

# New Dimensions of the Greater Eurasian Project. National Perspectives

## Sino-Russian Cooperation with Central Asian States in “One Belt – One Road Format” as SCO Development Factor<sup>1</sup>

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### Abstract

*China and Russia issued a joint statement on 8 May 2015 outlining the main approaches to linking the Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) projects. The parties believe that to build the One Belt One Road project, it is necessary to: use economic integration laws and actively enhance the role of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) in stimulating regional economic cooperation; to promote construction of the SREB and linkage to and cooperation with the EAEU; to create a free trade area (FTA) in the Asia-Pacific region (APR) and simultaneously begin creating a similar FTA between China, Russia and Central Asia to gradually stimulate interstate trade and promote regional economic development; actively develop – along with an improved model of energy cooperation – infrastructure and related industry; and strengthen business contacts and jointly promote construction of the SREB.*

**Key words:** SCO; functional transformation; development of cooperation

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## Introduction

In May 2015, Beijing and Moscow issued a Joint Declaration of the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China on Cooperation in Linking Construction of the Eurasian Economic Union and the Silk Road Economic Belt (hereafter, Joint Statement). This indicated a clear mutual understanding of the need to deepen cooperation [People's Daily, 2015a; Lukin, 2016, p. 583], followed by the creation of a platform for cooperation and the drawing up of a road map and tactical plans. Prior to this, the National Development and Reform Commission, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of Commerce of China jointly published the Vision and Actions on Jointly Building the Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st Century Maritime Silk Road (hereafter, Vision and Actions), announcing the Chinese government's plans for building the One Belt One Road (OBOR) [People's Daily, 2015b]. Thus, the OBOR initiative moved into the realm of concrete action.

Focusing on the practical construction of the Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB), this article studies China's cooperation with Russia and the countries of Central Asia, taking into account the specific circumstances in those countries. It suggests that, in building the SREB, China should enhance the role of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and coordinate relations and specific stage-by-stage cooperation with the already established Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and other countries of Central Asia to achieve the anticipated results in promoting all areas of active cooperation at every stage.

## SCO: Building a Platform for Cooperation

During the joint implementation of the OBOR initiative it became clear that the full-scale development of the SCO plays an important role as a mechanism in advancing business cooperation. With regard to "mechanisms for cooperation," the Vision and Actions document clearly states the need "to strengthen the role of the mechanism of all-round cooperation and to increase the importance of such multilateral formats as the SCO" [People's Daily, 2015b].

The use of these mechanisms to strengthen and deepen interstate exchanges stimulates the expansion of cooperation. Among the mechanisms for cooperation that have already helped the "big ten" to develop, the SCO is assuming a leading role and becoming a very important tool in the OBOR strategy. The Joint Declaration also states that China and Russia "will work jointly in bilateral and multilateral formats, primarily on the platform of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation" [People's Daily, 2015a].

However, in order to position the SCO as an efficient linking mechanism between the OBOR and the EAEU, it should assume the function of strengthening economic cooperation.

As the SCO was developing, several members had suggested endowing the organization with economic functions, but a consensus was never reached. In 2005, China

proposed creating an SCO development fund, but in 2006 Russia and Kazakhstan created the Eurasian Bank of Development. At the SCO summit in June 2009, the Russian delegate put forward a proposal to create a currency for transactions between SCO members, but this idea has yielded almost no results. The SCO continues to falter at the most basic stage of economic cooperation – the establishment of preferential trade and investment arrangements.

The SCO has yet to adopt the creation of free trade areas – the fundamental form of integration – as a goal in economic cooperation. This deficiency makes it very difficult for SCO members to build cooperation on trade and investment.

The SCO needs to expand its economic function and to seize the opportunity to transform the direction of its development. In the 17 years of its operation, the SCO has accomplished a great deal toward establishing links between members, contributing to regional security and facilitating trade, but it must transform itself to respond to the boom in integration in both the regional and global economies.

Russian international affairs expert Alexander Lukin believes that the SCO has achieved significant success in fostering closer cooperation between Russia and China on security. For example, 20 years ago it would have been difficult to imagine that Russia and China would cooperate on the exchange of security-related information [Lukin, 2012, p. 23]. He underscores that the SCO is also a platform for developing cooperation in economic matters, education and culture. The SCO not only corresponds to Russia's political interests, but remains the only organization enabling Russia to coordinate its regional policy with China [Lukin, 2009]. If the SCO could also assume an economic function, it would stimulate multilateral economic cooperation between all SCO members. This would enable them to use their strengths comprehensively by consolidating their capital, human and natural resources. This, in turn, would enable China to advance economic cooperation with Russia and the Central Asian countries. According to the executive secretary of the China Center for Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Studies, Chen Yurong, "implementation of the SREB also opens up broad opportunities for the development of the SCO" [Chen, 2014, p. 23].

Alexander Lukin also notes that the transformation of the SCO and the mechanism for the development of economic exchange with the EAEU is "the most strategically cost-effective option." On 1 January 2015 Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan officially launched the EAEU, with Armenia and Kyrgyzstan acceding to the organization later. Regional economic integration proceeded rapidly, moving from a Customs Union (2010) to a Single Economic Space (2014) and then to the creation of the EAEU (2015), "steadily advancing from the format of mutual assistance with an emphasis on self-reliance to an expanded format of development" [Feng, 2011] – thus culminating the formation of a Russia-led body for economic cooperation in Central Asia. The SCO, however, clearly plays a less substantial role than the EAEU in stimulating economic cooperation.

Therefore, Sino-Russian-EAEU cooperation might be used for upgrading SCO's role and strengthening its abilities with the purpose of reaching a new level of eco-

conomic cooperation. In his op-ed published in the People's Daily in June 2012, President Vladimir Putin stressed the great importance of developing economic cooperation between the SCO and the EAEU, saying it could not only facilitate complementary co-development, but also expand the horizons of cooperation [Putin, 2012].

The expert community also has constantly voiced its support for including economic matters in the SCO agenda by adding OBOR projects and linkages to the EAEU. According to Professor Zhenis Kanbayev at the Kazakhstan Institute of Management, Economics and Strategic Research, all SCO members have shown strong support for the concept of building the SREB, recognizing that it can enable them to raise the level of business cooperation in all areas, deepen their mutual dialogue, reinforce mutual trust and “extend the cooperation agenda – that previously focused primarily on security – on the expansion and deepening of economic cooperation” [Kazinform, 2014]. Including the SCO in the construction of the SREB in order to expand the scope of integration in Central Asia – where the EAEU plays the main role – could do the most towards developing the fullest possible cooperation at a minimum cost. The Kazakhstan International News Agency published a special article on 29 June 2014 entitled “Only the Transformation of the SCO Can Ensure the Success of the SREB” [Kazinform, 2014]. This indicates a high level of interest in SCO reform shown by Central Asian states.

The idea of the SREB being the best tool for stimulating a linkage between the SCO and the EAEU is also supported by SCO leadership as well as the individual members; Secretary-General Rashid Alimov has spoken of this on several occasions. He suggests that the China's OBOR initiative has contributed significantly to economic cooperation between SCO members, and that construction of the One Belt One Road has lent new impetus to the SCO for “cooperation in the field of transportation and the creation of infrastructure, transportation corridors and logistics centers aimed at fostering trade within the SCO” [Zhang, 2016]. Kazakh President N. Nazarbayev has similarly noted that linking the construction of the SREB and the EAEU favourably influences the development of all Central Asian countries: “The strategy for the joint construction of the SREB with China strengthens the international position of Kazakhstan, making Kazakhstan an important partner and transportation hub of the Eurasian continent” [People's Daily, 2016].

Analyzing the above, we can single out a definite consensus between China, Central Asian countries and Russia on the importance of developing the economic function of the SCO and similar mechanisms on the broadest scale, which will undoubtedly contribute to the implementation of the OBOR. In addition, the construction of OBOR objectively requires strengthening existing institutions and their economic functions.

At the same time, due to the EAEC's transition from “cohesion and mutual assistance” to “economic integration planning” as expressed in its official proclamation on 1 January 2015, the SCO needs to build a mechanism of interaction with the EAEC as soon as possible in order to exchange views in a timely manner, transfer information to each other about the change in the functions of organizations on a reciprocal basis as well as to strive for mutual trust.

Thus, the SCO should, in accordance with modern trends, implement the economic transformation in a timely manner in order to strengthen its role in the construction of OBOR and bring relations with the EAEU to a new level as its most important economic partner in Central Eurasia.

## Creating a Roadmap for Cooperation

Quite a number of issues are evoked by the prospects for the noncompetitive development of the SCO and the EAEU. However, until now, the leaders of the members have emphasized the prospects for cooperation between the two formats, noting that they can develop in parallel without any contradictions between them [CRI Online, 2016]. The leaders of China and Russia have repeatedly noted that the EEA and the SCO can carry out conjugated cooperation all along the Belt and Road [Ma, Li, 2017].

The “Points of Cooperation” section of the Visions and Actions document published by Beijing, proposes creating a free trade area (FTA) as a means for expanding the common “pie” for all countries bordering China [People’s Daily, 2015b]. Taking into account the actual situation in the EAEU, where Russia plays a leading role, we suggest that it would be possible to start by granting most favoured nation status to those countries. This would strengthen China’s economic ties with Central Asia and Russia, and as conditions become favourable in this or that country, negotiations toward an FTA could begin – thereby facilitating phased economic integration.

The actual filling of the most favoured nation regime can, of course, be different. However, the Chinese side pays special attention to close economic cooperation with neighbouring countries as the basis for future economic integration. As President Xi Jinping pointed out at the SCO summit in Dushanbe in September 2014, “it is necessary to discuss the issues of trade and investment cooperation in broader areas and at higher levels on the basis of common advantage; to grant most favoured nation status on a reciprocal basis, and to promote the process of regional economic integration and the creation of a single trade, investment and logistics space” [Xi, 2014].

China has already granted most favoured status to member of the SCO, thereby stimulating economic integration. Russian President Vladimir Putin stressed at the Dushanbe meeting that Russia also supports the strengthening of closer multilateral cooperation between SCO members. This also applies to the desire of SREB countries for trade barriers be lowered as that initiative is implemented [President of Russia, 2014b].

Even though most favoured nation status is a bilateral mechanism and the EAEU is a multilateral structure, each side can function without contradicting the other because “the integrative processes of the SREB and EAEU are fully compatible” [Zhou, 2014a]. According to Zhou Li, deputy director of the CPC Central Committee Foreign Liaison Department, the SREB is a multifaceted, large, open platform that is capable of developing without conflict and on a mutually beneficial basis along with the EU, the SCO and the free trade areas of the CIS, EAEU and other regional integration organizations” [Zhou, 2014b].

The next important part of SCO's transformation is negotiating free trade agreements and accumulating experience from relevant agreements for the SREB. To this end, China must make every effort necessary to create an atmosphere of cooperation in this area with the countries concerned and thereby promote economic integration. By June 2017, China had already signed and implemented free trade agreements with 22 countries in the region.

In the process of building the SREB, it will be necessary to coordinate free trade agreement talks with all countries located along the Silk Road – thus making those agreements more effective – and to actively extend the experience of such negotiations and the methods for achieving results to use FTAs to establish mutual market access and economic cooperation along the entire Silk Road. Alexander Lukin believes that the SCO could play an active role in linking the SREB and EAEU. For example, after creating an FTA between the EAEU and China, other SCO members could accede to it through the SCO [Hu, 2016; Lukin, 2016, p. 583].

From the point of long-term strategy and the development of regional economic integration, both Russia and China should look far ahead and work together to safeguard regional stability and economic integration processes. It is important that the two countries work to negotiate free trade agreements. We suggest that in the course of these negotiations trial FTAs could be established in Northwestern China and Russia's Siberian region, linking them at the same time with the SREB. It would also be possible to create similar areas between the Chinese Northeastern provinces and Russia's Far Eastern cities. These would gather experience as territories of economic integration and free trade.

In an interview with the editor in chief of the Xinhua News Agency in June 2016, President Vladimir Putin noted: "We are engaged in negotiations on two tracks: China-Russia, bilaterally and China-Eurasian Economic Union." He also emphasized, "there is a common understanding that the general development path in a global economy, as well as in our cooperation with China, should involve a gradual removal of all barriers to open collaboration. In the initial stages, it could imply the establishment of a free trade zone" [President of Russia, 2016]. This indicates that the establishment of an FTA is not simply the subject of hypothetical discussion but rather is under consideration at the level of bilateral and multilateral talks.

The creation of China-Russia, China-EAEU and China-Central Asian states free trade areas could lend a powerful impetus to China's regional development with Russia and the states of Central Asia. In light of the proposed routes and the possible results, we hold that cooperation in creating such FTAs could contribute to "new industrialization" programmes in Russia, the "third modernization" in Kazakhstan and other political projects and also provide considerable assistance to the modernization of Central Asian countries.

The Joint Statement clearly states the need to create mechanisms for streamlining trade in those areas where conditions would allow; to develop joint steps for harmonizing rules and regulations and ensuring their mutual compatibility; to introduce trade,

economic and other policies in areas of mutual interest; and to pursue the long-term goal of establishing an FTA between the EAEU and China [People's Daily, 2015a]. The establishment of an FTA with Russia and the countries of Central Asia should therefore become one of the important tasks and main objectives of trade and economic cooperation within the framework of the SCO.

Another prospective direction for SCO activity is conducting a comprehensive study on potential FTAs in the Asia Pacific as well as strategically coordinating and promoting research on such areas, and striving for the rapid creation of mechanisms for negotiations so that cooperation on FTAs can stimulate construction of the SREB. The statement on the results of the 22nd unofficial meeting of Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) leaders in Beijing on 11 November 2014 states that, to promote the establishment of an FTA in the APR, APEC will, starting with that meeting and over the subsequent two years, officially undertake a strategic study of the FTA, channel collective efforts towards creating it and will develop the relevant roadmap and strategic concept. An analytical report of the results of those steps was to be presented for further discussion and as the main agenda point of a meeting of APEC ministers in late 2016. The initiation of such studies marks the transition of the APR FTA to the stage of long-term planning. That, in turn, indicates that a new historical period is dawning in the economic integration of the Asia-Pacific states.

In the "Mechanisms for Cooperation" section of the Vision and Actions document, emphasis is placed on multilateral mechanisms for cooperation and APEC is mentioned as one of the most important such organizations [People's Daily, 2015b]. China, together with Russia, the SCO and the EAEU, should participate in global economic integration to determine the place that bilateral cooperation and future development have in that process. Construction of the SREB should be based on the SCO and EAEU; strategic economic cooperation agreements made with other non-Eurasian partners based on the SREB – along with construction of the Eurasian FTA in the SREB – could become one area of future development.

There is no doubt that, for the construction of the SREB – starting with granting most favoured nation status to the relevant countries and actively promoting negotiations on FTA agreements, including between Russia and China as well as with those countries of Central Asia where conditions are favourable – everything will depend on the establishment of ties and the creation of cooperation platforms in order to make the transition to a strategically effective linkage of plans. It is necessary to implement plans actively to create an FTA in the APR in the emergent historical period.

## Industrial Agenda for SCO

China, together with Russia and the countries of Central Asia, has already created long-term mechanisms for cooperation on energy that have produced positive results. Cooperation in the energy sector will invariably play an important role in the construction of the SREB. However, in addition to strengthening such cooperation and per-

fecting the mechanisms involved, it is necessary to search actively for opportunities to diversify and expand cooperation to non-energy sectors.

Therefore, the basic priorities are the following: implementing plans for energy cooperation in the SCO framework, revitalizing the work of the “energy club,” collaborating to create an “energy community,” and stimulating energy cooperation between members. The SCO includes major energy-exporting countries as well as major energy consumers and transit countries. It is entirely possible to create a sort of special energy cooperation structure within the SCO format. That structure could establish a joint policy once it reaches agreement on common energy-related interests and issues.

Some steps have been already made towards that goal: in September 2011, Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan published the Xian initiative that proposed creating an SCO “energy club.” In March 2013, Chinese and Russian leaders signed a joint declaration on deepening partner relations for comprehensive strategic cooperation, envisioning deeper cooperation on energy, fossil fuels, electric power and non-traditional energy for the sake of forming a closer and stronger strategic energy partnership. In addition, Chinese and Russian oil companies signed an agreement providing for Russia to increase crude oil shipments to China to 31 million tons in the coming year. The China Development Bank has extended loans of \$2 billion to Russian oil companies. At the 13th SCO summit in September 2013, President Xi Jinping put forward a political initiative to “create a stable supply and demand relationship in the energy club and guarantee energy security” [Sina, 2013]. This is clearly a good basis for cooperation that could be deepened in the future. Now is the most opportune moment to expand the activities of the SCO Energy Club significantly.

The strategy for Russian-Chinese economic and energy cooperation proceeds from the premise that “Russia is the world’s largest producer of crude oil, China is a major energy consumer, and both countries are neighbors and natural partners in the energy sector” [Zhao, 2013]. Statistics show that China was dependent on imports for 65.4% of its oil and 40% of its gas in 2017 [Sina, 2017; Lin, 2017]. Although European and U.S. demand for Russian oil and gas has declined, Russia has responded to international political factors by strengthening energy cooperation with China. Russia also participates actively in the “energy club” and, by taking the very reasonable approach of diversifying its energy exports, it reduces its excessive dependence on the European market. Once the SCO members create and finalize the form of their “energy community,” it will contribute to not only cooperation on energy, but also the stabilization of world energy prices and the formation of new mechanisms for dialogue.

Besides solving the issues of energy security, a productive dialogue in the field of energy also helps to extend the production chain and use diverse methods to stimulate closer industrial cooperation in the energy sector. China already has a good foundation with Russia and the countries of Central Asia; the scope of cooperation is constantly expanding, thereby opening a wide range of opportunities for the further deepening of cooperation on energy. Both sides can use the experience and examples of successful energy cooperation to further deepen the integration of energy production at all

levels. The cooperation on energy now developing between China and Russia and the countries of Central Asia is based entirely on mutual benefit and has already become an important result of economic cooperation with those countries. The launch of the joint construction of the SREB should therefore bring even greater fruits from energy cooperation, expand and deepen its scope, extend the sector-based price chain and strengthen the “energy community” as the basis for linking construction of the SREB and EAEU – making it possible to build the “Energy Silk Road” of the new era.

The important tools for such transformations are efficient financial institutions. Developing interconnected construction and stimulating cooperation in associated production now becomes possible – coupled with the need to build up the infrastructure of neighbouring countries – with the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the Silk Road Fund serving as financial platforms. Because they are based in Asia and are actively promoted by the Chinese government, the AIIB and Silk Road Fund are able to provide funds and resources for the joint development of the SREB.

At the opening of the Olympic Games in Sochi in February 2014, President Vladimir Putin told President Xi Jinping, “the Russian side actively supports the initiative of the Chinese side to build the SREB and Maritime Silk Road, and hopes that in the future Russia can join the ‘Belt and Road’ with the aid of the Eurasian railway. This type of linkage would be of great benefit” [Huang, 2014]. In May of that year, the leaders of the two countries signed a China-Russia Joint Statement on a New Stage of Comprehensive Strategic Partnership of Coordination [President of Russia, 2014a] in which Russia confirmed its full support for the SREB. Both sides continue to search for ways to link the Silk Road Economic Belt with the now-existing Eurasian Economic Union and to develop practical cooperation.

A joint statement signed in August 2014 by the leaders of China and Uzbekistan also stated that “the parties support the implementation of the SREB initiative, define new promising areas for economic cooperation and promote the most important projects” [Xinhua, 2014]. It should be noted that the EAEU had already confirmed a comprehensive construction plan for the members of the Association of Railways and Highways calling for the laying of seven highways and seven railways with 142 logistics centers by 2010. This is what President Vladimir Putin was referring to when he spoke of a “railway passing through Europe and Asia” [Huang, 2014].

In May 2015, President Xi Jinping visited Kazakhstan, Russia and Belarus. The joint construction of the SREB was the main subject of his talks with the leaders of those three countries. China and Kazakhstan have closely linked the construction of the SREB with Kazakhstan’s “Nurly Zhol” state infrastructure development programme and the Kazakhstan 2030 programme, thus developing practical cooperation and opening a new and splendid page in the history of the SREB [Lu, 2015a].

The Chinese-Russian statement issued on 8 May 2015 elevates cooperation on linking the SREB and EAEU to the priority level of the state. On 1 October 2017 in Hangzhou, the Eurasian Economic Commission (EEC) – a permanent body of the EAEU – and the Ministry of Commerce of China signed a joint declaration stating

that negotiations concerning the agreement on trade and economic cooperation had concluded. That agreement set out measures for establishing favourable treatment in trade [EEC, 2017].

The rapid construction of a Chinese-Belarusian industrial park became a “new model of Eurasian economic cooperation” [Lu, 2015b]. An increasing number of SCO members are taking an interest in the OBOR initiative, recognizing that its implementation contributes to stronger regional economic cooperation for the SCO. Thus, according to Chinese experts Xue Li and Zhang Wenwen, “the SCO creates a platform and mechanisms for the further construction of the SREB, contributing to the mutual development of these two structures” [Xue, Zhang, 2017].

If, with the help of the AIIB and Silk Road Fund, we can join forces and achieve a linkage with current EAEU infrastructure projects – especially those such as the Eurasian railway that has already gone through the planning and design phase – practical results of the construction of the SREB could appear in the near future. That means that “interconnected projects of the ‘Belt and Road’ will facilitate the linking and harmonizing of the development strategies of neighbouring states, freeing up the potential of the intraregional market, and stimulating investment and consumption, demand and employment...” [People’s Daily, 2015a]. One unit of investment in infrastructure yields 4.95 units of return at all stages of production. The economic return on investment in building the basic infrastructure of the SREB should therefore be very high. For that reason, construction of the SREB should unquestionably be linked with the strategic development of neighbouring states. We must move forward, hand in hand with their peoples, to inscribe ever more glorious pages in the annals of the SREB, creating still more examples of Eurasian economic cooperation and working together to promote construction of the SREB.

## Conclusion

The number of SCO members grew to eight as of June 2017, and all aspire to develop economic cooperation. Linking the construction of the SREB with the SCO and EAEU, endowing the SCO with economic functions, creating the associated agencies, establishing platforms for cooperation, mechanisms and routes for interaction in conjunction with the EAEU – all of this should be placed on the agenda in the nearest future. The only way the SCO can carry out its important role in the construction of the SREB is by transforming its functions, establishing regional affiliates for economic cooperation and confirming its programme for strategic economic cooperation. Building on improved models of energy cooperation between China and Russia and the Central Asian countries, it can strengthen and deepen the production chain at all stages of energy production and create diversified mechanisms of industrial cooperation so that energy cooperation in the construction of the SREB stimulates all-round industrial cooperation between China and the relevant states as well as mutual development.

Working in conjunction with the SCO and EAEU, we have every opportunity to confidently promote cooperation in a businesslike and effective manner, to create a community benefiting from the One Belt One Road – a community sharing a common destiny and responsibility. In this way, we can make a fitting contribution towards the revival of the global economy and the peaceful development of the entire planet.

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# Сотрудничество Китая с Россией и странами Центральной Азии в формате «Одного пояса, одного пути» как фактор развития ШОС<sup>1</sup>

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*8 мая 2015 г. Китай и Россия опубликовали совместное заявление, наметив основные подходы к сопряжению проектов «Экономического пояса Шелкового пути» (ЭПШП) и Евразийского экономического союза (ЕАЭС). При этом общей институциональной платформой для реализации планов многомерного сотрудничества по объективным причинам пока может выступать только ШОС. Данная статья, опираясь на практику строительства ЭПШП, фокусирует внимание на исследовании перспектив трансформации ШОС за счет расширения экономической повестки организации. Ключевые факторы такой трансформации, рассматриваемые в статье, – это сотрудничество Китая с Россией и странами Центральной Азии в рамках реализации проектов «Пояса и Пути» и указанного заявления между Россией и КНР. Авторы рассматривают такие перспективные направления работы ШОС, как стимулирование и гармонизация торговых переговоров в Евразии и АТР, создание общего энергетического сообщества, расширение общих цепочек добавленной стоимости, финансирование инфраструктурных проектов и гармонизация подобных проектов со стратегическими планами стран – членов данной организации. В своем исследовании авторы опираются преимущественно на анализ публичных выступлений лидеров стран – членов ШОС, анализ национальных доктринальных документов и международных соглашений. Ключевой вывод статьи заключается в необходимости быстрой трансформации ШОС в организацию с проактивной экономической повесткой, только в этом случае удастся эффективно реализовать планы по созданию пространства «Пояса и Пути», сопряжению ЕАЭС и ЭПШП и в долгосрочной перспективе – обеспечению региональной стабильности и экономической интеграции.*

**Ключевые слова:** ШОС; функциональная трансформация; развитие сотрудничества

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