 2. Opportunities for Strengthening the NDB’s Role in the International Financial Institutions System

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opportunity</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Increased capital subscriptions by the existing members</td>
<td>Not started</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased capital subscriptions by new members</td>
<td>Perspectives are considered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Becoming the intellectual centre for the design of a new development paradigm for poor countries based on the principles of sustainability, and taking into account their national interests</td>
<td>Not started</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More effective use of callable capital</td>
<td>Not started</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in international credit ratings reform</td>
<td>Not started</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased operational use of national currencies</td>
<td>Limited to loans and bonds denominated in renminbi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expanding the range of operational instruments</td>
<td>Not started</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enhancing practical cooperation with other banks</td>
<td>Mainly declarative</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: elaborated by the authors.

Table 2 shows that NDB actions able to contribute to the transformation of the international financial system or at least to strengthening the bank’s role in it are still limited. To achieve the projected approved financing volume of $32–44 billion by 2022 [NDB, 2017a], the bank needs to consider the possibility of integrating into its five-year strategy some of the recommendations mentioned in this article, for example, regarding the more effective use of callable capital, and also specify measures aimed at expanding the scale of its operations, taking into account the opportunities, risks and recommendations presented above.

Opportunities for Strengthening the AIIB’s Role in the International Financial System

Unlike the NDB, where there is formally no single country leader, the AIIB is obviously dominated by China. Although China has not “abused” its role, the country’s share in AIIB votes predetermines the possibility that China can affect key decisions within the bank. China’s position largely determines the specifics of the institution and its potential role in the global financial architecture. In terms of the number of member countries and projects, the AIIB is far ahead of the NDB and the leading role of China, its financial strength and its ability to contribute “own resources” through various funds and national banks ensures the rapid geographic expansion of the bank’s activities. Consequently, the AIIB is more likely to quickly become a full-fledged equivalent of other large multilateral development banks. To further increase the scale and geographic coverage of operations, the AIIB can establish special funds as provided for in its statutory documents, and use them to finance the same projects as from the bank’s ordinary resources. These special funds, in turn, can use the substantial financial resources of China’s national investment funds, such as the $40 billion Silk Road Fund.
Currently, the AIIB considers attracting new members as the main factor in its successful development and strengthening position in the international financial system. Despite different positions on establishing the bank, most of the major Asian and global economies (except Japan and the U.S.) have supported it. In this regard, the AIIB will likely continue its efforts to create a positive international image in order to attract interested countries and thereby strengthen its influence. Further negotiations with potential members suggest a high likelihood of achieving the AIIB’s goal of increasing the number of member countries to one hundred or more in the short term [AIIB, 2016]. At the same time, potential disagreements between members, along with the rapid growth of the membership, may pose a challenge for the bank that should be considered.

The large number of members providing subscriptions to the AIIB’s capital, as well as participation of key non-regional economies (developed countries), contributes to the expansion of the bank’s activities. The first of these factors helped the AIIB to accumulate a large project portfolio. The impact of the second factor, that is, the participation of developed countries, may become decisive in the near future when the AIIB, given its highest credit ratings from leading global agencies, will start raising funds in the financial market. This wide range of borrowers implies that the AIIB, unlike the NDB, will provide financing mainly in U.S. dollars. However, it seems that it is expedient for the bank, given the formation of a new multipolar world economic order, to also expand operations in yuan — a currency that in the future may become much more important for the world economy.

De-dollarization of developing economies is an issue that is actively discussed at various levels. Settlements in renminbi are estimated to account for about 5% of the total trade between 55 countries along the route of the One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative. The National Bank of China has signed agreements with 36 central banks on mutual settlements and payments in national currencies. Renminbi clearing services were launched in 23 countries, covering Southeast Asia, Europe, the Middle East, America, Oceania and Africa. As of the end of 2017, the central banks of more than 60 countries used the yuan as a reserve currency (Table 3).

China, being one of the leading trading and investment partners of these countries and actually using the AIIB as one of the tools to implement its OBOR initiative (although officials tend to distance the bank from the initiative), can strengthen the position of the yuan. While it is beyond the scope of this article to examine the expediency and activeness of this process, it can be noted that within the framework of the AIIB China could stimulate, based on the NDB experience, a gradual move toward diversifying lending currencies, reducing the share of dollar-denominated loans and issuing loans in renminbi. China’s active support of the bank is a significant source of strengthening its positions among other IFIs and is one of the elements of the international financial system’s potential transformation and, in particular, de-dollarization.

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2 Including Canada, the U.S., Chile, Argentina, the UK, France, Germany, Russia, Qatar, the UAE, Hungary, Switzerland, Luxembourg, South Africa, Zambia, Thailand, Korea, Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan, Australia, Singapore and Malaysia.
### Table 3. Renminbi (RMB) Positions in the International Monetary System (as of the end of October 2018)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>USD</th>
<th>EUR</th>
<th>GBP</th>
<th>JPY</th>
<th>RMB</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Share in global GDP based on PPP, %</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>18.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share in the SDR basket, %</td>
<td>41.73</td>
<td>30.93</td>
<td>8.09</td>
<td>8.33</td>
<td>10.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share in official international reserves, %</td>
<td>57.1</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source:* [IMF DataMapper, c. a.; IMF, 2018a; 2018b].

In addition, in order to strengthen its positions in the global financial architecture, the AIIB, like the NDB, will likely seek to expand the range of its operational instruments. Currently, the bank provides loans and participates in equity of several infrastructure initiatives. In the future, it may start using innovative instruments, such as project bonds or derivatives to hedge risks, especially given its plans to attract large-scale private investment in infrastructure.

Most of the AIIB’s projects provide for infrastructure investments in the countries participating in the OBOR initiative. They were initially offered for implementation by other multilateral development banks or the governments of the countries concerned, and the AIIB acted as co-financier in these projects. It is obvious that in the future the bank will move away from this practice: in its strategy to mobilize private capital for infrastructure, the AIIB provides for an increase in the number of projects where it will participate as a sole or main financing institution [AIIB, 2018].

It is important that this process proceeds gradually. An abrupt AIIB move away from other institutions’ practices— which are typical of the majority of joint projects approved to date—would risk a reduction in the quality of their implementation and monitoring, leading to deterioration of the bank’s reputation and increased costs of raising funds. In the longer term, as the bank works more closely with business representatives and governments of member countries, expands qualified staff and accumulates its own competencies, as well as develops its special project preparation fund, it will be expedient to increase the share of its own projects in the portfolio.

Most of the AIIB’s activities in the medium term should be carried out in Southeast, South and Central Asia. The need to maintain this geographic focus is explained by significant demand for infrastructure investments in the region, as well as active involvement of other MDBs that are potential competitors of the AIIB. At the same time, despite China’s interests, other major shareholders, including Russia, should ensure a gradual expansion of the geographic scope of the bank’s activities in order to meet the interests of developing countries from other regions of the world.

Another important factor for strengthening the AIIB’s role in the international financial system is a strategy of cooperation with other institutions. In addition to traditional multilateral banks it is advisable for the AIIB to establish cooperation with other newly founded or planned institutions with similar goals, primarily the NDB.
This partnership could be promoted by China, which has significant influence in both institutions.

Given the specifics of projects supported and considered by the AIIB, in the short term the bank will likely continue to develop cooperation with other MDBs and participate in syndicated financing, using the best practices developed by these MDBs for their preparation and monitoring of projects. Implementation of projects in cooperation with major MDBs, including the World Bank, the ADB and the EBRD, will help reduce risks for the AIIB itself and accumulate competencies and experience within its own business model, increase awareness and trust of investors and potential partners, and provide the possibility of participating in “ready-made” large-scale projects on the basis of official co-financing.

At the same time, at least one of the projects considered for implementation – construction of the Mumbai metro line 4 – indicates that co-investors will be determined by the bank itself [AIIB, 2017]. Given the need to increase the AIIB’s independence and meet the interests of the emerging market economies that are its main shareholders, one should also expect the launch and expansion of its participation in official co-financing with other multilateral banks as the main co-financing institution.

An important way to strengthen their respective positions in the system of international financial institutions for both new banks is the development of mutual cooperation between them. Despite both banks’ formal support, their practical engagement has not yet started. At the same time, the role of major shareholders, similar specialization and overlapping country priorities predetermine the possibility of fruitful cooperation between the NDB and AIIB, primarily in the framework of official co-financing for large-scale infrastructure projects in the countries that are members of both institutions (BRICS states). A memorandum of understanding between the two banks was signed on 1 April 2017. Similar to documents with other MDBs, despite mentioning a wide range of possible cooperation formats, such as exchange of information, including databases, research preparation and publication, joint seminars and conferences, professional exchanges and co-financing of projects, the document is merely declarative. As a result, despite the obvious expediency of cooperation between the new development banks, this potential is not fully utilized at the moment. For successful cooperation in the most important area – co-financing – the NDB and AIIB should first agree on its parameters. In this regard, it is advisable to conclude a co-financing document, similar to the framework for agreement on co-financing between the World Bank and the AIIB.

Thus, the future role of the AIIB in the international financial system depends on several factors that can have a different impact depending on the specific situation. The most important element of the bank’s development scenario is the role of China in its capital and governance. If the AIIB takes into account some recommendations presented above in a timely manner and effectively uses the financial and political resources of its main shareholder, it will be able to overcome the current limitations to dynamic operational growth and strengthened influence among other multilateral in-
Conclusion

Although the new development banks have quite quickly moved beyond their formative periods and accumulated large-scale project portfolios, the needs of emerging market economies and the aspirations of these new banks for a greater role in the system of international financial institutions set a number of new objectives.

For the NDB, the best way to strengthen influence among other IFIs is to increase its loan portfolio, including in conjunction with its geographic expansion, based on the principle of equal rights of participants and stimulating cooperation between emerging markets (South-South cooperation). The bank may consider integrating into its medium-term strategy a number of additional measures and policies, for example, with regard to more efficient use of callable capital, and also specify some actions it already provides for to expand the scale of operations, taking into account the opportunities and risks identified above.

Unlike the NDB, where there is formally no single country leader, China certainly dominates in the AIIB. China’s role determines the specifics of the institution and its potential role in the global financial architecture. Prospects for further strengthening the AIIB’s position depend on several key factors, determined mainly by the role of China in its capital and governance structures and the ability of the bank to address economic efficiency challenges. Using Chinese financial and political resources, the AIIB, as demonstrated in this article, will likely overcome the current limitations to a dynamic increase in the scale of its operations and will gain influence among other multilateral institutions more easily than the NDB. However, even for the AIIB the transformational potential with regard to the global financial system will remain limited in the foreseeable future, while measures aimed at increasing the influence of the two institutions will face obstacles, in particular due to the different positions of the members regarding their future functioning and development.

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Возможности усиления влияния НБР и АБИИ в глобальной финансовой системе

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Азиатский банк инфраструктурных инвестиций (АБИИ) и Новый банк развития БРИКС (НБР), полноценно функционирующие всего лишь три года, фактически завершили этап становления, сформировав достаточно масштабные портфели проектов. Тем не менее нужды стран с формирующимися рынками и необходимость укрепления позиций новых банков в системе международных финансовых институтов стоят перед ними ряд новых задач.

Целью данной статьи является оценка траектории развития двух новых институтов и выявление возможностей их влияния на глобальную финансовую систему в интересах ключевых акционеров — стран с формирующимися рынками.

Авторы рассматривают направления, по которым возможно усиление влияния НБР и АБИИ в системе многосторонних банков, оценивают достигнутый прогресс, риски и перспективы дальнейшего укрепления позиций двух институтов.

По результатам исследования авторы приходят к выводу, что НБР для наращивания кредитного портфеля и расширения географии деятельности, возможно, будет практически полезно интегрировать в свою среднесрочную стратегию ряд дополнительных мер, а также конкретизировать содержащиеся в ней шаги по расширению масштабов операций с учетом выявленных возможностей и рисков. В отличие от НБР, где формально нет единственного странового лидера, перспективы дальнейшего укрепления позиций АБИИ зависят от нескольких ключевых факторов, определяемых в основном ролью Китая в его капитале и механизмах управления. АБИИ, по мнению авторов, будет легче, в сравнении с НБР, преодолеть ограничения для динамичного роста масштабов операций и усиления влияния среди других многосторонних институтов. Однако трансформационный потенциал в отношении глобальной финансовой системы АБИИ и тем более НБР в обозримом будущем останется крайне ограниченным.

Ключевые слова: Новый банк развития; Азиатский банк инфраструктурных инвестиций; международная финансовая система; банки развития


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Resilience in Discourses of the European Union and International Organizations

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Abstract

Lately, the European Union (EU) has faced multiple internal and external challenges. The conceptual response of EU institutions was “A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy” (June 2016). At the core of the understanding of what was happening, as well as of the prospects of overcoming those crises, sat the concept of “resilience.” It has been some time since this concept appeared in the discourses of international organizations and its meaning remains volatile, situational and dependent on the scope of application, the relevant context and the authorship.

The purpose of this study is to examine the specificity of use of the concept of resilience in the discourses of the EU and various international organizations, as well as the interrelation between those uses. The sample encompasses organizations of particular importance to the European integration project and to global and regional governance, including the Council of Europe, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and those which comprise the United Nations system (the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, etc.). Since the empirical material consists mostly of official texts produced by international organizations, the preferred method of study is discourse analysis.

The analysis examines the Brussels-advanced notion of resilience from a more distant perspective, namely, within the coordinate system of global and regional governance represented by Western-dominated multilateral institutions. The study identifies channels and agents responsible for the concept’s penetration into the discourses of the EU and other international organizations. Conclusions are drawn regarding similarities and divergences in the articulations of resilience. Particular focus is put on the interrelation between the concept and the neo-liberal approach to risk management and security.

Key words: European Union; United Nations; resilience; neo-liberalism; security; governance; experts

While our feet are still wet from the wave of sustainability, a new wave has come our way bearing the name of resilience

*J. Thomas* [2016]

During the past decade, the European Union (EU) encountered multiple internal and external challenges. Conceptually, it responded in part with “A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy” (June 2016) [EU, 2016], which replaced a document of a similar nature, namely, the European Security Strategy (2003). “Resilience” became the cornerstone for a renewed approach to the security problems of the EU. The concept of resilience has been around for some years, particularly in discussions on global governance. Moreover, the intensity of conceptualization applied to the relevant problematizing of the concept within the framework of the United Nations (UN) and other organizations has been steadily rising. Global governance itself, it seems, has been the subject of an active interest on the part of the EU [EU, 2012]. The very essence of the EU, as a community that came into being by way of multilateral cooperation, gives rise to stimuli for its own active backing of certain ways of dealing with international problems. The Europeans are among the most active members in organizations comprising the UN system. At the regional level the fora of European integration have traditionally included organizations intimately affiliated with the EU, including the Council of Europe, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).

The objective of this study is to illuminate the specificity of the use of resilience as a concept, as well as the interplay between its various interpretations and meanings within the discourses of the EU and international organizations relevant to the European project. Articulations of the notion of resilience within the discourses of organizations that approach problems of global governance and development in similar and often complementary ways are of interest as cases that may help not only to grasp the European discourse on the subject but also to shed light on some larger trends, e.g. the increasing role of resilience in governance and security discourses of western nations.

The article is structured as follows: first, the existent academic approaches to defining resilience and the latter’s associations with the notions of security and risk management are discussed. A critical synthesis of the existing theoretical knowledge establishes an applicable framework for the selection and empirical analysis of relevant data. This discussion focuses particularly on the available reasoning that the notion belongs to neo-liberal discourse [Pavlova, Gudalov, Kotsur, 2017]. This is followed by an exploration of the meanings and context of the emergent concept of resilience within the discourses of EU institutions. The specifics of the treatment of resilience in the discourses of international organizations including the Council of Europe, NATO, the OECD, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the UN system are examined, including the interrelation between the various interpretations of the notion and the approach taken by the EU. The intersections of those discourses with that of the EU are taken as a separate contextual factor of analysis.

This analysis draws mainly on the official papers of the EU, documents and materials from the official websites of the Council of Europe, the OSCE, NATO, the OECD
and the UN system. Conceptually significant texts, e.g. Council of Europe conventions, were included in the sample regardless of whether there was any mention of resilience. For other texts, if there was such a mention, they were included in the sample (amounting to approximately 200 texts).

The Concept of Resilience and the Framework for Analysis

The concept of resilience came into the social sciences from the field of ecology. Initially, it was conceived as the ability of systems to absorb changes of variables and parameters. If the system is sufficiently resilient, the result will be its preservation, otherwise — disappearance. There is a fundamental distinction between resilience and stability, which is identified as the ability of a system to return to an equilibrium following a temporary shock. As the author of the concept Crawford Holling [1973, p. 17] noted, a system can be highly resilient but possess low stability, which is particularly characteristic of complex systems. It is highly likely that the EU is an instance of that class.

This potential to bring together the internal conditions of a system and the ambient shocks under a single category facilitated the onward use of the concept in psychology, economics and social sciences. A number of epistemic communities (e.g. the Resilience Alliance [Resilience Alliance, n.d.]) formed around the problem of resilience. As time went by, from being strictly an academic term resilience turned into a concept that inhabited the area of public policy. The end of the Cold War did not make the world any more predictable. On the contrary, the disappearance of the deterrent maintained by the bipolar confrontation, additionally complicated by a growing interdependence, gave rise to new crises and conflicts. Within the discourse of global governance, the category of resilience was enriching the lexicon of sustainable development. At various UN fora the need to strengthen the resilience of developing countries in the face of crises so as not to jeopardize the achievements that had been made through progress and international assistance was articulated.

New uses of the term were emerging under the bearing impact of some major international crises. The global economic crisis generated debate on economic resilience (within World Bank, OECD and IMF). The surge of international terrorism helped to propel the use of the concept in the context of ideological affinity and value-based cohesion of liberal democracies in the face of the terrorist threat (within NATO). All those dimensions were also, to a degree, mirrored in the official discourse of the EU. The active interest of managing officials in resilience gave further impetus to discussions within the academic community about the term’s substance. Following those discussions, it is possible to identify several circumstances that offer potential interest for a comparative analysis of the discourses of international organizations.

One of those circumstances has to do with the multifaceted nature of meanings and articulations of resilience. Depending on contexts and situations, it shows varying facets as a term, as a conception and as an ideology [Anderson, 2015]. Drawing upon their analysis of dozens of scholarly publications, F. Brand and K. Jacks identified at least 10 different approaches to resilience. They argue that, originally articulated in the field of ecology, its meaning became blurred because of the interest from other academic disciplines. From a holistic and descriptive concept, resilience turned into a “boundary object.” On the one
hand, this facilitates communication across disciplines, enabling an even greater penetration of the term into political praxis. Yet, on the other hand, it does not help with the formation of a common approach to resilience. A veneer of consensus is being lacquered, whereas in fact the concept can acquire any meaning that one may wish. This also affects the prospects of for scholarly development and applicability of the concept. In this regard, resilience follows in the footsteps of “sustainable development” [Brand, Jax, 2007].

Another circumstance has to do with an obvious connection between resilience and security discourses. Frequently, resilience is contextualized as an element of the search for an adequate response to interconnected but hard-to-predict challenges, ranging from cyberattacks to flooding. And at the same time, in keeping with U. Beck’s conception of risk society, it is not as much about trying to “overcome predictable or known threats” but rather about trying to “prepare for, adapt to and live with a spectrum of possible, perhaps unknowable risks” [Brasset, Croft, Vaughan-Williams, 2013, pp. 222–3]. According to this logic, risk is no longer an emergency but now is part of everyday life.

Some scholars associate the transition from traditional security policy to new methods of managing risks as a new governmentality. According to M. Foucault, its essence originates in the change that occurred in Western thinking about governance through rationalizing their (those who govern) own perception of the essences of governing and their view of the governed. In the same vein, resilience is visualized as a neo-liberal form of that very new governmentality. Moreover, liberalism should not be construed as some specific political ideology or economic theory, but exactly as “a principle and method of the rationalization of the exercise of government, a rationalization which obeys…the internal rule-of-maximum economy” [Foucault, 2008, p. 318]. The traditional approach supposed that the state takes care of known threats and enemies by way of their elimination. The new approach stresses the need to develop the inner qualities of social systems in order to face inevitable and unpredictable challenges, thereby utilizing the available resources in a more rational way. The state engages in “the entrepreneurial move to enjoin businesses, communities and individuals to manage their own risks.” The goal is to create so-called “resilient subjects” [Brasset, Croft, Vaughan-Williams, 2013, p. 223–4].

Still, some in the academic community voice reasonable doubt about the novelty of the resilience concept. Thus, for example, neo-liberal discourse and the corresponding policy have long been in existence, yet, there is nothing of what is associated with resilience that would not be directly related to the former [Anderson, 2015, p. 63].

Having juxtaposed the research objectives and the current academic debate on the concept of resilience, the textual analysis developed in this article emphasizes the following six parameters. The first is authorship, which helps to deduce, for example, who within an organization (political leadership, bureaucracy or external experts) acts as a key agent of channeling resilience into discourse. Second is the context and field of application of resilience (economy, ecology, security, etc.). The third parameter is defined by concepts articulated in tandem with resilience (security, sustainable development, economic growth, risk management and the like). Among other things, this parameter allows determination of the correlation between resilience and the already existent terminology — whether used as a synonym, a qualification or a substitution for an “obsolete” notion. Definitions or attempts at defining the substance of resilience are the fourth parameter. In a narrow sense,
it is suggestive either of using the concept as a “boundary” or in a holistic and unequivocal way. The fifth is defined by references to other international organizations regarding resilience, which allow identification of which organization poses as a donor of expertise on resilience and which acts as recipient. The final parameter is the interconnection between interpretations of resilience and neo-liberal practices. Indicative of such interconnections are, for example, uses of resilience in such contexts as decentralization and rationalization of governance. Whether a neo-liberal approach is taken or not can be evidenced through the prescriptions for attaining resilience as formulated by the authors of any particular text.

Resilience in the European Union’s Discourse

Some researchers point to the fact that EU institutions have been using the term resilience in such areas as environmental policy and economy since the 1980s. The interest on the part of the European Environment Agency regarding the concept is understandable. In the last decade, the main domain of the term’s circulation was the assistance to developing countries to prepare for natural disasters and emergency situations, which was made possible by joining the efforts of the EU, individual donor countries and organizations under the aegis of the UN. In that context, resilience was mentioned only sporadically, while its substance was never explicated [Romanova, 2017].

A more active penetration of the resilience concept into the discourse and political praxis of the EU began in 2011. That year, the European Commission (EC), following the UN, stated the need to tie humanitarian assistance to development policy with a focus on developing countries building their own resilience in the face of various kinds of disasters. Among the applications of the new approach was to the programme adopted in November 2011 to support the countries of the Horn of Africa affected by drought [EC, 2012a].

Both the EC’s communication of 2012 [2012b] and the conclusions by the Council of the EU in 2013 formulated an approach to resilience that generally did not step out of the frame of UN discourse. Resilience, it was suggested, should be understood as “the ability of an individual, a household, a community, a country or a region to prepare for, to withstand, to adapt, and to quickly recover from stresses and shocks without compromising long-term development prospects” [Council of the EU, 2013]. It was noted that the EU had an understanding that it was necessary to eliminate the very causes behind crises, making the actions at the international and regional levels contingent on local and national praxis. In April 2014, the Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development of the European Commission with support from the World Bank and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) prepared guidelines on resilience in the area of development policy. The guidelines summarized various EU programmes and projects that, according to the authors, exemplified good practices for forming resilience [EC, 2014]. It is noteworthy that similar guidelines on various aspects of resilience were released earlier by the OECD and the World Bank.

Yet, before the adoption of the Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy (hereafter, Strategy 2016), the use of the term “resilience” had been limited to a few specific areas. Strategy 2016 brought resilience to the level of a key concept that, on the one hand, mirrored the sentiment of the proponents of the European project about the exis-
tential nature of the challenges facing the united Europe, while on the other, the availability of recipes at the disposal of Brussels to overcome those challenges. As High Representative F. Mogherini insightfully noted in the preface to Strategy 2016, “the purpose, even existence of our Union is being questioned” [EU, 2016]. In that regard, Strategy 2016 is primarily about the resilience of the European integration project per se. This makes the EU significantly different from other international organizations. Unlike the UN, the EU is legitimately considered by many in Europe and beyond as a community based on common values and practices. This is the only ground to treat resilience from an existential perspective, rather than as an abstract category generated by the former metropoles’ interest in their former colonies.

So far, however, the other components of the EU discussions on resilience have shown no evidence of major changes happening to the perception of threats or to the methods of their removal. Strengthening the resilience of the EU is viewed by the authors of Strategy 2016 with a focus on repairing the imbalances of governance in the EU in order to move forward to a greater value-based normative unity, using the ability of the EU to act independently in the international arena, advocating its core principles and values, as well as through efforts to facilitate the formation of resilient communities, states and economies bordering the EU. The methods of strengthening resilience of third countries remained unchanged. Having conceded the need to take into consideration the diverging national ways of attaining resilience, the authors of Strategy 2016 nonetheless remained insistent on proliferating the European model as universal [EU, 2016]. In this regard, resilience continues to be part of the old Eurocentric discourse that provoked the crises that are currently facing the EU.

As to the question of whether there is an interrelation between the neo-liberal approach and resilience in the discourse of the EU, the answer is yes. In most texts under review, strengthening resilience is associated with the call to be self-reliant with respect to system resources and to robustly engage actors of all types and levels in planning and preparation endeavours. By way of example, consider that the authors of the EU’s cybersecurity strategy expect that the private sector will be able to act independently to provide resilience of the critical infrastructure, as well as to communicate to and coordinate with the public [EC, 2013].

There is a relative integrity of the EU’s supranational discourse on resilience. EU institutions react in a timely way to the voiced positions, morphing them as much as possible into a single approach [European Parliament, 2017; Council of the EU, 2017]. Yet, some nuances remain. The EC, based on analysis of its documents, is to a significant degree affected by the discourses on resilience produced by World Bank and UN programmes. The European Parliamentary Research Service tends to concentrate on the OECD’s methods when drawing policy briefs. It is not fortuitous that the relevant EU Parliament resolution recommends that the Commission and the Council take note of the OECD’s methods as effective and practice-oriented [European Parliament, 2017]. On top of that, some Research Service papers which offer detailed analyses of the connections between various aspects of resilience and foreign policy had been released prior to the 2016 strategy that turned it into a key category [Pawlak, 2015]. It is quite obvious that the indicated organizations (OECD, World Bank) and the experts associated with them wield enormous influence in shaping the EU’s approaches to global governance and to resilience as an element of the latter.
EU’s Engagement with International Organizations

Given the history of origins of the European Communities and the very essence of the association, multilateral diplomacy has been a fundamental principle of the EU’s action in the international arena. The Treaty on the EU clearly states the idea of an active participation in global and regional governance with an emphasis on promoting the European model around the world [EU, 2012]. Among all types of international organization, it prioritizes those of the UN system, including the International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the World Bank Group. Other international organizations with which the EU should have structured in-depth cooperation include the Council of Europe, the OSCE, the OECD and NATO.

The Council of Europe and NATO have traditionally formed the basis of European integration. The former serves as a large cultural and legal forum for European integration. The intersection between political discourses of the Council of Europe and those of the EU is facilitated by incorporating European conventions and European Court of Human Rights decisions into the EU’s legal order. The EU institutions are guided by standards of the Council of Europe and its various units (e.g. the European Commission for Democracy through Law) in their relations with third countries, referring to them in official papers. NATO has been providing the security umbrella under which the West European model of economic integration could form. Despite having had its own Common Security and Defense Policy since the mid-1990s, members and institutions of the EU regularly avow that the North Atlantic Alliance is key to European security. The discourses of the two organizations on matters of military security in Europe are intertwined. This was possible in part through experts and officers crossing over between the bureaucracies. Further, there seems to exist a certain axiological unity of western nations.

The OECD, known from 1948–1961 as the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, was initially tasked with implementing the Marshall Plan. The OECD contributed to building the economic foundation of European integration and to developing certain practices of economic management and reform. Today, the organization serves as a forum for sharing experience in implementing economic reforms and managing socio-economic developments. The EU’s institutions turn to OECD experts, while their programmes often demonstrate moral unity and similarity of the approaches taken.

The OSCE was intended to serve as a forum for interaction between the western and eastern parts of the European continent. The principles of international cooperation, as set forth in the final act of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, are an integral part of international law. With the end of the Cold War, there were high hopes regarding the OSCE; however, it failed to establish the basis for a full-fledged system of European security. The current discourse of the organization, much like its policy, is heavily influenced by Western approaches, of which the OSCE is frequently accused by Russia and a few other countries. Judging by its share within the OSCE’s bureaucracy, as well as by its participation in discussions and expertise of the organization, Russia is significantly behind the EU countries. At the same time, it is exactly the mechanisms of the OSCE that the conflicting parties of Russia and the West turned to when the Ukrainian crisis erupted.
The organization remains the very institution whose representatives enjoy a significantly higher degree of trust from Russia than do those of NATO. The official documents drawn up by both Russia and the EU and its members on a range of aspects of security and cooperation in Europe retain references to the OSCE and its practices.

It is crucial to understand that the comfort of interaction between the EU and the aforementioned international institutions is determined in part by the fact that the current structure of global governance is dominated by Western institutions. The discourses of the World Bank, the IMF, UN programmes, the Council of Europe, the OSCE and the OECD were formed with an active input from the U.S. and West European states. As European integration grew more profound, some supranational institutions (mostly the European Commission) began to take part in those discourses. The rate of interaction between the EU and those international organizations depends on the relative membership share of the EU countries in them (with an overlap starting from one-half of their number to a virtually complete coincidence). One could therefore expect that the chances for the Anglo-Saxon concept of resilience to penetrate organizations and structures with a significant presence of non-Western states (Russia, China, etc.) will be limited.

Resilience in the Discourses of International Organizations

The notion of resilience emerged in the discourses of international organizations primarily as a result of their officials interacting with expert communities in such fields as ecology and economy. Evidently this was the pattern that the OECD and the UN organizations followed, including the IMF and the World Bank. The presence of resilience in their discourses is quite discernible, which is further evidenced by numerous references made to them in the relevant EU papers. It is a rare EU document that, while mentioning resilience in the context of global governance or development policy, would not also invoke the relevant UN initiatives such as the Sustainable Development Goals and the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction.

As noted, the UN system uses the concept of resilience in a variety of ways, from resilience to natural disasters to economic resilience. As expected, it is used most seldom in the discourses of such structures as the General Assembly and the Security Council. Thus, out of all Security Council resolutions for 2013–2017, only two contained a reference to resilience and no definition or disclosure of its substance was given. In 2014, it was about local community resilience [UN Security Council, 2014], whereas in 2017, the context was that of countering international terrorism [UN Security Council, 2017]. Significantly more frequently, even in the context of security, the traditional category of sustainability was used. Political discourses of many UN members, particularly those who are not directly targeted by programmes that have to do with resilience, seem to contain no such category. So, the Russian language version of the General Assembly resolution on global development goals handles resilience by three different interpretations within a single document — once as “viability” (cities, the indigent), another time as “durability” (infrastructure) and finally as “stability” (agrarian systems) [UN General Assembly, 2015].

It comes as no surprise that those UN organizations and programmes that heavily relied on Anglophone expertise in highly specialized areas were among the most receptive
to the concept. Intensive project communication and revolving doors between the international bureaucracy personnel and the expert communities facilitated the penetration by academic resilience studies into the practical agenda of the UN. This is the case, first and foremost, of the UN International Strategy for Reduction (UNISDR), the UNDP, the World Bank Group and the IMF.

A testimony to the conceptual nature of resilience in UN discourse is one of its key initiatives, namely the Sustainable Development Goals. The relevant General Assembly resolution mentions resilience about two dozen times in reference to infrastructure, urbanism, refugees and natural disasters [UN General Assembly, 2015]. Yet, its set of problems and approaches to tackle them could hardly be described as a fundamentally new conceptualization of the development policy problematics. Resilience does not replace the concept of sustainable development but rather complements it by shifting the emphasis of the UN organizations’ work toward local resources and capabilities of objects to global governance. As the UN secretary-general noted, together the three interdependent UN pillars (peace, sustainable development and human rights) “form the basis of resilient and cohesive societies” [United Nations Secretary-General, 2016b].

The other important participants of UN discourse are the World Bank Group and the IMF. This is due mainly to the fact that these organizations attempt to develop a toolbox for gauging resilience and also because they are perceived around the world as agents of the overarching neo-liberal approach to solving global and regional problems. With respect to applying the neo-liberal approach to governance as a rationalization practice, it is obviously a characteristic of both the IMF and the World Bank, as well as of the majority of UN programmes. It is universally assumed within their discourses that individuals, social groups and local communities possess intrinsic resilience potential to withstand crises and other challenges. In this vein, the UN secretary-general, in an act of admiration for the resilience of refugees, cited the example of a Syrian refugee camp whose residents had created from scratch an entire infrastructure that they had been accustomed to, spanning restaurants, shopping markets, art galleries and sports gyms [United Nations Secretary-General, 2016a].

The World Bank’s president named strengthening resilience to counter global shocks and threats among the three foci of the Group. The other two are boosting sustainable economic growth and investment in human capital [World Bank, 2016a]. Investments in human capital are aimed in part at developing the intrinsic potential and capabilities of individuals, who are the first to suffer the consequences of natural disasters and emergencies. World Bank experts focus their studies on the definition of the concept of resilience, as well as on the methods of gauging it. They draw particular attention to developing the category of socio-economic resilience. Their relevant reports provide a detailed methodology and a system of indicators for gauging it [World Bank, 2016b, p. 3]. Resilience is defined as the ability of communities or societies to adapt to a negative impact. This ability is attained through resilience or by changing the system so as to maintain an acceptable level of functioning and integrity of structure. Such aspects of resilience as the system’s ability to self-organize, learn and adapt are particularly emphasized [Prasad et al., 2009, p. 33]. Following C. Holling, World Bank experts believe that complex and diverse systems possess more resilience. After all, when resources or capacities are in the hands of various interest groups (the state, business and local communities) there exist more options for testing different approaches and solutions [Ibid., p. 34].
The discourse of the IMF has used the concept of resilience since the 1990s. It is noteworthy that the context of the term’s use has not changed — it is still about the resilience of economies and financial systems in the face of crises. IMF experts admit that there is no single template to build resilience [IMF, 2015]. Still, when used, the concept is situated within the contexts of traditional categories of IMF discourse and political praxis (structural reforms, macroeconomic stabilization), indicating that the same “universal” recipes and models are being promoted. Also questionable is the presumed neo-liberal nature of resilience. Analysis of the causes of financial crises and currency imbalances have prompted the IMF to conclude that these are due to the “irresponsibility of market participants” and that there is a need to strengthen the supervisory role of national regulators and those of international financial institutions [IMF, 2005]. Concurring with the IMF conclusions are members of academic community who contend that such neo-liberal practices such as privatization of critical infrastructure may carry security risks [Walker, Cooper, 2011, p. 153].

Despite the OECD’s relatively late engagement with resilience, the approach it has taken is one the most systemic and profound. The organization releases voluminous guides designed to help experts and practitioners in the field to develop the instruments for gauging and embedding resilience into their humanitarian programmes [OECD, 2014a]. Naturally, OECD methods gained the immediate attention of the European Parliamentary Research Service, while the recommendations for their use became part of European Parliament’s resolutions. A major event that contributed to further interest for the organization and the concept of resilience was the global financial and economic crisis of 2008 and its consequences. In this respect, the OECD’s experience is similar to that of the IMF. When defining the notion of resilience, OECD experts particularly emphasize the ability not only to withstand an unfavourable impact and to recover, but also, having learned from the experience, to become stronger. To them, to be resilient means to be able to recognize the sources of risks and opportunities, and to learn to live with uncertainty [OECD, 2014b].

Also, according to OECD discourse, resilience is a multilayered phenomenon. Different layers (individual, local communities, public institutions, the international arena) tend to have different sets of risks and ways of managing them [OECD, 2013]. They propose to gauge resilience along four interdependent dimensions — economic, social, institutional and environmental [OECD, 2014b].

The attention of the OECD experts is mostly focused on the resilience of developing countries. They view it as a guarantee that invested international assistance will not be lost due to the collapse of the economy or the state. The opposite of resilience is the proposed concept of state fragility. In the event of the latter, the prime task of the international community is to assist in the restoration of statehood by reaching an effective social compact between the state and society [OECD, 2008].

The OECD experts also tried to answer the question of the practicality of resilience as a concept for managing risks. In their view, an analysis of the system’s resilience cannot replace traditional approaches to risk management but, it does draw on and complement the latter. In particular, such analysis does not focus on the risk per se, but on the system and the record of its past performance, as well as on the analysis of trends, taking into account uncertainty and constant risk fluctuations [OECD, 2014a]. Their call to pay special
Table 1. Resilience in the Discourses of International Organizations: Summary of the Results of Textual Analyses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Key Documents on Resilience</th>
<th>Key Actors of the Discourses on Resilience</th>
<th>Fields of Most Frequent Mentions</th>
<th>Dominant Approaches to Resilience</th>
<th>Interconnection of Neo-liberal Approach to Governance</th>
<th>Influence of the Expert Community on the Resilience Discourse of an Organization</th>
<th>References to Other Organizations Concerning Resilience</th>
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<tr>
<td>European Union</td>
<td>Conclusions of the Council on the EU approach to resilience, 28 May 2013; Global Strategy for Foreign Policy and Security of the EU, 28 June 2016; Resolution of the European Parliament on Resilience as a Strategic Priority of the EU Foreign Policy, 1 June 2017</td>
<td>European Commission; European External Action Service; Experts</td>
<td>International assistance to development; Security; Resilience of the European system of norms and values; Overcoming the consequences of natural disasters</td>
<td>Boundary object</td>
<td>Present, but ambiguous</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>UNO (including the World Bank)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN System of Organizations</td>
<td>Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction; Sustainable Development Goals; The Paris Climate Agreement, 2015; World Bank and IMF expert reports</td>
<td>UN Development Programme; United Nations Office for Disaster Reduction; World Bank; International Monetary Fund; Experts</td>
<td>International development assistance; Overcoming the consequences of natural disasters; Socio-economic development</td>
<td>Socio-ecological resilience; Economic resilience; Financial resilience; Socio-economic resilience</td>
<td>Present</td>
<td>Paramount</td>
<td>References to other organizations are practically absent</td>
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<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Key Documents on Resilience</td>
<td>Key Actors of the Discourses on Resilience</td>
<td>Fields of Most Frequent Mentions</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Expert reports and guides</td>
<td>Secretariat and experts</td>
<td>International development assistance; Sustainable urban development; Socio-economic foundations of statehood</td>
<td>Socio-ecological resilience; Economic resilience; Resilient cities</td>
<td>Present</td>
<td>Paramount</td>
<td>UNO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>Commitments to strengthen resilience, 8 July 2016</td>
<td>Secretariat</td>
<td>Cybersecurity; Civilian resources of the Alliance’s defense capability; Unity of the Alliance</td>
<td>Boundary object</td>
<td>Present, but ambiguous</td>
<td>Difficult to assess</td>
<td>In equal measure – UNO and EU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Council of Europe</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>Secretariat, experts from other organizations</td>
<td>Adopted from the UN system</td>
<td>Not specified</td>
<td>—</td>
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<td>UNO and EU</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>Secretariat, experts from other organizations</td>
<td>Adopted from the UN system</td>
<td>Not specified</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>UNO, less often – EU</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
attention to data collection, development of methods of analysis and identification and forecasting of possible risks based on such analysis places the OECD in close quarters with the World Bank and the IMF, and then with the European Union. Of late, the concept of "big data" has increasingly been mentioned in this context [World Bank, 2015].

Resilience is not a key concept in the discourses of the Council of Europe or the OSCE and is in use only when the programmes or interests of these organizations become congruent with the initiatives of the UN system. The channels through which resilience is transmitted from the discourses of the UN into the agendas of the OSCE and the Council of Europe are the various joint conferences and events at which the actors are vested experts (e.g. of the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, autonomous part of the MFA). Currently, the Council of Europe and the OSCE have no expert knowledge on resilience to offer the EU, for they are among the recipients of it themselves (See Table 1).

Localization of the resilience concept at the ground level by Anglophone experts who shift through and between the multilateral institutions can be largely explained by the absence of this category in the discourses of a significant number of the members of the Council of Europe and the OSCE. A good example of this is the report by an international collective of authors (including from Russia) prepared under the auspices of the OSCE in 2015, containing proposals to end the crisis in relations between Russia and the West. The text of the report uses the term “sustainable,” while the preview of the report, which was prepared by the OSCE secretariat, talks about the “resilience” of European security [OSCE, 2015].

The relative recency and ambiguity of interpretation of the concept does not allow it to be used in the Council of Europe conventions, even when the subject would imply such use (e.g. preserving city landscapes). Neither the conventions, nor the protocols to them, including those adopted over the past decade, mention the concept of resilience. A contributing factor to the inability of ambiguous notions to take hold in the discourses of these organizations is the existence of contradictions between members. As is well known, besides member countries of the EU, Russia and a few post-Soviet states also hold membership with both organizations.

Standing apart is NATO. The notion of resilience has been part of NATO’s discourse since the 1990s; however, the use of the term was irregular and devoid of any serious conceptual bearing. It was mostly referred to by the Alliance’s political leadership (Secretaries-General G. Robertson and H. Solana) when characterizing NATO’s overall ability to adapt to changed conditions and new security challenges [Solana, 1997]. The Alliance’s treatment of resilience as an internal criterion has remained unchanged. With the rise of international terrorism, resilience was repeatedly invoked within the context of the unity of the transatlantic community of values in the face of this threat. This strictly endogenous reading of resilience would be later encountered in Strategy 2016, as well as within the context of the Alliance’s own perception of Russia’s policy in the region as a threat [NATO, 2014].

The transformation of resilience within NATO discourse from a situational concept into a more or less holistic one had occurred by 2016. From 2016–2017, resilience was mentioned in the official texts of the Alliance more often than it had been over the entire period.

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2 For more, visit http://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list.
since the 1990s, coinciding with the activation of the concept within the EU discourse. It became the main topic for the first time at the NATO Warsaw summit (July 2016) as is evidenced from the joint statement of the heads of states and governments released at the event’s conclusion. Obviously, the activation of the concept within NATO had to do with its awareness of Europe’s vulnerability to the so-called hybrid threats. The latter were defined as the use of asymmetric tactics intended to tap into and take advantage of the vulnerabilities of adversaries, using non-military means (political, informational, economic) and accompanied by a threat to use conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction [NATO, 2015]. Undoubtedly, lately Russia has been referred to as a major source of such threats, placed immediately after international terrorism. This fact, obviously, is just another point of intersection in the discourses of NATO and the EU on resilience. A joint statement of the EU and the Alliance on 8 July 2018 asserted that the Euro-Atlantic community had encountered unprecedented challenges from the southern and eastern directions [EC, 2016]. A more explicit statement by the Alliance emphasized the need to take into account and address “potential vulnerabilities that can arise from Russia’s involvement in business, financial, media or energy concerns” in Europe [Shea, 2016].

Meanwhile, this activation of the resilience concept in the discourse of the Alliance was not followed by any fundamental change in the perspective on the internal capabilities and the applied criteria of the organization. The personnel of the civil and military staffs made resilience part of the existing conceptual framework for strategic planning. It was particularly emphasized that the need to strengthen the resilience of the Alliance arose from the provisions of NATO (Articles 3 and 5). Resilience itself was defined as “the combination of civil preparedness and military capacity” [NATO, n.d.] of the Alliance, while the set of measures for strengthening it relied on the existing programmes and instruments.

Conclusion

Discussions concerning resilience in various international organizations and fora relate to the notion that the modern challenges to international development and security are not only complex and interdependent but also, to a large degree, unpredictable. As B. Anderson [2015, p. 63] notes, resilience can be viewed as a way to manage insecurity in today’s world of disasters. The penetration of resilience into the discourses of international organizations bespeaks a general confusion before a series of hard-to-predict crises and appears to be an attempt to instill in both the governed and those who govern a sense of confidence as to the possibility of overcoming those crises successfully.

In the meantime, a feature of the international organizations’ discourses is their disregard for the fact that modern risks do not simply emerge out of the blue but rather are produced within and by systems. Those crises are built-in components of rationalized decision-making, which sends us back to neo-liberal practices. As N. Luhmann [1994] remarked, “we can speak of risk only if we can identify a decision without which the loss could not have occurred.” In a similar vein, the identification of risks to the stability of the European integration project must be an element of the analysis of decisions taken at all levels of European decision-making, i.e. an element of the very policy of the EU. Likewise,
decisions taken by national governments following IMF recommendations, for example, are inevitably accompanied by corresponding risks to their socio-economic, financial, and political systems.

A commonality for all organizations examined in this study was the interdependency between their interpretations of resilience and the neo-liberal approach to governance (see Table 1). The rationalization of the view of the system’s capabilities and resources is characteristic of both hard security and development policy. Some NATO documents explain in detail what is implied by civil capabilities of resilience of the Alliance, while the discourse of the World Bank refers to capabilities and criteria for socio-economic resilience of developing countries. Still, the degree of proposed autonomy for the supervised in an act of strengthening their resilience is strongly dependent on the assessment of their capabilities, as well as on their political culture and the focal area of the organization. The closer the latter is to so-called high politics, the less autonomy is offered to the private sector (a salient example is NATO). The same holds true for the capabilities of the supervised. When the focus is on the resilience of society of an EU Member State, a high level of autonomy is assumed. In cases with developing countries, the focus is on the guiding role of the donor’s assistance in building resilience.

The degree of novelty of the resilience concept in most cases is not very high. With a varying success rate all organizations have integrated resilience into their existing discourses by complementing rather than replacing categories such as sustainable development, security and risk management (see Table 2). The most profound elaboration of resilience can be observed in those organizations whose scope of activity includes the development of expertise, methodologies and instruments for global and regional governance. Among such

| Table 2. Notions That Are Most Frequently Used in Association with Resilience |
|----------------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| SECURITY                         |                   |                   |                   |                   |
| RISKS                            | Terrorist attack  | Climate Change    | DISASTERS         | CRISES            |
| VULNERABILITY                    |                   |                   |                   | Fragility         |
| RISK MANAGEMENT                  | Awareness         | Preparedness      | Prevention        | Defense           |
| System                           | Capabilities      | Capacity          | Infrastructure    | Institutions      |
|                                  |                   |                   |                   | Society           |
| Notions related to the various system qualities and properties: |                   |                   |                   |                   |
| Solidarity, Effectiveness, Coherence, Flexibility, Innovation, Connectivity, Cohesion, Complementarity, Resourcefulness, Inclusiveness, Integration, Dynamism, Smart, Renewable |
| SUSTAINABILITY                   | SUSTAINABLE       | Adaptation        | Economic          | Stability         |
| DEVELOPMENT, DEVELOPMENT         |                   |                   | growth            |                   |

The data have been compiled for all organizations. Key concepts are in capital letters.
organizations are the World Bank and the OECD. Their experts are clearly trying to move away from ambiguity in understandings of resilience. In the meantime, from the viewpoint of the EU, it is still treated as a general approach and a “boundary object” that enables communication between different areas of EU policy. Such an approach is fraught with vulnerabilities. An illusion of consensus disguises substantial differences in articulations.

As far as one can see, the inclusion of resilience within the discourses of the leading international organizations is happening without Russia’s input. This has to do in part with the Anglo-Saxon origins of the notion. Another important reason is the existing normative and ideological contradiction between the West on one side and Russia and a few other countries on the other. They speak different languages, which affects the degree to which their discourses mutually intersect. As a consequence of their conflict, running along the fault line between Russia and the West, the talks on Russia’s accession to the OECD, a key organization from the standpoint of elaborating the resilience concept, have been suspended. Moreover, the concept of resilience in EU and NATO discussions is directly linked to the discussion of Russia’s policy as threatening European security. This circumstance and the fact that NATO and the EU treat resilience as an internal criterion of their unity sets the discourse of the so-called “Euro-Atlantic community” apart from those of the other organizations studied in this article.

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Стрессоустойчивость (resilience) в дискурсах Европейского союза и международных организаций

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В последние годы Европейский союз столкнулся с множественными внутренними и внешними вызовами. В концептуальном плане одним из ответов управленцев Евросоюза стала Глобальная стратегия внешней политики и безопасности (июнь 2016 г.). Ядром видения происходящего, а также перспектив выхода из кризиса стала концепция стрессоустойчивости (resilience). Понятие стрессоустойчивости имеет англосаксонское происхождение и появилось в дискурсе международных организаций давно, при этом интенсивность обращения к нему поступательно возрастает.

Целью предлагаемого исследования является выявление специфики присутствия стрессоустойчивости в дискурсах Евросоюза и международных организаций, а также взаимосвязей между ними. В исследование были включены организации, имеющие особое значение для европейского интеграционного проекта, а также глобального и регионального управления — Совет Европы, НАТО, ОБСЕ, ОЭСР и организации системы ООН (МВФ, Всемирный банк и т.д.). Поскольку источниковой базой исследования являются, прежде всего, документы международных организаций, в качестве методологической основы был выбран анализ дискурсов.

Проведенный анализ позволил взглянуть на понятие стрессоустойчивости, продвигаемое Брюсселем, более широко — в системе координат глобального и регионального управления, представленного западными многосторонними институтами. В исследовании были определены основные каналы и агенты проникновения понятия в дискурс Евросоюза и других международных организаций. Сделаны выводы относительно схожих черт и противоречий в артикуляции стрессоустойчивости. Отдельное внимание уделено взаимосвязи понятия с неолиберальным подходом к управлению рисками.

Ключевые слова: Европейский союз; ООН; стрессоустойчивость; неолиберализм; безопасность; управление; эксперты


Источники


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МНОГОСТОРОННИЕ ИНСТИТУТЫ В КРИЗИСЕ?


Legal Integration in the European Union and the Eurasian Economic Union: Comparative Analysis

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Abstract

The author studies the communitarian and conventional models of legal integration used in the European Union (EU) and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), respectively. The purpose of this comparative legal analysis is to determine unique features reflecting differences between these models. Particular focus is on the examination of legal acts of public bodies of the EU and the EAEU – their legal nature, place, role and the characteristics of their implementation in the national legal systems of their members. The author also analyses how the Court of the European Union and the Court of the Eurasian Economic Union control the enforcement of legislation of the EU and the EAEU, primarily in those cases where the courts assess justifications provided by supranational public bodies of these unions when they pass legal acts creating rights and obligations directly for citizens of the EU and economic entities of the EAEU. The article offers a rationale for the concept stating that the absolute priority of integration law over national legislation and the binding power of decisions of a supranational court for all participants of integration relations are the key milestones of supranational legal integration; when these milestones are achieved, it is possible to open borders not only for economic cooperation, but also for other forms of collaboration not linked tightly to the general processes of transnationalization of the economies.

Key words: European Union; Eurasian Economic Union; supranational status; legal integration; legislative act; judicial control; national parliaments; democratic legitimacy; inter-institutional consensus


1 The editorial board received the article in April 2018.
The lack of effective integration law makes it impossible to accomplish the goals and tasks of integration.

*Lev Entin* [2009, p. 238]

**Introduction**

In view of the “multi-level, multi-stage and non-linear design of international integration processes” [Kashirkina, Morozov, 2012, p. 17], all integration associations endeavor to attain their objectives by searching for and utilizing regulatory methods and tools that ensure the most appropriate balance between the interests of an association and those of its members. Such balance allows an association to better achieve the intended aims [Lenaerts, Nuffel, 2011, p. 134] without developing biases or giving preference to decisions at a “better” level of government and without the excessive overlapping intervention of public bodies in each other’s competences.

The law of integration associations is special. Created in all cases on the basis of international treaties, integration law retains some elements of international law [Iumashev, 2006, p. 75], but it also penetrates the national legislative frameworks of members by substantially modifying these frameworks and creating within them unified or harmonized regulatory tools to foster integration. In the process of development, integration law acquires specific features depending upon the goals of an integration association and the willingness of members to share their sovereignty. This may occur not only by handing over (delegating) certain authorities and elaborating practices of coordinated interaction with supranational institutions, but also by using national regulatory tools to secure the implementation of legislative acts of associations, their institutions and governing bodies in states and in relation to their citizens. To analyze these features, this paper studies two integration associations, the European Union (EU) and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), which have chosen different pathways of integration — a communitarian one and conventional (traditional) one. The study is preceded by the short overview of these pathways.

**Theoretical Background**

It would be fair to say that scholars studying European integration do not pay much attention to analyzing methods of integration development. Most experts of European integration are more interested in evolution and justification of the supranational nature of the EU and its legal, economic and institutional aspects [Majone, 2009, p. 2] rather than in examining the tools and means of attainment of supranational objectives. It feels like this preferential focus on supranational aspects of European integration may be explained by a fear of undermining the consistent trend within the last 30 years
(since the adoption of the Single European Act,\textsuperscript{2} which paved the way and formed the legislative basis for the comprehensive application of a communitarian method of legal integration in relation to almost all issues of integration development\textsuperscript{3}) to strengthen normative integration. Even the concepts of supranationalism and intergovernmentalism as key theoretical blocks of European integration policy have been infused with a strictly contextual meaning.

Usually, researchers in European integration matters consider supranationalism as an extension of integration development, while intergovernmentalism has become a somewhat negative notion as it appears to be closely related to regionalism and even separatism, and thus not beneficial in the context of supranational integration [Mid­delaar, 2013, p. 5]. Leaving aside the semantic details of supranationalism and intergovernmentalism as ideas that have been already widely studied not only in the international but also in Russian literature [Varlamova, 2014; Meshcheriakova, 2014; Chirkin, 2016], it would be true to say that, being the essential concepts of communitarian and conventional methods of integration, supranationalism and intergovernmentalism contribute to the achievement of integration development using their own, more relevant, tools.

For the communitarian method, such tools are legislation applied directly and on a priority basis as well as legal principles determining the application of such legislation while still configuring it.\textsuperscript{4} This method is also called the “community method.” According to the position outlined in the official document of the EU Commission, it involves the following key elements: the right of legislative initiative of the EU Commission; the responsibility of the EU Council and European Parliament to pass budgetary and legislative acts; participation of the EU Commission along with national parliaments in the execution of a single implementation policy in the EU territory; and a special role of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in protecting and advancing EU legislation [EU Commission, 2001, p. 8]. As long as the communitarian method requires members to delegate some of their authorities to the integration association, supranational institutions here play a key role as the actors that adopt supranational acts and engage as facilitators between states in their relationships with each other and with the EU over disputes emerging in relation to the delegation of authorities, while integration itself is positioned as “[national] sovereignty tamed” [Magnette, 2000, p. 117]. The conventional method, on the contrary, recognizes that states, or more exactly, their governments as key players in making integration decisions, are superior in the development and pursuit of integration aims [Puetter, 2014, pp. 854–70]. According to this method, supranational decisions result from the interaction of national govern-

\textsuperscript{2} The Single European Act has not only provided the EU Commission with a range of important functions in regulating the single domestic market and its social and environmental facets, but also improved the judiciary system by creating a court of first instance. These innovations have become major landmarks in the normative integration of the EU.

\textsuperscript{3} Excluding such sensitive areas, which later were given special regulatory status, as foreign policy and security policy, equity, justice, cooperation of the police and the judiciary.

\textsuperscript{4} This is a specific characteristic of the evolvement of EU law where two streams of the European legal tradition meet — Romano-Germanic law and common law [Moorhead, 2012, pp. 126–43].
ments and their coordinated efforts, and so this method is also theoretically called the method of intergovernmental integration [Uçarer, 2013, p. 293].

While theoretically different, in practice the communitarian and conventional methods of integration have many tangency points. When one method is used some aspects of the other are also applied. It is important to note that since both methods have the common subject of regulation (integration and integration relations), it does not make practical sense to force an exclusiveness of application of any of these methods taken separately. Thus, communitarian integration that mostly takes place in the EU abounds with examples of when intergovernmental tools are used to ensure a better attainment of objectives of regulatory development. One can talk here not only about an active lawmaking role for the intergovernmental EU Council, which is a co-legislator in the EU along with the European Parliament, but also about countless so-called de novo bodies of collective decision-making created at the level of ministers and public servants representing national governments and positioned to deal with a number of crucial complex technical issues. In this regard, the purpose of this article is not to counter one integration model with the other, but to reveal elements that may be useful for ensuring a better achievement of core aims pursued in the process of integration.

**Legal Integration in the European Union**

The EU follows the communitarian model of integration, which was conceptually described in the *Van Gend et Loos v. Administratie der Belastingen* case as follows: “The European Economic Community constitutes a new legal order of international law for the benefit of which the states have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields, and the subjects of which comprise not only the Member States but also their nationals.” In another case, *Flaminio Costa v. E.N.E.L.*, the CJEU stated that “by contrast with ordinary international treaties, the EEC Treaty [Treaty establishing the European Economic Community] has created its own legal system which, on the entry into force of the treaty, became an integral part of the legal systems of the member states and which their courts are bound to apply.”

Regarding the existing legal system in the EU, EU law enjoys supremacy (primacy) over the laws of its members. The adherence to this principle was first formulated in 1964 by the CJEU in the above-mentioned *Flaminio Costa v. E.N.E.L.* case, and was later confirmed in Declaration 17 of the Lisbon Treaty. In the EU, “a national constitution matters for implementing union law only to the extent it does not hamper the effective execution of union law” [Khol’tsinger, 2014, p. 40]. This means that, in order to regulate integration relations involving citizens, the EU uses as a matter of priority not national legislation, including constitutional acts, and not even international treaties

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5 Eurojust, Frontex, European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, etc.
entered into by national governments and ratified by national parliaments, but rather acts passed by the European Parliament and/or the EU Council that are supposed to be applied in full by individuals in the meaning set forth by the CJEU.

**Legislative Tools of Legal Integration in the EU**

The EU adheres to the intra vires rule, i.e. it acts only within the jurisdiction outlined in the founding treaties to pursue aims defined in these treaties. If a competence is not directly transferred to the EU by the treaties, it belongs to the members. This approach reflects the practice of vesting the EU with competences that was established in 1950s and still exists: members delegate authority in certain policy areas not entirely, but only in relation to some aspects that are clearly described in special enabling articles of the founding treaties — the so-called “legal bases.”

To exercise its regulating competences the EU uses legislative acts. According to Article 289 of the Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) [EU, 2012], a regulating act adopted by the EU becomes an EU legislative act if it meets three conditions simultaneously: it is passed in the form of a regulation, directive or decision; it is adopted by the European Parliament and/or the EU Council; and it is adopted through the legislative procedure.

In 1992, at the Edinburgh summit, the European Council stated that “the form of action should be as simple as possible consistent with satisfactory achievement of the objective...The Community should legislate only to the extent necessary. Other things being equal, directives should be preferred to regulations” [cited in Lenaerts, 1993, p. 885]. This approach has changed the legislative culture of the EU. With the introduction of the Treaty of Maastricht, the EU “legislated less often (subsidiarity per se) and in a less intrusive manner” [Cooper, 2017, p. 36], mainly using directives as a form of regulation.

According to Article 288 of the TFEU [EU, 2012] a directive is a legislative instrument that makes it possible to avoid excessive regulation of relations at the EU level and leaves to the national authorities the choice of form and methods used to achieve their aims. But the problem is that every member of the EU, being an addressee of a directive, incorporates its provisions into domestic national legislation with a different degree of loyalty. As a result, implementation gaps occur from time to time in EU states, and some states bear much more of the expense associated with the implementation of a directive (legal, political, economic, social and environmental) as compared to other states. This factor complicates legal integration in the EU based on the principle of regulation via directives. To mitigate this negative effect, the CJEU has taken the approach described below.

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8 The “legal bases” identify specific issues, aims, procedures, institutions and types of acts that the EU should use to regulate certain issues within its jurisdiction. References to them are mandatory in a recital of each legislative act of the EU, and if it is not there or not included in full it leads to the cancellation the act by the CJEU.
Implementation of Legislative Acts in the EU

Implementation of EU legislation is decentralized and based on the idea that interested individuals have a serious intention to exert control over the observance of EU legislation regulating their rights and freedoms. “The vigilance of individuals concerned to protect their rights amounts to an effective supervision in addition to... the diligence of the Commission [EU].”

Civil actions by individuals play a greater role in legal integration of the EU as an instrument of pressure on national authorities for responsible and timely implementation of EU directives, as an alternative to the centralized supervision by the EU Commission.

N. V. Varlamova [2014, p. 13] argues that the EU has no “‘regional’ and ‘local’ public agencies enforcing implementation of [EU] decisions.” This is done by national authorities as they act as main implementors of EU law, and they are presumably liable for the damage affecting rights of individuals, including damage due to non-implementation or improper implementation of EU directives.

Starting with its first decision made in 1963 in the Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen case, the CJEU has stressed that protection of rights of individuals has been conducted by the Court in addition to protection provided by the Commission and the members. The CJEU reinforced this position later, in 1991, in the Francovich v. Italy case, where it confirmed a duty of members to consider actions filed against them by individuals for damages affecting rights of individuals incurred due to non-discharge or improper discharge of an obligation to implement EU directives. Finally, with the introduction of the Lisbon Treaty, the CJEU has been authorized to impose fines and penalties on EU members not only for non-implementation of its decisions, but also if a state has not reported to the EU Commission on measures taken to implement a EU directive within a certain time limit (Article 260, Para 3 of the TFEU) [EU, 2012].

This feature of legal integration in the EU – the use of instruments and means of national states – secures the efficiency of EU law in the framework of national legal systems, where national public institutions, according to G. Ellinek [2004, p. 413], having the “dominant nature,” are endowed with a constitutional power based on the will of the voters to use tools forcing their citizens to comply with legal requirements of the EU. After all, it also explains why institutions implementing regulating competences of the EU try to have the process of adoption of EU legislative acts, as far as possible, brought into maximum proximity with citizens and take into account local, regional and national characteristics of relations that these acts regulate through institutionalization of involvement into the EU legislative process of bodies – national

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10 Ibid.
parliaments — that are directly formed by citizens of states and that are politically accountable to their citizens.

**Judicial Review of Adoption of EU Legislative Acts**

The role of the CJEU in validating and developing supranational legal regulation cannot be overstated. Not envisaged in the founding treaties of the EU, the doctrine of direct effect of EU law and the doctrine of supremacy of EU law are “products of judge-made law” [Waele, Vleuten, 2013, p. 645] by their origin and nature. It is true to say that legal evolution of the EU in general occurs within the reference system established by the CJEU. Thus, in the canonic *Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football Association and others v Bosman* case, the CJEU held that the EU possessed an exclusive competence to regulate the exercise of fundamental rights and freedoms in the EU. With these arguments in mind, the CJEU has repeatedly delivered decisions in favour of the EU even in those cases in which the EU had not had an appropriate regulating competence under provisions of EU founding treaties (for example, in the areas of education, and culture and sports).

Today, regulating competences of the EU are rigidly restricted to issues delegated to it by members through the above-mentioned legal bases. EU acts without a legal basis or which do not follow it to the full extent are regarded as symbolic and contravening the principle of conferral of powers. These acts must be abolished under Article 263 of the TFEU [EU, 2012], which allows the CJEU to supervise the legitimacy of the adoption of EU legislative acts.

In 1992, the CJEU in the *France v Commission* case held that express indication of the legal bases must be included in any EU legislative act, and the absence of such indication results in the act being declared null and void by the CJEU. However, this decision has not had an influence on the further law enforcement practice of the CJEU. Not a single EU legislative act challenged by members as being passed without sufficient justification has been abolished or declared void. At the very best, the CJEU was just reiterating the content of the recital of a legislative act, relying on the opinion of EU institutions that had elaborated the act in resolving the question of necessity.

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14 Case C-415/93, *Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football Association and others v Bosman*. Available at: http:
16 According to Paul Craig [2012, p. 80], in last 20 years, there were just over 10 cases for abolition or invalidation of EU legislative acts due to an insufficient justification of their adoption.
of its adoption; at the worst the CJEU provided a mere statement of the proposing institutions that achievement of the aims of an intended action “necessarily presupposes Community-wide action” without any accompanying analysis of factual circumstances.

It is definitely impossible in a system based on legal and democratic values to disregard the capability of a court to denote errors of lawmakers in relation to the compliance with rules and procedures determining how lawmakers should exercise their regulating competences. However, any appeal to a more demanding role for the CJEU in policing boundaries of EU legislative competencies [Kumm, 2006, p. 503] poses certain risks of disrupting the institutional balance. In the multilevel constitutional system of the EU, various institutions — participants of the EU lawmaking process having different political views — are involved in determining a level of government for a legislative action. If, making a decision on an EU legislative act that has already been passed by the EU Council and/or European Parliament, the CJEU voices concerns about the improper level of adoption of this act, it inevitably puts itself in a situation in which it must face opposition of a qualified majority of members that believe action at the EU level is required as they supported this action at the lawmaking stage [Craig, 2012, p. 81]. This can create the grounds for accusing the court of “rampant judicial activism” [Toth, 1994, p. 48]. For this reason, the CJEU prefers not to undermine its reputation as an “instrument… of constitutionalization… of communitarian law” [Varlamova, 2014, p. 17]. As a rule it does not engage in political inter-institutional disputes, thus remaining a purely legal institution delivering decisions that are binding for all participants of integration relations.

Legal Integration in the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU)

According to T. Risse [2015, p. 1], the institutional design of the EAEU “resembles the EU to a large extent — with one exception: the [EAEU] does not contain provisions to build supra-national institutions, it remains intergovernmental.”

Russian researchers correctly indicate that national governments play a major role in the EAEU decision-making process, while EAEU institutions “just provide a platform for their [national governments’] interaction” [Strezhneva, 2016, p. 6]. Even though some institutions have certain supranational features and, therefore according to T. Neshataeva, the EAEU can be regarded as an “organization of the supranational type” [2015], it is still impossible to consider EAEU law as a supranational legal framework in its pure form and within the meaning that has been elaborated and maintained in the EU system.

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Certain supranational features can be traced in the Eurasian Economic Commission (EEC) which is empowered with regulating authority, and in the EAEU Court which is granted authority to ensure the consistent application of international treaties and decisions of EAEU bodies. At the same time, the EAEU Court does not examine appeals by citizens of states related to violations of their rights and freedoms by national legislation passed, for example, in contradiction to decisions of the EEC. This is because decisions of the EEC, despite being subject to direct application in the territories of states, are not given an absolute priority recognized at both Eurasian and national levels over national legislative acts.

Created on the grounds of the Treaty on Eurasian Economic Union, dated 29 May 2014 [EAEU, 2014] EAEU law mostly keeps features of international law as, expanding its regulating potential, it relies on international treaties and EAEU decisions that are not contradictory to these treaties — decisions by EAEU institutions such as the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council, the Eurasian Intergovernmental Council and the EEC (EAEU, 2014, Sect. 6, Clause 1, Para. 5]. In accordance with the decisions of these EAEU bodies, single rules of behaviour for citizens20 of states are being created in the EAEU, but these single rules do not form an independent and self-sufficient legal order for its participants, as they are adopted by EAEU bodies within their mandates provided not only by the EAEU Treaty but also by other international treaties ratified by states within the EAEU. Thereby, EAEU institutions originally do not possess founding authority to create a supranational level of legal norms which would have its own scope of regulation independent of other international treaties and an application mechanism not constrained with special national procedures relating to these norms. This is one of the things that prevents EAEU acts from asserting an absolute application priority over acts of EAEU members.

**Instruments of Legal Integration in the EAEU**

In addition to international treaties, instruments of legal integration in the EAEU are acts adopted by EAEU bodies and containing regulatory norms. As long as international treaties do not directly serve goals of supranational legal integration, the focus can be on the second element existing in the EAEU legal arena — acts of EAEU bodies. These acts possess features that make legal integration in the EAEU very “intergovernmentally specific.”

First, EAEU acts are adopted by EAEU bodies within mandates provided by international treaties ratified by national governments within the EAEU [EAEU, 2014, Sect. 6, Clause 1]. Second, there is a rigid hierarchy of EAEU acts that suggests that decisions of the EEC are subordinate to decisions of the Supreme Council and Intergovernmental Council [Sect. 6, Clause 4]. Third, acts of the Supreme Council and Intergovernmental Council are directed to EAEU members and are supposed to be

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20 Here, actors in question are economic units, i.e. entities registered in a manner prescribed by national legislation, including legal entities and self-employed entrepreneurs.
applied in a way determined by their national legislation. At the same time, the Treaty
does not explicitly state the binding nature of acts of the Supreme Council and Intergovernmental Council on the institutions of states.

The EEC stands out in this context, as its acts, being subordinate to the legal system of the EAEU (in relation to acts of the Supreme Council and Intergovernmental Council), are still directed to citizens (economic units) of states and are generally applicable in the territories of states according to Clause 13 of the Regulation on the Eurasian Economic Commission that is annexed to the Treaty. These valuable features ensure the supranational nature of acts, but unfortunately the significance of these features for Eurasian legal integration is devalued because the priority of acts of the EEC over acts of national law is not recognized at the EAEU level. Members do not share a single approach to this issue.

For example, the constitution of the Russian Federation does not state the supremacy of legally binding decisions of international organizations and their institutions over domestic legislation. The constitution of the Republic of Belarus directly provides that acts of intergovernmental associations must be subordinate to the national legal system. They may be elevated to a higher level only if international treaties are made on their basis, with such treaties being not ultimately paramount but right below the constitution and constitutional acts [Vasilevich, 2009, p. 15].

The Republic of Kazakhstan has developed a unique approach. According to Clause 3 of Article 4 of Kazakhstan’s constitution, ratified international treaties have priority over laws and are applied directly, except in situations when an international treaty requires adoption of a law of the Republic of Kazakhstan. To develop further this constitutional provision, on 5 November 2009 the Constitutional Council of the Republic of Kazakhstan passed a special resolution establishing that acts of international organizations created pursuant to ratified international treaties and acts of their bodies are included within the national legal system through above-mentioned international treaties. If an international treaty ratified by the Republic of Kazakhstan states that acts of bodies of international organizations are of a binding nature for members, public authorities of the Republic of Kazakhstan must adjust national legislation according to such acts. As a result, if a decision of the EEC contradicts a legislative act of the Republic of Kazakhstan, a decision of the EEC will have priority in the application scheme, and public authorities of the Republic of Kazakhstan will have to amend national legislation accordingly. Unfortunately, this approach to determining the role of acts of EAEU bodies in national legislation is not common to all EAEU members.

For supranational legal integration, it is critical not only to have a single state-level legal approach to determining a role of supranational acts in national legal systems of members of an integration association [Kashirkina, Morozov, 2012, p. 251], but also to ensure that founding acts of the association deal with this issue. S. V. Bakhin [2007,

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21 For the official interpretation of provisions of section 4 of the Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan in relation to implementation of decisions of international organizations and their institutions, please see: Resolution of the Constitutional Council of the Republic of Kazakhstan [2009].
Judicial Review of Application of Legislation in the EAEU

As EAEU judge T. Neshataeva [2015] points out, supranational courts are created to ensure the unified interpretation and application of general legal rules, which they do by creating legal norms which “fasten all three types of legal regulation of integration relations: an international treaty, a norm passed by international bureaucracy and a norm passed by national bodies, including national courts.” In relation to activities of the CJEU, this claim is correct; in relation to the EAEU Court, it is not: the EAEU Court is not empowered to solve such tasks. This should be examined in more detail.

As follows from Clause 2 of the Statute of the EAEU Court, annexed to the Treaty, the Court ensures the unified application of EAEU law resolving disputes regarding the issues of implementation of this law (Clause 39, Subclauses 1 and 2 of the Statute). However, the EAEU Court is not provided with the competence to endow EAEU bodies with new functions in addition to those directly established by the Treaty and/or other international treaties ratified within the integration association (Clause 42 of the Statute).

Decisions of the EAEU Court “do not modify and do not override existing norms of EAEU law, national legislation and do not create new norms” (Clause 102 of the Statute), and prejudicial rulings of the EAEU Court do not have a binding nature for national jurisdictional bodies that are requested to deliver such rulings (Clause 98 of the Statute). Taking into consideration the critical importance of prejudicial rulings for setting up a lawmaking and law-enforcement dialogue between supranational and national judicial bodies, the wording of Clause 98 of the Statute confirms, as A. S. Ispolinov argues, “the disregard of legislative acts of the integration association by member states, primarily by their national courts” [2017, p. 115]. This is the first competence-related impediment created by the authors of the Treaty that makes it impossible to secure the unified interpretation and application of norms of EAEU law.

The second impediment is linked to the necessity of compliance with the procedure of pre-court mediation for disputes on the legitimacy of decisions of the EEC in terms of their conformity to international treaties and decisions of EAEU institutions. This procedure is applied in relation to disputes initiated not only by member states but also by economic units. The EAEU Court takes up a dispute only if an applicant previously submitted a claim to the EEC (Clause 43 of the Statute). At the same time, the Statute does not introduce a procedure of judicial appeal against the results of pre-court mediation, which, for example, may be unsatisfactory for an economic unit if it still believes that its rights and legitimate interests granted by the Treaty have been
violated by a decision of the EEC. Only if the EEC fails to take action may a dispute be taken up by the EAEU Court (Subclause 44 of the Statute). The rule demanding that applicants use the procedure of pre-court mediation works as a bottleneck” for individuals and legal entities doing business in the EAEU as it significantly narrows their opportunities to be upheld by the court at the Eurasian level. While states can use alternative methods to protect their interests and prerogative powers (for example, by appealing to the Supreme Council), economic units are unable to do so. Unfortunately, this circumstance was either not addressed by the authors of Eurasian integration or, conversely, this tactic was intentionally used to “constrain activities and the broadening of authority of the [supranational] court” [Ispolinov, 2017, p. 116].

The Formal Parliamentary Element in the EAEU

Another formal impediment of communitarian integration in the EAEU mentioned in the literature is that the EAEU lacks “the formal parliamentary element” [Likhachev, 2014] which would interact with other EAEU institutions in the process of making Eurasian decisions. However, the issue of supranational parliamentarism is not as clear as the issue of supranational courts and the experience of the EU proves it.

The presence of a supranational parliament itself does not ensure the supranational nature of legal integration. The role of the European Parliament in legal integration in the EU is controversial. “European Parliament does not share many of the democratic credentials of national parliaments, remains distant from citizens and within the process of EU decision-making may be viewed as part of the legitimacy problem [in the EU].” [EU Select Committee, 2013, p. 40]. Today, Europe looks at national parliaments as a means to protect democratic legitimacy to an extent that cannot be achieved by EU institutions themselves in the process of supranational legal integration. The European Parliament is physically unable to replace national parliaments in regard to certain issues of legislative policy which fall within regulating competences of EU members but which require the adoption of harmonization measures by the EU: national parliaments, being local, remain politically responsible for the situation in their states, and this positions them as unique bodies for elaborating EU legislative acts. Guided by these motives, the Lisbon Treaty developed as a founding element a special tool (the so-called subsidiarity control mechanism) which allows national parliaments to take part in the EU law-making process, not substituting the European Parliament, the EU Council or the EU Commission, but directly cooperating with them, as well as with each other, on the question of what level of government is proper regulating authority.

Perhaps, the EAEU should also turn to the national parliaments of its members as unique actors in the process of rendering Eurasian decisions. National parliaments, by participating, for example, in the exercise of regulating competences of the EEC could

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22 In the EU, the procedure of pre-court mediation is not used for disputes between individuals and EU bodies that have passed an act under question. Pre-court mediation is only applied to disputes between EU member states. That said, it is still possible to appeal to the CJEU if a decision of the EU Commission is absent (See Art. 259 of the TFEU [EU, 2012]).
enhance the democratic legitimacy of its acts (through the same subsidiarity control mechanism evaluating the justification for delegation of certain functions and implementation of these functions at the level of the EEC), and contribute to a better local implementation. Being politically responsible to their voters, national parliaments can serve links between the EAEU and the citizens of its members, enabling citizens to take part (through their parliamentary representatives) at the Eurasian level in the development and adoption of legislative acts regulating integration relations involving not just their states, but themselves. The attainment of parliamentary legitimacy of acts of EAEU bodies could definitely be an important step toward supranational legal integration, which is the aim that the EAEU wants to achieve. However, in order to turn an apprentice into a master, it is required not only to have an intention and spend time; it is necessary to have a better developed mechanism, from the institutional point of view, for the adoption of supranational decisions which would involve all participants of integration relations equally in the joint process of solving problems, rather than have them persistently advancing their own interests.

Conclusion

Of course, legal integration in the EU is completely different from legal integration within the EAEU from both the formal legal standpoint, as these associations follow different integration evolution pathways, and the practical standpoint, as they achieve different results. The EU and the EAEU have developed totally opposite mechanisms for adopting integration decisions, which have different natures.

Legislative acts passed in the EAEU are not given an absolute priority over acts of national legislation of its members, which results in a lack of consistency and unity on this issue among members — this was the key reason for focusing substantive research efforts on legislation of individual members of the EAEU while leaving aside relevant legislation of EU members). The EU faces precisely the reverse situation: its acts at the founding level (starting with the Single European Act) have created preconditions for endowing EU institutions with founding competences to compose an independent supranational layer of legal acts that are superior and directly applied in the territories of states. States are cooperative and unified in how they follow the decisions of the CJEU and secure the proper implementation of acts of the EU Commission.

The utilization of capacity and tools of states for attaining integration development aims is the strategically beneficial approach to integration development. Good will and the consent of members of an integration association can help attain all ambitious aims in relation to integration. For this reason, the mechanism of adoption of decisions itself becomes a key element for the success of the subsequent implementation of these decisions. And fortunately, the chosen method of integration development, even though it sets the appropriate tone for implementation processes, does not predetermine their outcome.
The communitarian method appeals to the legislative procedure of inter-institutional interaction involving national parliaments, while the conventional method appeals to intergovernmental negotiations. However, in both cases, decision-making actors endeavour to achieve the same outcome — to completely eliminate the possibility that supranational decisions may be inconvenient for national implementing authorities [Glencross, 2014, p. 70]. This can be brought into action through the reconciliation of wills of decision-making actors on the basis of their dialogue. The most effective collective decisions are taken on the basis of consensus and not on the basis of priority of the will of majority. Here, a consensus is supposed to be reached via the inter-institutional dialogue (inter-institutional consensus) of decision-making actors localized at various levels of integration management. It is crucial to directly involve those who will be responsible for implementation of these decisions locally. The EU law-making process is characterized by the multipolarity and complexity of reconciliation of positions of its participants and provides for institutional engagement of citizens of states though their parliaments. These parliaments directly interact in the framework of the subsidiarity control mechanism with supranational institutions exercising regulating competencies of the EU, which is recognized as a basic guarantee that positions of all interested and affected stakeholders will be taken into consideration in supranational legislative decisions to the fullest extent. And even though a qualified majority in the Council and/or a majority in the European Parliament is required for passing legislative decisions, this aspect of the legislative process nonetheless does not offset the purely inter-institutional nature of this process.

In its turn, it is important to note that decisions of the Council of the EEC (as a body exercising oversight functions over EEC activities), also require a consensus. If one is not reached an issue under question is passed for consideration to the Supreme Council (Clause 29 of the Regulation on the Eurasian Economic Commission annexed to the Treaty). However, the situation with the Eurasian consensus is of quite a different type: given that the Council of the EEC consists of five vice-premiers representing national governments of EAEU members, it would be unreasonable to claim that this body, as well as the decision-making procedure that it has developed, is inter-institutional by their nature.

The genuinely consensual nature of supranational decisions provides an avenue for their procedural legitimacy and, therefore, for the uncomplicated implementation by all participants of integration relations involved in adoption of these decisions as well as in their direct application by citizens. It appears to be the main lesson learned from integration development in the EU, where inter-institutional consensus has become a gold standard for the legal approximation of states.
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Правовая интеграция в Европейском союзе и Евразийском экономическом союзе: сравнительный анализ

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В статье рассматриваются коммунитарная и конвенционная модели правовой интеграции, принятые в Европейском союзе и Евразийском экономическом союзе соответственно. Анализ проводится в сравнительно-правовом разрезе с целью выявить те уникальные черты, использование которых способствует решению актуальных задач интеграционного развития. Особое внимание уделяется исследованию актов органов Европейского союза и Евразийского экономического союза, их правовой природы, места, роли и специфики имплементации в национальных правопорядках государств-членов. Автор анализирует также деятельность Суда Европейского союза и Суда евразийского экономического союза по контролю реализации права Европейского союза и права Евразийского экономического союза в части правомерности принятия наднациональными органами данных интеграционных обеднений правовых актов, создающих права и обязанности непосредственно для граждан Европейского союза и хозяйствующих субъектов в Евразийском экономическом союзе. В статье обосновывается идея о том, что без условный приоритет интеграционного права над национальным законодательством и юридическая обязательность решений наднационального судебного органа для всех участников интеграционных отношений выступают теми «вехами» наднациональной правовой интеграции, при достижении которых становится возможным открытие государственных границ не только в сферах экономического сотрудничества, но и в других областях взаимодействия, прямо не связанных с общими процессами транснационализации экономик.

Ключевые слова: Европейский союз; Евразийский экономический союз; наднациональность; правовая интеграция; законодательный акт; судебный контроль; национальные парламенты; демократическая легитимность; межинституциональный консенсус


Источники


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The Problem of Russia’s Declining Influence in the Former Soviet Union: Why Are the CIS Countries Drifting Toward Multilateralism?1

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Abstract

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the problem of Russia’s relations with the countries of the former USSR has traditionally been the focus of attention of both the academic and the expert community. This issue becomes especially urgent in the context of significant changes in world politics caused by the rapid deterioration of relations between Russia and the western world following the escalation of the Ukrainian crisis. This article identifies the key economic, political and social factors having a negative impact on the current dynamics of relations between the Russian Federation and the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and thereby gradually decreasing Russia’s influence in the former Soviet Union.

The article is structured around three groups of factors — objective, ambivalent and subjective — which impede the growth of Russia’s influence in the former Soviet Union. Objective factors are related to economic and political issues, ambivalent (mixed) factors are those of sociocultural and historical nature and subjective factors are predominantly psychological. Based on an extensive analysis of relevant material, the authors conclude that the CIS countries refuse to follow the pro-Russian path not only (and in some cases not so much) due to the objective need of the post-Soviet countries for diversified political, trading and economic ties, but also (and rather) for several subjective, social and cultural, political and psychological factors considered in detail below. An important conclusion of this research is that most subjective factors negatively affecting the efficiency of Russia’s policy in the former Soviet Union can be potentially and significantly minimized in a relatively short term. Objective factors, especially those concerning Russia’s declining role in the world economy and its reduced trade volumes with the CIS countries, on the contrary, are of a rather long-term nature and therefore it may take a considerable amount of time to adjust the current dynamics.

Key words: foreign policy; multilateralism; CIS; former Soviet Union; Russia; political influence


1 The editorial board received the article in May 2018.
Introduction: The Purpose and Objectives of the Research

The need for a comprehensive study of the specifics of Russia’s foreign policy carried out in the former Soviet Union is conditioned by both the rank that the region holds in the structure of Russia’s foreign policy interests, reflected in several conceptual documents of the country (in particular, the 2016 Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation1), and the trends that are increasingly evident over the past decades in the relations between Russia and the countries of the former Soviet Union. There are at least three specific features characteristic of Russia’s interaction with these countries which have led to the gradual decline in Russia’s influence.

First, a variety of political forces in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), previously focused on Russia’s foreign policy course, are now striving to employ an increasingly diversified, multilateral approach, thereby de jure or de facto distancing themselves from close coordination of their own foreign policy interests with those of Russia. Second, this trend results in a significant decrease in Russia’s foreign policy efficiency in the former Soviet Union. To a large extent, this is because quite often Russia’s assumption that the national elites of the CIS countries are natively loyal and pro-Russian is not completely accurate. Third, foreign policy divergence between Russia and the countries of the former Soviet Union means that the relations between Russia and several post-Soviet countries have lost their former privileged status, having a negative impact on political, economic, cultural and humanitarian relations between them.

The objective of this research is to identify the key economic, political and social factors adversely affecting the current dynamics of relations between the Russian Federation and the CIS countries which are causing a gradual decline in Russia's influence. In particular, the combination of the above factors often results in a sometimes quite noticeable cooling of Russia’s relations with individual countries of the former Soviet Union (for example, occasionally, with Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan). In exceptional cases it even results in the emergence and subsequent escalation of a political conflict (involving Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova). Moreover, to a certain extent a similar trend can be observed in the larger international arena, involving the western states with whom the quality of Russia’s relations are currently on the downturn. This research analyzes the factors causing the gradual drift of the pro-Russian forces in the former Soviet Union toward multilateralism.

This requires first, identification and analysis of factors causing a decline in Russia’s influence; second, assessment of the objective, ambivalent and subjective subgroups of factors; third, consideration of the importance of the deterioration of relations between Russia and the West between 2014–2018 as a factor; and fourth, analysis of Russia’s ac-

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1 “The foreign policy priorities of the Russian Federation include developing bilateral and multilateral cooperation with member States of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and further strengthening integration structures within the CIS involving Russia” [Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2016, Clause 49].
tivities in the CIS, the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) on the understanding that Moscow's desire to intensify integration in the former Soviet Union was a response to its reduced influence in the region.

Key Definitions, Methodology and Historiography

To begin, it is necessary to clarify terms such as the pro-Russian focus (pro-Russian forces) and multilateralism (multilateral approach).

When speaking about the pro-Russian focus of certain forces in the former Soviet Union, the authors are referring to the objective or subjective viewpoint of certain political leaders or members of the national elites of the CIS countries, directly interested in building close, privileged relations with Russia in political, economic, social, cultural, humanitarian and other spheres. Accordingly, the authors use the term multilateralism (or multilateral approach) as a kind of antithesis, meaning the foreign policy strategy and actions of certain forces in the former Soviet Union aimed at diversifying the political relations of the country in the international arena, as well as forming stable interstate relations with the widest range of international actors, which can be objectively proven or subjectively perceived as a rejection of privileged relations with Russia.

The research methodology employed focuses on both objective and the subjective components underlying the drift of pro-Russian forces toward multilateralism. In this connection, the authors single out five groups of factors (economic; political; sociocultural and historical; political and psychological), which in turn are divided into three broad subgroups: objective (economic and political), ambivalent (historical, social and cultural) and subjective (political and psychological) factors.

The authors use quantitative and content analysis to compare the economic indicators of gross domestic product (GDP) growth and trade dynamics between Russia and the countries of the former Soviet Union and employ event analysis to consider the issue of several CIS states shifting from Cyrillic to Latin. A systemic approach and analysis of the process of foreign policy decision-making was used to evaluate subjective political and psychological factors affecting the relations between Russia and individual post-Soviet countries.

In recent years, the problem considered in this article has been reflected in the work of several Russian and foreign authors. In particular, in the Russian historiography, it has been considered by researchers including D. Degterev, I. Vasilyuk and V. Baum [2018], K.P. Kurylev [2016a, 2016b], V. Lapkin and V. Pantin [2016], N.G. Galoyan [2015] and others. In this context, it is worth mentioning the collective English monograph, titled *Russia and East Central Europe after the Cold War*, under the scientific editorship of A. Zagorsky [2015], a Russian researcher. The problems of trade and economic relations between Russia and the countries of the former Soviet Union have been addressed in the work of authors such as S.P. Bazyleva and Y.F. Chernenko.
[2016], S.N. Fedorchenko [2017] and V. Obolensky [2017]. Cultural and humanitarian, as well as ideological, determinants of Russia's foreign policy in its historical retrospect were examined in detail by R.A. Arslanov et al. [2017]. As for the foreign historiography, for objective reasons the relevant works are not so numerous. In this context, the most topical ones are the scientific works of such authors such as R. Menon and E. Rumer [2014], C. Descalzi [2011] and T. Gomart [2006].

**Economic Factors Underlying Russia's Declining Influence in the Former Soviet Union**

One of the main economic factors determining Russia's gradual loss of political influence in the former Soviet Union is the general decrease over the last 25 years in Russia's role in the world economy and international commodity turnover. In particular, according to the World Bank, while in 1991 the Russian Federation (RSFSR) had a purchasing power parity GDP share totaling 3.9% of the global value, by 2008 it dropped to 3.4% and by the end of 2017 it declined further to 2.8% [World Bank, n.d.]. Undoubtedly, this decline in Russia's economic opportunities reduced the efficiency of its policy in the former Soviet Union. This can be explained in several ways. First, there is an ever-increasing deficit in the economic (and consequently, political) instruments of Russia's influence in the CIS region. Second, because the attractiveness of a foreign policy course aimed at building close trade and economic ties with Russia is generally declining for a number of post-Soviet countries, they are gradually refocusing their policies toward multilateral economic cooperation with dynamically developing actors external to the region. For instance, they are shifting toward cooperation with China (which is primarily relevant for the countries of Central Asia). Third, the gradual decline in Russia's role in the world economy has had the most negative impact on Russia's trade turnover with the post-Soviet countries, with a particularly pronounced decline between Russia and several CIS countries in the period after 2014, including a sharp aggravation of Russia's economic problems due to the consequences of the Ukrainian crisis and the introduction of western sanctions. For example, for the period of 2014–2016, the aggregate trade turnover decreased by 23% between Russia and Belarus (from $30.5 billion to $23.5 billion); by 37% with Kazakhstan (from $20.8 billion to $13.03 billion); by 32% with Uzbekistan (from $3.96 billion to $2.7 billion); by 4% with Armenia (from $1.4 billion to $1.34 billion); by 51% with Azerbaijan (from $3.96 billion to $1.95 billion); and by 63% with Ukraine (from $27.8 billion to $10.2 billion) [Foreign Trade of Russia, 2017].

The situation over the past few years has been characterized by a tangible decrease in the intensity of certain trade and economic ties between Russia and the majority of the post-Soviet countries, and by the ongoing process of Eurasian integration. The development of the EAEU has unfortunately not slowed this process by a visible degree. The result of these dynamics is the disappearance of the “economic airbag” which
had previously smoothed out some of the contradictions emerging from time to time between Russia and individual CIS countries, and which had acted as a solid basis for building a constructive political dialogue on the widest possible range of matters. In this context, the situation with Ukraine is particularly symptomatic, causing the aggravation of foreign policy contradictions between the countries which leads to a decrease in the intensity of trade and economic interaction between them and, as a consequence, to a sharp reduction in their trade turnover. In turn, the breakup of trade and economic ties results in the disappearance of a limiting factor which, to a certain extent, would prevent a further escalation of political tensions between the countries.

The decline in trade turnover between Russia and the countries of the former Soviet Union entails a gradual decline in the influence of pro-Russian members of the CIS countries’ political elites, as well as the related special interest groups in the economy (entrepreneurs, financiers, etc.) which are objectively interested in maintaining close ties with Russia in both economic and political spheres. This naturally makes the countries in question turn to an alternative foreign policy direction based on a multilateral course.

And, finally, another important economic factor contributing to the decline of Russia’s influence in the former Soviet Union is the objective interest of the CIS countries in developing trade and economic interaction with the widest range of extra-regional actors, for instance, with the countries of the West. Earlier, in the absence of a conflict between Russia and the western world and the existence of relatively close economic, cultural and humanitarian links between them, such aspirations did not and could not entail any serious financial or reputational losses for Russia. However, after the introduction of western sanctions and a sharp aggravation of foreign policy contradictions generated primarily by the Ukrainian and the Syrian crises, individual CIS countries (such as Ukraine, Moldova and to a lesser extent, Belarus) are facing a dilemma: they must choose between Russia or the West — there is no third option. Earlier, for the post-Soviet countries it was just a matter of diversifying the economic course and establishing stable trade relations with the widest possible range of external actors. Today, it is increasingly evident that the countries in question have to play a zero-sum game, being forced to make a choice in favour of one of the two sides of a global confrontation. This choice inevitably deteriorates the relations (possibly even resulting in a conflict) with the country losing in this competition. Undoubtedly, such a dilemma, faced by a multitude of CIS countries (and, above all, by those countries that already enjoy long-standing trade relations with the western world) cannot help but deteriorate Russia’s economic and, consequently, political positions in the former Soviet Union.

At the same time, the significance of these economic factors reducing Russia’s influence in the CIS region should in no way be overemphasized. For instance, this trend does not fit the situation of the Republic of Belarus which has traditionally maintained a high level of trade and economic ties with Russia. Minsk is, nevertheless, quite
independent from Moscow in the way it conducts its foreign policy, which shows that the above methodology should be employed with a considerable degree of caution. It is also necessary to consider the important fact that the indicators of economic trade turnover between Russia and the CIS countries are quoted in US dollars, and therefore the relevant statistical data should be adjusted to account for the substantial devaluation of the Russian national currency in 2014–2018 (one should not ignore, however, that the national currencies of several other post-Soviet countries were also devalued during the period in question, and therefore it is necessary to approach each case of declining goods turnover on a strictly individual basis).

Based on analysis of the economic factors causing the CIS countries to drift toward multilateralism, one can conclude that post-Soviet countries often take a similar approach because of their aspiration toward a gradual geopolitical turn to the West and subsequent integration into the relevant political and economic structures (the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU), for instance), while retaining financial and resource support from Russia. Such a foreign policy course is not a novelty, and to varying degrees it has been typical of several post-Soviet countries (Ukraine and Georgia, for instance, and to a lesser extent, Moldova) since these countries celebrated their independence in 1991. However, in the context of a sharp aggravation of relations between Russia and the West, this phenomenon may well receive a new embodiment. To date, it is difficult to assess how efficient such a policy can be, but it will undoubtedly have influence on Russia’s position in the former Soviet Union.

Political Factors Making Multilateralism Attractive for the CIS Countries

In close relationship with economic circumstances contributing to the decline of Russia’s influence in the former Soviet Union, there is another group of objective factors that can be roughly attributed to politics. The gradual decline in Russia’s role in the world economy and international commodity turnover pushes the CIS countries to diversify their own economic, and consequently, political courses. In this regard, multilateralism and the consequent need for a balanced foreign policy is a theme in many speeches and interviews of state representatives and political leaders in various countries of the former Soviet Union [Dorozhkin, 2012]. This is illustrated in statements by the presidents of Belarus, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. A.G. Lukashenko, president of the Republic of Belarus notes: “We have no other fate than to build our foreign policy as a multilateral one. Today we find ourselves in the epicenter of the Eurasian continent, this is our fate. We have no other way but to develop multilateralism” [RIA News, 2017]. A.S. Atambayev, former president of Kyrgyzstan observed: “One of the main tasks of foreign policy is to maintain a balance of interests among the major players in world politics. Consequently, for us, multilateralism
is an independent and free choice of foreign policy, which is based, first of all, on the national interests of Kyrgyzstan and the welfare of the nation” [KRG, 2016]. N.A. Nazarbayev, president of Kazakhstan stated: “Due to its geopolitical position and economic potential, Kazakhstan has no right to confine itself to narrow regional problems. It would be incomprehensible not only to our multinational population, but to the whole world community either. The future of Kazakhstan lies both in Asia and in Europe, in the East and in the West. If we carry out such a policy, we will be able to exclude any manifestations of security threat to Kazakhstan. We will be able to improve favorable external conditions for economic and political reforms in our country” [Foreign-policy priorities of Kazakhstan, 2016].

These statements are essentially based on the same idea, even while articulated in somewhat different ways. Despite the absolute dissimilarity of the political, economic and social situations in Belarus, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, these CIS leaders perceive the choice for multilateralism as an objective political and economic need for their respective countries. The statement by N.A. Nazarbayev is particularly indicative in this regard, as it dates back to early December 1991 (that is, several weeks before the collapse of the USSR), and de facto was the political programme of Kazakhstan for the next few decades. In addition, it should be emphasized that although these statements do not directly articulate this idea, they nevertheless contain it implicitly: the leaders of post-Soviet countries view a gradual refusal or, at least, a departure from an exclusively pro-Russian focus in favour of a more multilateral approach as an advantageous foreign policy alternative. Therefore, the existence of objective political and economic interests in the CIS countries which do not always coincide with Russia's national interests and foreign policy needs should be pinpointed as being among the most important reasons for the pro-Russian forces to drift toward multilateralism, gradually reducing Russia's influence. Moreover, considering the objective nature of this factor, it is virtually impossible to resolve it in “manual control mode,” that is, using purely subjective measures (for example, building up warm personal relationships with the leaders of the respective countries). On the contrary, in order to change the current situation for the better, it is necessary to use the widest range of measures designed to overcome the existing disagreements and coordinate joint efforts of Russia and the CIS countries to address key economic, political and humanitarian issues. This would ensure the convergence of the positions and national interests of Russia and the post-Soviet countries and minimize the threat of conflict or sharp deterioration of relations between the parties in the future.

Historical, Social and Cultural Factors Impeding the Growth of Russia’s Influence in the Former Soviet Union

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of CIS countries gave a strong momentum to the rise of identity in the newly formed states, and quite often the search for ethnic and national identity carried out by the post-Soviet republics went in hand
with a sharp rejection of their own past. Another serious contradiction is the fact that often members of the new national elites blamed the current social, economic and political problems peculiar to their countries on what they viewed as their colonial past, as well as on the policy of the Soviet Union and Russia as its legal successor. In particular, this trend was most visible from 1991–2017 in the Baltic states, Ukraine, Moldova and, to some extent, Georgia, while in the countries of Central Asia, Armenia and Azerbaijan this trend was rather less pronounced. Logically, the subjective perception of the Russian Federation as an actor more or less responsible for the current domestic and foreign political failures of the newly formed states, combined with objective problems in establishing a full-scale dialogue with Moscow on the widest range of fairly complex issues (relating, among other things, to such sensitive topics as the common past within the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union) had a negative effect on Russia’s positions and the degree of influence in the former Soviet Union.

The decreasing relevance of pro-Russian special interest groups in several CIS countries has been discussed from an economic viewpoint. However, the trend toward multilateralism is driven by more than just trade and economic factors. The determining impact of historical and social factors as well manifested in a gradual divergence of the cultures of Russia and other post-Soviet countries after the collapse of the USSR, as well as in the declining role of the Russian language in the social and cultural life of CIS countries. To date, Russian has been given the status of an official language in only three states of the former Soviet Union, namely Belarus, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, while in the rest of the CIS countries its relevance is steadily decreasing. Moreover, the situation is aggravated by three important factors. First is the systematic reduction in the scope of the Russian language's use in both comprehensive and higher education, science, culture, television and radio broadcasting and in everyday life, evident in practically all the countries of the former Soviet Union. Second, we observe an almost complete absence of support for the Russian language in the former Soviet Union by federal authorities of the Russian Federation, as well as low efficiency of the Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States, compatriots living abroad and international humanitarian cooperation (Rossotrudnichestvo). Third is the transition of several CIS countries from the Cyrillic alphabet to Latin: a similar reform was carried out in Moldova in 1989, before the collapse of the Soviet Union. Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan shifted to the Latin script in 1993. Azerbaijan gradually rejected Cyrillic in 1992–2001. Finally, a similar reform was launched in Kazakhstan following a presidential decree dated 26 October 2017 [President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2018]. The decline in the size of the Russian-speaking diaspora and, consequently, the pro-Russian special interest groups in the CIS countries, is among the most important social and cultural preconditions for the decrease in the significance and the degree of Russia’s influence in the former Soviet Union.
Political and Psychological (Subjective) Factors Reducing Russia’s Political Efficiency in the Former Soviet Union

The political and psychological factors contributing to the decline in Russia’s influence in the former Soviet Union include an extensive range of personal and subjective reasons directly or potentially leading to a distorted assessment of the current status and specifics of Russia’s bilateral relations with individual CIS countries. Political and psychological factors can be divided into three subcategories.

The first subcategory includes incorrect assessments by the Russian ruling class about the initial intentions and political preferences of certain forces in the former Soviet Union which position themselves as being pro-Russian. Often, representatives of the national elites of the CIS countries use pro-Russian rhetoric either as a populist tool aimed at attracting some of the electorate or to obtain immediate benefits from Russia. The most vivid example of this is the strategy of the Belarusian political class, interested in sourcing financial benefits for Belarus by positioning themselves as Russia’s closest (or the only) reliable ally. Similarly, this subcategory includes the national elites of Armenia, who view the pro-Russian focus not as a value in itself, but rather as a tool helpful to ensure their own security and the most rapid resolution of the frozen Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in their favour. Another example of the Russian ruling class having a distorted view of the political aspirations originally attributed to the supposedly pro-Russian forces in the former Soviet Union is the situation that arose in 2003 after the Rose Revolution in Georgia. In particular, the Russian establishment initially considered Mikheil Saakashvili as a pro-Russian candidate, a lucrative alternative compared to Eduard Shevardnadze who tended to pursue a multilateral foreign policy course. Subsequent events clearly showed that the initial confidence in Mikheil Saakashvili’s supposed pro-Russian focus was fundamentally wrong, and this later became one of the key reasons for the escalation of the South Ossetia conflict and the five-day Russia-Georgia war in August 2008.

Second, another problem of Russia’s foreign policy in the former Soviet Union is a certain overemphasis on the concept of pro-Russian focus, that is, the identification of this term with the alleged readiness of certain political forces of CIS countries to make any possible concessions and compromise on the widest range of issues. In its reasoning, this viewpoint leads to the erroneous conclusion that finding a pro-Russian force in power in a given country of the former Soviet Union gives Moscow some kind of green light for any foreign policy actions it wants regarding the relevant subject. This causes serious damage to bilateral ties and, moreover, causes the previously loyal and completely pro-Russian forces to rapidly move toward multilateralism. Previously, a similar trend was typical for Russia-Ukraine relations during the presidencies of L.D. Kuchma (1994–2005) and V.F. Yanukovych (2010–2014). Today it is most prominent in Russia’s interaction with Belarus and some other EAEU states (Armenia, Kyrgyzstan and partly, Kazakhstan) in whose regard Russia follows a logically mistaken thesis
about the single-option nature of the pro-Russian course of these countries (which, for clarity, can be described with a well-known, though not so academic phrase, “there is no way around it”). Consequently, their readiness to make the most serious concessions in the economic, political and humanitarian spheres for the sake of preserving a long-term, close and privileged relationship with Russia is overestimated.

Third, the political and psychological aspect determining Russia's declining influence in the former Soviet Union is also driven by the significant overestimation by the Russian ruling class of the so-called subjective (personal) factor in relations with the CIS countries. This problem is most clearly manifested in three key areas. First, the Russian establishment erroneously equates good personal relations with the leaders/members of the national elite or the ruling class of the CIS countries with their readiness to pursue an absolutely pro-Russian foreign policy. This misunderstands the fact that warm and friendly relations with the leader of a corresponding country does not imply any guarantee that the country's foreign policy will always unquestionably follow a course profitable for Russia. This kind of error is quite clearly manifested in relations with both counties of the former Soviet Union and countries of the far abroad (in this context, a notable example is the good personal relationship between President V. Putin of Russia and President D. Trump of the U.S., finding almost no correlation with the dynamics of bilateral relations, and in fact not helping to ease the current contradictions between the two countries).

The second way in which this problem manifests itself is in the tendency of the Russian establishment to make separate, often significant foreign policy decisions stemming from a relatively unpromising, subjective approach which is not based on a comprehensive rational analysis of a vast array of objective economic and political data. The authors believe that at all times this kind of subjectivistic, irrational approach to making key foreign policy decisions has been a direct consequence of excessive concentration of power in the hands of one leader or a small group of individuals. At the same time, one can note the following logical pattern: the stronger the concentration of power observed in a particular country, the greater the percentage of domestic and foreign policy decisions made on the basis of a subjectivistic approach. Ultimately this results in serious mistakes and miscalculations in the international arena.

The third way the problem appears is that the two above-mentioned tendencies result for the Russian ruling class in a significant underestimation of the urgent need for serious and systematic cooperation with the civil society structures, political opposition and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the post-Soviet countries. In other words, the overestimation of the role of pro-Russian (or mistakenly recognized as such) politicians of the CIS countries induces a rather risky foreign policy course aimed at interacting with only one of the important public groups of the respective country (again, using less academic terminology, such a foreign policy course can be metaphorically characterized as an “putting all of its eggs in one basket”). The result of using this approach in practice is often a situation when a power shift in a particular CIS country de facto leads
to an almost complete loss of all existing ties with Russia and a subsequent escalation of the conflict. This was most clearly manifested in 2004 after the Orange Revolution in Ukraine and after the Euromaidan events in Kiev in late 2013 and early 2014.

Regional Integration as a Mechanism to Support Russia’s Influence in the Former Soviet Union

In the historical context, the formation of the Russian Federation coincided with the need to counter the disintegrational trends in the former USSR which threatened to disrupt the existing economic, political, cultural and social ties between the former Soviet republics. Initially, the main mechanism designed to ensure the preservation of Russia’s influence in the former Soviet Union was the CIS, which implied integration in all the above areas. However, subsequently, for a variety of reasons the Commonwealth demonstrated its low efficiency, motivating Russia to adapt its foreign policy course to some narrowly specialized formats of regional integration. In particular, the high-priority areas of interaction with the countries of the former Soviet Union, namely the trade and economic, and the military-political spheres, have found their practical implementation in the activities of the EAEU and the CSTO, respectively. The principal objective Russia pursues in carrying out its own activities in terms of these regional organizations is reduced to counteracting the negative factors causing its influence in the region to decline. Thus, the activities of integration associations in the former Soviet Union can be considered as a kind of counter-trend in relation to the effect of the factors described above.

In this context, a comprehensive assessment of the efficiency of regional integration instruments employed by Russia to strengthen its own positions in the former Soviet Union must answer the following question: how successfully does Russia’s activity in regional organizations neutralize the factors causing the CIS countries to drift toward multilateralism? In view of its exceptional complexity and ambiguity, this question should be considered in a dialectical way.

On the one hand, there have been considerable advances made by the EAEU: elimination of customs restrictions and duties on a variety of commodity categories; greater freedom of movement for capital, services and labour within the integrative organization; registration of the legal framework for a common economic space; arrangement of a common market for certain product categories (pharmacological substances and medical products, for instance [EEC, 2017]; development of a programme liberalizing the electricity market, planned to take effect in 2019 [EAEU, 2016; EAEU 2018]; and the creation of a free trade zone between the EAEU and Vietnam (2016) [EEC, 2016], the People’s Republic of China, Iran and Cuba (2018). The undeniable achievements of the EAEU increased Russia’s influence in the former Soviet Union as their immediate consequence was the strengthening of trade, economic and social ties between Russia and its partners in the organization.

Similarly, certain success was also achieved in the military-technical and political spheres of cooperation, in particular, the signature of the CSTO Peacekeeping Agree-
ment [CSTO, 2007a]; creation of the Joint Staff [CSTO, 2012] and the Emergency Management Coordination Council [CSTO, 2007b]; and the approval of the Action Plan for the Implementation of the Basic Guidelines for the Development of the Collective Security Emergency Response System [CSTO, 2014]. Some noteworthy results were achieved in ensuring information security of Russia and its partners in the organization. These accomplishments, despite their local and rather limited nature, had a certain positive impact on Russia’s position in the former Soviet Union.

On the other hand, economic integration in terms of the EAEU has not yet become the basis (some kind of a driver) for acceleration and expansion of integration initiatives in other spheres. Moreover, the dynamics and pace of economic integration are affected by several negative factors, in particular, the remaining disagreements among the EAEU members on the list of categories of goods and services to be regulated by the legal and regulatory framework of the organization. As the latest example illustrating this trend, one can recall the discrepancy of the positions of Russia and Belarus regarding the supply of dairy products [Tut.by, 2018]. Similar problems arise from time to time in relations between other EAEU participants (for example, between Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan). Also, the members of the organization have not yet reached an agreement on the introduction of a single currency in mutual trade, and several countries directly oppose such an innovation even in the long term (consider Nursultan Nazarbayev’s statement, “Earlier, there was one single currency, but now we don’t have such a question on the agenda. There is nothing to be afraid of” [Altyn-orda, 2015]). This position is largely explained by the fears of several post-Soviet countries that a further integration of the economic sphere could make the EAEU members excessively dependent on Russia and, as a result, subsequently deprive them of their political independence.

Another problem of regional integration in the former Soviet Union is the actual inequality of the economic potentials of the participating countries which leads to a significant imbalance in the structure of mutual trade and to an excessive fiscal burden for many countries of the EAEU. According to Alisen Alisenov, PhD (economy), associate professor of the Department of Economics and Finance of the Russian Academy of National Economy and Public Service under the President of the Russian Federation, “In 2014, the fiscal burden to GDP was 34.5% in Russia, 42.6% in Belarus, and 26.4% in Kazakhstan. For the same period, the inflation indicators also display a significant difference: 11.4% in Russia, 16.2% in Belarus, and 7.0% in Kazakhstan.” [EAEU: Wishing for the Better, Having the Same Old Story] Therefore, the potential of free market instruments in terms of the EAEU has not been fulfilled, which has a negative bearing on the dynamics of strengthening Russia’s influence in the former Soviet Union through regional integration mechanisms.

The following conclusion can be drawn based on the foregoing: the mechanisms of regional integration, due to the insufficient fulfillment of their potential and the existence of significant contradictions between individual countries, can only slightly offset the negative factors causing Russia’s influence in the CIS region to decline. However, the current situation is not a dead end. The authors believe that with the proper politi-
cal will of all the parties concerned, the role of regional integration associations may significantly increase in the long term, having a most positive effect on Russia’s position in the former Soviet Union.

Conclusion

Having analyzed the factors causing the pro-Russian forces to drift toward multilateralism, and, consequently, causing Russia’s influence in the former Soviet Union to decline, we are able to draw several conclusions. First, considering the current relations between the Russian Federation and the CIS countries, the dynamics of their bilateral and multilateral ties are largely determined by the broadest range of both objective and subjective factors. Unfortunately, in the near future this trend, paralleled with a gradual decline in the influence of pro-Russian forces in the former Soviet Union, is unlikely to stop and is even less likely to reverse. The authors believe this assumption to be a logical derivative from the thesis that the trend analyzed comprises numerous economic, political, historical, social and cultural, political and psychological factors that, mutually supplementing and reinforcing each other, acquire a significant synergetic effect.

Second, the mechanisms of regional integration in terms of the CIS, the CSTO and the EAEU could become effective instruments helping Russia preserve its influence in the former Soviet Union, but due to a variety of factors listed above this potential remains partly unfulfilled. Nevertheless, the foreign policy course to expand and deepen the integration processes in political, social and economic spheres may well become a fairly effective Russian response to the challenges threatening its positions in the CIS region.

Third, while the subjective factors having a negative bearing on the efficiency of Russia’s policy in the former Soviet Union can potentially be minimized in a relatively short-term perspective, the situation regarding the objective factors, and especially those concerning Russia’s declining role in the world economy and the reduction of its trade turnover with the CIS countries, is much more complicated, requiring a considerable amount of time to adjust the current dynamics. At the same time, the world political and economic situation will play a significant role in this process, and it is vital for Russia to exercise particular prudence, caution and delicacy in making key foreign policy decisions affecting its interests in the former Soviet Union. In the context of globalization and the buildup of numerous transnational challenges and threats, every foreign policy action of a country should be cleared of any emotional components and must rely on a thorough and painstaking analysis of the entire array of empirical and factual data available. The result of this approach should be absolute rationality and predictability of the foreign policy course of the corresponding actor.

Ultimately, the success of Russian foreign policy in the CIS region will largely depend on Moscow’s restrained reaction to the sovereign choices of post-Soviet countries in the trading, economic, political, social, cultural and humanitarian spheres, as well as on the prompt minimization of the subjective factors discussed above, that is,
on the total rejection of any irrational, not completely circumspect actions that could potentially damage the relationship between Russia and a significant part of the world community and, in particular, with its closest former USSR neighbours.

References


Проблема снижения влияния России на постсоветском пространстве: чем вызван дрейф государств СНГ в сторону многовекторности?\footnote{Статья поступила в редакцию в мае 2018 г.}

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С момента распада Советского Союза проблема взаимоотношений России с государствами постсоветского пространства традиционно находится в центре внимания как академического, так и экспертного сообщества. Особую актуальность данный вопрос приобретает в контексте существенных изменений в мировой политике, вызванных стремительным ухудшением отношений между Россией и западными державами на фоне эскалации украинского кризиса. В настоящей статье предпринимается попытка выявить ключевые факторы экономического, политического и социального характера, негативным образом воздействующие на текущую динамику взаимоотношений между Российской Федерацией и странами СНГ и тем самым обуславливающие постепенное снижение влияния России на постсоветском пространстве.

Структура статьи определяется методологией исследования, состоящей в выявлении трех крупных комплексов факторов (объективных, объективно-субъективных и субъективных), препятствующих укреплению влияния России на постсоветском пространстве. При этом под объективными подразумеваются в первую очередь факторы экономического и политического характера; под смешанными, объективно-субъективными — социокультурные и исторические факторы; и, наконец, под субъективными — политико-психологические факторы, детерминирующие постепенное падение влияния России на постсоветском пространстве.

Опираясь на вышеуказанную методологию и обширный аналитический материал, авторы приходят к выводу, что отказ государств СНГ от пророссийского курса обусловлен не только (а в отдельных случаях — и не столько) объективной потребностью постсоветских государств в диверсификации своих политических и торгово-экономических связей, но и рядом субъективных социокультурных и политико-психологических факторов. Они подробно рассматриваются в тексте статьи. Кроме того, один из выводов по итогам исследования состоит в том, что большая часть субъективных факторов, негативно воздействующих на эффективность политики России на постсоветском пространстве, потенциально может быть существенно минимизирована в относительно краткосрочной перспективе. В то же время ряд объективных факторов — и в первую очередь касающихся падения роли России в мировой экономике и сокращения ее товарооборота с государствами СНГ — напротив, носит достаточно долгосрочный характер, ввиду чего на исправление текущей динамики может потребоваться много времени.

**Ключевые слова:** внешняя политика; многовекторность; СНГ; постсоветское пространство; Россия; политическое влияние

Источники


Организация Договора о коллективной безопасности (ОДКБ) (2007б) Решение Совета коллективной безопасности Организации Договора о коллективной безопасности о создании Координационного совета по чрезвычайным ситуациям государств – членов Организации Договора о коллективной


The Dynamics of the Canadian Insurance Market Under NAFTA

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Abstract

This article analyses changes in quantitative indicators of the development of the insurance market in Canada within the framework of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The development of the world economy leads to the growing influence of economic integration, including integration in the insurance sector. Globalization makes it necessary for countries to work together to improve the stability of national financial systems. Along with the positive effects of integration, such as higher trade volumes, there are also negative repercussions, such as local producers being driven out of the market. The effects and risks associated with the influence of integration groups, identified in the course of research and discussions in economics, can be verified (or falsified) empirically on the basis of data on the development of national insurance markets within the framework of integration groups. Based on statistical data, econometric models were built to determine the effect of NAFTA on the Canadian insurance market by assessing the extent to which the changes in quantitative indicators of the development of the insurance market in Canada, namely the premium volume, insurance density and penetration, are due to the agreement. Based on existing insurance market research, a number of economic and social factors were selected as macroeconomic parameters affecting the premium volume. The author concludes that being a member of NAFTA does not affect the selected quantitative insurance development indicators in Canada. The author assumes this to be one of the reasons why the main NAFTA clauses concerning insurance were not significantly revised under the new United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA).

Key words: Canada; NAFTA; integration; insurance market; insurance premium; insurance density; insurance penetration


In the context of globalization there is a need for cooperation between countries to increase the stability of national financial systems. Membership in integration associations has a positive impact on economies of all member countries due to the increase in multilateral trade volume, lower prices for a number of goods and services, wider range of consumer choice, incentives for innovation (as a result of higher competition) and

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1 The editorial board received the article in April 2018.
2 At the time this article was written, negotiations were underway to amend the NAFTA, and at the time of its submission to the editor, a new agreement had been reached and signed in November 2018.
access to new markets. Nevertheless, integration can have negative consequences as not all countries receive the same benefits from these processes. Among the negative consequences are the trade diversion effect, the displacement of national producers from the market and the imposition of “rules of the game” by relatively more-developed countries to relatively less-developed ones. Moreover, not all countries benefit equally from integration processes. A trade agreement between countries with different levels of development has a heterogeneous effect on the economies of its members.

Insurance markets are adapting to a single regime of trade in insurance services, which is formed depending on national and regional economic development strategies. At the same time, it should be noted that the strategy a member country chooses is based on the comparison of the level of economic development of the country with the level of development of other member countries. The fact that a “stronger” member may impose its own “rules of the game,” as well as the possibility of stagnating or even declining production in some sectors are potential repercussions to be taken into account by relatively less-developed member countries. The European Union’s insurance market has shown that not all countries benefit equally from integration [Pisarenko, Kuznetsova, 2014]. According to a number of scholars, for example G. V. Chernova, under certain conditions3 the positive effects of integration for the insurance market of every country outweigh the negative ones [2013]. In light of this, the development of insurance markets of NAFTA members is of particular interest, as it is a group of countries with different levels of development,4 the model of relations between which is sometimes described as “hub-and-spokes.”

The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) came into force on 1 January 1994. It has recently been replaced by the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA5) signed by the three countries on November 30th 20186 and coming into force in 2020. In the sphere of trade in financial services, the agreement stipulates that there is to be a national treatment and a most favoured-nation treatment for the member countries: “Each Party shall accord to investors of another Party treatment no less favorable than that it accords to its own investors” [NAFTA, 1992, Art. 1405], and “Each Party shall accord to investors of another Party, financial institutions of another Party... treatment no less favorable than that it accords to the investors... of any other Party or of a non-Party” [NAFTA, 1992, Art. 1406]. Financial service providers may establish a commercial presence in other countries, with the exception of the restrictions listed in the annex to the agreement.

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3 For example, when the level of development of the national insurance market is lower than the regional one.
4 U.S. GDP per capita was $57,797 in 2016 and only $18,535 in Mexico (the figure for Canada is $44,819). Source: OECD [c. a., b].
5 It should be noted that in Canada the Agreement is referred to as the Canada-United States-Mexico Agreement (CUSMA) or Accord Canada–États-Unis–Mexique (ACEUM) in French, while being referred to as Tratado entre México, Estados Unidos y Canadá (T-MEC) in Mexico.
Although quantitative restrictions agreed upon by the parties are allowed under the agreement [NAFTA, 1992, Annex VII], it is also stated that such restrictions should be revised or abolished in the future to facilitate integration. For example, a Canadian insurer, other than a life insurer or a reinsurer, could not purchase reinsurance services worth more than 25% of the risk undertaken by the insurer from a non-resident reinsurer under the initial agreement. This restriction was abolished in 2011, which led to more risks being transferred by Canadian insurers to non-Canadian reinsurers. Nevertheless, certain restrictions can still be imposed, for instance to protect investors, financial market participants and policyholders or to ensure the stability of a party’s financial system [NAFTA, 1992, Art. 1410].

Due to changes in the geopolitical situation as well as in the economic landscape of the world, NAFTA member countries came to a new trade agreement - the USMCA, - on 30 September 2018 (after the formal deadline for the negotiations). The proclaimed grounds for amending the agreement on behalf of the United States were, first, that changes have occurred over the last 25 years that were not taken into account when the original NAFTA was signed, and second, that support should be provided for United States’ workers [Lobosco, Borak, Luhby, 2018]. Changes to the existing agreement are mainly concerned with trade in goods, e.g. higher quotas of American dairy products in the Canadian market, lower share of car parts made outside North America in order for them to be exempt from tariffs (rules of origin) and a requirement that at least 30% (to rise to 40% in a few years) of car parts be made by workers earning no less than $16 an hour. It also regulates spheres that are relatively new or which began developing rapidly after the agreement came into force, such as the digital economy and intellectual property rights.

It is worth noting that the new agreement elaborates more on the financial services sector, including insurance. The general provisions on the national and most-favoured-nation treatment (Art. 17.3 and Art. 17.4 of the USMCA, respectively) will not undergo significant changes. The possibility of imposing restrictions in order to protect investors, depositors and policyholders also remains (Art. 17.11). The reservations under this agreement for each country are set out in Annex III. For example, Mexican citizens cannot insure credit, housing credit and third party liability with foreign entities unless they can prove that “none of the insurance institutions authorized to operate in Mexico is able or deems convenient to enter into a given insurance operation proposed to it” [Office of the United States Trade Representative, 2018, Annex III: Mexico, Section A-9, p. iii].

The assessments of the effect of NAFTA on the welfare of member countries range from positive [Curtis, Sydor, 2006; Komkova, 2015; Caliendo, Parro 2015] to neutral (“without the NAFTA, the development of the country would be the same”) [Romalis, 2007; Castaneda, 2014]. There are also studies devoted to analyzing the impact of this agreement on the insurance markets of member countries. For instance, various North American insurance associations (the American Insurance Association, the Insurance Bureau of Canada, the Mexican Association of Insurance Companies and several

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7 For instance, aggregate foreign investments in Mexican insurance companies must not exceed 50% of paid-in capital.
others) have expressed their positive view of NAFTA and support for the modernization of the agreement [Insurance Journal Staff, 2017]. Among the positive influences are:

- higher trade volumes
- wider customer choices
- expansion of the range of services provided
- facilitation of “cooperation among policymakers, regulators and insurers in all three countries”
- promotion of competition
- creation of “a regulatory environment that supports innovation, market efficiency and regulatory transparency”

Apart from the increase in trade in services, these associations mainly note qualitative impacts on the insurance markets of member countries.

A quantitative assessment of the impact of the agreement on the quantitative indicators of the Canadian insurance market can help evaluate how integration influences the insurance markets of the countries involved. Among the effects expected from integration in the services markets (as noted above) is higher competition, to which domestic insurance companies respond by increasing productivity, leading to lower insurance premiums and custom made products. If we observe an increase in trade in services as well as wider consumer choices, it can be assumed that total premium volumes will also grow despite slightly lower premiums as there will be higher demand. It must be noted that assessing the effects of NAFTA on the efficiency of insurance companies in member countries as well as estimating the welfare effects fall outside of the scope of this study and will be dealt with in future research.

The choice of the country is based on the fact that, while both countries are developed, certain development indicators are lower in Canada than they are in the United States, such as gross domestic product (GDP) per capita ($44,773 in Canada versus $59,495 in the United States in 2017) [IMF, 2017]. In absolute numbers, the size of the Canadian economy is significantly smaller than the U.S. economy, as U.S. GDP at current prices in 2016 was 12 times higher than the GDP of Canada [IMF, 2017]. At the same time, both Canada and the U.S. are among the top-ten countries in the world in terms of gross insurance premium volume, while Mexico, the third NAFTA member, ranks 25th [Swiss Re Institute, 2017]. The total premium volume of NAFTA member countries is $1,491,311 [Swiss Re Institute, 2017], of which 91% is collected in the United States and only 1% in Mexico. The data are shown in Table 1.

Table 1. Select Data on the NAFTA Insurance Market

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Premium Volume ($ Million)</th>
<th>Penetration (Premiums as a % of GDP)</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Density ($ per capita)</th>
<th>Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>1,352,385</td>
<td>7.49</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4,174.1</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>114,523</td>
<td>7.32</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3,161.1</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>24,403</td>
<td>2.34</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>189.4</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,491,311</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>3,049</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Swiss Re Institute [2017].
In order to estimate the effect of integration on the quantitative indicators of insurance market development the following specification of the linear regression model was used:

$$y_t = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{GDPd} + \beta_2 \text{Inf} + \beta_3 \text{IntR} + \beta_4 \text{Popd} + \beta_5 \text{EmpRd} + \beta_6 \text{Unempd} + \beta_7 \text{PovR} + \beta_8 \text{NAFTA} + \epsilon_t = \beta_0 + \mathbf{x}_t \beta,$$

where $y_t$ is the dependent variable (gross premium (GrossPrd), density (Den) and penetration (Pen) respectively in the three models), $\mathbf{x}_t$ are the control variables detailed below, $\beta_0$ is the intercept $\beta_i$ are the coefficient of the explanatory variables and $\epsilon_t$ is the error term. For the purposes of this analysis, the author assumes that the relation between the gross premium (or, to be more precise, the change in the gross premium) is linear and not quadratic.

Explanatory variables were chosen based on factors that have an effect on gross premiums identified in existing studies. These factors can be divided into four groups [Golyshева et al., 2016]. The first group includes economic factors. Insurance contributes to the redistribution of cash flows as insurance funds — formed out of insurance premiums and thus connected with the income of citizens and working capital of enterprises — are subsequently invested in the economy. Shortage of working capital along with low incomes of the population are factors that hinder the development of the insurance market.

The second group includes political factors that characterize the political stability in a country and government policy in insurance. It should be noted that there is political stability in Canada, and despite a number of changes in insurance legislation, these changes do not have a significant effect on the premium volume and therefore this group of factors will not be taken into account in the model.

The third group can be defined as social factors, that is macroeconomic indicators having to do with demographics, consumer preferences, cultural traditions and financial literacy. Urbanization also affects the insurance market since urban dwellers are the principal consumers of insurance services.

The last group includes technological factors, which have a growing influence on the insurance market: online insurance, electronic sales of insurance policies and the use of new technologies by insurance companies. These factors increase the availability of insurance services and reduce the costs of running an insurance company, but there are also risks associated with the use of technology, such as hacking and data loss.

The observation period is from 1984 to 2016, the data are annual and there is a total of 33 observations of 10 variables. The data are from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) website. The data are somewhat inconsistent with the data in the Sigma journal (Swiss Re). Due to the fact that to estimate an econometric model it is necessary to work with stationary time series (otherwise there is a chance to get a so-called “spurious regression”), the first logarithmic difference of non-stationary time series was taken. This difference corresponds to the percentage change in these indicators (series with the logarithmic difference are marked with the letter “d” at the end of the variable name).
The following explanatory variables were selected for the analysis:

*Table 2. List of Explanatory Variables in the Model*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDPd</td>
<td>first logarithmic difference of GDP per capita (in $)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>InGrd</td>
<td>first logarithmic difference of gross fixed capital formation (annual growth rate in percent)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inf</td>
<td>inflation rate (calculated based on the Consumer Price Index (CPI))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IntR</td>
<td>long-term interest rates on government bonds maturing in 10 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Popd</td>
<td>first logarithmic difference of population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EmpRd</td>
<td>first logarithmic difference of the employment rate (as a percentage of working age population)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unempd</td>
<td>first logarithmic difference of the unemployment rate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PovR</td>
<td>poverty (ratio of people whose income falls below the poverty line to total population)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAFTA</td>
<td>binary variable that equals 1 starting in 1994, when NAFTA came into force</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: compiled by author.*

GDP per capita was chosen as an explanatory variable because at the end of the 20th century it was demonstrated that the growth rate of insurance penetration is correlated with GDP per capita rather than simply the GDP of a country. According to this theory, developed by G.M. Dickinson, R.L. Carter and R. Enz [Carter, Dickinson, 1992; Enz, 2000], penetration increases as GDP per capita rises. However, after GDP per capita reaches a relatively high level, insurance penetration stops growing, so the increase in insurance penetration is no longer correlated with the increase in GDP per capita. The graphic interpretation of this relationship has the shape of the letter “S,” which is why the name of the model is “S-curve.”

Investment has an impact on insurance premiums because legal entities account for a high share of demand for insurance. Investment is a leading indicator of output and contributes to higher production capacity, the increase of which leads to a higher value and/or quantity of objects insured.

The inflation rate, as well as interest rates, mostly influence customers’ decisions to purchase life insurance, as well as the overall level of consumer confidence. Interest rates also affect the volume of loans and, by extension, insurance premiums, since insurance contracts are often required in order to get a loan (life insurance in case of mortgages and/or insurance of property bought on credit or used as collateral).

The effect of population on premium volume is intuitively understandable, while the levels of employment, unemployment and poverty characterize the social situation in the country and determine the level of effective demand.

The dummy (binary) variable “NAFTA,” which equals 0 up until 1993 and 1 starting 1994, was selected to estimate the impact of joining NAFTA on the quantitative indicators of insurance market development in Canada. NAFTA can affect the premium volume and other indicators in various ways. For example, due to the increased trade volume resulting from lower trade barriers there is a need to insure more cargo. Higher
competition, on the contrary, will lead to lower prices and consequently to a decrease in the premium volume. This binary variable works to incorporate these changes.

The fact that these indicators have an effect on the premium volume is confirmed by the correlation between these indicators and the premium volume. Using R, the effect of all of the above factors on the gross insurance premium was estimated, and at a significance level of 10% the statistically significant factors are the following explanatory variables: inflation and employment rate. Statistically insignificant variables were gradually excluded from the model until all coefficients were significant (the critical t-value is 1.699) and had a statistically significant impact on the premium volume.

To check model adequacy, a correlation matrix of explanatory variables was built (a strong correlation was found between changes in investment volumes, GDP and the unemployment rate (over 0.7), as well as between inflation and interest rates (which is in line with the Fisher equation, according to which the nominal interest rate is adjusted for inflation so that the real interest rate remains unchanged). Models were also tested for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation of residuals using the Breusch-Pagan and Box-Ljung tests, respectively. According to these tests, there is no heteroscedasticity or auto-correlation of residuals in any of the models.

The initial and final models of the relationship between the gross premium and selected factors are shown in Table 3.

**Table 3. Models for Estimating the Relationship Between Gross Premium and Selected Macroeconomic Indicators**

| Model Number | Coefficient GrossPrd | Pr(>|t|) | Coeff. GrossPrd | Pr(>|t|) | Coeff. GrossPrd | Pr(>|t|) |
|--------------|----------------------|---------|----------------|---------|----------------|---------|
|              |                      | 1       | 2              | 3       |                |         |
| Dependent Variable | Const | 0.070504 | 0.9267 | −0.06942 | 0.89933 | −0.09298 | 0.03763 |
|                | GDPd     | 3.021698 | 0.1420 | 2.48783  | 0.06333 | 1.60397  | 0.09540 |
|                | EmpRd    | 8.496636 | 0.0322 | 9.57092  | 0.00953 | 10.42162 | 0.00114 |
|                | InGrd    | 0.010747 | 0.9883 |              |       |            |         |
|                | Popd     | −7.368092| 0.4077 | −0.52616 | 0.94211 |              |         |
|                | Unempd   | 0.394522 | 0.3024 | 0.30073  | 0.36382 |              |         |
|                | Inf      | 0.051147 | 0.0372 | 0.04566  | 0.04882 | 0.02619  | 0.07273 |
|                | PovR     | −1.994805| 0.7178 | −1.29939 | 0.75923 |              |         |
|                | IntR     | −0.001425| 0.9300 |              |       |            |         |
|                | NAFTA    | 0.099156 | 0.2519 | 0.10211  | 0.14566 |              |         |
|                | R²       | 0.6403   | 0.6279 |              |       | 0.5805   |         |
|                | Adjusted R² | 0.4932  | 0.5193 |              |       | 0.5355   |         |

*Source: author’s calculations in R.*

₁ Where applicable.
Based on the estimated models, it is clear that GDP per capita, the level of employment and the rate of inflation have an effect on the premium volume. The coefficient of determination ($R^2$) of the final model is 0.5805, which means that the selected factors explain only 58% of the variation in the dependent variable. However, an $R^2$ greater than 50% is considered acceptable, so the model can potentially be used to predict the gross premium. According to these estimates, NAFTA membership did not contribute to the growth of gross premiums.

Figure 1 shows the actual and fitted values of the changes in the gross premium volume in Canada between 1985–2016.

![Premium growth graph](https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DatasetCode=INSIND)

Fig. 1. Actual and Fitted Values of the Changes in the Gross Premium Volume in Canada, 1985–2016

*Source:* Plotted by the author based on OECD data: Insurance Indicators (c. a., c) and the model estimates obtained in R. Available at: https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DatasetCode=INSIND.

Since the 2000s, gross premium volume increased (positive growth rates), but it later decreased as a result of the financial crisis. Note that the crisis also had a negative impact on insurance density and penetration, which can be seen in Fig. 2.

The ratio of insurance premiums to GDP remained around 4–6% starting 1984 until the last few years of the century when it began to grow steadily, peaking at almost 8% before the financial crisis and then decreasing to around 5%. These data suggest that the reduction in premiums was greater than the reduction in GDP, meaning the insurance market is more sensitive to crises and shocks than the economy in general.

The changes in insurance density in Canada are similar to that of the gross premium. This is due to the fact that the population of Canada has been growing steadily over the past 20 years, albeit at a slow pace: since 1992 the maximum growth rate has not exceeded 1.2% (in 1986–1990 population growth rates reached 1.8%). Thus, the change in population size slightly “smoothes out” the fluctuations of insurance density compared to changes in premium volume.
Fig. 2. Insurance Density and Penetration in Canada, 1984–2016

Source: OECD data: Insurance Indicators (c. a., c.)
Available at: https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DatasetCode=INSIND.

Based on the same assumptions and the same methods used when building models to determine the relationship between premium volume and NAFTA membership, the effect of being a part of NAFTA on the density and penetration of insurance in Canada was estimated. The results are shown in Table 4.

Table 4. Models for Estimating the Effect of Macroeconomic Indicators on Insurance Density and Penetration

| Model Number | Coeff. | Pr(>|t|)² | Coeff. | Pr(>|t|)² | Coeff. | Pr(>|t|)² | Coeff. | Pr(>|t|)² |
|--------------|--------|-----------|--------|-----------|--------|-----------|--------|-----------|
|              | 4      | 5         | 6      | 7         |
| Dependent Variable | Pen     | Pen       | Den    | Den       |
| Const        | 0.567666 | 0.31708   | 4.705  | 0.03812   | −34.403 | 0.4829    | 21.5678 | 0.0146    |
| GDPd         | −0.555092 | 0.67495   | −      | −         | −131.013 | 0.3135    | −      | −         |
| EmpRd        | 10.041521 | 0.00807   | 40.671 | 0.00245   | −143.850 | 0.5387    | −      | −         |
| InGrd        | −      | −         | −      | −         | 35.210   | 0.4494    | −      | −         |
| Popd         | −0.784731 | 0.91571   | −72.418 | 0.03528   | −      | −         | −      | −         |
| Unempd       | 0.157675 | 0.63956   | −      | −         | −51.326 | 0.0355    | −31.4329 | 0.0304    |
| Inf          | 0.008138 | 0.72087   | −      | −         | −3.000  | 0.0480    | −3.5241 | 0.0167    |
| PovR         | −4.893817 | 0.26510   | −32.590 | 0.05194   | 401.451 | 0.2632    | −      | −         |
| IntR         | −      | −         | −      | −         | 2.728   | 0.0146    | 1.67188 | 0.0305    |
| NAFTA        | 0.038061 | 0.58886   | −      | −         | −7.215  | 0.1979    | −9.5456 | 0.0729    |
| R²           | 0.3892  | 0.3525    | 0.5942 | 0.5177    |
| Adjusted R²  | 0.2111  | 0.3062    | 0.453  | 0.4463    |

Source: Author’s calculations in R.
² Where applicable.
Note that for estimating the effect of NAFTA on density, population growth was excluded from the models because population size is used to calculate insurance density.

Based on these models, it can be said that the employment rate, poverty and population growth are factors that have an effect on penetration. In this study, these variables describe effective demand. It must be noted that these factors only explain 35% of the variance of penetration, thus it is necessary to take other indicators into account to predict the penetration. The estimated model is in line with the “S-curve” because in this case GDP per capita is so high that its increase has no effect on insurance penetration.

At a 10% significance level, being a member of NAFTA (along with unemployment, inflation and interest rates) does have a non-zero effect on insurance density. Thus, based on this estimate we can say that the insurance premium per capita, other things being equal, has decreased as a result of Canada becoming a member of NAFTA. This is partly because of higher competition driving prices down as a result of U.S. companies penetrating the Canadian market. It may also be due to the fact that with higher volumes of trade some companies switched to insuring foreign trade with insurers from the United States rather than Canada. It is worth noting, however, that a significance level of 5% or below is usually set in econometric analysis, so we can say that being a member of NAFTA has no effect on the indicators of the development of the Canadian insurance market examined in this study.

This article concludes that GDP per capita (the main indicator of economic development), the employment rate (one of the factors determining effective demand) and the inflation rate have an effect on gross premiums in Canada. Insurance penetration, in turn, is affected by population growth, as well as employment and poverty. Finally, the insurance density in Canada, according to the estimated models (at a significance level of 5%) is influenced by the unemployment rate, the inflation rate and the long-term interest rates on government bonds maturing in 10 years. At the same time, NAFTA does not have a significant effect on these quantitative indicators of the development of the Canadian insurance market. In light of this, as well as the fact that the Canadian insurance market is quite small for the United States in terms of volumes, it is understandable that the main provisions of NAFTA with regard to insurance markets were not considerably revised under the new agreement.

References


According to OECD data market share of foreign companies in the Canadian insurance market was 21% or $17.554 million in 2015, which was 0.67% of total gross premiums in the United States in the same year (note that not only U.S. companies operate in the Canadian market). See OECD [c. a., c].


Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (c. a., a) Data. Available at: https://data.oecd.org/ (accessed 26 October 2018).


Динамика страхового рынка Канады в условиях НАФТА

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Статья посвящена анализу изменений количественных показателей развития страхового рынка Канады в рамках действия Североамериканского соглашения о свободной торговле. Развитие мировой экономики происходит при возрастающем влиянии экономической интеграции, охватывающей все сферы экономической жизни, в том числе страховой сектор. Усиление процессов глобализации обусловливает необходимость сотрудничества стран для повышения устойчивости национальных финансовых систем. Наряду с положительными сторонами интеграции, такими как увеличение объема торговли, имеются и отрицательные, к примеру, вытеснение национальных производителей с рынка. Кроме того, очевидно, что не все страны получают одинаковую выгоду от интеграционных процессов. Эффекты и риски, связанные с влиянием интеграционных объединений на национальные страховые рынки стран-участниц, выделенные в ходе исследований и дискуссий в экономической науке, могут быть верифицированы (или фальсифицированы) эмпирически за счет получаемых данных о развитии национальных страховых рынков стран в рамках интеграционных объединений и построения соответствующих математических моделей. На основе статистических данных были построены эконометрические модели с целью выявления влияния Соглашения НАФТА на страховой рынок Канады путем оценки того, насколько изменения количественных показателей развития страхового рынка данной страны, а именно объема собираемых премий, плотности и проникновения страхования, связаны с действием Соглашения. В качестве макроэкономических параметров, влияющих на объем собираемых премий, в целях регрессионного анализа был отобран ряд экономических и социальных факторов, выделенных в ходе исследований страхового рынка. Автор приходит к выводу, что участие в данной интеграционной группировке не влияет на исследуемые количественные показатели развития страхового рынка Канады, и предполагает, что это одна из причин, по которой положения Североамериканского соглашения о свободной торговле в сфере страхования не были серьезно пересмотрены в рамках нового соглашения США – Мексика – Канада (USMCA)².

Ключевые слова: Канада; НАФТА; интеграция; страховой рынок; страховая премия; плотность страхования; проникновение страхования


Источники


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Business as Usual?

The Impact of Anti-Russian Sanctions Introduced by the U.S. on the Foreign Investment Activity of Russian Oil and Gas TNCs: The Lukoil and Rosneft Investment Strategy of Russian Oil and Gas TNCs During the Sanctions Period

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Abstract

This article examines the impact of anti-Russian sanctions introduced by the U.S., including the sanctions package signed on 10 August 2017, on the foreign investment activity of Russian oil and gas transnational corporations (TNCs) such as Lukoil and Rosneft in particular. The authors examine the American sanctions against Russia and identify the possible consequences of such restrictions for the development of the Russian oil and gas sector and foreign capital expansion of Russian oil and gas majors; the authors also analyze the foreign investment activity of Lukoil and Rosneft under the sanctions regime.

Key words: sanctions; Russian oil and gas sector; foreign investment activity of Russian oil and gas TNCs; Lukoil; Rosneft


1 The editorial board received the article in June 2018.
Introduction

The sanctions imposed against Russia by the U.S. in 2014 and expanded in 2017 are intended to destabilize the development of the Russian oil and gas industry as a whole and are primarily aimed at weakening Russia’s position in the international energy arena. Implementation of the sanctions regime imposes on the key Russian oil and gas companies new strategic objectives for current and long-term development, bringing to the fore the issue of further opportunities and prospects for their foreign investment activities.

On 12 September 2014 the U.S. Department of the Treasury introduced a package of sanctions against the energy, financial and military sectors of Russia’s economy. U.S. sanctions were introduced by Executive Order 13662 signed by the U.S. President Barack Obama. The sanctions package included four directives – measures against Russia’s oil sector are set out in Directives 2 and 4.

According to Directive 4, American companies are prohibited from providing direct or indirect exportation supplies, re-exportation of goods, services (except for financial services) and technologies to Russian oil and gas companies such as Gazprom, Novatek, Rosneft, Lukoil, Surgutneftegaz and Gazprom Neft (their properties or their interests in property) which could be used in support of oil exploration and production for deepwater, shale or Arctic offshore projects claimed by the Russian Federation [United States Treasury, 2014b].

Directive 2 imposes “restrictions on any transaction operations, funding and any other operations on new tax obligation, of longer than 90 days maturity” [United States Treasury, 2014a] for individuals and companies listed in the directive, their property and their interests in property. The list of sanctioned companies includes Rosneft, Novatek, Transneft and Gazprom Neft, the last two of which appeared in this list for the first time. These financial restrictions are not applied to Lukoil, Surgutneftegaz or Gazprom.

In sum, sanctioned Russian companies were cut off from oil and gas equipment, services and technologies (even from countries of origin other than the U.S.) in any case in which a supplier was aware that the equipment would be used in support of oil exploration and production in deepwater projects, Arctic offshore projects or any other shale formations. In particular, the embargo applies to drilling, geophysical, geological, logistics and management services, as well as computer modeling and modern mapping technologies.

American companies must abide by the export restrictions to Russia regardless of their location and dispatch of goods. They were given only 14 days to finish the delivery of goods and services under existing contracts and agreements.

Clarifications to certain definitions were added to the updated sanctions list in the executive order of 12 September. Deepwater projects were defined as oil exploration and production in waters deeper than 500 feet; Arctic offshore projects were defined as those with a potential to produce oil in areas above the Arctic Circle that involve drill-
ing operations originating offshore; shale projects were defined as those with a potential to produce oil from resources located in shale formations. Moreover, the geographical scope of sanctions was clarified to include the territory of the Russian Federation and its maritime territories, including the continental shelf.

An important feature of Directive 4 is that the prohibition on the provision, exportation (direct and indirect), re-exportation of goods, services (except for financial) and technologies extends to exploration and production in deepwater, shale and Arctic offshore projects, irrespective of whether the project has the potential to produce gas. Prohibitions do not apply if projects only produce gas. Therefore, sanctions apply to oil-gas, gas-oil, gas-condensate oil and oil-gas condensate projects.

On 2 August 2017, U.S. President Donald Trump signed into law the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (H.R. 3364) [United States Treasury, 2017] – hereafter, the Sanctions Act – which had been passed by both houses of Congress in the previous month. In general, the act is a primarily political document, focused on tightening the sanctions regime against Iran, Russia and North Korea, and on limiting president’s authority to lift sanctions without congressional approval.

In the section regarding the Russian Federation, the document includes an assessment of Russia’s foreign policy and a list of political, military and economic measures to counteract Russia’s policy aims by putting pressure on Russia’s fuel and energy complex in order to destabilize the Russian economy. Adoption of this law created new challenges for the Russian government and Russian companies to overcome.

The crucial feature of the Sanctions Act for Russia appears in the section entitled “Sanctions with Respect to the Russian Federation and Combating Terrorism and Illicit Financing.”

On the legislative level the act enforces sanctions imposed by President Barack Obama under Executive Order No 13660 (on 6 March 2014), Executive Order No 13661 (on 6 March 2014), Executive Order No 13662 (on 6 March 2014), Executive Order No 13694 (on 1 April 2015) including the Appendix on 29 December 2016, Executive Order No 13685 (19 December 2014) including the Appendix on 29 December 2016, the Ukraine Freedom Support Act (on 18 December 2014), and Directive 41 (on 26 July 2016) about cybersecurity incidents relevant to the vital national interests of the United States. A report prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the National Security Agency (NSA) entitled “Accessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent U.S. Elections” (on 6 January 2017) was taken into consideration.

In general, the new legislation with respect to Russia codifies and modifies existing anti-Russian sanctions enshrined in prior directives, including restrictions on certain energy projects of the Russian Federation and financing for certain sectors of Russian economy. It also applies new sanctions on strategic sectors of the Russian economy, in particular, mining, metals and transport industries including shipping and railways. Importantly, the president must receive congressional approval before taking any action to ease, suspend or lift sanctions.
The Sanctions Act enabled Congress to significantly restrict the president’s authority. After adopting this document, any attempt by the president to terminate or waive restrictions for individuals and companies listed in the sanctioned list must be submitted to the Congress. For example, according to the Ukraine Freedom Support Act relating to defense and energy sectors of Russia referenced in Section 229, in order to introduce new sanctions the president must notify the appropriate congressional committees in writing.

According to Section 222 the president can terminate the application of sanctions provided for in Executive Order No 13660, No 13661, No 13662 and No 13685, if the president submits to the appropriate congressional committees a written determination that rejection is in the vital national security interests of the United States, or gives a certification that the government of the Russian Federation is taking steps to implement the Minsk Agreement —meant to address the ongoing conflict in eastern Ukraine and signed in Minsk, Belarus on 11 February 2015 by the leaders of Ukraine, Russia, France and Germany — as well as any successor agreements that are agreed to by the government of Ukraine. These kinds of amendments help the U.S. Congress gain more control over the government’s sanctions policy.

Concerning the fuel and energy complex, the Sanctions Act envisages extending the restrictions with regard to cooperation of American nationals and companies (“United States persons”) with Russians through various amendments. Executive Order 2 of 12 September 2014 reduces minimal financing maturity from 90 to 60 days for energy companies falling under the sanctions (Rosneft, Transneft, Gazprom Neft, Novatek). That said, most experts argue that the amendment’s influence on the activity of key Russian energy companies will not be significant because the long-term financing was greatly reduced earlier. Executive Order 4 of 12 September 2014 extended the range of shale, deepwater, and Arctic offshore projects subject to the restrictions and direct prohibition for participation by United States persons. As a result, the sanction regime encompasses all projects, including those abroad, of PSJC Gazprom, PSJC Gazprom Neft, PSJC Lukoil, PSJC Rosneft and PTC Surgutneftegaz, in which their stake is more than 33%. The amendment could have an impact on the activity of every international company participating in joint energy projects with Russia because the term “United States person” includes companies having representative bodies in the United States. The foreign projects of Rosneft and Lukoil, introduced in Table 1, are potentially at risk.

The amendment reinforces the U.S.’s aim to ensure that equipment and services provided for joint external projects with Russian companies falling under the export and re-export ban will be used for the purpose intended and not for complex exploration projects in Russia. In the meantime, despite the new the executive order the Sanctions Act still contains loopholes, as projects on Russian territory in which a stake of less than 33% is held by sanctioned Russian companies are not subject to the sanctions.

The act allows for the possibility of sanctions in the form of restrictions on the supply of American goods and technologies as well as on funding from the U.S. for companies contributing to Russian export pipeline projects.
Table 1. Foreign Projects of Rosneft and Lukoil Under Potential Risk Due to Sanctions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Company</th>
<th>Lukoil</th>
<th>Rosneft</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td></td>
<td>Brazil Project Solimoes (100% owned by Rosneft)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Venezuela 1. Carabobo-2, Carabobo-4 projects (JV Petrovictoria) (Rosneft share – 40%);</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2. Project Junin-6 (JV Petromiranda) (Rosneft share – 40%);</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3. JV Petroperija (Rosneft share – 40%).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Region</td>
<td>Romania Project Trident (Lukoil share – 72%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa Region</td>
<td>Ghana Project Deepwater Tano/Cape Three Points (Lukoil share – 38%)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Côte d'Ivoire Project CI-401 (Lukoil share – 56.66%); Project CI-205 (Lukoil share – 63.0%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIS</td>
<td></td>
<td>Abkhazia Development of the Gudautsky area in the Abkhazian sector of the Black Sea (Rosneft share – 51%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia-Pacific Region</td>
<td>Vietnam Block 06.1 (Rosneft share – 35%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Lukoil [2016], Rosneft [2016].

The new act also prohibits investment, sale or leasing involving goods, services, technology, information and support for construction, modernization and repair of Russian export energy pipelines which have a fair market value of more than $1 million or an aggregate market value of $5 million or more during a 12-month period.

The amendment serves to undermine Russian energy resource supplies in Europe and is aimed at the disruption of work on projects such as Nord Stream 2 and Turkish Stream. European oil and gas majors, including Royal Dutch Shell, Engie, Wintershall, OMV and Uniper, are involved in implementation of Nord Stream 2. The assessed value of the project is about $10 billion and part of the funding has already been invested by foreign partners. Furthermore, all the vessels for laying undersea pipeline are owned by the European entities.

Within Turkish Stream, the Swiss Allseas, which has laid pipeline in the Black Sea shallow waters, falls under the sanctions. The company also takes part in laying further
deepwater pipeline with technologies that are currently unavailable to Russia. Allseas’ withdrawal from the project would negatively impact its future realization.

It should be noted that commissioning the pipeline on time, that is by 2019, is of high importance for Russia in the context of the current round of negotiation with Ukraine to reach agreement on Russia’s natural gas transit, which expires in late 2019.

The new restrictions could also concern infrastructural projects, including Baltic LNG, involving cooperation between Shell and Gazprom; Nord Stream, involving cooperation among Gazprom, Wintershall, Uniper, Gasunie and Engie; Blue Stream, involving cooperation between Eni and Gazprom; the pipe-building Caspian Pipeline Consortium involving Shell, Eni and Rosneft; and the construction of the South Caucasus Pipeline by BP and Lukoil.

The amendment sparked a backlash in Europe and is considered by a number of political leaders and companies to be an effort to undermine the energy security of European countries and to significantly impair business. It is quite evident that the main strategic goal of the restriction is the desire of the U.S. to possess the largest gas market in Europe by removing its key competitor – Russia – and by coercing European countries to import costly American liquefied natural gas, which requires an additional investment of 1 trillion euros in infrastructural projects.

There is every reason to believe that European countries would nevertheless take actions necessary to protect their interests aimed at economic and energy security preservation. Indirect evidence of this may be the Europeans’ agreement to construct Nord Stream 2. Currently, virtually all European countries with territorial sea crossed by the pipeline agreed on its construction. Denmark is the last expected to sign the necessary authorizing documents.

While analyzing the new act, it has to be mentioned that the text contains the phrase “the president shall” instead of “the president must,” which attaches a fundamentally different strength and greatly augments uncertainty as to law enforcement practice. As a result, at the moment the partners of Russian companies do not have a clear understanding as to whether their activity falls under the sanctions in case of participation in one joint project or another. Further, new potential risks for foreign companies arising from the implementation of large energy projects of strategic importance jointly with Russians could be viewed as unjustifiable. This would negatively influence ongoing effective practical bilateral and multilateral cooperation.

Together with this, while reacting to the sanctions and being forced to rearrange their strategic plans, the largest Russian oil and gas companies continue to maintain successful investment activity in foreign markets. Analysis of the investment activity of the Russian energy majors in the important foreign strategic markets over the period from the first restrictive documents to the present follows below.

Hydrocarbon reserves and the ramp-up of production volume in regions and countries which are preferred for their prospective development of the company remained one of the key strategic targets of Lukoil in 2015–2017. At the same time, the company restructured its foreign assets and optimized its petrochemical business segment.

The reorganization of Lukoil Overseas, Lukoil’s subsidiary engaged in oil and gas deposit exploration and development outside Russia, was an important event in 2015. As defined by the company’s formal documents, improved competitiveness, the introduction of international management standards, reduced offshore jurisdiction, as well as country and tax risk mitigation were the goals of the reorganization.

The company has been divided into three large management centres in Dubai, Houston and Tashkent, with the headquarters in Vienna. All projects in the Middle East and Africa have come under the management of Lukoil International Services B.V, with an office in Dubai. The Houston subdivision operates in Central Asia and North America, while the Tashkent one works with the company’s projects on the territory of the CIS. Despite a complex external political and economic situation and the actual risks related to the new anti-Russian sanctions imposed by the U.S. in 2017, the company continues to launch new energy projects in new countries.

In February 2015, a decree by Cameroon’s president authorized a deal with Lukoil which allows the company to join the project on the exploration of the Etinde field, located in Cameroon’s offshore waters in the Gulf of Guinea (West Africa), in which Lukoil holds a 30% stake. The deal was closed in March. In July, the company entered the Mexican market, having acquired a 50% stake in the Amatitlán block exploration project. In September, the company officially joined the offshore project in OML-140 block in Nigeria (West Africa) with a 45% stake [Lukoil, 2015; 2016]. In October, the deal to join the deepwater project in the Tano block – Deepwater Tano Cape Three Points in Ghanaian offshore waters in the Gulf of Guinea – where the company’s stake is 38%, was finalized. Moreover, in the near future Lukoil plans to explore Iran’s Mansouri and Ab-Teymur deposits.

However, since 2015 there has been a downward trend in the company’s foreign capital expenditures (calculated in dollars at the average rate over each year) in the segment of exploration and production. In 2015, the size of capital investment amounted to $3.2 billion, having fallen by 14% over a year, in 2016 and 2017, it decreased by 30% to $2.3 billion and by 3% to $2.2 billion, respectively (Fig. 1).

On the one hand, the fall in capital expenditure in foreign projects is partly related to the completion of a range of important stages of West Qurna 2 field infrastructure development and stages of exploration drilling in projects in Cameroon, Nigeria and Romania, as well as withdrawal from a number of projects which did not prove successful.
Fig. 1. Lukoil Capital Expenditures on Exploration and Production in the Development of Foreign Projects, 2010–2017*

* At an average exchange rate of 61 roubles per dollar in 2015, 67 roubles per dollar in 2016 and 58.4 roubles per dollar in 2017.


On the other hand, the decrease is partly related to the complex economic and political situation and the prolonged and newly imposed anti-Russian sanctions. Investments in projects in Iraq in 2015 amounted to $736 million and declined by 49% (over a year) to $295 million in 2016 (60% less compared to the previous year), and to $241 million in 2017 (18.3% less than in the previous year) (Fig. 2) (See Consolidated Financial Statements IFRS for 2010–2017 [Lukoil, c. a.]).

This was evident first in the West Qurna 2 project where capital expenditures were significantly reduced. The decline, however, is first explained by the completion of field infrastructure development. Since 2014 oil has been produced on the field. In 2017, the company reported that the project capital investments had been paid off.

However, it should be noted that due to a fall in oil prices the Iraqi government requested that Lukoil not increase production to $1.2 million barrels a day in 2017 as was initially planned, and instead to limit production to 400,000 barrels a day. That was particularly explained by the production sharing agreement which presupposed offsetting field exploration costs by oil produced. In the situation of relatively low oil prices, that is $65–$70 per barrel, the volume of compensation oil which should be offset to Lukoil by the Iraq party increased, since the flat fee under the contract was set out at the oil price of $110 per barrel.

In 2015 Lukoil launched the Etinde project in Cameroon. In 2015 investments amounted to $131 million and in 2016 they fell to $18 million (86% less compared to the previous year).

The capital expenditures in the Romanian projects demonstrated 189% growth in 2015, yet in 2016 growth was down 97%, related mostly to withdrawal from the Rapsodia project on the Romanian shelf after unsuccessful exploratory research. Nonetheless, Lukoil stayed in Romania and continues to work on the Trident shelf project following the discovery of a new gas deposit in 2015.
Stable growth of capital expenditure in 2015–2017 was observed in the company’s projects in Uzbekistan: in 2015 the company fixed a 6.7% growth rate, with a capital expenditure of $894 million, increasing by 42% to $1.3 billion in 2016 and by 13.7% to $1.5 billion in 2017. In 2015 six wells were put into operation at the Dzharkuduk field within the framework of the South-Western Guissar project, and exploration at Kuvachi Alat and North Shady fields of Kandym-Khausak-Shady-Kungrad started ahead of time (see Consolidated Financial Statements IFRS for 2010−2017 [Lukoil, c. a.]). In 2017 the preliminary gas-processing terminal and six gas-gathering stations were launched within the framework of the South-Western Guissar project, and as part of the Kandym project the first phase of Gas Processing Complex construction was completed.

Foreign capital expenditures in the refining, marketing and distribution segments declined as well, falling in 2014–2016 by 68% to $256 million. The fall was seen mostly in oil refineries and was caused by the completion of construction of the large heavy residue process complex in the oil refinery plant in Bulgaria (Fig. 3 and 4).

In 2015–2017, the company continued to implement the post-crisis strategy goals to diversify and optimize its distribution network. In 2015, Lukoil sold its petrol stations in Ukraine and Estonia, and in 2016–2017 sold its petrol stations in Poland, Latvia,
Lithuania and Cyprus. As a result, whereas by the end of 2016 the company had 2,706 petrol stations abroad, by the end of 2017 there were only 2,649. Capital expenditure for international distribution network development over the 2015–2017 period amounted to $264 million.

Fig. 3. Lukoil Foreign Capital Expenditures on Refining, Marketing and Distribution, 2010–2016*

* At an average exchange rate of 61 roubles per dollar in 2015 and 67 roubles per dollar in 2016.


Fig. 4. Lukoil Capital Expenditures on the Development of Foreign Refineries, 2010–2017*

* At an average exchange rate of 61 roubles per dollar in 2015, 67 roubles per dollar in 2016 and 58.4 roubles per dollar in 2017.


Experts estimate that the sell-out by Lukoil of all foreign oil refining and distribution assets was a consequence of the new sanctions package against Russia. Lukoil management, in turn, emphasizes that although the company suffers difficulties raising external financial resources, the sell-out of its foreign assets and sanctions only demon-
strates a standard response to a market situation change and results from the company’s reorganization and asset optimization.


Currently, Rosneft’s major focus is on the domestic market; however, the company plans to increase the share of its foreign projects and strengthen its presence in the prospective regions which can provide real opportunities for the company. At the same time, Rosneft’s senior management notes that extending the scope and geography of the business will require an increase of outward foreign investment amounts and will be accompanied by a range of difficulties, including those related to sanctions imposed against Russia and strengthened in 2017.

The period from 2015–2017 was marked for Rosneft by the increase of its foreign expansion and planned implementation of already existing foreign projects in the field of hydrocarbon exploration and production and also in the field of refining. In October 2015, Rosneft, in partnership with ExxonMobil, won the tender and received the right to undertake exploration on the shelf of Mozambique with three licenses: A5-B, Z5-C and Z5-D. Some seismic activities have already started. Rosneft plans to finish offshore exploration not earlier 2021. Despite the fact that partnership between Rosneft and ExxonMobil collapsed in Russia, it has continued to develop abroad [Rosneft, 2015a].

In May 2016 Rosneft increased its stake in the Petromonagas joint venture, which implements extra-heavy crude oil production projects in Venezuela, to 40% [Rosneft, 2015b; 2016a]. In October, Rosneft increased its activities, including foreign ones, by closing the deal on acquisition of the government’s stake in Bashneft Public Joint Stock Company representing 50.08% of its charter capital. The company received a positive synergetic effect from this deal. The capitalization and stock prices of the company increased, as did the production of liquid hydrocarbon (by 10%) and refining throughput (by 20%). The quality of refining assets was also improved and the company gained access to additional infrastructure and new hydrocarbon production regions and sales markets [Rosneft, 2015b; 2016a]. In December, Rosneft and the state-run oil company of the Republic of Cuba, Union CubaPetroleo (CUPET) signed an agreement to enhance oil production at Varadero-East Central Block. Rosneft continues to consolidate its position in the Latin American energy market where a number of large projects are being implemented in Venezuela and Brazil (Solimoin project).

In October 2017, Rosneft invested $1.125 billion in the acquisition of a 30% share in the project of the Italian company Eni for the development of the large gas field Zohr, located on the deepwater shelf of Egypt. Shares in the project are distributed as follows: Eni owns 60%, BP owns 10% and Rosneft owns 30%. Participation in this project will provide Rosneft with additional experience in the development of offshore fields and will strengthen the country’s position in the African region. The Zohr field accounts for about 30% of Egypt’s gas reserves.
It must be pointed out that Rosneft considers the Middle East to be a prospective market, taking into account the large resource base available on its territory. After acquiring controlling shares of Bashneft company, Rosneft has obtained access to work in Iraq. Moreover the company expects enhanced cooperation with this country in the near future. At the moment, Rosneft is the operator for exploration and development of hydrocarbons in the context of the Block 12 project in Iraq, located in the provinces of Najaf and Muthanna. Drilling of the first exploratory well, Salman-1, began in February 2017. Rosneft controls 70% of the project and the remaining share (30%) is controlled by the British company Premier Oil.

At the beginning of 2017, the company signed an agreement for three years with the government of Kurdistan for the purchase of oil valued at $1 billion. Later, in the summer, agreements on Rosneft’s access to export pipelines passing through the territory of Kurdistan with a capacity of 700,000 barrels per day was reached. In October, the sides signed documents on the development of five oil blocks, including those located in Kirkuk, which remains a disputed territory. Due to the fact that the government of Kurdistan has the right to conclude agreements with foreign partners without the permission of the central authorities only on the territory of the autonomy itself, the agreements reached between Rosneft and Kurdistan are controversial, and their implementation will largely depend on the negotiation process between the governments of Russia and Iraq.

Rosneft is also considering the possibility of entering the Iranian market. The company is interested in mutually beneficial cooperation with Iranian oil companies on projects for the development of large oil and gas fields with a proven onshore and offshore resource base, as well as entering geological exploration units after examination of their geological structure and resource potential.

During the period 2015–2017 Rosneft has significantly expanded its presence in the Asia-Pacific market. In 2016, through the acquisition of Bashneft, Rosneft gained access to the Myanmar energy market within the framework of the development and exploration project of the EP-4 unit located in the central oil and gas basin of Myanmar. Rosneft also plans to enter the Indonesian market. In May, Rosneft signed an agreement with the Indonesian company Pertamina on the construction by 2022 of a Tuban oil refinery in Indonesia with a capacity of about 15 million tons per year and costing about $13 billion. According to the agreement, Rosneft would control 45% of the project. The construction of such facility would allow the direct supply of Russian oil to Indonesian partners without intermediaries, and would also ensure greater economic efficiency of oil refining in Indonesia.

In August 2017, Rosneft implemented a deal to buy the second-largest power plant in India. The company purchased a 49% share of Essar Oil Limited (EOL), thus obtaining a share in the high-tech oil refinery Vadinar in the city of Vadinar (state Gujarat) with a capacity of 20 million tons and a processing depth estimated at 95.5% [Rosneft, 2016b].
Rosneft actively involves partners from the Asia-Pacific region to collaborate in joint projects in the territory of Eastern Siberia in order to provide them with an additional volume of investment, as well as for the purpose of risk sharing.

During the period 2015–2017 Rosneft continued to expand its marketing assets, entering new foreign markets. In November 2015 the company acquired a 100% share of the Armenian company Petrol Market LLC for $40 million, having received a network of filling stations and a tank farm in Armenia.

Moreover in 2017 Rosneft received additional retail assets for foreign oil sales in India after the acquisition of a share in EOL, which has an extensive retail distribution network in India that contains 3,500 filling stations. At the same time, the company sold a number of inefficient marketing assets, including those located in Ukraine.

Table 2. Structure and Geography of Lukoil and Rosneft Foreign Expansion as of 2017

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Company</th>
<th><strong>Expansion Exploration and Production</strong></th>
<th><strong>Rosneft</strong></th>
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<td><em>Iraq</em></td>
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<td><em>Saudi Arabia</em></td>
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<td>South-Western Hissar project</td>
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<td>Project Shah Deniz</td>
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<td>Interested to take part in development of the Absheron project</td>
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<td><em>Abkhazia</em></td>
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<td>The project for the development of the Gadautsky license area on the Black Sea shelf</td>
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<td><em>Turkmenistan</em></td>
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<td><em>Norway</em></td>
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<td>Project PL713 for the development of the license area on the Norwegian shelf in the Barents Sea</td>
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<td><strong>African Region</strong></td>
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<td>Project Meleihia</td>
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<td>Project WEEM</td>
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<td>Project WEEM Extension</td>
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<td><em>Egypt</em></td>
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<td>Project Zohr (joined in 2017)</td>
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<td>Company</td>
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<td><strong>Ganna</strong></td>
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<td>Project Deep Water Tano Cape Three Points</td>
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<td><strong>Nigeria</strong></td>
<td>Mozambique</td>
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<td>OML-140 Nsiko</td>
<td>Licensed areas A5-B, Z5-C and Z5-D</td>
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<td>OML-140 BSWAp</td>
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<td><strong>Latin America</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Venezuela</strong></td>
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<td>Project Carabobo-2,4 (JV Petrovictoria)</td>
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<td>Project Junin-6 (JV PetroMiranda)</td>
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<td>Cardium Project</td>
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<td><strong>Asia-Pacific Region</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Vietnam</strong></td>
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<td>Unit 06.1 (the Lantai and Lando fields)</td>
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<td><strong>Myanmar</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Foreign Oil Refineries</strong></td>
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<td><strong>European Region</strong></td>
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<td>The Romanian Petrotel Ploiesti refinery</td>
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<td><strong>European Region</strong></td>
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<td>Zeeland refinery</td>
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<td>Burgas refinery</td>
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<td>ISAB refinery</td>
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<td><strong>Germany</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Gelsenkirchen refinery</strong></td>
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<td>Bayernoil refinery</td>
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<td>MiRO refinery</td>
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<td>PCK Raffinerie GmbH</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Company & Lukoil & Rosneft & 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) & Belarus 
Mozyrsk refinery & 
Asia-Pacific Region & China 
Tianjin refinery (stage of technical backstopping for the project) & 
India & & 
Vadinar refinery (joined the project in 2017) & 
Indonesia & & 
Tuban refinery (implementation is planned) & 

Foreign Distribution Network & 
Overseas petrol stations & 2,706 pieces, or 51% of the total number of the company’s petrol stations & 

Source: Lukoil [2016; 2017], Rosneft [2016a, 2017].

Conclusion

Despite the strengthening of anti-Russian sanctions aimed at destabilizing the Russian fuel and energy complex, currently the country’s largest oil and gas TNCs continue to effectively expand their capital abroad and strengthen their presence in the energy markets of the most promising regions, especially in the exploration and production segments. However, it should be noted that the new restrictions imposed by the U.S. threaten the implementation of joint foreign energy projects on production and energy infrastructure which involve technologies and services provided especially by foreign companies, not only in Russia, but also abroad. The newly implemented sanctions may force foreign companies to abandon the projects mentioned above in order to protect their assets, because in theory such companies need to exclude U.S. dollar settlements, at least, and to completely exclude ties with U.S. entities, even through affiliated structures.

Currently, within a reasonable time frame (less than four years), the impact of sanctions on the international activity of the largest Russian oil and gas companies is not so tremendous to significantly adjust their long-term development programmes. However, the sanctions have a “cumulative effect,” and the negative consequences may be fully assessed only in the long term. The main goal of the sanctions against Russia is to block opportunities for the future growth and development of Russia’s key economic sectors.

The results are mixed. On the one hand, additional sanctions make Russia an “unattractive partner” by restricting the international oil and gas expansion of Russian energy companies and by limiting foreign funding for joint projects. These measures narrow Russia’s ability to obtain modern technologies. On the other hand, the
sanctions have a stimulating impact on the accelerated implementation of the import substitution programme and the development of a domestic base for the production of modern energy technologies. Moreover, although the sanctions are officially directed against Russia, they are to some degree extraterritorial and their application will have a direct negative effect on all partners of Russian companies, affecting their business interests and creating additional costs and losses. In the modern world it is hardly possible to cause maximum damage to one side while minimally affecting other players in the market. The current stage of globalization is characterized by a large number of cooperative and other types of ties which are difficult to foresee and calculate.

That is why the position of the western partners and, above all, significant European oil and gas market players, will largely determine the structure and prospects for the development of the world oil and gas market and also the participation of Russian companies in the exploration of foreign energy resources deposits, the construction of refining and distribution capacities and the search for new prospective partners from the developing world.

Protecting the interests of the country’s business has been and remains the main task of the Russian state in the face of sanctions implemented on the part of the leading western developed countries.

References


Влияние антироссийских санкций США на зарубежную экспансию крупнейших российских нефтегазовых ТНК ПАО «Лукойл» и ПАО «Роснефть» (инвестиционная стратегия крупнейших российских компаний нефтегазового сектора в условиях ужесточения санкционных ограничений) ¹

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Статья посвящена вопросу воздействия антироссийских санкций, введенных США, включая новые санкционные меры от 2 августа 2017 г., на зарубежную инвестиционную деятельность крупнейших российских нефтегазовых ТНК – ПАО «Лукойл» и ПАО «Роснефть» в частности. Авторы раскрывают содержание обновленных санкционных ограничений, выявляют возможные последствия данных ограничений для развития ТЭК России и зарубежной экспансии капиталов крупнейших нефтегазовых ТНК, анализируют зарубежную инвестиционную деятельность российских нефтегазовых ТНК ПАО «Лукойл» и ПАО «Роснефть» в санкционный период.

Ключевые слова: санкции; нефтегазовый сектор России; зарубежная инвестиционная деятельность российских нефтегазовых ТНК; ПАО «Лукойл»; ПАО «Роснефть»


Источники


¹ Статья поступила в редакцию в июне 2018 г.


Cooperation for Development

The Soviet Union in the United Nations Development System

M. Larionova

Abstract

The study of the evolution of international cooperation for development in the United Nations (UN) system from 1946 to 2000 reveals that political and ideological contradictions and priorities exerted significant influence on the system’s construction, creating barriers to negotiating resolutions and forging decisions and constraining progress in development cooperation.

This article reviews the USSR’s initiatives and positions on concrete areas of cooperation, drawing on an analysis of the resolutions and records of the meetings of the UN General Assembly (GA) and the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). It highlights the main trends and cases reflecting the Soviet Union’s priorities and its role in the evolution of cooperation for development under UN auspices.

Content analysis of meeting records helps to trace the official positions of delegations, problems in advancing cooperation, opportunities for building coalitions, difficulties forging compromises and constraints stemming from the failure to pursue an integrated and comprehensive approach to the resolution of development and international financial/economic problems.

The USSR actively contributed to deliberations and decision-making on a wide range of cooperation for development issues, promoting the primacy of the principles of national policy, developing countries’ sovereignty over their natural resources and the right of their exploitation, development of countries’ economic potential through support for industrialization, technology transfer, agricultural and national cadre development, and the creation of the necessary external conditions for the mobilization of developing countries’ own resources.

These principles, the pursuit of change in the international balance of economic power and the drive for an expansion of influence defined the Soviet Union’s initiatives and its support for developing countries on such issues as global negotiations aimed at the establishment of a new international economic order as proposed by the Group of 77 (G77) – this call was blocked by the Group of 7 (G7) using the Versailles formula to safeguard the independence of the specialized agencies.

Inability to allocate substantial amounts of funding significantly weakened the USSR’s influence on decisions defining the parameters of development support mechanisms. Telling examples include the failure to promote the establishment of the UN capital development fund or to counter the assertion of the dollar monopoly in the UN cooperation for development system.

The solidarity of the USSR and the U.S. with their respective allies frequently led to opposition on issues...
which did not contradict either of the opponents’ interests. A case in point is the struggle around the participation of the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany in the UN conference on human environment in Stockholm.

Distrust and tough opposition caused multiple lost opportunities, including a chance to generate additional resources for development through the conversion of resources released by disarmament to peaceful needs.

At the end of the 1990s, following the economic crises of the previous decades, a series of external debt crises and assessment of accumulated data on aid effectiveness and donor fatigue, the principles promoted by the USSR in the first decades of cooperation for development were reflected in the Agenda for Development and the Millennium Declaration.

Key words: cooperation for development; the UN; General Assembly; ECOSOC; UNDP; international financial institutions; the USSR


The study of the evolution of international cooperation for development in the United Nations (UN) system from 1946 to 2000 [Larionova, Safonkina, 2018] reveals that political and ideological contradictions and priorities exerted significant influence on the construction of the system, creating barriers to negotiating resolutions and forging decisions and thereby constraining progress in development cooperation. The review of the USSR’s initiatives and positions on concrete areas of cooperation presented in this article draws on analysis of the resolutions and records of the meetings of the General Assembly (GA) and the UN’s Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). Content analysis of the records of GA meetings helps to trace the official positions of delegations, problems in advancing cooperation, opportunities for building coalitions, difficulties in forging compromises and constraints stemming from the failure to pursue an integrated and comprehensive approach to resolution of international development, financial and economic problems. While this article cannot present a comprehensive picture of the USSR’s interaction with its UN partners on the entire spectrum of development issues, it does highlight the main trends and cases that illustrate the Soviet Union’s priorities and role in the evolution of cooperation for development under UN auspices.

Formation of Development Cooperation Instruments: Missed Opportunities

The USSR actively participated in decision-making, often supporting the proposals of developing countries advanced by the Group of 77 (G77), putting forward its own initiatives, and openly opposing decisions affecting the interests of the Union. From the very beginning of the creation of development cooperation mechanisms, the position of the USSR reflected its aspiration for strengthening the UN bodies. Thus, at the second session the USSR proposed a resolution on the implementation of recommendations on economic
and social matters\(^2\) aimed at raising the level of compliance with GA recommendations. The goal was to create a feedback system: the GA formulates recommendations in accordance with Article 64 of the UN Charter, the secretary-general reports to the ECOSOC, and the ECOSOC reports to the GA on implementation of ECOSOC and GA recommendations by member countries. The USSR did not participate in the creation of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) or the International Monetary Fund (IMF), therefore, it did not use the GA and ECOSOC platform to influence the policies of these organizations, which it viewed as being influenced by the United States. For example, when voting on agreements with specialized organizations (World Health Organization (WHO), Universal Postal Union (UPU), International Telecommunication Union, IBRD and IMF) [UN, 1947], the USSR proposed separate votes on each organization and while it did not object to agreements with the IBRD and the IMF, it abstained from voting on them. At the third session, when discussing the resolution on economic development of underdeveloped countries [UN, 1948a], the USSR supported the proposal to facilitate the process of obtaining IBRD loans, expressing hope that the resolution would spur the ECOSOC’s work, while at the same time stressing that the Bank did not pay enough attention to underdeveloped countries, and instead acted as a U.S. tool assisting economically developed countries [UN, 1948b].

The desire to change the balance of power in international economic relations and expand its own influence, the need for resources to restore its own economy after World War II, a frankly critical attitude toward the IBRD and the IMF, and confrontation with the U.S. and its allies were all reflected in the position of the USSR at the first stage of the formation of development cooperation mechanisms. A good example is the discussion on the draft resolution of the seventh session of the GA on financing economic development of underdeveloped countries. The draft resolution contained several issues, including the right of countries to exploit their own natural wealth and resources,\(^3\) the establishment of appropriate and fair prices on the international market and the establishment of the International Finance Corporation (IFC). Discussion and voting went on separately for each of the projects. The United States and its allies opposed the right to free exploitation of natural wealth and resources, fearing the nationalization of the property of private investors without guarantees of mandatory compensation from governments [UN, 1952a, pp. 496–8]. For its part, the USSR did not support the creation of the IFC, believing that: “the assistance which the United States claims to give in reality causes a deterioration in the position of the under-developed countries, since it is accompanied by the imposition on those countries of conditions which place them under the economic, political and even military control of the United States... The credits granted to certain underdeveloped countries by

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\(^3\) Put forward by developing countries and actively promoted by India, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, and some Latin American and Asian delegations. When the United States voted, its allies (Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Sweden, the Union of South Africa, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland) also opposed. The USSR, the Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republic, China, Czechoslovakia, Greece, Haiti, Poland, Turkey and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic abstained.
banks under United States control are being used mainly to expand the production of strategic raw materials, such as uranium, not for the effective economic development of those countries. The USSR delegation is not inclined to overestimate the potentialities of either the special fund or the international finance corporation, which are to be established under the resolutions just adopted by the General Assembly. It is a foregone conclusion that these credit institutions, if established, will operate under the aegis and control of United States financial institutions such as the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and will therefore not bring about the desired improvement in the financing of the underdeveloped countries” [UN, 1952a, p. 502]. For the same reason, the USSR did not support funding under the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance [UN, 1952b], considering it “a link in what is known as President Truman’s Point Four programme, and is in no way designed to promote the development of under-developed countries. It is bound up with so-called military assistance, and comprises a system of measures, whose purpose is the subjection of the economies of the under-developed countries to United States control and the use of their territories for the establishment of military bases and military springboards, in fulfillment of the aggressive plans of the United States.”

As a priority in development assistance the USSR promoted enhancing economic potential of underdeveloped countries based on exploitation of national natural resources, creating industry and developing agriculture. It also supported the inalienable sovereignty of developing countries over their natural resources and their right to exploit them [UN, 1972, p. 9] as well as the creation of external conditions for development. This approach is reflected in the support given by the USSR and the socialist countries to the Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, the programme of action for its implementation [UN, 1974a] and the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States [UN, 1974b]. These documents contained principles which were supposed to provide internal and external conditions for the development of states: the sovereign equality of all states, the self-determination of all peoples, the right to adopt the economic system most suitable for development, inalienable sovereignty over natural resources and all economic activities, regulation and supervision of activities of multinational corporations, assistance without political conditions, transformation of the international monetary system to assist developing countries, preferential and non-reciprocal treatment for developing countries, and provision of access to the achievements of science and technology.

These priorities, as well as the socialist ideology and nature of the economic structure, determined the position of the USSR on the IFC and the role of private capital. When negotiating funding mechanisms, the USSR invariably insisted on the preferential use of the UN technical assistance administration system instead of distributing the funds of the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance between the UN and specialized agencies. At the discussion of the draft resolution of the ninth session on the international flow of private capital to underdeveloped countries [UN, 1954a], the Soviet delegation noted that “the draft resolution submitted by the Second Committee is motivated by these very interests of the exports of capital, and not by the interests of under-developed countries. Foreign capital is directed to those branches of the economy of under-developed countries in which it can bring the highest profits and not to the branches which need to be developed in order to achieve a multilateral development of that economy. It is enough to point out that
the result of the export of capital to underdeveloped countries, and to the Latin-American countries in particular, is the promotion of a lop-sided, unilateral development of their economy. Moreover, many data were adduced in the Second Committee to show that the exporters of foreign capital were deriving from the underdeveloped countries considerably larger sums in profits and interest than the amount of capital which they invested in those countries. The resolution is aimed at creating more favorable conditions for foreign investments in these countries, but at the same time, the draft resolution contains no provisions protecting the interests of the underdeveloped countries and, in particular, relating to the need to protect national industries from the ruinous competition of foreign capital, to the promotion of the development of the domestic resources which are the basis of a country’s economic independence” [UN, 1954b, p. 478].

The inability to allocate significant amounts of funding substantially reduced the USSR’s impact on decisions regarding the formation of development cooperation instruments. This was clearly manifested in the process of creating a special UN fund for economic development [UN, 1954c]. The decision to establish a special fund was first made in 1954 at the ninth session; discussions about the goals, modalities of work and methods of financing lasted for several years, ending with the creation of the Special Fund at the 13th session of the GA. Its resources (no more than $100 million per year) were sufficient to prepare projects that could later be financed from other sources, including private capital and World Bank funds, but were not at all sufficient to finance capital development projects. The desire of the USSR and developing countries to further transform the fund from a technical assistance instrument to a capital development fund was not met, since the main donors were not ready to support it, and the USSR simply did not have adequate resources. Supporting the proposal of developing countries that “a steadily increasing or a fixed percentage of the resources of the Special Fund should be allocated for the direct financing of industrial construction in under-developed countries on a refundable basis and certainly on favourable terms,” the Soviet Union itself offered to provide technical assistance “through contributions in its national currency, research and planning, lending Soviet experts, receiving students for instruction and practical raining, and providing educational and laboratory equipment for the underdeveloped countries” [UN, 1958a, pp. 383–4].

In the debates about the creation of the fund and financing of development programmes, the Soviet Union tried to resist the assertion of the dollar monopoly in the UN development system. The USSR’s position on the possibility of making contributions to the fund in national currencies or in other currencies at the request of the fund’s members is generally reflected in the soft wording of Paragraph 47 on financing: “Contributions are made by governments in currencies transferable to the greatest possible extent into a currency readily usable by the Fund.” However, the financial and economic strength of the U.S., the persistent promotion of the dollar as a currency for the budget by the U.S. and

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4 Article 6 of Resolution 1240: Projects might be in one or a combination of the following forms: surveys, research and personnel training and demonstration, including pilot projects.

5 For details see Larionova and Safonkina [2018].

6 In 1965, it was decided that the Special Fund and the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance would be merged into the United Nations Development Programme.

7 In particular, the United States initiated resolution A/RES/1021 (XI) on the utilization of convertible currencies when governments provide funding in excess of $500,000. The USSR opposed, as well as when coordinating the budgets of funds and programmes [UN, 1956].
its partners and its dominant position as a donor were of decisive importance, ultimately, development budgets were made in dollars.

**Allies and Opponents**

The landmark decisions on development assistance adopted at the 16th session (1961) were perceived by the USSR in different ways. Supporting the decision on the “Development Decade” [UN, 1961a] and the establishment of the World Food Programme [UN, 1961b] on a pilot basis, the Soviet Union objected to setting a goal of allocating 1% of the total national income by all countries [UN, 1961c]. The USSR considered setting the mandatory limit as a violation of the principle of voluntary participation in assistance programmes. The Soviet Union shared the position of the developing countries that “the colonial Powers must compensate the under-developed countries for some, at least, of the wealth which they obtained as a result of exploiting the national resources and the population of the under-developed countries” [UN, 1961d, p. 1110]. The USSR opposed the mobilization of food surpluses for distribution in economically less-developed countries [UN, 1960], considering that the supply of surpluses creates the risk of imbalances in prices and supplies in commodity markets and threatens the marketing of goods and the development of agricultural sectors in developing countries.

The USSR put forward the idea of convening the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) at the 18th session, advocating it as a mechanism for the development of trade between countries with different state systems and a first step toward the creation of an international trade organization. The proposal did not find support from the members of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), however UNCTAD became a key UN body in the area of trade and development [UN, 1965a].

Together with other socialist countries, the USSR advocated the industrial development of developing countries, the expansion of the scope of industrial projects and technical assistance, and the creation of a specialized organization of industrial development. Statements by official representatives of the USSR are often viewed as ideology and propaganda [Marchowski, Schultz, 1987], but they nevertheless characterize the Union priorities and scale of aid. In the early 1970s, the USSR had agreements on assistance and cooperation with 45 developing countries, assisted in building and expanding about 860 different projects, of which more than 400 were already in operation. The amount of credit on preferential terms offered by the Soviet Union for the purposes of economic, scientific and technical development to developing countries for the period from 1963 to 1971 had almost doubled and exceeded 5.6 billion roubles. Moreover, about 90% of those funds were channeled into the development of production, including three-quarters into industry and power [UN, 1973a, p. 6].

The creation of the United Nations Industrial Development Organization [UN, 1965b], supporting both developed and developing countries, has become an important contribution to cooperation for industrialization [UN, 1965b, pp. 324–7]. The USSR consistently defended the universal character of the draft resolution, unsuccessfully seeking to involve the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in this work [UN, 1966a, pp. 10–1].

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8 For details, see Larionova and Safonkina [2018].
Allied solidarity often influenced the position of the USSR on resolutions whose essence in general did not contradict the interests of the Union. For example, when discussing the members of the preparatory committee for the development of an international strategy for the second UN Development Decade, the United States pushed through wording on the membership of the committee which allowed the Federal Republic of Germany to be involved [UN, 1968a, Para. 1 and 2]. The USSR’s amendment was rejected, the emotional statement by the representative of the Union remained unanswered [UN, 1968b, pp. 4–5] and the delegation voted against the resolution. The same struggle unfolded regarding the participation of the GDR in the UN Conference on the Human Environment. During the discussion on the preparations for the Stockholm conference [UN, 1971], the USSR and other socialist states made an amendment proposing to include the GDR as an official participant. The amendment was rejected in the Second Committee. At the 26th session of the GA the USSR, the socialist states and a number of developing states supported the principle of universality of participation in the conference, and 43 delegations voted in favour of the amendment. However, the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia strongly objected, adhering instead to the Vienna formula. GDR experts were invited to participate in the conference and take part in its preparation at the working level. The struggle irrationality and wastefulness is striking. It would have been much more efficient to use resources to work together given that four years later, in 1973, the process of admitting the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany to the UN was completed.

Beat Swords Into Ploughshares

Given the lack of official data, it is difficult to give an accurate assessment of the funds allocated by the USSR for development assistance. According to some calculations, from 1954 to 1991, the volume of Soviet aid amounted to more than $78 billion [Machowski, Schultz, 1987]. Certainly, this is significantly less than developed countries allocated. For example, development assistance provided by the United States government after World War II exceeded $75 billion by 1973 [UN, 1973a, p. 8]. According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), official U.S. assistance for the period 1960–1991 was $556.4 billion.

In an effort to increase opportunities for assistance, the USSR proposed at the 13th session of the UN GA (1958) an initiative to stop testing atomic and hydrogen weapons, to reduce the military budgets of the USSR, the U.S., the U.K. and France by 10–15% and to use part of the savings to assist underdeveloped countries [UN, 1958b]. The United States and its allies strongly opposed the proposal.

Eventually joint work and mutual concessions made it possible to agree on the text and adopt in 1962 a declaration on the conversion of the resources released by disarmament.

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9 Articles 81–83 of the 1969 Vienna Convention. In accordance with the Vienna formula, member states of the United Nations or of any of the specialized agencies or parties to the Statute of the International Court of Justice, and any other state invited by the General Assembly of the United Nations may become parties to the Convention.

10 Such a hope was expressed by the rapporteur of the Second Committee, introducing the draft resolution on the conversion to peaceful needs of the resources released by disarmament.
ment [UN, 1962a]. Considering the approval of the declaration as a significant success, the representative of the USSR said: “It is significant that it was drafted jointly by the Soviet Union and the United States, that is to say, by the two great Powers which bear the greatest responsibility for the fate of the world... We hope, in this connection, that the Soviet Union’s constructive ideas for a basic economic programme for disarmament, which are reflected to some extent in the Declaration, will be taken into account in any further consideration of this question by United Nations bodies” [UN, 1962b, p. 1171].

A large package of solutions aimed at bridging the gap between developed and developing countries – through, among other things, capital inflows, agrarian reforms, industrialization, eradication of illiteracy, technical assistance and training of qualified personnel – was submitted for the 18th session and included a draft resolution on the conversion of the resources released by disarmament (A/5652, Para. 9). The draft resolution was adopted unanimously. As the representative of Cyprus said: “We have here two aspects that developed during 1963 which should be taken into account: one, the growing awareness that the dangers resulting from the gap between the rich and the poor would become equal, in their threat to humanity, to nuclear war itself; and the other, the possibility of administering to both these great needs by the cut-off of production – it should not be too difficult to reach an agreement for the cut-off of production after the consensus, more or less, between the two nuclear Powers about the “nuclear umbrella.” It would be very important from the standpoint of the release of resources that this release should be connected more with the cut-off of production than with general and complete disarmament” [UN, 1963, p. 7]. Reports on the conversion of the resources released by disarmament were subsequently considered every two years until the 25th session (1970) [UN, 1966b], although they were of a rather declarative and passing character.

The USSR and its allies emphasized that disarmament and the easing of political tensions are essential conditions for the implementation of the international development strategy for the second United Nations Development Decade. Speaking at the plenary meeting of the 25th session, the representative of Poland, on behalf of the socialist countries, said: “The elimination of this disparity will require not only the greatest mobilization by individual countries of their own resources, expanded international economic, scientific and technological cooperation and foreign aid, but also the easing of political tensions and the cessation of the arms race, which is consuming the resources for the peaceful development of mankind” [UN, 1970a, pp. 4–5]. The complete disarmament, elimination of nuclear, chemical and bacteriological weapons and their means of delivery, as well as foreign military bases and the peaceful resolution of territorial disputes were formulated as the cornerstone principles and conditions for accelerating social and economic development in the joint statement of eight socialist countries on the draft document on the second Development Decade [UN, 1970b]. The relevant provisions were reflected in the international strategy.

However, the USSR’s proposal in 1973 to reduce the military budgets of the permanent members of the UN Security Council by 10% and to use part of the savings to assist developing countries [UN, 1973b] caused a strong negative reaction, even though in May

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11 The proposal to reduce military budgets by 10% envisaged a one-time reduction of the official budgets of the permanent members of the Security Council from the 1973 level and allocation of a certain part of the funds thus released for development purposes. According to calculations, this could make it possible to
1972 the United States and the USSR had signed an agreement on limiting strategic weapons. The United States, Great Britain, France and their allies questioned the practicality, realism, verifiability, possibility of agreement on the criteria for considering the size of the budget, and the expediency of establishing a direct link between the possible reduction of state military budgets and the obligation to increase government allocations to assist developing countries. The representative of the Chinese delegation accused the USSR of hypocrisy in its proposals and the desire “to cover up [its] own arms expansion and war preparations and shift the responsibility for opposing disarmament on to other countries” [UN, 1973a, p. 11]. The proposal was strongly supported by the Third World countries and the draft resolution was adopted by 83 votes in favour, with two against and 38 abstentions. But the hopes for its implementation were clearly not destined to come true.

The question was again raised five years later at the 33rd session [UN, 1978] when negotiations on a new treaty between the USSR and the U.S. on the limitation of strategic offensive arms had been almost completed. The decision to study the issue of disarmament and development, including the proposal to create an international disarmament fund for development, was included in the agenda as part of a large package of documents on disarmament [UN, 1979a]. In 1982, the GA decided to include the issue of the relationship between disarmament and development as a separate item in its agenda starting from the 40th session [UN, 1952a].

The languid existence of this issue ended with the 1987 International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development. The conference was held on the eve of the signing by Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan of the permanent Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF) in December 1987. The United States did not take part in the conference and refused to take action to implement its decisions. In November 1987, at the 42nd session of the GA, the representative of the United States made a statement: “The United states delegation wishes to announce that it will not participate in whatever action the General Assembly takes on agenda item 69. As is commonly known, the United States believes that disarmament and development are two distinct issues that cannot be considered appropriately in terms of an interrelationship between these two disparate subjects. Consequently, the United States declined to participate in the recent International Conference on this matter, and it refrained from participating in the drafting of draft resolution A/C.1/42/L.74 in the First Committee, the subsequent debate on it in the Committee and its adoption in that Committee. For allocate additional assistance in the amount of at least $1 billion. The GA was supposed to establish an ad hoc committee to distribute funds allocated for development by reducing military budgets.

12 China and Albania.
13 Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Congo, Denmark, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Guinea, Guyana, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Japan, Luxembourg, Malawi, Mauritania, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Portugal, South Africa, Sweden, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America and Zambia.
14 START 2 was signed by U.S. President Jimmy Carter and secretary-general of the CPSU Central Committee, Leonid Brezhnev, in Vienna on 18 June 1979 but it was not ratified by the United States.
15 France expressed its willingness to host a conference in Paris in July/August 1986 [UN, 1985] but as a result the conference took place in August/September 1987 in New York [UN, 1987a].
16 Came into force in May 1988.
those reasons, the United States delegation requests that the record of today’s proceedings reflect the fact that the United States has not participated in the consideration of agenda item 69. At the same time, our delegation takes the opportunity to state that the United States Government does not, and will not, consider itself bound or committed in any way by either the declarations in the Final Document of the recent International Conference or the terms of any resolution adopted here” [UN, 1987b, p. 13].

The signing of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START 1 in 199117 and START 2 in 199318) did not change the dynamics of the dialogue. Over the years,19 resolutions on the relationship between disarmament and development, which had become an integral part of an extensive package of disarmament issues, essentially limited themselves to recalling the provisions of the Final Act and calling for measures to implement the action programme adopted at the conference, directing part of the funds released through the implementation of agreements on disarmament and limiting armaments for socio-economic development [UN, 1996].

Mutual mistrust and tough confrontation became the causes for the missed opportunities to attract additional resources for the implementation of development objectives.

The Thorny Path to Restructuring International Economic Relations

The principles and approaches of the USSR, based on the view that development was possible only in the context of international economic relations built on a fair, equitable and democratic basis, determined the position of socialist countries on the issue of global negotiations aimed at “establishing a new system of international economic relations based on the principles of equality and mutual benefit” [UN, 1979b, pp. 1925–6] initiated by the G77.

The USSR has consistently advocated an integrated and coordinated approach to solving the problems that hindered growth and exacerbated the steady decline of the global economy, including “halting the outflow of real resources from the developing countries resulting from the activities of private foreign capital, primarily the transnational corporations, and from the policy of protectionism, the lowering of world commodity prices, the voluntarist financial policy of the leading Western countries, the unjust international monetary system, the export of inflation to the developing countries” [UN, 1982b, p. 1926]. On this issue, the countries of the G77, the USSR, the socialist countries and China spoke from common positions, very clearly articulated by the representative of China at the 37th session of the GA: “The most widespread and persistent economic recession since the war originated in the developed countries. It has, however, brought serious and unprecedented difficulties to everyone, and to the developing countries in particular. The turbulence in the international financial and monetary system has further aggravated the sense of crisis. On the contrary, it is precisely the malfunctioning of and imbalances in existing international relations that constitute important factors in aggravating the economic crisis. As the

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17 Came into force in 1994.
18 Ratified by the United States in 1996 and by Russia in 2000.
19 Every year up to the 55th session, inclusive.
developing countries have consistently maintained, only a radical reform of international economic relations and the establishment of a new international economic order can create the conditions necessary for the recovery of the world economy and, in particular, for the development of the developing countries. The global negotiations are an important effort aimed at achieving this goal” [UN, 1982b, p. 1923].

The question crawled from year to year to the 45th session, inclusive. But, in fact, comprehensive negotiations never started. At the 40th session, it was decided that the draft agenda of the 41st session would include negotiations on international economic cooperation for development. Further, development issues were discussed mainly in the context of preparing a new international development strategy for the fourth UN Development Decade: development of technology, power, agriculture and industry in connection with relevant industrial programs; solving external debt problems in the framework of resolutions on monetary issues; and problems of state responsibility for economic policies in connection with the review of the implementation of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States. These long years of negotiations about negotiations ended in a deadlock due to the position of the United States and its partners [UN, 1982b, pp. 1922–4], which insisted on “guarantees of the independence of specialized agencies” 20 according to the Versailles G7 formula [G7, 1982].

Indeed, the IMF and the IBRD, established as specialized structures of the UN, quickly achieved functional independence [IMF, 1947] and as a result the relationship between these institutions and the UN has never worked in accordance with the original intent. Moreover, “the richest and most powerful states effectively limit the UN’s role in global economic governance. For this reason, the ECOSOC was never able to effectively perform its task of coordinating the political and economic aspects of global affairs... As a result, national governments, corporations and the institutions themselves were deprived of the opportunity to learn about more integrated approaches to the governance of international financial and economic affairs and transactions that may have developed if the ECOSOC had been able to play its intended role” [Bradlow, 2018].

After 1991

After the collapse of the USSR, the Russian Federation became the successor of the Union in the UN, assuming all its rights and obligations. In 1992, Russia became a member of the IMF and the World Bank. Russia’s integration into the world economic community took place in the midst of a deep crisis of the national economy. In 1992, large-scale reforms were launched to facilitate the transition from a planned to a market economy, and a long period of recession began. In 1992–1999, Russia’s gross domestic product fell by 36%, and the share of the Russian economy in the global economy decreased from 3.2% in 1992 to 1.9% in 1999. The crisis severely limited the resources available to implement international commitments to assist development. The Russian Federation began to receive international assistance and turned from a donor country into a recipient country. The restoration of

20 IMF, WB and GATT.
21 For the details on the G7’s position, see Larionova and Safonkina [2018].
Russia’s donor potential began only in the 2000s with the beginning of the growth of the national economy [Larionova, Rakhmangulov, 2016; Kolmar, Sakharov, 2019].

Transformation in the international economic system affected cooperation for development. In the 1990s, developing countries several times raised the question of the impact of this evolution on economic growth, believing that support extended to Eastern and Central European countries could lead to an outflow of, or decrease in, development assistance to developing countries whose economies were also affected by changes in economic relations with the former socialist countries [UN, 1991a].

In 1994, the elaboration of a comprehensive agenda for development began. It has absorbed all the issues, including the impact of globalization and the end of the Cold War on addressing development challenges. The Agenda for Development [UN, 1991b], adopted on 20 June 1997 without a vote at the 103rd plenary session of the GA, stated that economic development, social development and environmental protection are interdependent and mutually complementary components of sustainable development, for which peace and security are required. Russia participated in drafting the Agenda provisions that included “acknowledging the primacy of national policy and measures in the development process and calling for action toward a dynamic and enabling international economic environment, including an open, rule-based, equitable, secure, non-discriminatory, transparent and predictable multilateral trading system and promotion of investment and transfer of technology and knowledge, as well as for enhanced international cooperation in the mobilization and provision of financial resources for development from all sources, the strategy for durable solutions to the external debt and debt-servicing problems of developing countries and the efficient use of available resources” [UN, 1992, Para. 2]. The Agenda for Development reflected all the priorities and principles that the USSR had promoted for many years. Russia supported the document.

Conclusion

The USSR actively contributed to deliberations and decision-making on a wide range of cooperation for development issues, promoting the principles of the primacy of national policies, developing countries’ inalienable sovereignty over their natural resources and the right of their exploitation, development of the countries’ economic potential through support to industrialization, technology transfers, agricultural and national cadre development, and the creation of the necessary external conditions to mobilize developing countries’ own resources.

These principles, the pursuit of change in the balance of power in international economic relations and the drive for expanded influence defined the nature of the Soviet Union’s initiatives and its support of the developing countries on such issues as global negotiations aimed at establishment of a new international economic order as proposed by the G77 but blocked by the G7 Versailles formula.

Inability to allocate substantial amounts of funding significantly weakened the USSR’s influence on decisions defining the parameters of development support mechanisms. Telling examples include the failure to promote the establishment of the UN capital development fund or to counter the assertion of the dollar monopoly in the UN cooperation for development system.
The solidarity of the USSR and the U.S. with their respective allies frequently led to opposition on issues which did not contradict either of the opponents’ interests. A case in point is the struggle around the participation of the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany in the UN conference on human environment in Stockholm.

Distrust and tough opposition caused multiple lost opportunities including a chance to generate additional resources for development through the conversion of resources released by disarmament to peaceful needs.

At the end of the 1990s, following the economic crises of the previous decades, a series of external debt crises and assessment of accumulated data on aid effectiveness and “donor fatigue” [Keeley, 2012], the principles promoted by the USSR in the first decades of cooperation for development were reflected in the Agenda for Development and the Millennium Declaration.

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Исследования эволюции международного сотрудничества в целях развития под эгидой ООН в период с 1946 по 2000 г. показывает, что политические и идеологические противоречия и приоритеты участников оказывали значительное влияние на процесс формирования системы, создавали барьеры в согласовании подходов и решений, становились сдерживающим фактором для прогресса в содействии развитию.

Представленное в статье исследование позиций и инициатив СССР по конкретным направлениям сотрудничества опирается на анализ текстов резолюций и официальных отчетов ключевых органов ООН, прежде всего Генеральной Ассамблеи (ГА) и Экономического и Социального Совета ООН (ЭКОСОС). Основная задача работы состояла в том, чтобы проследить тенденции и представить характерные примеры, которые позволяют читателю сформировать понимание приоритетов и роли СССР в эволюции международного сотрудничества в целях развития под эгидой ООН.

Контент-анализ текстов официальных отчетов заседаний ГА позволяет выявить официальные позиции делегаций, проблемы выстраивания сотрудничества, возможности формирования коалиций, трудности поиска компромиссов и ограничения, связанные с невозможностью реализации интегрированного подхода к решению проблем развития и международных финансовых и экономических вопросов.

Анализ показывает, что СССР активно участвовал в формировании решений по содействию развитию, продвигая принципы примата национальной политики, неотъемлемого суверенитета развивающихся стран над своими естественными ресурсами и права на их эксплуатацию, развития собственного экономического потенциала на основе индустриализации и передачи технологий, развития сельского хозяйства и национальных кадров, создания внешних условий для мобилизации собственных ресурсов развивающихся стран.

Эти принципы, а также стремление изменить расстановку сил в международных экономических отношениях и расширить собственное влияние определяли характер инициатив СССР и поддержку предложений развивающихся стран по таким вопросам, как глобальные переговоры, направленные на «создание новой системы международных экономических отношений, основанной на принципах равноправия и взаимной выгоды», инициированных Группой 77 и заблокированных «версальской формулой» «Группы семи».

Невозможность выделения значительных объемов финансирования существенно ослабляла влияние СССР на решения о формировании инструментов содействия развитию, наглядным примером чего стали нежизнеспособность идей учреждения Фонда капитального развития ООН и неспособность противостоять утверждению монополии доллара в системе развития ООН.

Солидарность СССР со своими союзниками, с одной стороны, и США с их партнерами, с другой, зачастую приводила к противоречию по вопросам, суть которых не противоречила интересам ни той ни другой стороны. Например, является борьба вокруг участия ГДР и ФРГ в Конференции ООН по проблемам окружающей человека среды. Недоверие и жесткое противостояние стало причиной многих упущенных возможностей, в том числе при влечения дополнительных ресурсов для реализации задач развития в результате переключения на мирные нужды ресурсов, высвобождаемых в результате разоружения.

В конце 90-х годов после экономических кризисов 70-х и 80-х, нескольких кризисов внешней задолженности, анализ данных об эффективности официальной помощи развитию и накопившейся «донорской усталости» принес впервые детальное содействия развитию, нашли отражение в Повестке дня для развития и Декларации тысячелетия Организации Объединенных Наций.

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СОТРУДНИЧЕСТВО ДЛЯ РАЗВИТИЯ

Ключевые слова: сотрудничество для развития; ООН; Генеральная Ассамблея; ЭКОСОС; ПРООН; международные финансовые учреждения; СССР


Источники


Организация Объединенных Наций (ООН) (1973б) О сокращении военных бюджетов государств – постоянных членов Совета Безопасности ООН на 10 процентов и об использовании части сэкономленных средств на оказание помощи развивающимся странам. Резолюция Генеральной Ассамблеи


Leading Donors’ Approaches to SDGs Implementation¹

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Abstract

The Sustainable Development Goals, adopted by the UN General Assembly on 25 September 2015, cover a wide range of challenges faced by developing and developed countries alike. The Agenda 2030 is focused on fighting poverty in all its manifestations through the implementation of strategies for sustainable economic growth.

The SDGs are relevant on both international and national levels. This article discusses the policy of the six major foreign aid donors in achieving the SDGs both domestically and abroad. The countries selected for the analysis include three major developed donors: Germany, Canada, and Japan, as well as three new developing donors: Brazil, India, and China.

The comparative analysis was based on such aspects of the national policy aimed at achieving the SDGs as: a) SDGs inclusion into national conceptual and strategic documents; b) institutional organization and social partners engagement; c) integration of the SDG priorities into foreign aid strategies; d) official ODA motivation; e) and the quality of communication policy on the SDGs implementation.

Based on a review of the aforementioned countries’ experience in localizing the SDGs, the author makes recommendations to advance this agenda in the Russian Federation.

¹The editorial board received the article in August 2018.

The research was carried out within the framework of the RANEPA research project “Leading Donors’ Sustainable Development Goals Implementation Strategies.”
The sustainable development agenda — commonly referred to as Agenda 2030 — adopted by the United Nations General Assembly (UN GA) on 25 September 2015 defined the primary direction for global development discourse, placing social, economic and environmental concerns at the fore of the future development agenda [UN, 2015]. The UN also pledged to “leave no one behind” [Stuart, Samman, 2017], committing to fight poverty, hunger and inequality by all means necessary. Agenda 2030 includes 17 sustainable development goals (SDGs) and 169 concrete targets encompassing a wide spectrum of global development issues, from facilitating inclusive economic growth to ensuring environmental sustainability and introducing more effective natural resources exploitation models.

Attaining the SDGs is central to both multilateral and national development agendas. The distinctive feature of the SDGs compared to the millennium development goals adopted in 2001 is their focus on the issues facing both developing and developed countries.

In terms of their content, the SDGs reflect the agendas of the key global governance institutions — the Group of 20 (G20) and the BRICS grouping of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa — which are focused on ensuring strong, sustainable and balanced economic growth. They also reflect the national policy priorities of the Russian Federation, including those set out in the framework of the presidential decree “On National Goals and Strategic Objectives of the Russian Federation Through to 2024” [President of Russia, 2018].

In this regard, it seems appropriate to study the experience of the leading international assistance donors in the implementation of the SDGs at both national and international levels. The most important aspects in this context are the localization of the sustainable development goals in developing and developed countries and the modalities of SDG integration into national legislation, conceptual and strategic planning documents, as well as relevant government policies at federal and regional levels.

This article reviews the policies aimed at implementing the SDGs of the major international aid donors, both nationally and in the framework of their official development assistance (ODA) activities, and provides a comparative analysis thereof. Six countries — three major developed donors (Germany, Canada and Japan) and three emerging donors (Brazil, India and China) — were selected for the analysis. Based on the review of these countries’ experiences localizing the SDGs, recommendations are provided for performing similar work in the Russian Federation.
The results of the monitoring of the state policies on the areas touched upon in SDG 8 (decent work and economic growth) and SDG 12 (responsible consumption and production) conducted in the framework of the research project “Leading Development Assistance Donors’ Strategies for Achieving the Sustainable Development Goals” by the Centre for International Institutions Research at the Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (CIIR RANEPA) formed the basis of a comparative analysis on the following key aspects:

− inclusion of the SDG objectives into national conceptual and strategic documents and the balance between economic, social and environmental aspects of the SDGs in national sustainable development strategies or other official documents;
− institutional organization and inclusion of social partners (business, non-profit organizations, local communities, ethnic minorities, etc.);
− integration of SDG priorities into development assistance strategies;
− rationale for the selection of international assistance priorities; and
− the quality of communications policy regarding SDG implementation.

The Inclusion of SDGs 8 and 12 into National Conceptual and Strategic Documents

In most of the reviewed countries (Canada, Germany, Japan and India) national objectives and SDG implementation plans are consolidated within special documents designed specifically to meet the UN targets. Characteristic features of such documents are the adaptation of the goals to national circumstances, designation of executive bodies responsible for conducting concrete tasks and designation of specific targets with correspondent indicators and deadlines.

Germany’s Sustainable Development Strategy was published in 2016 and updated in January 2017. The document reiterates Germany’s commitment to sustainable development and sets the specific goals of the federal government with respect to each of the SDGs. The central element of the German strategy is the sustainable development management system based on concrete goals with deadlines for their implementation, indicators for continuous monitoring, a regulatory regime and the definition of the tasks for government bodies. The German authorities pledged to contribute to the achievement of all 17 sustainable development goals, both within the framework of national policy implementation and at the international level. Accordingly, the implementation processes of all 17 targets are considered to be closely interrelated. The adapted goals set out in the German sustainable development strategy and the corresponding objectives primarily concern the implementation of the SDGs at the national level [Federal Government of Germany, 2016a].

Similarly, Canada’s Federal Sustainable Development Strategy, approved in 2016, is positioned as a “primary mechanism for planning and reporting on sustainable development” at the national level [Government of Canada, 2016]. An important element of the Canadian approach is the creation of a hierarchy of responsibility with relevant
federal ministries and regional authorities having their specific targets. The federal strategy encompasses 26 government departments. The 2008 Federal Sustainable Development Act, which determines Canada’s approach to sustainability, serves as a legislative basis for the federal sustainable development strategy. Sustainable development is understood as “development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.” The basic principle of the Act is the premise that the basis of sustainable development is the effective use of natural, social and economic resources. Thus, it is vital that the decision-making process takes into account all of the aforementioned aspects of development [Government of Canada, 2008].

Developing countries also resorted to the creation of special tools aimed at achieving the SDGs. In India, the national development strategy (Collective Efforts, Inclusive Growth/“Sabka Saath Sabka Vikas”) was spearheaded by Prime Minister Narendra Modi. To implement the strategy, the government of India adopted a three-year action plan for the financial years 2017–2018 and 2019–2020. At the same time, a 15-year vision is being implemented which includes a seven-year development strategy. All documents were prepared with the active participation of Indian state-level authorities.

Brazil has adopted a different approach to integrating the SDGs into national legislation and strategic documents. The country has not issued special documents on the implementation of the SDGs. The instrument that lays the foundations for sustainable development policies in Brazil is the 2015–2019 Multi-Year Plan. Multi-year plans, according to Brazil’s constitution, are adopted every four years and define strategic goals and activities for the government, as well as outline a number of specialized programmes. The current plan includes 54 programmes and covers the whole range of issues of the country’s socio-economic and political development.

Despite the fact that the current multi-year plan was drawn up without taking into account the SDGs (as it was developed before their adoption by the UN), it obviously touches upon many aspects of sustainable development. In its voluntary report to the UN High-Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development, Brazil notes that out of 169 SDG targets only 24 are not addressed in the plan in any way, while 145 tasks are to some extent covered by it. Out of 241 target indicators, 52 are not reflected in the plan, while 189 have a high degree of correlation with Brazilian national indicators [Presidency of the Republic of Brazil, 2017]. The 2016–2019 plan itself has 1132 target indicators distributed by thematic areas [Federal Government of Brazil, 2015]. The distribution of the various components of the plan (programmes, actions, initiatives and tasks) according to their relationship to the SDGs shows that most of the planned activities are aimed at achieving SDGs 2, 3, 8 and 16 [Presidency of the Republic of Brazil, 2017].

An important aspect of national sustainable development policy is the balance of social, economic and environmental objectives, as established by the SDGs. In general, governments are guided by their national circumstances and prioritize measures that address pressing issues of national development. One of the most notable examples in
this regard is Canada’s sustainable development strategy, focused primarily on addressing environmental sustainability issues and creating social and economic prerequisites for advancement in these areas.

The basis for effective work on integrating the SDGs into the general course of national socio-economic policy is the development of a specialized system of strategic documents that has a clear hierarchical structure and includes all relevant ministries and regional authorities in the implementation of the SDGs. Such an approach allows for the inclusion of both municipal organizations, having limited organizational and information and communications technology (ICT) capabilities, and non-governmental actors, including the business community, which can become one of the primary sources of investment for sustainable development.

The Inclusion of Institutional Organization and Social Partners

The distribution of responsibilities between state authorities and the involvement of non-state actors in the implementation of national sustainable development policies are significant factors in the localization of SDGs. The institutional structure of the executive bodies involved in conducting sustainable development policies reflects the national vision of the SDGs and the priority nature of certain industries.

In all of the countries analyzed, sustainable development strategies are comprehensive in nature and involve all or most government agencies. Special coordinating bodies are being created to ensure the coherence of government actions in the field of sustainable development. At the same time, along with coordinating the activities of state bodies, specific attention should be given to safeguarding the rights and interests of non-state actors such as civil society, business, and certain social and ethnic groups. In this regard the countries selected for analysis also demonstrate at least an institutional capacity to take into account the interests of these groups.

The tasks of monitoring the implementation of Germany’s sustainable development strategy and of updating its content are entrusted to the State Secretaries’ Committee for Sustainable Development, which includes the representatives of all federal ministries. The committee provides strategic input to the work of the German government and acts as a platform for various departments to exchange information on their activities in the field of sustainable development. The Parliamentary Consultative Council on Sustainable Development, in turn, supervises the implementation of the strategy, holds discussions on sustainable development issues in the German Parliament, and is also responsible for assessing the regulatory impact of federal government decisions in this area.

Additionally, the German government cooperates with the Sustainable Development Council, an independent advisory group that has supported the federal authorities since 2001, promoting social dialogue on sustainability. It consists of 15 public figures who, by virtue of their professional and personal experience, are well acquainted
with the economic, environmental and social aspects of sustainable development in its national and international dimensions.

In Canada, the creation of a special body to coordinate national sustainable development policies was provided for under the 2008 Sustainable Development Act [Government of Canada, 2008]. The Sustainable Development Advisory Council, chaired by the minister of the environment, includes one representative from each province or territory, as well as three representatives each from aboriginal peoples, environmental non-governmental organizations, business associations and trade unions. Thus, the council serves to ensure both the consistency of the national sustainable development policies at all levels of government and the inclusion of non-state actors into decision-making processes.

Japan’s work on the implementation of the SDGs at both national and international levels formally involves the entire government. The SDG Promotion Office, headed by the prime minister of Japan, was created to monitor and coordinate the efforts of state agencies. The membership of the office includes all the current ministers. In addition to coordinating and monitoring the activities of state bodies in the field of sustainable development, the office interacts with the representatives of business, NGOs, academia and regional authorities both in Japan and abroad.

Taking into account the interests of the social partners is the predominant trend in the work of public authorities in the context of adapting the SDGs to national development priorities. As noted above, the involvement of non-state actors in the process of developing, adopting and executing decisions can be a significant mechanism for organizing, promoting and financing activities in the field of sustainable development.

Integration of SDGs into International Development Assistance Strategies

As the SDGs are characterized by the universality of the issues they aim to tackle, the goals have both national and international dimensions. Table 1 shows the data on the official development assistance (ODA) of the countries analyzed in this paper.

Table 1. Volumes of Official Development Assistance from Germany, Canada, Japan, Brazil, India and China ($ billions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>ODA Volume</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>24.7 (2016)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>4.34 (2016)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>10.41 (2016)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>0.396 (2013)</td>
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<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>1.77 (2015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>3.08 (2016)</td>
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</table>
The most important question for donor countries in this context is the extent to which the integration of sustainable development objectives into their development assistance activities in other countries is possible. The reviewed countries respond to this question differently.

Germany regards all activities in the area of international development assistance as aimed at achieving the SDGs, in view of their comprehensive nature. Germany’s aid aims to assist developing countries in enacting economic policy measures that ensure the greatest possible degree of economic prosperity, social equality and environmental protection, which form the foundation of a sustainable growth model. Along with state bodies’ capacity building, which creates stable and equitable conditions for development, Germany regards private sector empowerment and support for micro, small and medium enterprises as cornerstones for sustainable economic growth in partner countries.

Canada ensures the integration of sustainable development priorities in its international aid activities in accordance with its own approach to the definition of sustainable development. Canada regards promoting sustainable development as the central element of the country’s international assistance efforts. According to data from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 29.5% of Canada’s ODA in 2014 was aimed at tackling environmental issues, while 4.5% was directed at combating climate change. Considerable attention is paid to another important topic covered by the SDGs – gender equality. According to OECD estimates, 60.2% of Canadian bilateral assistance was to some extent related to ensuring economic and social equality for women [OECD, DAC, 2016]. Assisting feminist organizations is another priority of Canada’s international assistance. The department of international affairs directly links its policy in this area with the implementation of SDG 5 (achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls), however, it also contains the elements of SDG 8 (promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive). Thus, the Feminist International Assistance Policy promoted by the Canadian government includes specific actions on women’s economic rights and employment [Government of Canada, 2017].

Japan’s specific measures to assist in the implementation of the SDGs at the international level are highly dependent on the specific situation of the recipient country. In its international assistance aimed at achieving the SDGs, Japan declares the priority to be human security, broadly defined to include healthcare development, reducing the risk of natural disasters and gender equality. Nevertheless, an analysis of examples of the practical implementation of Japan’s priorities in the field of international assistance shows that social development is pursued in close conjunction with the promotion of economic reforms. Japan mostly provides assistance on SDG issues through the provision of development grants, which are the main international aid instruments employed by Japan.

The Chinese approach to the implementation of SDG policy is characterized by the complementarity of internal and external dimensions: the Chinese leadership con-
siders the tasks of national and international development in conjunction. Many of the national practices (demonstration zones, business organization and financing formats, production technology and management) are then used internationally with certain adaptations to the conditions of the target countries and regions. The One Belt One Road initiative forms the framework for China’s efforts in the area of SDG implementation. The priority sectors for international aid include development and modernization of the means of production, introduction of mass innovations, integrated industrialization, development of affordable financial services, digitalization and platformization of production, the provision of public services, infrastructure development, countering climate change and environmental degradation, training skilled workers and the creation of high-performance jobs.

Rationale for the Selection of International Assistance Priorities

International development assistance is inevitably associated with achieving certain national political priorities and ambitions. It is the relationship between the declared national development goals and the selection of priority areas for international assistance in the field of sustainable development which is of interest in this regard.

When considering the reasoning behind the national policies to promote SDGs at the international level, two main approaches were identified. The first is a declaration of practical interest in the development of other states. Factors of such interest may include development of bilateral trade with the recipient country, reduction of migration pressure from the recipient country and the strengthening of regional and global security. All of the countries reviewed adhere to this position except Canada.

According to the statements of the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development of Germany, the choice of country and sectoral priorities for SDG activities is determined by several factors, one of which is a sharp increase in the number of migrants arriving from said country. In order to combat this challenge, efforts are being made to improve living conditions in the countries from which the majority of migrants, including, for example, Turkey, arrive to Germany. The measures are aimed at improving the quality of education, providing access to basic services and creating jobs. Another factor is economic interest. Given the development of global value chains, the success of German internationalized businesses is directly dependent on the economic situation in the countries of their presence. A third factor is the global problem of climate change, necessitating collective efforts by both developed and developing countries. Finally, another factor relates to the political commitments made by Germany within the framework of international institutions.

The constitution and the national security strategy of Japan define homeland security as the main factor for the country’s involvement in development assistance efforts. Japan considers increasing the quality of life and promoting social and economic development of low-income countries as a guarantee of national security, with a sig-
significant part of long-term development programmes being primarily focused on accelerating economic growth.

Brazil’s priority SDG areas, both domestically and internationally include: decent employment and job creation, the fight against youth unemployment, sustainable and efficient use of resources (primarily water and fossil fuels) and the development of tourism. Also, much attention is paid to the eradication of poverty, the fight against hunger and the development of infrastructure. In choosing partners for international development cooperation Brazil is primarily driven by the three considerations: the need to ensure security and economic development of its immediate neighbourhood, support for the economic growth of developing countries in order to turn them into potential trading partners and the promotion of the Portuguese language. These factors determine the main groups of the recipients: Latin American neighbours, African countries and members of the Community of Portuguese Language Countries.

The Chinese approach can be singled out as the clearest example of pragmatism in international assistance. The principles of mutual benefit, non-interference and non-conditionality are at the core of the Chinese international cooperation ideology. This increases the attractiveness of cooperation with the PRC to many developing countries that do not meet the conditions imposed by Western partners. In this context, China itself also has the opportunity to maximize the economic benefits of cooperation, since the interaction is reciprocal.

China’s involvement in international efforts to promote SDGs in developing countries is driven by the desire to:
- develop under-developed western regions of China, as well as to create conditions for incremental development of the entire country’s economy;
- create “China-oriented” international value chains and transfer less efficient industries abroad;
- generate demand for Chinese business services and utilize domestic capacity in order to ensure medium-high growth rates;
- form a diversified network of routes and conditions for the uninterrupted supply of resources to China and the transportation of Chinese goods to main export markets;
- strengthen national security by improving relations with partner states and by expanding the choice of economic foreign policy instruments; and
- promote China’s “soft power” and form a platform for the country’s international leadership through a set of institutions and projects.

Along with domestic socio-economic implications, China’s implementation of the SDGs at home and abroad is perceived as the most important mechanism for strengthening its own international influence and creating the conditions for China’s establishment as a legitimate global centre of power.

Canada embodies the opposite approach to identifying priority areas for international cooperation, including within the framework of SDG implementation. The main motives of Canada’s activities in the field of international development assistance, in
addition to prestige considerations, are the promotion of democratic principles and liberal values, including gender equality, and the integration of sustainable development priorities into recipient countries’ economic policies, mainly in the context of climate change adaptation and mitigation. Another important goal of Canadian sustainable development policy is to spread awareness of sustainable development issues and the government’s priorities and actions among the general population and civil society organizations both in Canada and in recipient countries.

Canada’s international development efforts are carried out by Global Affairs Canada in accordance with regularly updated priorities. One of the goals set for 2017–2018 was to “increase the contribution of Canada to building a more equitable, inclusive and sustainable world.” The primary targets in this area were to implement a new Canadian vision promoting dignity and improving the quality of life of the poorest and most vulnerable people, strengthening the economic well-being of women and girls based on Canada’s competitive advantages, and making a significant contribution to the implementation of the sustainable development goals [Government of Canada, c. a., a].

Quality of Communications Policy

Another important component of international assistance policy, including in the context of achieving the SDGs, is maintaining a high-quality communications policy. Ensuring the availability, openness and transparency of information on government priorities, goals and specific measures in the field of sustainable development both domestically and abroad is an integral part of any donor state’s foreign policy. In essence, disseminating information on the country’s international assistance efforts and achievements among the largest possible number of actors can be considered one of the primary goals of the country’s foreign aid policy as a whole.

The quality of communications policy encompasses not only the modalities of providing information on a country’s foreign aid activities to the general public, but also transparency of decision-making mechanisms, as well as the use of international tools such as global governance institutions or the UN High-Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development, in order to promote a national vision of the SDGs.

It should be noted that developed countries are currently far ahead of their developing counterparts in terms of the availability and transparency of information provided by state authorities, in part due to the existing legislative mechanisms ensuring a high level of openness of information and inclusiveness of decision-making processes.

For example, in Canada, pursuant to the 2008 Official Development Assistance Accountability Act, Global Affairs Canada ensures the transparency and availability of data on funding and the nature of ongoing foreign assistance projects. All relevant information is available on a website hosted by the department [Government of Canada, c. a., b]. In July 2018, Canada’s voluntary report to the UN High-Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development was published [Government of Canada, 2018]. The report was prepared by Global Affairs Canada, with input from a wide range of stakeholders.
including individual citizens, collected through an open survey on their contribution to the country’s efforts in promoting sustainable development at the national and international levels. Before 2030, Canada plans to submit at least two voluntary reports on the implementation of the SDGs. In addition, it was announced that a new strategy for achieving the goals was being developed [Government of Canada, 2018].

In Germany, a sustainable development communication strategy was adopted in 2014. The press service of the federal government is allotted primary responsibility for the implementation of the strategy [Federal Government of Germany, c. a.] which provides for the regular publication of brochures and newsletters on the implementation of Germany’s sustainable development strategy [Federal Government of Germany, 2014], and organizes conferences to discuss new revisions of the strategy at the federal and regional levels. The purpose of these activities, which also include publishing the Sustainable Development Strategy in German and English and a summary in all official UN languages, preparation of a newsletter on sustainable development, and maintenance of continuous dialogue with social partners, is to further raise general public and stakeholder awareness of the importance of sustainable development and the federal government’s efforts to promote it. Constant, open and transparent exchange of information is considered a necessary condition for cooperation between the government and social partners in the framework of Germany’s multilateral approach to the implementation of Agenda 2030 [Federal Government of Germany, 2018].

Germany’s voluntary report to the UN High-Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development was published on 12 July 2016 [Federal Republic of Germany, 2016b]. The government drew from the UN’s handbook and the relevant guidelines for the preparation of voluntary reviews, actively engaging with non-governmental actors in the preparation of its report [UN, 2019]. The text of the report was discussed with representatives of non-governmental organizations, local authorities, the academic community, business associations and trade unions in the framework of the Agenda 2030 dialogue forum.

Developing donors, despite the absence of established regulatory frameworks and practical expertise in the organization of communication processes on the SDGs and international assistance issues, demonstrate moderate progress in this area.

In contrast with many developing countries, India pursues a transparent policy regarding SDG implementation. The National Institution for Transforming India (NITI Aayog), the agency responsible for coordination and monitoring of SDG implementation in India, maintains a website with all the relevant information, including a description of the goals, India’s voluntary report to the UN High-Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development, data on the correlation between the SDGs and the national development goals, expert assessments and advisory opinions, and progress reports from states on SDG implementation. The websites of ministries and departments involved in the implementation of the SDGs also provide information on programmes, annual reports and financial statements, and newsletters on government activities. All information is updated several times a month.
NITI Aayog presented the first voluntary national report to the UN High-Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development on 19 July 2017. The report opens with a brief summary describing the national objectives and accomplishments on SDGs 1, 2, 3, 5, 9, 14 and 17. Each section of the report is dedicated to a specific SDG and includes statistical indicators as well as a description of the state programmes that relate to the SDG in question. In general, the report serves to highlight the positive role of the Modi Government in the formation of an inclusive society of universal well-being in India. The report portrays India as an ancient civilization with SDG principles firmly rooted in its historical foundations, including the rational use of natural resources and respect for the environment.

In Brazil, the question of developing and adopting a solid SDG communication strategy was raised by a commission on achieving the SDGs in February 2018. While it is too early to speak of the existence of a coherent strategy at this point, since the adoption of Agenda 2030, various digital platforms have been created in Brazil to inform the public and stakeholder groups of the SDGs, their significance for socio-economic development and possible ways to contribute.

Two basic principles form the basis of China’s communication strategy in the field of achieving the SDGs: “mutual benefit” and “non-interference in internal affairs,” closely associated with non-conditionality of aid, which is intrinsic to China’s international assistance policy. At the international level, these principles are promoted through the implementation of large-scale projects, such as the One Belt One Road initiative. A distinctive feature of the Chinese communication strategy is that it targets both domestic and external actors. This approach is designed to showcase China’s international prowess within the country, in accordance with the course towards the revival of “national spirit” and the growth of Chinese influence abroad. Government documents emphasize the mutually beneficial nature of the Chinese international aid [People’s Republic of China, 2018]. This approach aims to reduce potential social tensions that could potentially arise from the fact that China directs significant resources to assist foreign nations despite the large number of unresolved socio-economic issues at home. At the same time, China actively uses the platforms of international organizations and informal multilateral institutions to promote its own international development assistance initiatives.

Conclusion

Most of the reviewed countries (Canada, Germany, Japan and India) have developed documents devoted specifically to the implementation of the SDGs. Characteristic features of such documents include the adaptation of the goals to national circumstances, designation of executive bodies responsible for conducting concrete tasks, and designation of specific targets with corresponding indicators and deadlines. For example, Canada adopted the Federal Sustainable Development Strategy, with the corresponding 26 departmental strategies. Similarly, the Japanese guidelines for the implementa-
tion of the SDGs are designed to include measures to achieve the goals at the national and international levels.

A different approach to SDG implementation is the inclusion of measures to achieve the goals via existing national mechanisms, such as strategies for socio-economic development. Brazil’s Multi-Year Plan 2016–2019, adopted in 2015, defines strategic and tactical goals and activities and includes 54 specialized programmes reflecting 145 of the 169 SDG targets.

From the point of view of the mechanisms used to promote sustainable development at the international level, developed countries predominantly resort to bilateral instruments (grants, technical assistance programmes, capacity-building, educational programmes, etc.). Thus, bilateral assistance amounts to more than 80% of ODA for Germany, 71% for Canada and 68% for Japan. These countries rely heavily on grant instruments and direct budgetary support measures aimed at promoting sustainable development in recipient countries to ensure that SDG priorities are effectively integrated into their national plans and programmes for economic growth.

Large developing donors are currently in the process of building up their own international development assistance capabilities, and therefore are making greater use of multilateral mechanisms. However, new donors are increasingly using bilateral cooperation mechanisms as well. In particular, Brazil, prioritizing South-South cooperation channels, is implementing bilateral programmes of technical assistance and advanced training in such areas as agriculture, healthcare, education and environmental protection. China, in turn, is actively expanding bilateral cooperation with recipient countries in the context of the implementation of the comprehensive One Belt One Road initiative.

An important factor shaping the donor countries’ SDG implementation strategies at the international level is the rationale behind the choice of priority areas and partner countries. In addition to the obvious prestige advantages, donors pursue their specific pragmatic agendas. International aid is used, among other things, as a tool for promoting economic and trade interests, ensuring security, implementing political priorities (promoting the principles of democratic governance or supporting loyal regimes), alleviating social tensions in migration centres and reducing the anthropogenic environmental impact on a global scale. In addition, at least officially, objectives of a more humanitarian nature are indicated. This approach is characteristic of developed Western countries such as Canada, which has declared priorities for gender equality and the development of civil society in recipient countries at core of its foreign aid strategy.

In general, the reviewed countries demonstrate a sufficient balance between the economic, social and environmental aspects of the SDGs within the framework of their national sustainable development policies. Nevertheless, given the institutional structure of the responsible government bodies and the content of specific national sustainable development strategies, the prioritization of certain issue areas becomes apparent. Canada is a prime example in this regard, where, despite the comprehensive nature of its sustainable development strategy, most of its priorities and objectives are related to
ensuring environmental sustainability. Social and economic goals often either play an auxiliary role to environmental ones or relate to specific ethnic groups and territories.

The governments’ communication strategies can also play a significant role in implementing the SDGs. Ensuring the availability, openness, and transparency of information on government priorities, objectives, and specific measures in the field of sustainable development both at the national level and abroad is an integral part of ensuring a policy’s overall efficiency. In this regard, developed countries are far ahead of the developing ones, especially given that developing countries often lack universally accessible and regularly updated information portals containing relevant and comprehensive information on foreign aid and SDG implementation. Table 2 shows the information on the main indicators of the SDG integration into national policies and mechanisms of international assistance.

Based on this study of the leading donors’ experiences localizing the SDGs, recommendations for the Russian Federation were developed on each of the five criteria considered in the article. The analysis demonstrates the importance of a systemic approach to the integration of the SDGs into national policy instruments. The most effective approach would include:

− adaptation of the SDGs to national conditions and development requirements;
− formation of a comprehensive conceptual and legislative framework for state authorities involved in SDG implementation, directly aimed at the fulfillment of the adapted goals;
− creation of a clear and transparent institutional structure of the responsible executive authorities at the federal and regional levels;
− creation of a conceptual framework for the interaction of government bodies and the delegation of authority from the federal levels to regions and municipalities (it is necessary to adopt a comprehensive strategy for sustainable development, including both national priorities and sectoral objectives); and
− ensuring the transparency of the decision-making and implementation processes.

Currently, despite the fact that a large number of SDG targets correspond to the priorities, outlined in Russian conceptual documents, in particular, the state programmes and the presidential decree “On National Goals and Strategic Objectives of the Russian Federation Through to 2024,” there is no systematic approach to ensure a balance of the social, economic, and environmental aspects of sustainable development. Moreover, there are no attempts to create comprehensive legislative and institutional structures necessary for developing officials’ awareness of the SDGs, increasing their competence on the sustainable development issues, ensuring accountability and, ultimately, the planned implementation of the set objectives.

An important factor in terms of enhancing transparency and accountability of the decision-making process for creating sustainable development strategies and the implementation thereof is to ensure that the interests of the social partners (business, non-profit organizations, local communities, ethnic groups) are taken into account.
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Canada</th>
<th>Japan</th>
<th>Brazil</th>
<th>India</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Institutional organization and social partners’ inclusion</strong></td>
<td>Special coordinating body with social partners’ participation: State Secretaries’ Committee for Sustainable Development</td>
<td>Special coordinating body with social partners’ participation: Sustainable Development Advisory Council</td>
<td>Special coordinating body with social partners’ participation: SDG Promotion Office</td>
<td>SDG Implementation Committee is active. Social partners are included in decision-making on the SDGs. Non-state actors are involved in the preparation of the voluntary report to the HLPFSD</td>
<td>National Institution for Transforming India (NITI Aayog) is active</td>
<td>The State Council and Foreign Ministry coordinate the work of 43 government agencies through holding meetings and conferences on the SDGs implementation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Integration of SDG priorities into development assistance strategies</strong></td>
<td>Complex approach creating base economic conditions for sustainable development, including through SMEs support</td>
<td>Priority areas: climate change; equality (primarily gender aspects)</td>
<td>Priority areas: healthcare; climate adaptation; gender equality</td>
<td>Priority areas: employment; sustainable use of natural resources; agriculture</td>
<td>Priority areas: healthcare; education; energy (hydro-power generation); ICT</td>
<td>Integration of SDG priorities into regional initiatives, such as the One Belt One Road, favouring the creation of basic economic conditions for sustainable development</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rationale for the selection of international assistance priorities</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Japan</td>
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<td>Fight against migration crises and climate change</td>
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<td>Advancing liberal values and democratic governance; promoting gender equality; integrating sustainable development principles into recipient-countries’ economic policies</td>
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<td>Promoting development to ensure national security</td>
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<td>Ensuring security and promoting bilateral trade in immediate neighbourhood through promoting economic growth; Portuguese language promotion.</td>
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<td>National security; environmental sustainability; energy security</td>
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<td>Maximizing economic benefits from cooperation; creating China-oriented regional value chains; promoting western regions’ development</td>
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<tr>
<th>The quality of communications policy regarding SDG implementation</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Canada</th>
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<th>Brazil</th>
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<td>SDG communication strategy is being implemented; information on SDG implementation is disseminated through bulletins, conferences and stakeholder meetings; voluntary report to the HLPFSD is published</td>
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<td>The government created a communications network reaching out to social partners on sustainable development issues; voluntary report to the HLPFSD is published</td>
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<td>Development of the communications strategy started in 2018; voluntary report to the HLPFSD is published</td>
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<td>Information on national SDG implementation is available on the NITI Aayog web-portal; voluntary report to the HLPFSD is published</td>
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<td>Communications on SDG implementation are conducted within the framework of individual development projects; voluntary report to the HLPFSD is published</td>
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The experience of developed countries shows that formalized state institutions, such as the Sustainable Development Advisory Council (Canada) or the Committee of State Secretaries for Sustainable Development (Germany), created with the aim of forming national strategies and monitoring their execution, can become a vital channel of communication with non-state actors. Currently there are no mechanisms for public participation in decision-making in the field of sustainable development in the Russian Federation.

The state policy on the implementation of the SDGs should take into account not only national, but also international objectives. In this regard, an important role is played by the integration of the SDGs and sustainable development priorities in foreign assistance strategies. Foreign aid projects also require attention to the balance of social, economic and environmental aspects of the recipient countries’ development within their national economic growth strategies, integrating the issues of social and income equality that are relevant for these states, minimizing gender and age barriers for economic development and reducing the negative impact of business on the environment. To this end, it is necessary to improve the institutional structure and promote capacity building for government officials responsible for the formulation and implementation of state policy in the area of international assistance.

Finally, given the importance of the communications aspects of foreign aid activities, it is necessary to create open accountability mechanisms, enhance accessibility and upgrade the content of the existing information dissemination channels, in particular, the website of Rossotrudnichestvo, the government agency responsible for the implementation of Russia’s foreign aid policy. Using these channels, it is necessary to effectively convey to citizens of Russia and recipient countries, as well as the wider global community, the value of Russian assistance efforts, and to demonstrate that this assistance is integrated into the global efforts to achieve the sustainable development goals approved by the United Nations.

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Подходы ведущих стран-доноров к внедрению ЦУР
в национальные стратегии устойчивого развития

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А.Г. Сахаров, А.В. Шелепов

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Цели устойчивого развития, принятые Генеральной Ассамблеей ООН 25 сентября 2015 г., охватывают широкий спектр проблем, с которыми сталкиваются развивающиеся и развитые страны. Повестка 2030 ориентирована на борьбу с нищетой во всех ее проявлениях через реализацию стратегий устойчивого экономического роста.

Проблематика достижения ЦУР актуальна и для международной повестки дня, и для национальной политики. В настоящей статье рассматривается политика шести стран – крупных доноров международной помощи по достижению ЦУР как внутри страны, так и в рамках мероприятий в сфере СМР. Для анализа были отобраны три крупных донора из числа развитых стран: Германия, Канада и Япония, а также три новых развивающихся донора: Бразилия, Индия и Китай.

Основой сравнительного анализа стали следующие аспекты национальной политики по достижению ЦУР: а) учет задач ЦУР в рамках национальных концептуальных и стратегических документов; б) институциональная организация и учет интересов социальных партнеров; в) интеграция приоритетов ЦУР в стратегии содействия международному развитию; г) официальная мотивация оказания международной помощи; д) качество коммуникационной политики в сфере реализации ЦУР.

Анализ опыта указанных государств по локализации ЦУР позволил выработать рекомендации для начала работы в данном направлении в Российской Федерации. Рекомендации представлены в заключительном разделе статьи.

Ключевые слова: Цели устойчивого развития; устойчивое развитие; содействие международному развитию; Повестка дня в области устойчивого развития на период до 2030 г.; официальная помощь развитию

Источники


Prospects of Implementation of the UN SDG in Russia

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Abstract

The Sustainable Development Goals, adopted by the UN General Assembly on 25 September 2015 in Resolution 70/1 “Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development” embrace a wide range of issues facing both developed and developing countries.

Implementation of the SDG is of particular interest both in international context and according to the agenda of socio-economic development of the Russian Federation, thus the task of identifying medium-term sustainable development priorities of Russia acquires great importance. The paper is based on comparative analysis of priorities of the Presidential Order “On National Goals and Strategic Objectives of the Russian Federation through to 2024” (the May-2018 Executive Order), active state programs and the SDG targets. The purpose of the paper is to determine the correlation between the SDG targets and Russia’s medium- and long-term national strategic goals.

The outcomes of the research demonstrate that there is a room for further increase of effectiveness of implementation of the SDG based on contingent approach ensuring solidarity and balancing of social, economic and ecological aspects of the SDG implementation. Russia’s strategy towards implementation of the SDG requires greater level of contingency meaning incorporation of social aspects of sustainable development into national strategic documents.

Key words: Sustainable Development Goals (the SDG); sustainable development; Agenda 2030; socio-economic development of the Russian Federation; May-2018 Executive Order; State programs of the Russian Federation


1 The editorial board received the article in September 2018.

The research was carried out within the framework of the RANEPA research project “Leading Donors’ Sustainable Development Goals Implementation Strategies. Main results”.
Introduction

During the 2015 session of the United Nations General Assembly (UN GA) 193 countries adopted Resolution 70/1, “Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development” (hereafter, Agenda 2030), which laid down the sustainable development goals (SDGs) for the next 15 years [UN, 2015]. There are 17 goals and 169 indicators detailed in Agenda 2030 aimed at maintaining a balance of the economic, social and environmental aspects of development for the international community in the long run.

The implementation of the SDGs is a topic of particular interest both in the international context and in terms of the Russian Federation’s agenda of socio-economic development. Russia actively participated in formulation of the UN’s sustainable development agenda while pursuing its own priorities, namely promoting sustainable industrial development, traffic security, the spread of healthier lifestyles, combating non-communicable diseases, ensuring reliable access to basic energy services, transportation, education, healthcare and social security.

This article analyzes the incorporation of the UN SDGs within the socio-economic development policy of the Russian Federation, as laid out particularly in the decree “On National Goals and Strategic Objectives of the Russian Federation through to 2024” (hereafter, the May 2018 Executive Order) [President of Russia, 2018a] and in the ongoing state programmes of the Russian Federation [Government of the Russian Federation, 2010]. This acquires a particular urgency due to the preparation of a voluntary report to the High-Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development on the Russian Federation’s progress toward the implementation of the SDGs, planned for 2020. To this end, content analysis of national and international documents and comparative methods of study were used. The results of the comparative examination of Russia’s strategic priorities of socio-economic development stipulated in the May 2018 Executive Order and measures under government-sanctioned programmes were summarized in a concluding table available on the Centre for International Institutions Research at the Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (CIIR RANEPA) website [RANEPA, c. a.]. It is should be noted that this article does not evaluate the effectiveness of current or planned measures within the framework of Russia’s sustainable development policy. The purpose of the article is to determine the correlation between the SDG targets and Russia’s medium- and long-term national strategic goals. The article specifically focuses on domestic aspects of SDG implementation, while issues related to the promotion of international development are excluded from analysis. Because SDG 17 (partnership for the goals) does not touch upon any aspect of the national development agenda, it is also excluded.

Several recently published articles touch upon the process of the realization of the SDGs in Russia on various aspects. Early research on this topic was conducted by the Analytical Centre for the Government of the Russian Federation in 2016. The outcomes were presented in an analytical report entitled “Sustainable Development Goals and Russia” [Bobylev, Grigoryev, 2016]. The Centre continued its work on human de-

S.N. Bobylev and S.V. Solovyova [2017] published an article on the measures of adaptation and realization of the SDGs in Russia; L.M. Grigoryev and V.A. Pavlushina presented an article on inequality as a development issue [2017]. N.E. Ryazanova focused on integration of the SDGs into vocational training curricula [2018]. Corporate responsibility in the implementation of the SDGs was examined by L.G. Sudas [2017] and O.I. Dunaev and V.A. Nagornov [2017]. However, research comparing Russia’s mid- and long-term policies with the SDG targets has not yet been presented.

**Measures for the Realization of the SDGs in Russia**

In March 2016, the Federal Council of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation promulgated proposals for the parliamentary hearings on the post-2015 UN agenda [2016]. The recommendations focused on issues related to international development assistance and national efforts on adaptation to climate change. The document also included important recommendations on the spread of information concerning Russia’s activity as a global donor.

The coordination of efforts among various governmental bodies concerning the SDGs is formally conducted by the interagency taskforce for the Executive Office of the President of the Russian Federation on issues related to climate change and sustainable development. In 2016 the taskforce examined the conformity of the tasks and goals laid out in Russia’s executive orders issued in 2006–2016 with the SDGs, in close cooperation with federal executive bodies. The taskforce inspected the status of statistical data necessary for monitoring implementation of the SDGs in Russia and established a new expert group on info-statistical support for the monitoring of SDG implementation, composed of officials from federal executive bodies.

Despite the fact that three years have passed since the adoption of the SDGs, Russia has not laid out a national approach to their implementation and has not formulated an adapted national strategy of sustainable development. However, the Russian Statistical Service (Rosstat) has started to prepare a set of indicators to monitor SDG implementation and in September 2017 the Federal Plan for Statistical Efforts was complemented with indicators of SDG implementation in Russia. Ninety indicators were incorporated with the majority focusing on such aspects as poverty and welfare, decent jobs and economic growth, healthcare and education. Russia also actively participates in work of the UN Conference of European Statisticians on issues related to SDG statistics.

The official representatives of Russia responsible for the country’s activities toward the implementation of the SDGs on national and international levels have announced several times Russia’s intention to introduce national and subnational SDG indicators, and to establish an accounting platform for delivering information to the UN and prepar-
ing national reports containing Russia’s achievements in SDG implementation on a regular basis. Recently, steps were taken toward establishing a national system of indicators for measuring the progress achieved in this sphere. Concluding and presenting Russia’s voluntary report to the UN High-Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development could be a great impetus for these efforts. Despite the fact that 162 countries (46 in 2018) including several Eurasian Economic Union countries – Belarus (2017), Armenia (2018), Kazakhstan (2019) – and two BRICS members – China (2016) and India (2017) – have already presented their achievements, Russia has not yet completed its report to the UN High-Level Political Forum. The outcomes of the evaluation of SDG implementation in Russia conducted by the Analytical Center [Bobylev, Grigoryev, 2016] generally match the SDG Index demonstrating countries’ achievements in the implementation of the SDGs [Sachs, Schmidt-Traub, Kroll, Durand-Delacre, and Teksoz, 2017] arranged by the Sustainable Development Solutions Network [SDSN, c. a.].

Russian and foreign experts have noted that since the 2000s Russia has achieved the most significant results in combating hunger (SDG 2) and poverty (SDG 1), and has demonstrated moderate accomplishments in providing quality education (SDG 4), promoting modern and clean sources of energy (SDG 7), employment policy (SDG 8), building sustainable cities and communities (SDG 11) and mitigating the effects of climate change (SDG 13). There is more to be done concerning gender equality (SDG 5), clean water and sanitation (SDG 6), sustainable infrastructure (SDG 9), sustainable consumption and production (SDG 12), building partnerships between governments, civil society organizations and the private sector (SDG 17), as well as preservation of life on surface and water ecosystems (SDGs 14 and 15).

The most challenging SDGs for Russia are good health and well-being (SDG 3), peace, justice and strong institutions (SDG 16) and inequalities (SDG 10). Economic development based on a raw-export model increases the environmental impacts that cripple people’s health and well-being.

According to the abovementioned report on sustainable development goals and Russia [Bobylev, Grigoryev, 2016], strategic documents of Russia, including those adopted in 2017 – the Strategy on Economic Security and the Strategy on Ecological Security – do not correlate with the sustainability principles and thus extra measures for the implementation of the SDGs into Russia’s agenda are required.


The Russian Federation has not yet adopted a document on the implementation of the SDGs in line with the General Assembly resolution adopted in 2015. The majority of SDG targets are realized by means of national socio-economic development policy.
Applicability of the implementation of the SDGs in Russia was fixed in the Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly in 2018 [President of Russia, 2018b] and the May 2018 Executive Order [President of Russia, 2018a]. The tasks formulated in these documents touch upon various issues — healthcare, education, demography, commodities and urban areas, international cooperation and export, labour productivity, SMEs and promotion of private entrepreneurship, safe and quality infrastructure, ecology and digital economy — all of which correlate with the SDGs and thus should be incorporated into strategic plans.

The May 2018 Executive Order is a programme document that establishes the goal of achieving a scientific and socio-economic breakthrough. The milestones of this breakthrough are the achievement of: Russia as one of the top-five economies of the world; population growth; increased life expectancy (from 72 to 78 years and up to 80 by 2030); growth of disposable income of the population and double-time decrease of poverty; annual improvement of living conditions for five million households; and a healthy environment for self-realization and creativity of every individual.

The milestones listed above are to be achieved by 2024 by means of national policies in 12 spheres of strategic development [Government of the Russian Federation, 2018a]: demography; healthcare system development (SDG 3); education (SDG 4); housing and urban areas (SDG 11); ecology (SDGs 13, 14 and 15); safe and quality automobile roads (SDG 9); improving labour efficiency and employment (SDGs 8 and 9); culture (SDGs 4, 8 and 9); promotion of SMEs and private entrepreneurship (SDGs 2, 3, 8 and 9); international cooperation and export. Some of the projects are based on programmes launched in 2016 in such spheres as healthcare, education and housing; in other cases, a programme was put in place (digital economy).

A new national project management system was introduced in order to implement the policies. Project authorities are formed on basis of the government and the federal executive bodies [President of Russia, 2018a]. Some bottlenecks may arise related to the nuances of coordinating the projects discussed above with existing programmes that had been a cornerstone of budgeting before 2018. Preparation of national and federal projects should take into account their contribution to the implementation of the May 2018 Executive Order’s goals and correlate with existing state policies.

The Inclusion of UN SDGs into Russia’s State Programmes and the May 2018 Executive Order

**SDG 1: End Poverty in All Its Forms Everywhere**

Two objectives concerning double-time reduction in poverty indicators by 2024 and securing growth of real household earnings were introduced in the Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly and the May 2018 Executive Order (SDG 1.2). Con-
cerning social security (SDG 1.3) further increase of pension scales and their regular indexation above inflation rates is planned as well as improvement in the quality of healthcare and social services for seniors.

Several programmes related SDG 1 priorities are currently in effect: “Employment of Population,” “Social Support,” “Comfortable and Affordable Housing for the Citizens of the Russian Federation.” Measures provided in the listed programmes generally correlate with SDG 1 targets 1.1, 1.2, 1.3 and 1.a. At the same time, a few targets are not covered by the programmes, in particular, target 1.4 concerning ownership and control over land and other forms of property and access of the poor to “natural resources, appropriate new technology and financial services, including microfinance;” target 1.5 “build the resilience of the poor and those in vulnerable situations and reduce their exposure and vulnerability to climate-related extreme events and other economic, social and environmental shocks and disasters;” and target 1.b “create sound policy frameworks at the national, regional and international levels, based on pro-poor and gender-sensitive development strategies, to support accelerated investment in poverty eradication actions.”

**SDG 2. Zero Hunger**

Despite some particular economic and social discrepancies, fighting hunger (SDGs 2.1 and 2.2) is not included in the list of Russia’s national priorities. Food security is skirted in the text of the May 2018 Executive Order. However, some priorities in agriculture were set, for example, establishment of a support system for farmers and promotion of rural cooperation, fostering export potential and competitive advantages.

In 2013 the state programme for agricultural development and regulation of agricultural products, raw materials and commodities market for 2013–2020 was launched. Initiatives under this programme relate to the following targets of SDG 2: target 2.3 (increase agricultural productivity), target 2.4 (ensure sustainable food production systems), target 2.5 (maintain the genetic diversity of seeds and cultivated plants), target 2.a (increase rural investment) and target 2.c (ensure the proper functioning of food commodity markets).

Implementation of target 2.a (correct and prevent trade restrictions and distortions in world agricultural markets, including through the parallel elimination of all forms of agricultural export subsidies and all export measures with equivalent effect) is facing challenges due to competitive weakness of the local commodities suppliers and the current sanction and counter-sanction regimes imposed on Russia by many countries of the world.

**SDG 3. Ensure Healthy Lives and Promote Well-Being for All at All Ages**

Healthcare system development was widely discussed among other topics in the May 2018 Executive Order. The order prioritized an increase in financing initiatives
aimed at fostering the well-being of mothers and infants (no less than 3.4 trillion roubles by 2024), improvement of access to and quality of medical care, spread of medical and obstetric centres and outpatient clinics across the country. Moreover, it was pointed out in the Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly that healthcare expenses should account for no less than 4% of gross domestic product (GDP) on average from 2019 to 2024.

Current measures provided under the state programme “Healthcare Development,” initiated in December 2017, cover all the targets of SDG 3: subprogramme 4 “Protection of Mother and Child Health” (SDGs 3.1 and 3.7); subprogramme 1 “Diseases Prevention and Promotion of Healthier Lifestyle. Development of Emergency Care” (SDGs 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, 3.a and 3.d); subprogramme 2 “Improvement of Specialized, Including High-End Aid” (SDG 3.6); subprogramme 9 “Expertise and Oversight in Healthcare;” subprogramme 3 “Development and Integration of Innovative Methods of Diagnostic, Prevention and Treatment, and Personalized Medicine” (SDGs 3.b and 3.c.).

**SDG 4. Quality Education**

Education development is mentioned among other priorities of the May 2018 Executive Order. In this sphere, the government of Russia is obliged to increase competitiveness of Russian education so that Russia achieves one of the top positions in the world in terms of quality of educational services. The Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly and the May 2018 Executive Order set out tasks in the sphere of education – improve access to elementary education (increase kindergarten capacity by 270,000 within a period of three years; 50 billion roubles of funding allocation); modernization of the system of vocational training, “promotion of professional staff in municipal authorities and civil service, private entrepreneurship and production;” 1 billion roubles of funding allocation in 2018 for the purpose of career-guidance for school students; “establishment of a system for continuing education for employees for the purpose of further improvement of knowledge and skills including digital skills;” and “establishment of a national system for professional development of teaching employees.”

It is should be noted that the SDG 4 targets are mostly integrated into Russia’s 2024 development agenda and current state policies. Under the framework of the programme “Development of Education” for 2013–2020 the following subprogrammes are in place: subprogramme 1 “Realization of Vocational Education Programs” (SDGs 4.3, 4.4, 4.5, 4.6, 4.b and 4.c); subprogramme 2 “Promoting Development of Pre-Elementary and Elementary Education” (SDGs 4.1, 4.2, 4.5, 4.a and 4.c); subprogramme 4 “Development of Supplementary Education and Realization of Youth Policy Initiatives” (SDG 4.5); subprogramme 5 “Improvement of Education Management System” (SDGs 4.b and 4.c).

SDG 4.7, focusing on ensuring that “all learners acquire the knowledge and skills needed to promote sustainable development, including, among others, through ed-
ucation for sustainable development and sustainable lifestyles, human rights, gender equality, promotion of a culture of peace and non-violence, global citizenship and appreciation of cultural diversity and of culture’s contribution to sustainable development,” is an exception – current plans and policies of the government of Russia do not involve any actions to this end.

**SDG 5. Achieve Gender Equality and Empower All Women and Girls**

Generally, gender issues are lacking in Russia’s programme and strategic documents. Russia’s 2024 development agenda includes provisions concerning maternal health (SDG 5.6, sexual and reproductive health) and creating “conditions for professional careers of women with children” (SDG 5.1, end all forms of discrimination against all women and girls; SDG 5.c, promotion of gender equality and the empowerment of all women and girls at all levels).

It is should be noted that in 2017 Russia ranked 53rd out of 189 according to the UN Gender Inequality Index. Additionally, Russia lags behind the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries in terms of deaths per 1000 births and teenage pregnancy. The most challenging issue is women’s involvement in political processes measured according to the share of parliament mandates held by women — in these terms, Russia falls behind not only developed, but also the majority of developing countries, including the former Soviet Union [UNDP, 2017].

**SDG 6. Ensure Access to Water and Sanitation for All**

Within the framework of the May 2018 Executive Order several measures aimed at ensuring environmental resilience of water-related facilities of the Russian Federation are anticipated. These measures include: “ecological restoration of water facilities including a project aimed at a threefold reduction in the polluted sewage water flow that disembogues into the Volga river, sustainable functioning of the water resources utilization system of the Lower Volga and preservation of the ecosystem of the Volga-Akhtuba floodplain,” and “preservation of unique water objects including realization of the project to preserve Lake Baikal, and removal of litter from the offshore strip and shore front of Lake Baikal, Lake Teletskoye, Ladoga Lake, Lake Onega and the Volga river, the Don, the Ob river, the Yenisey river, the Amur river, the Ural river and the Pechora river.” Despite the fact that these steps lack a systematic approach and are project-based, they partly match SDG 6.3 (improve water quality by reducing pollution) and 6.6 (protect and restore water-related ecosystems).

Concerning sanitation, the May 2018 Executive Order includes special provisions to increase of quality of drinking water for the population, including community dwellers that are not connected to modern district water networks (SDGs 6.1 and 6.2).

The governmental programme “Recreation and Utilization of Natural Resources” (2013) includes subprogramme 2 “Utilization of Water Resources.” Within the frame-
work of this subprogramme such steps as “planning of water management and water protection practices, ensuring safe exploitation of hydro-technical utilities and IT support,” “realization of flood prevention measures, minor repairs of hydro-technical utilities and measures to increase conveying capacity of rivers; informational and technical support; securing facilities run by RosHydroResources and reduction of amortization of hydro-technical facilities” are planned.

In addition, the government announced plans aimed at ensuring effective realization of state functions in water matters by means of “ensuring fulfilment of socio-economic needs for water resources; prevention and mitigation of risks of floods and other harmful impacts of water; securitization of water utilization systems and hydro-technical utilities; exercise of powers of regional authorities of the Russian Federation in the sphere of water policy.” Generally, these steps suit SDG 6.4 (increase water-use efficiency across all sectors) and SDG 6.5 (integrated water resources management at all levels).

An important task that does not correspond with the Russian government’s plans is SDG 6.b (support and strengthen the participation of local communities in improving water and sanitation management). Transparency and accountability ensured by direct involvement of stakeholders in formulation of policies are inherent in the SDGs. However, practices of this kind are not widely spread in the case of Russia.

**SDG 7. Affordable and Clean Energy**

The targets of SDG 7 are mostly incorporated into the May 2018 Executive Order. Among other priorities of the 2024 development agenda the following tasks were mentioned: development of energy infrastructure, guaranteed “provision of affordable electricity by means of electrification of the transportation corridors “West-East” and “North-South,” including the Baikal-Amur Mainline and the Trans-Siberian Railway in conjunction with development of transport infrastructure; development of central power supply grids, including modernization of generation capacities of heat power plants, nuclear power plants and hydro power plants in accordance with demands of socio-economic development; sustainable energy supply in all regions of the Russian Federation... ; development of distributed generation, based, among other sources, on renewable sources of energy, in remote and isolated energy areas; incorporation of intellectual power facilities control systems based on digital technologies.”

The list of pre-planned actions corresponds with SDG 7.1 (ensure universal access to affordable, reliable and modern energy services), SDG 7.2 (renewable energy) and SDG 7.3 (energy efficiency). Target 7.b (expand infrastructure and upgrade technology for supplying modern and sustainable energy services) is also covered by Russia’s development agenda except for the international component (support of least developed countries).

From a strategic point of view, SDG 7 is well represented in Russia’s 2024 development agenda.
**SDG 8. Promote Inclusive and Sustainable Economic Growth, Employment and Decent Work for All**

It is obvious that economic growth and employment are essential for any national government, including Russia. The Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly and the May 2018 Executive Order establish several ambitious goals in this sphere: in the medium-term Russia must achieve a position among the top-five global economies with an economic growth rate exceeding the global average level amid stable macro-economic indicators including an inflation rate of less than 4% per year. By 2025 Russia’s GDP should grow 1.5 times with annual growth rate about 3.7–3.8%. The state programme “Economic Development and Economy of Innovations” focuses on the same objectives, providing complex measures – from an increase of investment attractiveness and improvement of corporate governance to promotion of market competitiveness and development of special economic zones. The abovementioned measures generally correspond with SDG 8.1 (sustain per capita economic growth in accordance with national circumstances).

Concerning growth of economic productivity (SDG 8.2) and promotion of industrial activities, employment, entrepreneurship, creativity and innovations (SDGs 8.3, 8.5 and 8.6), the Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly and the May 2018 Executive Orders set the following goals: “increase labour productivity based on a new technological, managerial and human resources foundation;” doubling the amount of “non-resource export up to $250 billion;” growth of labour productivity in middle- and large-scale enterprises of primary non-resource sectors by 5% annually; promote involvement of no less than 10,000 middle- and large-scale enterprises of primary non-resource sectors into the process of implementing measures aimed at increased productivity; promotion of incorporation of state-of-the-art managerial, organizational and technological solutions to improve productivity and modernize sustaining capital also by means of tax preferences; removal of administrative and legislative barriers that compromise the growth of labour productivity and renovation of out-of-date and unproductive workplaces; introduction of methodological and organizational systems for promotion of growth of labour productivity in places; introduction of a human resource development system focusing on teaching the essentials of growing productivity of labour.

Support of micro- and small-size enterprises (SDG 8.3) is also included in the plans of the Russian government. The May 2018 Executive Order provides measures aimed at supporting first-time entrepreneurs and creating a framework to facilitate entrepreneur activity as well as easing of regulations and the tax burden for innovative micro- and small-size enterprises and self-employed people. According to the plan, by 2024 the number of micro- and small-size entrepreneurs including the self-employed would grow up to 25 million people.

The May 2018 Executive Order also provides policies to increase resource utilization efficiency (SDG 8.4). Specifically, the government plans to: effectively utilize land
for large-scale housebuilding, effective production and consumption waste management; decrease the level of air pollution in large industrial centers; and ecologically restore water objects. An important aspect provided in the May 2018 Executive Order corresponds with SDG principles of transparency, openness and realization of civil society’s initiatives: the “creation and effective functioning of public control system aimed at exposure and liquidation of non-authorized waste deposits in all regions of the Russian Federation.”

Issues concerning facilitation of tourism (SDG 8.9) are also addressed in Russia’s 2024 development agenda. The May 2018 Executive Order provides for the formulation of a national project on environmental matters with the purpose of developing ecotourism in national parks.

**SDG 9. Build Resilient Infrastructure, Promote Sustainable Industrialization and Foster Innovation**

Infrastructure development is one of the pillars of Russia’s 2024 development agenda. This issue entrenches all other sectors including transport, energy, urban areas, education, healthcare and innovations. Specific attention is given to: preparation of a complex plan for modernization and extension of the country’s backbone infrastructure; doubling expenditure on the spatial development of Russia’s cities and communities by 2024; assigning more than 11 trillion roubles for the renovation of regional and local roadways; increasing the carrying capacity of the Baikal-Amur Mainline and the Trans-Siberian Railway up to 180 million tonnes by 2024; a tenfold increase of carrying capacity of the Northern Sea Route by 2025; facilitation of modern infrastructure ensuring safe treatment of hazardous waste of classes I and II and liquidation of the most dangerous objects of accumulated environmental damage; and building modern healthcare infrastructure.

In addition to hard infrastructure, digital and innovative infrastructure is also on the spot. The May 2018 Executive Order contains special prescriptions concerning the building of frontier innovative and scientific infrastructure; facilitation of “resilient and safe IT-infrastructure for high-speed transmission, processing and storage of big data open for all organizations and households;” “establishment of global competitive infrastructure for transmission, processing and storage of data mostly based on Russian technologies;” “creation of a system for acceleration of small- and middle-size enterprises including self-employed, and support infrastructure and services.”

**SDG 10. Reduce Inequality Within and Among Countries**

In Russian strategic documents the problem of inequality is dealt with by means of development of the system of social protection, and thus steps and measures mentioned in relation to SDGs 1 and 5 correspond with SDG 10. In the Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly 2018 the president highlighted the task of preparing a special pro-
programme of systematic support to increase the quality of life of seniors. Moreover, one of the pillars of the May 2018 Executive Order is provision of universal accessibility of social benefits for the population: “ensuring optimal accessibility of immediate medical services for the population (including remote settlements dwellers);” “building of modern and safe digital frameworks for high quality education of all grades and kinds;” “provision of affordable housing for middle-income households;” and guaranteed provision of affordable electricity.

However, gender and sociopolitical aspects of SDG 10.3 (ensure equal opportunity and reduce inequalities of outcome, including by eliminating discriminatory laws, policies and practices and promoting appropriate legislation, policies and action in this regard) are missed in the abovementioned documents.

**SDG 11. Make Cities Inclusive, Safe, Resilient and Sustainable**

As was mentioned above, Russia’s 2024 development agenda pays great attention to development of urban areas. One of the top-priority national projects planned for implementation of the May 2018 Executive Order is the “Housing and Urban Areas” programme. According to the May 2018 Executive Order the milestones of the project are: “provision of affordable housing for middle-income households including opening up opportunities for purchasing (building) of housing by means of mortgage services with rate of interest lower than 8%; expansion of residential development up to no less than 120 million square meters annually; substantial improvement of quality of urban areas, increase of the urban areas quality index by 30%, double-time reduction in the number of cities with adverse environments in accordance to this index; facilitation of the mechanism of direct involvement of the population in creation of a comfortable urban environment, increase of the share of residents participating in urban development decision-making by 30%; provision of persistent reduction of un-tenantable housing facilities.”

According to the May 2018 Executive Order, targets 11.6, 11.7 and 11.a of SDG 11 are implemented apart from urban development plans and fall within the programme “Ecology” that indicates the absence of complex and systematic approach to facilitation of sustainable development in the Russian Federation.

**SDG 12. Ensure Sustainable Consumption and Production Patterns**

The May 2018 Executive Order provides the following measures for transition to more rational models of consumption and production: “effective consumption and production waste management including liquidation of all non-authorized waste deposits exposed by January 1, 2018 within cities’ limits; significant reduction of air pollution in large industrial centres, including reduction of the total amount of air pollutants emissions by 20% in the most polluted cities;” “facilitation of the complex system for household waste management including liquidation and remediation of waste deposits,
creation of a framework for recycling production and consumption waste forbidden to be buried; facilitation and effective utilization of systems of public control over exposition and liquidation of non-authorized waste deposits in all regions of the Russian Federation.”

Measures within the framework of the programme “Protection of Environment,” in particular, matching the SDG 12 targets, are provided by subprogrammes 1 (“Regulation of Quality of Environment”), 3 (“Hydrometeorology and Environmental Monitoring”) and 8 (“Liquidation of Accumulated Ecological Damage”) and by the priority project “Clean Country.”

**SDG 13. Take Urgent Actions to Combat Climate Change and its Impacts**

As mentioned earlier, the May 2018 Executive Order provides several measures concerning environmental issues, and reduction of pollutants emissions in large industrial cities in particular. However, the document does not include risks and dangers caused by climate change and its implications for the territory of Russia.

Among active initiatives on environmental adaptation, the programme “Protection of Environment” for 2012–2020 could be mentioned. The programme provides: monitoring of subsurface states in relation to hazardous exogenous geological processes; “drafting of regulations providing effective functioning of rate setting of negative ecological footprint; planning of measures for the provision of economic incentives for the reduction of negative anthropological and technological environmental impacts; research aimed at increasing the quality of the environment and provision of environmental safety including scientific support of state policy in the sphere of mitigation of negative impacts on the atmosphere;” and also fulfilment of international environmental protection obligations.

**SDG 14. Conserve and Sustainably Use the Oceans, Seas and Marine Resources**

In Russia’s 2024 development agenda there are no measures concerning the facilitation of environmental sustainability of maritime resources. Moreover, the goal to increase the traffic flow of the Northern Sea Route up to 80 million tonnes creates environmental risks in the vulnerable Arctic region.

However, within the framework of the active programme “Development of Fisheries Industry” several planned measures correspond with SDG 14.4 (effectively regulate harvesting and end overfishing, illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing), 14.5 (conserve at least 10% of coastal and marine areas, consistent with national and international law and based on the best available scientific information) and 14.6 (prohibit certain forms of fisheries subsidies). The programme provides further improvement of measures aimed at prevention, mitigation and liquidation of illegal, incomunicable and uncontrollable fisheries, provision of state monitoring on fisheries and preserva-
tion of living marine resources, development of fisheries in areas under international treaties of the Russian Federation and preservation of living marine resources in the open part of the oceans, and drafting of regulations on quotas on harvesting of living marine resources imposed on Russian legal entities and self-employed persons within Russia’s domestic waters.

**SDG 15. Sustainably Manage Forests, Combat Desertification, Halt and Reverse Land Degradation, Halt Biodiversity Loss**

In the May 2018 Executive Order, there are measures that correspond with SDG 15: “preservation of biodiversity including extension of specially protected natural sites by 5 million hectares, reintroduction of endangered species, building of infrastructure for ecotourism in national parks and preservation of forests by means of reintegration of logged or failed forest territories;” “utilization of systems of ecological regulation based on best available technologies by all facilities adversely affecting environment;” “preservation of biodiversity by means of creating no less than 24 new specially protected natural sites.”

SDG 15.6 (fair sharing of the benefits arising from the utilization of genetic resources), 15.8 (prevent the introduction and significantly reduce the impact of invasive alien species) and 15.c (combat poaching and trafficking of protected species) are not covered.

**SDG 16. Promote Just, Peaceful and Inclusive Societies**

SDG 16 is barely addressed by the measures introduced in the May 2018 Executive Order, but target 16.6 (develop effective, accountable and transparent institutions at all levels) is indirectly covered. The government is working on incorporation of the system of digital civilian workflow based on digital technologies.

Corruption (SDG 16.5), violence and related deaths (SDG 16.1) and the rule of law (SDG 16.3) – issues that are crucially important for the development of the country – are not included in the list of priorities.

**Conclusion**

The majority of UN SDGs are fully or almost completely incorporated into Russia’s 2024 development agenda. However, it should be noted that Russia’s approach to implementing the SDGs requires more consistency. An important feature of the UN SDGs is their comprehensiveness requiring implementation of SDGs with due regard to their strong correlations. In this case, measures aimed at better provision of access to energy resources cannot be regarded as corresponding with the SDGs if they contravene the tasks concerning ecological sustainability.
One aspect of the SDGs that is not fully incorporated into Russia’s strategic documents is social justice and the promotion of human rights including gender inequality, development and representation of local communities, and building just, peaceful and inclusive societies. This is partly due to the fact that the Russian authorities do not consider these aspects to be priorities in terms of economic growth as a top medium-term objective. Besides, the majority of the abovementioned issues manifest more on the practical implementation level, rather than during strategic planning. However, consistent implementation of the SDGs requires incorporation of all socially oriented priorities into development strategies.

Analysis of tasks and measures for the implementation of the SDGs provided in national conceptual and strategic documents demonstrates that there is a room for further increase of effectiveness of the implementation based on a contingent approach ensuring solidarity and balancing of social, economic and ecological aspects. The most suitable option is adoption of a complex development strategy including both national priorities and sectoral tasks. However, in the absence of political will for adoption and realization of a special implementation strategy, the following measures contribute to a solution: paying special attention to the SDGs while drafting policies and ensuring division of responsibilities among federal and regional executive bodies; specification of indicators for monitoring; regular monitoring based on specified indicators; involvement of social stakeholders in the realization, monitoring and evaluation; and heavy coverage of achieved results.

References


Перспективы реализации Целей устойчивого развития ООН в России

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Цели устойчивого развития, принятые Генеральной Ассамблеей ООН 25 сентября 2015 г. в рамках Резолюции 70/1 «Преобразование нашего мира: Повестка дня в области устойчивого развития на период до 2030 года», охватывают широкий спектр проблем, с которыми сталкиваются как развивающиеся, так и развитые страны. Проблематика достижения ЦУР актуальна и для международной повестки дня, и в связи с задачами социально-экономического развития Российской Федерации. Поэтому приобретает особую важность выявление приоритетов для России направлений устойчивого развития в среднесрочной перспективе. Анализ в рамках данной статьи построен на соотнесении приоритетов, заявленных в Указе Президента РФ «О национальных целях и стратегических задачах развития Российской Федерации на период до 2024 года» (Майский указ-2018), а также в действующих Государственных программах РФ, и конкретных задач ЦУР. Основная цель работы — выявить, насколько полно и системно задачи ЦУР реализуются в стратегических документах, определяющих основные направления развития России на кратко- и среднесрочную перспективу.

Проведенная авторами статьи работа показывает, что есть существенный ресурс повышения эффективности достижения ЦУР на основе реализации комплексного подхода, обеспечивающего единство и сбалансированность социальных, экономических и экологических аспектов устойчивого развития. Так, существует необходимость повышения уровня системности в подходе нашей страны к реализации ЦУР, в частности более полного включения социальных аспектов устойчивого развития в национальные документы стратегического планирования.

Ключевые слова: Цели устойчивого развития (ЦУР); устойчивое развитие; Повестка 2030; Социально-экономическое развитие Российской Федерации; Майский указ 2018 г.; Госпрограммы Российской Федерации


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Localizing and Achieving the Sustainable Development Goals at the National Level: Cases of Leadership

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Abstract

This article describes the experience of localization and implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) at the national level in the 10 countries which top the global SDG Index compiled by the Sustainable Development Solutions Network (SDSN) and the Bertelsmann Stiftung. The authors apply methods of comparative and content analysis of national and international documents and conclude that leading countries began to work actively on the transition toward sustainable development more than a decade ago, established effective inter-ministerial coordination in this area and have achieved significant success. Nevertheless, even they are still far from the full implementation of the SDGs. Moreover, not all of them have localized Agenda 2030 within their national sustainable development strategies.

The authors identify three key SDG localization and implementation schemes: full localization (e.g. Germany), implementation of the SDGs without their formal localization (e.g. Sweden) and the complete absence of localization (e.g. Finland). The most preferable and effective scheme, according to the authors, is the first one.

In the late 1990s, Russia could have become one of the pioneers of sustainable development. However, due to insufficient political will, Russia is still at the initial stages of its transition toward sustainable development. In order to catalyze progress in this area, Russia needs to urgently develop and adopt a national sustainable development strategy in which all of the SDGs are localized, take into account SDGs in other key strategic documents and set specific quantitative goals and designate ministries that will be responsible for achieving these goals.

1 The editorial board received the article in May 2018.
Key words: Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs); Agenda 2030; localization of SDGs


Introduction

The conceptualization of sustainable development as well as a broad international discussion on this issue began in the 1970s. In 1987, in its famous report, the Brundtland Commission elaborated the classic definition of sustainable development as development that “meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” [WCED, 1987]. This definition is focused on intergenerational and environmental issues as it contains a clear message that present generations need to save natural resources for their descendants. In 2000, the United Nations (UN) Millennium Declaration was adopted at the UN Millennium Summit. In 2001 eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) were derived from this document, focusing international efforts on solving social and economic problems in the world’s poorest countries. Environmental risks were also reflected among the MDGs: the seventh goal (“Ensure environmental sustainability”) was fully devoted to them, although the main focus of the agenda was still on the social and economic aspects of development.

The Millennium Development Goals were designed to improve the quality of life in developing countries by 2015. As a result of their implementation, profound and positive change was created. Between 1990 and 2015, the number of people with an income of less than $1.25 a day more than halved, decreasing from 1.9 to 0.8 billion people. The proportion of people who suffer from malnutrition declined from 23.3% in 1990–1992 to 12.9% in 2014–2016. The number of children who do not attend school was halved during the period 2000–2015. The maternal mortality rate in 1990–2015 also was almost halved, with the major reduction recorded after 2000. Since 1990, more than two billion people have gained access to improved sanitation facilities. The proportion of the urban population living in slums decreased from 39.4% in 2000 to 29.7% in 2014 [UN, 2015a]. However, absolute indicators sometimes showed completely opposite (i.e. negative) trends. For example, while the proportion of the urban population living in slums decreased, the total number of slum dwellers in 2000–2015 increased from 792 to 881 million people [UN, 2015a]. The key social problems of humanity (hunger, extreme poverty, inequality) were not fully resolved either. In 2015, almost half of employed people worked in vulnerable conditions. The environment continued to deteriorate due to irresponsible economic activities. Therefore, after the expiration of the Millennium Development Goals, humanity needed new mechanisms to continue the transition toward sustainable development.
Eight MDGs comprising 21 targets were replaced by 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and 169 targets. The SDGs were set in Resolution 70/1 of the United Nations General Assembly “Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development” (hereinafter referred to as Agenda 2030). This document was adopted by 193 UN member states in September 2015 [UN, 2015b]. Like the MDGs, the SDGs were designed for a period of 15 years but, unlike the MDGs, the SDGs are absolutely relevant for both developed and developing countries. Implementation of SDGs involves a very wide range of stakeholders, such as governments, the research community, businesses (especially transnational corporations) and civil society. Among these stakeholders, it is young people and youth organizations who play a special role, since today’s young people will live and take decisions in the world created after 2030.

In Agenda 2030, finally, all three aspects of sustainable development — economic, social and environmental — were harmonized to the extent that 193 countries could negotiate. Agenda 2030 is essentially the key to solving all global problems, from extreme poverty and armed conflicts to gender inequality and climate change. With time, the intergenerational aspect has almost disappeared in sustainable development discourse. At present, it is considered that sustainable development “offers a framework to generate economic growth, achieve social justice, exercise environmental stewardship and strengthen governance” [UN Secretary-General, 2013], following an integrated holistic approach that reflects the modern definition of sustainable development.

The global process to implement the SDGs has been going on for more than two years, and this allows us to take stock of the initial progress at global, national and local levels. This article examines the implementation of SDGs at the national level in several leading countries, since it is states that take key decisions which significantly influence regions and local communities, as well as determine national contributions to global efforts on hunger and poverty eradication, combating climate change and introducing pollution control.

The purpose of this paper is to identify and synthesize national approaches to the localization and implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals in countries that are world leaders in sustainable development. The authors use content analysis of national and international documents, as well as comparative analysis. The main sources are voluntary national reviews (VNRs) of progress in the implementation of Agenda 2030 and national sustainable development strategies. Since Russia has not yet begun the process of localization and implementation of the SDGs, the findings obtained by the authors can be extremely useful for the strategic planning of sustainable development in Russia.

**National Frameworks for Sustainable Development**

In this paper, the top 10 countries on the 2018 SDG Index compiled by the Sustainable Development Solutions Network (SDSN) and the Bertelsmann Stiftung [Bertelsmann Stiftung, SDSN, 2018] are considered leaders in the localization and implementa-
tion of the SDGs. The SDG Index ranks countries according to how close they are to achieving sustainable development goals (from 0 which is worst to 100 which is best); the first place is occupied by the country with the maximum number of points and the last by the country with the minimum. It should be noted that the SDG Index has some shortcomings. For example, it is calculated on the basis of publicly available statistical data, which at present are far from complete. Also, criticism by some experts is related to the fact that in addition to official data, this rating also uses estimates from research centres and non-governmental organizations. Due to changes in methodology, SDG Index scores are not comparable across 2016, 2017 and 2018 reports. In addition, while it is worthwhile to compare the scores of the SDG Index with scores of ratings compiled by other research teams, so far there is only one index tracking all 17 SDGs in all countries of the world with available statistics.

The top 10 countries on the SDG Index include only Scandinavian and other European countries: Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Germany, France, Norway, Switzerland, Slovenia, Austria and Iceland. Their level of SDG achievement ranges from 79.7% (Iceland) to 85.0% (Sweden). Thus, even these countries are still quite far from full SDG implementation. Moreover, even these leaders are not on track to achieve the SDGs by 2030 and their progress in achieving the most problematic goals for them (SDG12 “Responsible Consumption and Production” and SDG13 “Fighting Climate Change”) remains insufficient.

Top 10 SDG Index performers are the pioneers of sustainable development. They contributed much at the UN Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 (known as the Earth Summit), which resulted in the adoption of Agenda 21, as well as in the development and adoption of the UN Millennium Declaration in 2000.

Many of these countries are leading developing aid donors. Denmark, Switzerland and Sweden, along with Great Britain and Luxembourg, which occupy the 14th and 22nd places respectively in the SDG Index [Bertelsmann Stiftung, SDSN, 2018], form a small circle of countries that have been regularly allocating over 0.7% of their gross national income (GNI) to official development assistance (ODA) in line with UN recommendations [UN HLPF, 2017b]. Since 2006, Sweden has spent about 1% of its GNI on ODA annually. According to data from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), in the 2000s, even Development Assistance Committee (DAC) members devoted only about 0.3% of their GNI to ODA [OECD, 2018].

In countries occupying leading positions in the SDG index, sustainable development is more or less incorporated into the educational process. In 2003, the Swedish government formed a committee on education for sustainable development. In 2006, in one of its communications, the Swedish government stated that the concept of sustainable development should be studied at all levels of the educational process [Gustafsson, Engström, Svenson, 2015]. Currently, sustainable development is taught in Sweden from kindergarten to adult education. In Finland, sustainable development
was introduced into school education in 2003–2004. The country also took actions to integrate the concept of sustainable development into education in kindergartens and in educational programs for adults. In Austria, ecology, human health, civil rights and gender equality are included in the curriculum on an interdisciplinary basis, and when possible they are part of specific subjects.

The abbreviation ESD, which stands for Education for Sustainable Development, has come into use. It became popular during the UN Decade of Education for Sustainable Development (2005–2014). However, despite the significant progress achieved by top 10 SDG Index performers in the educational process, in many cases much depends on the educational organization and its willingness to take action [Buckler, Creech, 2014]. In addition, in many cases, educational programs have a strong focus on environmental issues with little attention to social and economic aspects of sustainability.

Thus, by the time Agenda 2030 was adopted, the countries under review had gained significant experience in sustainable development. They actively participated in the conceptualization of this phenomena, provided development aid to the world’s poorest countries, and integrated sustainable development into their educational processes, which significantly increased the awareness and support. This largely explains why these countries are leading global sustainable development.

National Sustainable Development Strategies

Since sustainable development practices of different countries vary greatly, all of the SDGs and corresponding targets of Agenda 2030 are formulated in a very generalized form, and specific quantitative targets are usually absent. It is assumed that each country should localize SDGs — that means, it should choose from among the 169 global goals those that should be achieved at the national level by 2030, taking into account national development priorities and financial capacities. These goals should be adapted to national conditions (i.e. reformulated) and, if possible, states should define corresponding statistical indicators and set quantitative targets for each goal. Goals and specific quantitative targets should be reflected in national strategic documents.

Countries have very different implementation practices for the SDGs. Switzerland adopted its first sustainable development strategy in 1997 (Table 1). Since then, the document has been revised every four years and the fifth edition is in effect from 2016–2019. Most other leaders of sustainable development adopted their first strategies in the early 2000s — Austria, Germany, Denmark, Iceland, Norway and Sweden did this in 2002 (Table 1). Their documents have been also revised several times.

Many countries have already made adjustments to their sustainable development strategies after the adoption of Agenda 2030 (Table 1). For example, Germany has renewed its strategy of sustainable development, and each of the 17 SDGs has at least one corresponding goal in the new German strategy. German goals are clearly set and adapted for the national context and each of them has an indicator to assess progress. For example, target 7.2 in Agenda 2030 (“By 2030, increase substantially the share of
renewable energy in the global energy mix”) corresponds to indicator 7.2.1 (“Renewable energy share in the total final energy consumption”). In the German sustainable development strategy, this corresponds to targets 7.2.a (“Share of renewable energy sources in gross final energy consumption to be increased to 18% by 2020, to 30% by 2030 and 60% by 2050”) and 7.2.b (“Share of renewable energy sources in gross electricity consumption to be increased to at least 35% by 2020, to at least 50% by 2030, to at least 65% by 2040 and to at least 80% by 2050”). It should be noted that in this case the German strategy has revised the SDG indicator “The share of renewable energy sources in gross final energy consumption” to “The share of electricity from renewable sources in gross energy consumption.”

Similarly, Switzerland has localized all 17 SDGs in its own nine goals and 52 targets. The monitoring of implementation of selected goals and objectives in Switzerland will be carried out with the MONET indicator system established in 2003 to monitor sustainable development. In the near future, this system will be significantly expanded and adapted to Agenda 2030.

Slovenia, like Germany and Switzerland, has formulated its own 12 goals which cover all 17 global SDGs. These 12 goals in their turn relate to five areas (Table 1). Also, Slovenia has already selected 30 statistical indicators to track the achievement of SDGs. The ultimate goal of implementation of Slovenia’s sustainable development strategy to 2030 is to ensure a high standard of living for all.

Some countries have already achieved much in the sphere of sustainable development, and did not revise their strategies or formally localize the SDGs. The most prominent examples are Sweden and Norway. Sweden adopted an action plan to implement Agenda 2030 focused on achieving social and gender equality, sustainable development of communities, creating a circular economy, strengthening businesses and corporate social responsibility, improving sustainability of the food system and stimulating innovations. In 2017, Sweden also published its first voluntary national review of the implementation of Agenda 2030. Norway included the SDGs in its budget process and released the first voluntary national review in 2016. In addition, each ministry is responsible for a follow-up on its respective SDGs. The coordinating ministry — the Ministry of Finance — is responsible for progress on all 17 SDGs.

Denmark also did not formally localize the SDGs and only announced five priority SDGs — 5, 7, 13, 16 and 17 — to which the majority of other countries cannot yet pay enough attention. In 2017, Denmark published the first voluntary national report on implementation of Agenda 2030. Denmark also announced its intention to actively cooperate with other countries on sustainable development, distinguishing the following three groups of countries: poor and vulnerable countries, poor and stable countries and transitional and emerging markets. The funds that Denmark will allocate for cooperation will be directed mainly to the first and second groups.

Some countries such as France and Iceland have still to update their sustainable development strategies. Others, such as Finland, have formally updated their strategies but retained all former priorities and added an analysis of the SDGs these priorities
### Table 1. National Characteristics of SDG Localization and Implementation Coordination in Top 10 Performers on the SDG Index and in Russia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No(^*)</th>
<th>%**</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year of the First Sustainable Development Strategy Adoption (or Revision After SDG Adoption)</th>
<th>National Characteristics of SDG Localization</th>
<th>National Characteristics of SDG Implementation Coordination</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>85.0%</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>2002 (–) + action plan</td>
<td>After the adoption of the SDGs, Sweden has not revised its sustainable development strategy, but it has intensified its efforts on some SDGs that are hard to implement in high-income countries. Sweden has also adopted an action plan to implement Agenda 2030 focused on social equality, gender equality, sustainable society, circular economy, strong business with developed corporate social responsibility, sustainable food system, knowledge and innovations.</td>
<td>The minister for Public Administration and the minister for International Development Cooperation and Climate are coordinating SDG implementation at national and international levels correspondingly. All ministers participate in the implementation of SDGs within their competencies. A small advisory group of state secretaries from the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Environment and Energy and the Ministry of Business and Innovations has also been established.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>84.6%</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>2002 (2017) + action plan</td>
<td>“The World 2030: Denmark’s Strategy for Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Action” is based on Agenda 2030. According to this document, which was released in 2017, priority SDGs for Denmark are SDGs 5, 7, 13, 16 and 17.</td>
<td>Denmark established an interdepartmental working group to implement SDGs. Initially, this group was headed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but later the leadership was transferred to the Ministry of Finance. This reflects the government’s intention to integrate SDGs into its domestic policies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>83.0%</td>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>2006 (2016) + action plan</td>
<td>“The Finland We Want by 2050” is a long-term objective for the future of Finland published after the adoption of Agenda 2030. It preserves eight priorities from the previous national key strategic document on sustainable development and adds an analysis of the SDGs that these priorities help to achieve. According to the document, all 17 SDGs are already localized in Finland, and 11 SDGs are localized particularly thoroughly.</td>
<td>The coordination secretariat in the Prime Minister’s Office coordinates the national implementation of Agenda 2030. It consists of representatives of the Secretariat General of the Finnish National Commission on Sustainable Development, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the Prime Minister’s Office. The secretariat is supported by the coordination network comprising representatives of key ministries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No*</td>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Year of the First Sustainable Development Strategy Adoption (or Revision After SDG Adoption)</td>
<td>National Characteristics of SDG Localization</td>
<td>National Characteristics of SDG Implementation Coordination</td>
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<td>-----------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>2002 (2017)</td>
<td>In its national strategy for sustainable development, updated after the adoption of Agenda 2030, Germany formulated 63 national goals and 63 indicators in 36 areas so that at least one German goal and one indicator corresponds to each SDG. Statistical indicators in the current version of the strategy are identical to indicators in the previous version. At the same time, the number of key areas that need action decreased from 21 in 2012 to 17 in 2017. Thus, the changes were purely formal and their implementation was necessary to bring the strategy in line with Agenda 2030.</td>
<td>The main body for managing sustainable development in Germany is the Committee of State Secretaries, which includes representatives of all ministries led by the head of the Federal Chancellery. External experts are sometimes invited to attend meetings of this body. The committee makes a strategic contribution to the work of the German government and serves as a forum for the information exchange between various government departments on their activities in the sphere of sustainable development.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>2003 (–)</td>
<td>France has not formally localized the SDGs. However, in the near future France plans to bring its national sustainable development strategy in accordance with Agenda 2030 and to adopt a roadmap for SDG implementation.</td>
<td>The prime minister mandated the coordination of SDG implementation to the inter-ministerial delegate for sustainable development who is working closely with the Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs. This delegate coordinates sustainable development issues within ministries.</td>
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<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>2002 (–) + action plan (2003)</td>
<td>All 17 SDGs are included in the budget process. However, the national sustainable development strategy was not renewed after the adoption of Agenda 2030.</td>
<td>For each SDG, the responsible ministry prepares a budget proposal. The Ministry of Finance is the coordinator that brings together all proposals and presents them to the parliament.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>1997 (2016) + action plan</td>
<td>After the adoption of Agenda 2030, Switzerland carried out an analysis of SDG implementation and adjusted its four-year sustainable development strategy, designed for 2016–2019. This strategy now contains nine priorities covering all SDGs. Sustainable development is an overarching objective stated in the federal constitution.</td>
<td>In Switzerland, the implementation of Agenda 2030 is overseen by the Federal Council. Coordination is carried out by the Federal Office for Spatial Development (ARE) and the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC). Implementation of SDGs involves all ministries.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No*</td>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Year of the First Sustainable Development Strategy Adoption (or Revision After SDG Adoption)</td>
<td>National Characteristics of SDG Localization</td>
<td>National Characteristics of SDG Implementation Coordination</td>
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<tr>
<td>8 80.0%</td>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>2005 (2017)</td>
<td>In December 2017, Slovenia adopted a new national development strategy, localizing all 17 SDGs. The document focuses on five priorities: a high-performing economy that creates added value for all, a strong, inclusive and responsible society, environment, good governance based on cooperation and lifelong learning. The strategy consists of 12 goals.</td>
<td>The government created the Permanent Inter-Ministerial Working Group on Development Policies to coordinate the implementation of Agenda 2030. This group consists of two representatives from each ministry. It is headed by the Government Office for Development and European Cohesion Policy.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 80.0%</td>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>2002 (—) + action plan (2003)</td>
<td>Austria has not revised its sustainable development strategy, but in 2016 it released the report “Contributions to the Implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development by the Austrian Federal Ministries.” Also in 2016, all ministries were instructed to integrate SDGs into their programmes and strategies.</td>
<td>All ministries are actively involved in the implementation of SDGs. Federal Chancellery and the Federal Ministry for Europe, Integration and Foreign Affairs are coordinating this work.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 79.7%</td>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>2002 (—)</td>
<td>Iceland’s first sustainable development strategy was adopted in 2002. It was designed for the period up to 2020. Currently, it is being updated after the adoption of Agenda 2030. Iceland also intends to develop an action plan.</td>
<td>The Policy Council is in charge of implementing SDGs. It comprises representatives of all ministries. The Prime Minister’s Office and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs constantly interact with this inter-ministerial body to work out sustainable development solutions.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63 68.9%</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>Russia has no sustainable development strategy, but it has the concept of sustainable development of 1996. In 1996, Russia planned to develop a sustainable development strategy and to integrate its principles into other key strategic documents. However, these plans have not been implemented.</td>
<td>Formally, SDG-related work is coordinated by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and Sustainable Development. However, in reality, this group is focused primarily on the development of SDG indicators, but not on the localization and implementation of the SDGs.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Country’s place in the 2018 SDG Index compiled by SDSN and Bertelsmann Stiftung.
** Distance to achieve sustainable development goals (from 0 which is worst to 100 which is best).

help to achieve. The updated strategy of Finland states that the country has already localized all 17 SDGs, and 11 of them have been localized very thoroughly. Neither France, nor Iceland, nor Finland have yet issued any voluntary national report on the implementation of Agenda 2030.

Another interesting example of SDG localization (in fact, an example of absent localization) is demonstrated by Austria. The country has not yet revised its sustainable development strategy. However, in 2016 all ministries were tasked to include SDGs in their programmes and strategies, as well as to develop new action plans to implement Agenda 2030 where necessary. In 2017, Austria released the report “Outline 2016: Contributions to the Implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development by the Austrian Federal Ministries” which contains a detailed analysis of the country against each SDG. No voluntary national report on Austria has been published so far.

Based on the experience of top 10 SDG performers, three schemes for SDG localization can be distinguished. The first scheme can be called “deep localization.” It implies a thorough consideration of the global sustainable development goals at the national level and the setting of national goals very close to the SDGs. Such national goals cover all SDGs. This approach is found in Germany, Switzerland and Slovenia.

The second scheme is SDG implementation without formal localization, which is typical of Sweden, Norway and Denmark. These countries are actively implementing Agenda 2030 and reporting to the international community on this, but they have not updated their sustainable development strategies after the adoption of Agenda 2030.

The third scheme of SDG localization stands apart from Agenda 2030 and in fact represents no localization. This scheme is found in France, Iceland, Finland and Austria. These countries are either still updating their sustainable development strategies and planning to develop road maps, or they have already done so but have made no changes so far.

Sustainable Development Governance

Global governance through inclusive goal setting is considered to be one of the main Agenda 2030 innovations. At least 70 governments and a large number of civil society representatives took part in the process of elaborating the SDGs [Bierman, Kanie, Kim, 2017]. In this regard, SDGs are fundamentally different from MDGs, since the latter offered the same goals for all developing countries which were defined by the UN Secretariat to a large extent. On the one hand, SDGs give countries more freedom and allow them to fully adapt the global agenda to their own specifics and priorities. But on the other hand, this sets a complex task for countries, since translating global goals into national ones requires well-functioning national governance systems [Bierman, Kanie, Kim, 2017].

In fact, the principle of soft governance or governance based on goals and commitments formulated by countries themselves lies at the basis of the implementation of the SDGs. Recent years have seen a steady increase in the popularity of this principle, especially in cases when global governance affects sensitive areas of national interest [Lanshina, Barinova, 2017].
Another innovation of Agenda 2030 is that it implies a detailed assessment of countries on the basis of a large number of quantitative indicators. This idea first appeared in the Agenda 21 document in 1992. In 1995, the UN Commission on Sustainable Development presented the first set of indicators for sustainable development and afterwards a number of countries developed their own sets [Rinne, Lyytimäki, Kautto, 2013]. For example, Sweden presented its first set of sustainable development indicators in 2001. This set consisted of 30 indicators classified into four topics — efficiency, equality/participation, adaptability and values and resources for future generations. Switzerland established its MONET monitoring system (German: Monitoring der nachhaltigen Entwicklung) consisting of 75 sustainable development indicators in 2003. Austria has been publishing MONE reports on sustainable development monitoring (German: Monitoring für eine nachhaltige Entwicklung) since 2006. These reports contain 26 key indicators supplemented by another 56. Other top SDG-performing countries have similar systems. In Russia, the first system of sustainable development monitoring is currently being created.

Since many countries outside the top 10 SDG performers list still do not collect statistics on many environmental and social indicators, the introduction of Agenda 2030 will certainly become an incentive to develop sustainable development statistics as well as to monitor relevant indicators. It is necessary to highlight the fundamental importance of having a developed monitoring system in sustainable development governance: in the absence of clear quantitative targets and mechanisms for their monitoring, Agenda 2030 and its implementation become an abstract task, as well as strategic management in general.

The role of national coordination mechanisms also cannot be underestimated in the implementation of Agenda 2030. As follows from Table 1, an inter-ministerial committee headed by a ministry is usually responsible for coordinating the implementation of the SDGs. In Sweden, Austria and Germany, absolutely all ministries are involved in the process of SDG implementation. In other countries such as Finland, Slovenia and Switzerland, only ministries that have a direct relation to sustainable development are involved in this work.

Some countries give particular importance to sustainable development. Thus, the Federal Chancellery is responsible for sustainable development in Germany [Federal Government of Germany, 2016]. In Switzerland, the need for transition to sustainable development is set in the federal constitution [UN HLPF, 2018a]. The coordination of SDG localization and implementation may be the responsibility of the Minister of State Service (Sweden), the Ministry of Finance (Denmark and Norway) or the Federal Agency for Spatial Development (Switzerland). This indicates a significant difference in emphasis of sustainable development management practices in the world.

SDGs and Russia

As a member of UN, Russia participated in the elaboration and adoption of the Sustainable Development Goals. Despite this, SDG implementation is not a priority in Russia, and in fact it has not yet begun with the exception of those SDG indicators that
are being developed by the Federal State Statistics Service of the Russian Federation (Rosstat). Russia is a member of the UN Conference of European Statisticians’ (CES) Steering Group on Statistics for Sustainable Development Goals.

However, the progress in statistics on sustainable development is also not sufficient. At the moment, datasets on many statistical indicators are unavailable. Also the federal statistical works plan includes SDG indicators, but these are mainly social development indicators. A large number of datasets on environment, institutions, and responsible production and consumption are not being developed.

It is important to note that Russia could become one of the pioneers of sustainable development. In 1996, Russia was among the first to approve the concept of sustainable development. According to this concept, Russia was to develop a national strategy of sustainable development as early as 1996, when the majority of today’s leaders did not have such strategies. However, further work in this area stopped and the strategy was never adopted. In 2012, coordination of sustainable development was formally assigned to the Interdepartmental Working Group on Climate Change and Sustainable Development that is part of the Presidential Administration. However, in the sphere of sustainable development, the efforts of this working group have been predominantly focused on the development of statistical indicators. In addition, the group is headed by the advisor to the president and special presidential representative on climate issues (until recently, Alexander Bedritsky, since 2018 – Ruslan Edelgeriyev). In the top SDG-performing countries such groups are usually headed by ministries.

Many of the Agenda 2030 objectives overlap with the national priorities set in Russia’s key strategic documents, such as Presidential Decree No 204 “On the National Goals and Strategic Objectives of the Development of the Russian Federation for the Period up to 2024” of 7 May 2018, the message of the president of the Russian Federation to the Federal Assembly, the forecast of the long-term socio-economic development of the Russian Federation for the period up to 2030, as well as the strategy for the socio-economic development of the Russian Federation up to 2035 (is being developed). These documents also address social problems, environmental degradation, governance shortcomings and the challenges of economic growth and development. However, they lack an integrated holistic approach toward development aimed at achieving stable economic growth without negative consequences for the environment or without reinforcing social and gender inequality. All key strategic Russian documents remain focused on steady economic progress (i.e. GDP growth) and extensive development through the intense exploitation of natural resources. In addition, they do not contain references to Agenda 2030 and do not mention the SDGs – that is, they are completely outside of the international discussion on development and Agenda 2030.

In order to integrate into this international discussion and begin a real transition toward sustainability, Russia needs to adopt its national sustainable development strategy and localize key Agenda 2030 provisions within it, as well as integrate localized SDGs into existing national strategic documents. In addition, it is advisable to define ministries responsible for achieving specific quantitative targets and introducing key
performance indicators (KPI) based on the achievement of these targets for the relevant ministers. Similar work needs to be done at the regional level (at the level of the regional and city administrations).

It is necessary to intensify the efforts of the Interdepartmental Working Group on Climate Change and Sustainable Development on issues related to sustainable development. This group should be responsible for elaboration of a sustainable development strategy and for implementation of sustainable development principles in other key national strategic documents. It is crucial that the interdepartmental working group not only coordinates this work among representatives of ministries related to sustainable development, but also involves in its discussions representatives of regional and municipal authorities, as well as representatives of business, universities, NGOs and other stakeholders. The transition toward sustainable development and the implementation of Agenda 2030 should become a priority for the president of the Russian Federation.

Conclusion

This article analyses the experience of the localization and implementation of Sustainable Development Goals by top SDG-performing countries according to the SDG Index compiled by SDSN and the Bertelsmann Stiftung. The authors conclude that even this narrow group of countries has very different experiences both in the transition toward sustainable development and in SDG implementation. Some countries adopted national sustainable development strategies in the 1990s, others did so only in the early 2000s. Countries also undergo completely different stages of implementing SDGs in strategic documents – from no localization to the localization of all 17 goals. All countries under review have already developed mechanisms to coordinate SDG implementation. Such mechanisms are represented by inter-ministerial groups comprising representatives of various ministries.

SDG Index leaders have been implementing the principles of sustainable development for many years (usually more than 15) and they have also developed coordinating mechanisms for SDG implementation headed by agencies within the executive branch. At the same time, not all of them have localized the SDGs in their national sustainable development strategies and not all have adjusted their strategies after the adoption of Agenda 2030 – e.g. the Scandinavian countries. This does not mean that Scandinavian countries stay idle on the SDGs; these countries have already implemented a significant part of Agenda 2030 (up to 85%) and they are global leaders in this sphere. Still, Scandinavian countries need to localize the SDGs, which had been elaborated for all countries of the world, including the most developed and top performing ones.

The authors identify three main schemes for SDG localization and implementation among the top performers on the SDG Index: deep localization (countries set their own goals based on Agenda 2030), SDG implementation without their formal localization (implementation of Agenda 2030 without amendments to the national strategies of sustainable development) and a complete absence of localization (countries continue
to make efforts in the sphere of sustainable development without references to Agenda 2030 in their national strategic documents). The first scheme is typical of Germany, Switzerland and Slovenia, the second of Sweden, Norway and Denmark and the third of France, Iceland, Finland and Austria. According to the authors, the most desirable scheme is deep localization of the SDGs.

Russia is still at the very beginning of its transition toward sustainable development, although it had a chance to become a world leader as one of the first countries to adopt the concept of sustainable development in 1996. Considering the rapid progress of other countries and the great international experience accumulated in this area, Russia needs to develop its national sustainable development strategy as soon as possible, localize Agenda 2030 within it and include the SDGs in all other key strategic documents. In other words, it should choose the deep localization pathway. Doubtless, Rosstat should continue to improve statistics in the sphere of sustainable development, and the Interdepartmental Working Group on Climate Change and Sustainable Development should be given the task of localizing and implementing SDGs in Russia. The latter should regularly discuss progress on SDG localization in Russia, come out with specific proposals and interact with regional and municipal authorities, as well as cooperate at the international level within its competences.

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Опыт локализации и внедрения Целей устойчивого развития в странах – лидерах в данной сфере¹

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В статье рассмотрен опыт локализации и внедрения Целей устойчивого развития на национальном уровне в странах ТОП-10 Индекса ЦУР, составленного SDSN и Bertelsmann Stiftung. Использован метод сравнительного анализа и метод контент-анализа национальных и международных документов. Авторы пришли к выводу, что страны — лидеры устойчивого развития уже более десяти лет ведут активную работу по переходу к устойчивому развитию, наладили межведомственную координацию в данной сфере и добились значительных успехов. Тем не менее и они пока далеки от полной реализации ЦУР. При этом далеко не все из них локализовали Повестку 2030 в своих национальных стратегиях устойчивого развития.

Авторы выявили три ключевых схемы локализации и имплементации ЦУР: полная локализация (пример — Германия), имплементация ЦУР без их формальной локализации (пример — Швеция) и полное отсутствие локализации (пример — Финляндия). Наиболее желательной представляется первая схема.

В конце 1990-х годов Россия могла стать одним из пионеров устойчивого развития. Ввиду недостаточной политической воли она до сих пор находится на начальных этапах перехода к устойчивому развитию. Для активизации работы в данной сфере России необходимо срочно разработать и принять национальную стратегию устойчивого развития и локализовать в ней все ЦУР, включить ЦУР во все прочие стратегические документы, а также поставить конкретные количественные цели и назначить министерства, которые будут отвечать за достижение этих целей.

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Ключевые слова: Цели устойчивого развития (ЦУР); Повестка 2030; локализация ЦУР


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Expert opinion

Identification and Assessment of Ecosystem Services: the International Context¹

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Abstract

Over the past 10 years the problems related to ecosystem services have been reflected not only in scientific developments but also in official conceptual documents of the leading international organizations, including the United Nations (UN), the World Bank, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the European Community (EC). Ecosystem services and payments for these services have become important in the economic and political parts of these documents. This is related in many ways to the awareness of the rapid degradation of nature, which also damages human well-being and the economy. This article analyzes the existing definitions and classifications of ecosystem services by international organizations and in the scientific literature. It concludes that the term “ecosystem services” remains controversial and that there are a number of approaches to its definition. Common in these approaches is an attempt to link eco-services with benefits for human well-being. The most recognized approach is the methodology of the UN Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, which defines ecosystem services as those benefits that people receive from ecosystems. Particular attention in this article is paid to identifying the economic value of ecosystems and their services, which is the most difficult and urgent task for economic science. Due to the latent nature of many benefits from ecoservices and their diffusion among consumers/beneficiaries, they largely serve as public goods and are seen as free. Thus their importance is greatly underestimated, which leads to their degradation. Without a solution to this problem, the transition to a new economy for humanity is impossible. It is necessary to level out the risks of over-exploitation and depletion of ecosystem services, which requires that the environmental factor is adequately taken into account when making economic decisions.

In Russia the economics of ecosystem services has been poorly developed both in economic research and in legal and policy documents. An important step in resolving this problem should be the implementation of the Russian president’s Orders to the Government of the Russian Federation (January 2017), which envisage the development of an international environmental agenda for the formation of a system of compensation (payments) for ecosystem services with Russia as an environmental donor. Such a system needs to be formed within the country to support regions with large ecosystem capital.

Key words: ecosystem services; economic assessment of ecosystem services; definition of ecosystem services; classification of ecosystem services; payments for ecosystem services


¹ The editorial board received the article in February 2018.
Introduction

Over the past 10 years, global ecosystem services issues have developed rapidly. This is reflected not only in scientific developments, but also in the official conceptual documents of leading international organizations. The term “ecosystem services” has become an important part of their economic and political documents. “The Future We Want,” published in 2012, is the fundamental conceptual document of the United Nations (UN) [UN, 2012]. It defines the main directions of human development in the 21st century and identifies the green economy as the basis for a transition to sustainable development, an important feature of which is the preservation of ecosystem services. This document was adopted at the global UN conference and approved by all countries of the world, including Russia. The importance of ecosystem services has been integrated into many of the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) for the period 2016–2030 [UN, 2015], and in particular, in goals 14 (conservation of marine ecosystems) and 15 (conservation of terrestrial ecosystems). These SDGs should be implemented by all countries. Similarly, the OECD’s concept of economic development gives priority to green growth, which involves the preservation of ecosystem services [OECD, 2013]. Among international structures, the World Bank, which actively incorporates the economic valuation of ecosystems and their services into its projects, should be noted. In its documents outlining the main directions of development for Europe to 2050, the European Community (EC) also highlights ecosystems and their services [EEA, 2013]. International business is increasingly including ecoservices in its activities. In particular, this is well illustrated by the example of the World Business Council for Sustainable Development [WBCSD, 2012].

In many ways, such activity by international organizations and scientists is associated with an awareness of the rapid degradation of nature, which leads to enormous damage to the well-being of people and the economy. Human impact on the environment is enormous and a significant part of its resources has already degraded or is on the verge of being unable to recover. The rapid growth of the world’s population and improvement of living standards is accompanied by the active involvement of new ecosystems for industrial and agricultural purposes and for housing needs. The demand for ecosystem resources is increasing — fresh water, food, wood and other resources — and the assimilation potential of ecosystems to neutralize and absorb water and air pollution, waste and greenhouse gases is exhausted. As a result, over the past 50 years, about 60% of the world’s ecosystem services have degraded [UNEP, 2005]. The loss of ecosystems and their services leads to huge economic losses. It is estimated that the cost of global environmental damage is $7 trillion per year, which is equal to 11% of the world economy [WBCSD, 2011].

In Russia, the economics of ecosystem services is extremely poorly developed both in economic work and in legal and policy documents. Several scientific studies can be noted here, including by one of the authors within the framework of the UN Deve-
However in 2017, the term “ecosystem services” (probably unexpectedly enough for the executive) acquired an official context. In his Orders to the Government of the Russian Federation, the president noted the need to “develop an action plan aimed at strengthening Russia’s position in the formation of the international environmental agenda, as well as in discussing issues related to the formation of a compensation system (payments) for ecosystem services, based on understanding Russia’s role as an environmental donor” [President of Russia, 2017]. In this connection, the executive authorities and the scientific community of Russia are faced with quite complex problems of identifying and defining ecosystem services, their valuation, compensation and payments for eco-services, and the international economic and legal mechanisms associated with them. Additional research is needed to substantiate Russia’s role as an environmental donor to the global biosphere and to compensate for its global ecosystem services; this will require stepping up activities in this area and coordinating with international organizations.

This article focuses on the identification of ecosystem services and the important economic aspects of their assessment, and the Russian objectives in the context of these problems. At present, there are a number of studies by international organizations on identification and evaluation issues, as well studies by teams and scientists from individual countries. First, it is necessary to highlight the fundamental contribution of the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment Report, “Ecosystems and Human Well-Being” [UNEP, 2005], carried out under the auspices of the UN, and its subsequent modifications. The Report brought together about 1,300 scientists from many countries.

The Genesis of the Ecosystem Services Concept

Constructive economic research on ecosystem services began in the 1990s; here we can highlight the work of R. de Groot et al [2002], R. Costanza et al [1997] and G. Daily [1997]. In many ways, this approach was associated with an awareness of the need to halt the degradation of nature and thereby contribute to increasing the sustainability of the biosphere, increasing well-being and developing the economy. In a broader context, the concept of “ecosystem services” began to emerge at the end of the 20th century (see for example, E. Gmez-Baggethun et al [2010] and R.B. Norgaard [2010]).

Today, the definition of “ecosystem services” remains controversial, and there are a number of approaches to its definition. The first definitions of eco-services can be found in classic ecological economics. According to R. Costanza [1997], ecosystem services are the benefits that people obtain, directly or indirectly, from ecosystem functions. G. Daily considers ecosystem services to be the states and processes through which natural ecosystems, as well as creatures that inhabit ecosystems, support and make humanity possible [1997].

Perhaps the common element that defines and connects the vast majority of various definitions is an attempt to link eco-services with the benefits and well-being of
a human. This is a fundamental point, associated with an understanding of the need to move from natural science definitions and approaches to economic developments. As made clear in recent decades, when warnings about the degradation of ecosystems were limited to slogans about the urgency of nature conservation, attempts at legal protection proved ineffective. For international organizations and world science, the need to identify a link between nature conservation and the enormous benefits people enjoy from such conservation has become obvious. This should stimulate ecosystem support, in particular through payment (compensation) mechanisms for ecosystem services.

In the recent work of international organizations and scientific research, the most widely used definition is from the UN report in which ecosystem services is defined in terms of the benefits that people receive from ecosystems [UNEP, 2005]. Similarly, in the report of the European Environment Agency (EEA), “ecosystem services” refers to “the contribution that ecosystems make to human well-being” [2012].

An important scientific issue in identifying eco-services is the separation or integration of ecosystem services and ecosystem goods. For example, in some classifications of forest resources, ecosystem services include both the services themselves (regulating floods, climate, etc.) and the explicit products of forest ecosystems: wood, mushrooms, medicinal plants and others. From the point of view of economic theory, it is necessary to distinguish eco-services and ecosystem goods. However, both in the work of international organizations and of many scholars, an approach has emerged that integrates these concepts. The authors share the approach of E. Barbier, according to whom ecosystem services include not only services, but also goods produced by ecosystems [2011]. Most international organizations follow a similar “integral” approach (the structures of the UN and the EC). For example, according to a study of the international TEEB (The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity) project under the auspices of the UN Environment Programme (UNEP), “ecosystem services are the direct and indirect contribution of ecosystems to human well-being. The concept of “ecosystem goods and services” is the same as ecosystem services” [TEEB, 2017].

An important point to consider about ecosystem services is their relationship with natural capital which implies, in particular, the use of the ecosystem approach [Bobylev, Perelet, Solov’eva, 2012]. Natural capital is considered along with physical (artificial) capital, but in contrast to physical capital, aspects of natural capital — for example, ecosystems — can be restored and can function for a long time with balanced use and respect for the limitations of assimilation potential. Consideration of ecosystem services through the prism of the ecosystem approach has practical applicability in the projects of the World Bank’s Environmental Department (see for example, S. Pagiola, C. von Ritter and J. Bishop [2004]). Herein, ecosystems are considered to be a form of natural capital. For example, forests are considered to be a resource in the form of wood and non-wood products, as well as a combination of their services.
Classification of Ecosystem Services

A unified classification of ecosystem services has not yet been developed. Most classifications group ecosystem services by the functions provided, i.e. classification is based on a functional feature. The best-known international classifications are: the UN classification in the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, the Report of the TEEB International Project, and the European Environment Agency (EEA).

The UN report, in which ecosystem services fall into four categories is widely quoted [UNEP, 2005] and includes the following as ecosystem services: provisioning services such as food, water, wood, various natural materials, genetic resources, natural medicines, etc.; regulating services that affect air quality, climate, water resources, water treatment, waste treatment, disease control, erosion and natural disasters; cultural services, such as spiritual and religious, aesthetic values, recreation and ecotourism; and supporting services such as soil formation, photosynthesis and nutrient cycling.

In addition, other functional classifications have been developed. It is possible to single out the classification of scientists such as G. Daily [1997], C. Wallace [2007] and R. de Groot and colleagues [2002; 2010]. The economist-ecologist G. Daily defined four groups of ecosystem services: production of goods; regeneration processes; saturation of life (life-fulfilling); and preservation of environmental benefits. K. Wallace proposed a classification of ecosystem services in terms of human values (needs). Three categories were distinguished: basic resources (food, drinking water, energy, etc.); favourable environment; and sociocultural needs. R. de Groot and colleagues identified four groups of 23 ecosystem services which largely anticipated the UN classification, but as a separate group. As in the TEEB project, there were suggested functions for habitat formation and maintenance for species and their reproduction (a refugium and nursery function).

There were attempts to create a Russian classification of ecosystem services, as part of the prototype of the national report “Ecosystem Services of Russia: Volume 1 – Services of Terrestrial Ecosystems” produced with the support of the TEEB-Russia project and the participation of one of the authors [Wildlife Conservation Center, 2016]. The classification in this report is based on international classifications and the National Strategy for the Biodiversity Conservation of Russia (2002). Three categories of ecosystem services are identified: production (analogous to providing services of international classifications); environment-forming (in international classifications, their analogue is regulating); and informational and spiritual-aesthetic (cultural services).

Economic Valuation of Ecosystem Services

The condition of ecosystems and their services has a huge impact on human well-being. Currently, ecosystem services largely act as public goods and are seen to be free. But because of the latent nature of many ecosystem services benefits and their diffusion between consumers/beneficiaries, their importance is greatly underestimated. This leads to the degradation of ecosystem services.
In this regard, the most important task for the economy becomes economic identification and monetarization of benefits from eco-services, or — in economic terms — a kind of “internalization of latent positive externalities” (external effects/benefits) from ecosystem services [Bobylev, Porfiriev, 2016]. At the same time, the internalization of damages/costs from the degradation of ecosystems is necessary for the practical implementation of the international legal principle that the “violator/polluter pays.”

The economic valuation of ecosystem services should be the basis of international and national payment mechanisms for ecosystem services and should take into account the potential of environmental donor countries. These tasks are reflected not only in documents of international organizations, but also in the Orders of the President of the Russian Federation for the Russian Government (2017) [President of Russia, 2017]. Russia is the world’s environmental donor, maintaining the stability of the global biosphere. It is possible to assess Russia’s contribution to this sustainability in different ways, but its contribution is not questioned in scientific research. According to some estimates, Russia’s contribution is about 10%, which significantly exceeds the similar figure coming after Brazil, Canada and the U.S. [President of Russia, 2016]. Another approach is based on the assessment of undisturbed territory by economic activity in environmental donor countries. Here Russia also leads with an indicator of 60–65% of the total territory of the country. The country’s eco-donation makes it expedient to develop approaches to the “capitalization” of the contribution of Russian ecosystems based on various payment mechanisms for ecosystem services (climate and carbon regulation, biodiversity conservation, forest ecosystems, etc.). In this direction, it is logical for Russia to uphold the need to include the role of forests in international climate agreements to regulate emissions and absorb greenhouse gases.

A full assessment of ecosystem services is the most complex methodological, methodical and practical tasks for the world. The development of the System of Environmental–Economic Accounting (SEEA), worked out by the UN in partnership with several other international organizations [UN et al, 2014], is focused on solving these tasks. The SEEA should reflect the environmental factor at the national and macro-economic levels.

In many countries, effective payment mechanisms for ecosystem services have already been established. In the EC these mechanisms are most clearly manifested in the agricultural sector, where payments are made to farmers to minimize environmental impact. A flexible and efficient system of financial mechanisms to support ecosystems and biodiversity was created in the U.S. (habitats and species banking). There are already 121 U.S. banks that support ecosystem conservation and biodiversity. These banks use 88 types of loans for rare species and 51 types of loans by habitat; such banks are located in 13 states with a total protected area of 123,000 acres. The concept of payments for ecosystem services at the national level was most consistently implemented in Costa Rica in a large-scale programme with the support of the World Bank and the Global Environment Facility created in 1996 (Pago por Servicios Ambientales). The goal of the programme is to encourage landowners to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, preserve water ecosystems, biodiversity and natural landscapes.
The problem of forming a mechanism of payments (compensation) for ecosystem services is also acute for Russia. Preserving a country’s role as a global environmental donor requires preventing ecosystem degradation in many regions. The support of eco-services in the regions of Baikal, Altai, the Far East and many other territories in Russia that are important for the planet implies minimal human impact in ecosystems. Most of these “natural” regions are poor and underdeveloped, forcing local authorities and the population to negatively impact (directly or indirectly) ecosystems to maintain/increase their living standards. In this regard, in our opinion, it is advisable to form financial mechanisms to support the ecosystem services of the regions, environmental sustainable projects in the tourism, agricultural, forestry and other sectors. As a first step, Russia can use the available capabilities of existing financial regional instruments (subventions, subsidies, transfers, payments, etc.).

There are many calculations confirming the high economic efficiency of preserving ecosystems and their services. In particular, a successful cost-based study was conducted to evaluate New York’s water supply options [Chichilnisky, Heal, 1998]. In 1996, the problem of poor quality of water entering the city arose. Two options for improving the quality of water resources were compared: improving the Catskill watershed ecosystem vs building water filtration facilities. The ecological option was nearly three times less expensive than the human-made alternative. Awareness of the value of the watershed in the provision of quality water determined the decision of the city authorities to invest in the ecosystem around New York and create a fairly complicated and large-scale financial system of payments for ecosystem services and their support.

Several iterations can be distinguished on the basis of global and Russian experience for the economic assessment of ecosystem services and the formation of a compensation/payment mechanism for them in the real economy: identification of the ecosystem service; determination of its economic value; identification of the supplier and owner of the ecosystem service; determination of the beneficiary of the service; and the formation of a payment mechanism (compensation) for eco-services [Bobylev, Perelet, Solov’eva, 2012].

The determination of the economic value of ecosystems and their services is the most difficult and urgent task for economics. The transition to a new economy in keeping with the priorities outlined in the conceptual documents of international organizations is impossible without solving this task. It is necessary to level out the risks of over-exploitation and depletion of eco-services. It is possible if the environmental factor is adequately taken into account when making economic decisions. The first fundamental economic research in the field of identification and economic valuation of ecosystem services was undertaken by R. Constanza and colleagues [1997], who made a global assessment of ecosystem services. It averaged $33 trillion for all ecosystems while global gross national product was almost half that amount ($18 trillion a year). In 2014 R. Constanza and colleagues made a new assessment of global ecosystem services [2014]. It has already reached $125 trillion per year. The losses of eco-services are catastrophic for the world and the economy; they amount to an average of about $12 trillion per year.
Conclusion

Global and large-scale degradation of ecosystems and their services causes significant damage to human well-being. Currently, international organizations and scientific experts have already amassed considerable experience in the field of identification of ecosystem services and their economic evaluation. This experience is reflected in the conceptual documents of the UN, the World Bank, the OECD, the EC and international businesses which have set long-term goals. This article has analyzed the main constructive approaches to the definition and classification of ecosystem services that contribute to the formation of the basis for their adequate economic evaluation.

Identification of the economic value of ecosystems and their services is the most difficult and urgent task for economics. The completion of this task will increase the sustainability of the world economy and the economies of individual countries on the basis of a comprehensive accounting of economic, social and environmental factors. In particular this approach is reflected in the UN Sustainable Development Goals to 2030. It is necessary to minimize the risks of degradation of ecosystems and their services, which requires adequate consideration of the environmental factor when making economic decisions. The economic valuation of ecosystem services should be the basis of international and national payment mechanisms (compensations) for ecosystem services, taking into account the potential of environmental donor countries.

There are at least three tasks in the field of ecosystem services that Russia faces: economic identification and assessment of the benefits of monetarization from ecosystem services at the global, national and regional levels; “capitalization” of ecosystem contributions based on various payment mechanisms for ecosystem services; and the formation of financial mechanisms to support regions with large ecosystem capital.

References


Идентификация и оценка экосистемных услуг: международный контекст

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За последние десять лет в мире проблематика экосистемных услуг нашла отражение не только в научных разработках, но и в концептуальных официальных документах ведущих международных организаций: ООН, Всемирного банка, ОЭСР, Европейского сообщества. Термины «экосистемные услуги» и платежи за них стали важными в экономических и политических частях этих документов. Во многом такая активность связана с осознанием быстрой деградации природы, которая наносит огромный ущерб благосостоянию людей и экономике. В статье проанализированы существующие определения, классификация экосистемных услуг со стороны международных организаций и в литературе, различные подходы для их оценки. В настоящее время определение термина «экосистемные услуги» остается дискуссионным, имеется ряд подходов к их определению. Общей в этих подходах является попытка связать экосистемы с выгодами и благосостоянием человека. Наиболее признана в мире методология Доклада ООН «Оценка экосистем на пороге тысячелетия», в котором под экосистемными услугами понимаются выгоды, получаемые людьми от экосистем. Особое внимание в статье уделено идентификации экономической ценности экосистем и их услуг, что является сложнейшей и актуальной задачей для экономической науки. Сейчас из-за латентного характера многих выгод от экосистем, их диффузии между потребителями/бенефициарами, они в значительной степени выступают как общественные блага, признаются бесплатными. Их важность недооценивается, что приводит к их деградации. Без решения этой задачи невозможен переход к новой экономике для человечества. Необходимо инвентаризировать риски переэксплуатации и истощения экосистемных услуг, что возможно в случае адекватного учета экологического фактора при принятии экономических решений.

В России экономика экосистемных услуг разработана крайне слабо как в экономических работах, так и в правовых и директивных документах. Важным шагом в решении этой проблемы должно стать выполнение поручений президента правительству Российской Федерации (январь 2017 г.), предусматривающих при разработке международной природоохранной повестки учета формирования системы компенсаций (платежей) за экосистемные услуги для России как экологического донора. Такую систему необходимо сформировать и внутри страны для поддержки регионов с большим экосистемным капиталом.

Ключевые слова: экосистемные услуги; экономическая оценка экосистемных услуг; определение экосистемных услуг; классификация экосистемных услуг; платежи за экосистемные услуги


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