Cooperation for Growth and Development

The G20, BRICS and APEC in the System of International Institutions – A Piece of Good News for Global Governance

M. Larionova

Marina Larionova – PhD, Head, Centre for International Institutions Research (CIIR), Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA); 11 Prechistenskaya naberezhnaya, 119034 Moscow, Russia; E-mail: larionova-mv@ranepa.ru

Abstract

The rise of new institutions in response to systemic vulnerabilities, strategic power shifts in the world economy and the slow pace of reform of existing institutions generated heated discussions over the proliferation of institutions and the subsequent fragmentation of global governance. However, this fragmentation does not mean there has been a decline in demand for global governance or reduced efficiency. On the contrary, it can be beneficial, positive and creative [Acharya, 2016].

Though essentially different in their missions and collective identities, the Group of 20 (G20), the BRICS grouping of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum each has an important role to play in promoting the inclusiveness, legitimacy and efficiency of global governance. The distinctive features of these summit institutions include their volunteerism and their recognition of the role of major developing countries in world economic growth and global and regional governance. They are deeply embedded within the system of international institutions and are intensely engaged with international organizations (IOs).

This engagement does not directly address the concerns over fragmentation. However, it does stimulate a division of labour which mitigates the risks of fragmentation and competition, facilitating coordination, coherence, accountability and effectiveness in global governance.

This paper examines G20/BRICS/APEC engagement with international organizations in fulfillment of their global governance functions of deliberation, direction-setting, decision-making, delivery and global/regional governance development.

The study is carried out within the paradigm of rational choice institutionalism. It draws on quantitative and qualitative analysis of documents adopted by the G20, BRICS and APEC to trace dynamics and identify their preferred models of engagement with multilateral organizations.

The article begins with a brief outline of the roles of the G20, BRICS and APEC in the system of global governance. Then it presents the analytical paradigm and methodology of the study. Applying the described methodology, it tests the key assumption that summit institutions can resort to a combination of “catalyst,” “core group” and “parallel treatment modes” in their engagement with IOs and that their preferred choice reflects their mission and role in the system of international institutions which may change over time. Reviewing

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the findings, this article concludes that the G20, BRICS and APEC consistently engage with IOs even while the range of organizations, the intensity, the dynamics and models of engagement differ substantially.

The G20, a premier forum for consensus-based economic cooperation, seeks to fulfill the promise of facilitating greater coherence in the system across institutions [Narlikar, Kumar, 2012, p. 389] to forge a new form of institutional collectivism. The G20 exceeds the BRICS and APEC in terms of the number of references to IOs, intensity and scope. It employs all three modes, engaging its key partners – the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Financial Stability Board (FSB), the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the World Bank (WB), the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the International Labour Organization (ILO) – mostly as a core group across the full range of global governance functions from deliberation to delivery. The BRICS, representing a new force in global governance, strives to build a better world order for humanity through a constructive contribution to defining the rules of the game [Duggan, 2015, p. 11]. The BRICS consistently acts as a catalyst stimulating, endorsing, compelling and supporting change across the United Nations (UN), the IMF, the WB and the WTO and building a BRICS-centred institutional system. APEC as a regional premier economic forum and a vehicle of Asia-Pacific engagement in global issues [Morrison, 2014, p. 2] advances inclusive growth regionally and globally. This duality is explicit in APEC’s choice of partners, where the top ten positions are split between global and regional IOs. APEC expedites integration of regional and global agendas, facilitates coordination between regional and multilateral institutions and reinforces their mutual influence.

Jointly the G20, BRICS and APEC contribute to more effective global policy coordination. Though there is definitely room for improvement, this is indeed good news, raising hopes for the future of global governance.

**Key words:** G20; BRICS; APEC; global governance; international organizations; engagement models


**The Context**

The rise of new institutions in the wake of the global economic crisis generated heated discussions over the proliferation of institutions and subsequent fragmentation of global governance. Indeed, given their effects on the “prominence, authority, and legitimacy of the global multilateral institutions that have been the bedrock of the postwar global governance system,” confusion, uncertainty and anxiety over the future of global governance among its traditional advocates is coupled with a concern about the future of the liberal international order and the traditional system of global governance led by the western powers [Acharya, 2016, p. 453].

The emergence of new plurilateral arrangements is a response to systemic vulnerabilities, structural changes and strategic power shifts in the world economy and the slow pace of reform of existing institutions. Together, these necessitate collective action to develop “a politics of inclusion, in which a wide range of key stakeholder countries are brought into an institutionalized process of consensus forming, if not decision making and power sharing” [Beeson, Bell, 2009, p. 73]. However, this fragmentation does not mean a decline in demand for global governance; on the contrary, this creative fragmentation “reflects a growing demand for new principles and approaches for governing a multiplex world, whose distinctive feature is a proliferation of transnational challen-
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ges and diffusion of ideas, actors and processes of global governance” [Acharya, 2016, p. 454]. Thus, the establishment of new institutions is an attempt to make cooperation more inclusive, even while the resulting fragmentation risks decreasing effectiveness.

As Dominique Strauss-Kahn, a former managing director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), put it in 2011 “the Washington consensus is now behind us. The task before us is to rebuild the foundations of stability, to make them stand the test of time, and to make the next phase of globalization work for all. This rebuilding has three core areas – a new approach to economic policies, a new approach to social cohesion, and a new approach to cooperation and multilateralism” [Strauss-Kahn, 2011].

The fundamental challenge is to attain effective global policy coordination, without which “there is little hope not only for resolving the pressing global problems of the day, such as a self-destructing international financial architecture and the unfolding environmental catastrophe, but even for defending some modest democratic and developmental gains of the past two decades” [Oniş, Güven, 2011, p. 471].

The Group of 20 (G20) and the BRICS grouping of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa were created at the leaders level in 2008 and 2009 respectively to enhance cooperation, restore global growth and achieve reforms to prevent another global crisis. The G20 was intended to manage the crisis, reform international financial institutions (IFIs) [G20 Leaders, 2008] and devise a new global consensus [G20 Leaders, 2009] – a task that the United States and its Group of 7 (G7) partners could not accomplish without the leading emerging market economies given their increasing share in the global gross domestic product (GDP), trade and investment. Designated by its members as a premier forum for international economic cooperation, the G20 has become transformed into the “hub of a global network” [Kirton, 2013, pp. 46–47].

The BRICS is committed to fostering cooperation, policy coordination and political dialogue on international economic and financial matters [BRIC Leaders, 2009]. It has become an entity that both explores economic opportunities for cooperation among its members and promotes the reform of international institutions so that the emerging and developing economies have greater voice and representation [Niu, 2013, p. 1]. Despite a slowdown in some of the member economies, the capacity of the BRICS to contribute to international public goods is growing through the expansion and deepening of intra-BRICS cooperation, consistent delivery on commitments made by the leaders and a steady increase in the scale of operations by the New Development Bank (NDB). Increasing institutionalization is coupled with interaction between the BRICS

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2 In 2017 the IMF estimates that China ranks second after the U.S., while India, Brazil, Russia and South Africa rank sixth, eighth, 11th and 35th respectively. See https://knoema.com/mnfkne/world-gdp-ranking-2017-gdp-by-country-data-and-charts. According to WTO data in 2016 China ranks first and second in world trade on merchandise export and import, and fifth and second on services exports and imports. India ranks 20th and 14th on merchandise export and import, and eighth and 10th on services exports and imports. Russia ranks 17th and 24th on merchandise and 25th and 18th on services. Brazil ranks 26th and 28th on merchandise and 32nd and 21st on services and South Africa ranks 38th and 34th on merchandise export and import and 49th and 46th on services. See http://stat.wto.org/CountryProfile/WSDBCountryPFRporter.aspx?Language=E. The share of BRICS countries in global inward foreign direct investment (FDI) flows in 2016 amounted to 15.8%. Source: UNCTAD Statistics. Available at: http://unctadstat.unctad.org
and international institutions, including the United Nations (UN), the IMF and the World Trade Organization (WTO), allowing members to coordinate and promote common positions.

The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum is a much older regional premier economic forum. It was established in 1989 as a venue for voluntary non-binding cooperation between developed and developing economies to facilitate sustainable economic growth in the Asia-Pacific region through trade and investment liberalization. APEC’s work on trade facilitation, regulatory practices, investment principles, environmental goods, guidelines for regional trade agreements and information technology products has helped advance trade and investment liberalization in the region; in numerous cases, it has contributed to binding commitments in trade agreements within the WTO and regionally [Independent Commission on Trade Policy, 2017, p. 25]. Not only it has helped build some common understandings of international economic norms and values, it has also become a vehicle of Asia-Pacific engagement in global issues [Morrison, 2014, p. 2]. Though a regional grouping, it has a growing role to play in the evolution of global governance structures [Drysdale, 2010, p. 12].

Criticism of the G20, BRICS and APEC abounds. The effectiveness and legitimacy of the G20 is questioned [Öniş, Güven, 2011, p. 480] and it is sometimes regarded as a failure [Chodor, 2017, p. 205]. Nevertheless, the G20 holds the promise of facilitating greater coherence in the system across institutions [Narlikar, Kumar, 2012, p. 389]. The G20 “is a new form of emergent collectivism – essentially a form of relational hegemony played out inside the G20” [Beeson, Bell, 2009, p. 72]. Indeed a new form of institutional collectivism is at work at different levels within the G20 [Beeson, Bell, 2009, p. 74] and also between the G20 and international organizations (IOs).

Critics of the BRICS question its collective identity [Wade, 2011, p. 352] and its capacity to forge a positive agenda or make collective decisions and implement commitments. They claim that the BRICS countries are brought together by common goals to impede the U.S. and European Union (EU) initiative [Wade, 2011, p. 358] and to challenge the architecture of liberal global economic governance [Duggan, 2015, p. 20]. However, though the BRICS countries do coordinate positions in international fora, they have built a coherent and comprehensive agenda, steadily increased compliance, supported key G20 decisions, and pursued “a more constructive and equal interaction with western powers... to build a better world order for humanity” [Niu, 2013, p. 6]. The BRICS represents a new force in defining “the rules of the game” [Duggan, 2015, p. 11]. The group is perceived as a concert of great powers sharing the idea of legitimacy as a core value in building institutions [Skak, 2011, p. 17].

The leadership role of APEC in the global system is said to be “handicapped by the political and economic diversity of its member states and the absence of a benevolent dominant state or coalition of states” [Webber, 2001], as well as by its character of volunteerism. “Some say that without the institutionalization and legal supra-national authority to ensure that member nations follow through on commitments, APEC is nothing but talk. But when you look at the numbers and measure the effect of these
commitments through APEC to trade and economic performance, it compares more favourably with NAFTA or the European Union, both of which are legally binding, exclusive arrangements” [Drysdale, 2010, p. 4]. “APEC has created a culture of constructive economic cooperation and dialogue, a far cry from the contentious trade negotiations we generally hear about in the world trade round” [Rudd, 2016]. Like the G20 and BRICS, APEC has an important role to play in promoting inclusive growth and ensuring that globalization works for all.

Distinctive features of these summit institutions include their volunteerism, the recognition of the role of major developing countries in world economic growth and in global and regional governance, and their deep embeddedness within the system of international institutions. Their engagement with international organizations in the course of global governance development enhances the legitimacy and representativeness of these summit institutions. Although this engagement does not directly address concerns over fragmentation, it does stimulate a division of labour which mitigates risks of fragmentation and competition, and facilitates coordination, coherence, accountability and effectiveness in global governance. Coordination and cooperation between multilateral and regional institutions allows regional governance initiatives to influence the international landscape which reinforces the capacity and legitimacy of global institutions [Kahler, 2017].

This article presents a comparative study of the engagement with international organizations by the G20, BRICS and APEC, testing the assumption that their preferred model of engagement with IOs reflects their mission and role in the system of international institutions which may change over time. It develops further the analysis of engagement by summit institutions with IOs focusing on the BRICS [Shelepov, 2015], the G20 [Larionova, 2017] and APEC [Safonkina, 2017]. Compatibility of the research data is ensured through the application of a common analytical paradigm [Larionova, 2016].

Analytical Paradigm and Methodology

This study is carried out within the framework of rational choice institutionalism. Given its fundamental assertion that institutions are created by states when they see benefits accruing to them from the functions performed by those institutions [Rosamond, 2000, p. 116], this paradigm can explain the origins of summits, their existence and evolution, and their relationships with international organizations. According to this framework, summit institutions are established through voluntary agreements by national leaders to perform concrete functions and missions [Hall, Tailor, 1996]. Club members accustomed to strategic actions, with roughly equal standing and coming from a wide range of civilizations, continents and levels of economic development, act in a highly strategic manner to maximize the attainment of their priorities. Summits are settings where strategic interaction between leaders plays a major role in determining political outcomes. And, to maximize benefits from the new arrangement the founders may
choose to voluntarily engage with existing organizations to attain their goals most efficiently [See Larionova, 2016 for a detailed account of the analytical paradigm and methodology].

Summit institutions can resort to a combination of “catalyst,” “core group” and “parallel treatment” modes [Putnam, Bayne, 1987, pp. 155–157]. Acting as a catalyst, they can exert a powerful influence for change in international organizations through endorsement, stimulus or compulsion. Engaging with IOs as a core group, they can impart a new direction by giving a mandate or providing the necessary political leadership to steer the IO’s course and harness the support of its members and the international community. Summit institutions can also create their own mechanisms, working in parallel with existing organizations.

This article explores how the G20, BRICS and APEC engage with IOs to fulfill the global governance functions of deliberation, direction-setting, decision-making, delivery and global governance development. “Deliberation” is understood as face-to-face discussion between members encoded in collective communiques. “Direction-setting” is defined as collective affirmation of shared principles, norms and prescriptions. “Decision-making” is regarded as credible, clear, collective commitments with sufficient precision, obligation and delegation. “Delivery” is understood as stated compliance with collective decisions. “Global governance development” is perceived as the summit institution’s capability to use other international institutions or create its own institutions to serve as global governance mechanisms [Kirton, 2013, pp. 37–39].

This study draws on quantitative and qualitative analysis of documents adopted by the G20, the BRICS and APEC to trace the dynamics and identify their preferred models of engagement with multilateral organizations. As a first step, a quantitative approach is used based on three parameters: the number of references to a particular organization made in a given period, its share in the total number of references and the intensity. Intensity is expressed as a ratio of the number of references to the institution to the number of characters (including spaces and punctuation) in the documents as follows:

\[ D_i = M_i / S_i. \]

In this formula, \( D_i \) is the intensity of references to an international institution for a given year (period), \( M_i \) is the number of references made to this institution during the given year (period), and \( S_i \) is the total number of characters in the documents for the given year (period). To make the findings more easily understood, \( D_i \) is multiplied by 10,000.

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3 The total number of documents used in the study from Washington to Hamburg is 191.
4 The total number of documents used in the study from Ekaterinburg to Xiamen is 103.
5 The total number of documents used in the study from Lima 2008 to Lima 2016 is 172.
6 The discrepancy between the feature and the symbol it denotes is explained by evolutionary changes in the methodology. Originally “intensity” was “density,” “references” were “mentions” and “characters” were “symbols.”
As a second step, qualitative analysis is carried out to identify the most characteristic models of engagement by the G20, BRICS and APEC with multilateral organizations.

Key Findings

The G20, BRICS and APEC consistently engage with IOs, though the range of organizations, the intensity, the dynamics and models of engagement differ substantially as illustrated by the data below (see Table 1).

Engagement Intensity Dynamics

Since the first summit in Washington the G20 has consistently engaged international organizations, with the total number of references to IOs in G20 discourse reaching 5749. While the intensity of G20 engagement with IOs has been changing, London and Pittsburg — the two summits defining the G20’s mission and role in the system of global governance — stand out with the highest intensity levels of 28.7 and 30.5 respectively against the average of 13.31. Though the number of references to IOs in BRICS discourse is significantly lower, amounting to 1045, the intensity (10.61) is comparable and the trend for the highest intensity in the first defining summits in Yekaterinburg and Brasilia is similar to that of the G20. The number of references to IOs in APEC discourse is 1425. However, about a third of these references relate to APEC’s own mechanisms; the share of references to IOs is 66% and with 936 references the share is lower than that of the BRICS, and much lower than that of the G20. Despite a relatively high number of references to IOs, the intensity of APEC engagement with IOs is two-times lower than that of the G20 and BRICS with an average of 5.77 for the study period. This rose slightly in the wake of the global economic crisis to 6.32 and 7.74 in 2008 and 2009 respectively, fluctuating around the average in subsequent years. For all three institutions, 2009 was the year of the highest engagement intensity as the crisis propelled the creation of new institutions and stimulated their engagement with existing international organizations.

Key Partners in Global Governance

Approximately 100 organizations — universal, specialized, regional and global — are referenced in G20 deliberations, only nine of which are the G20’s own institutions including its outreach partners. The intensity of G20 engagement with the IMF, the Financial Stability Board (FSB), the World Bank (WB) and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) by far exceeds the intensity of its interaction with other institutions. As illustrated in Table 1 their share in G20 discourse significantly outstrips the share of other IOs.
Table 1. Share and Intensity of G20, BRICS and APEC Engagement with IOs

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<th>G20</th>
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<th>BRICS</th>
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<td>Number (rank)</td>
<td>Share</td>
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<td>Number (rank)</td>
<td>Share</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
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<td>FSF+FSB</td>
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<td>OECD</td>
<td>636 (3)</td>
<td>11.06</td>
<td>1.47</td>
<td>80 (3)</td>
<td>5.61</td>
<td>0.32</td>
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<td>WB</td>
<td>508 (4)</td>
<td>8.84</td>
<td>1.18</td>
<td>40 (8)</td>
<td>3.83</td>
<td>0.41</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>311 (5)</td>
<td>5.41</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>299 (1)</td>
<td>28.61</td>
<td>3.04</td>
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<td>BCBS</td>
<td>272 (6)</td>
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<td>GPFI</td>
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<td>WTO</td>
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<td>0.46</td>
<td>114 (3)</td>
<td>10.91</td>
<td>1.16</td>
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<td>0.41</td>
<td>25 (9)</td>
<td>2.39</td>
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<td>118 (2)</td>
<td>11.29</td>
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<td>APEC Education Network</td>
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<td>48 (7)</td>
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<td>Policy Partnership on Food Security</td>
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<td>Total References</td>
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The G20 consistently pushed for the reform of IMF quotas and governance, supported the boost of its resources, endorsed new lending instruments and requested the Mutual Assessment process to track progress on the G20 Framework for Strong, Sus-
Tainable and Balanced Growth. Though the share of G20 references to the IMF has declined from 42.22% in Washington to 9.54% in Hamburg, with an average share of 14.51% the IMF remains the G20’s key global governance partner. The G20’s baby, the FSB, has become an indispensable partner in expediting and supervising the reform of financial markets and regulation. Its share was the highest of all IOs in the G20 documents from London to Seoul.

The G20 has consistently supported the World Bank Group (WBG) and the efforts of regional development banks to mobilize and catalyze financing for infrastructure investment. From Washington to Los Cabos the WB ranked third by the share of references to IOs. Since St. Petersburg it has yielded its place to the OECD, but it remains fourth in the cumulative narrative of the G20 with a share of 8.84%. The G20 relies on OECD expertise in the elaboration of decisions on a wide range of challenges, from tackling base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) to implementing structural reforms for growth. This reliance has been growing, driven by the G20’s mission shift and expanded agenda, as well as by OECD entrepreneurship. Moving from crisis management to global governance, the G20 sought a solid foundation for decision-making while the OECD strove to obtain political impulses and to project its influence beyond the OECD states through its alliance with the G20. Since the St. Petersburg summit the OECD has ranked first in G20 discourse by share and intensity, rising to third place in the total discourse of the G20.

The UN comes fifth in the G20’s narrative with the average share standing at 5.41% and the average intensity at 0.72. The G20 mostly engages with the UN on development (Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)), food security and climate change. Hangzhou and Hamburg summit documents recorded historic peaks of 8.86% and 10.62%, reflecting the rise in the share of these issues on the G20 agenda.

At their first summit the leaders committed to refrain from raising new barriers to investment or trade in goods and services, imposing new export restrictions, or stimulating exports with measures inconsistent with the WTO. Reiterating this pledge at every subsequent summit, in London they mandated the WTO to monitor and report publicly on adherence to the pledge, which the WTO does in partnership with the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the OECD. The WTO ranks ninth by share and intensity of references to IOs (3.48% and 0.46), while UNCTAD comes fourteenth with a share of 1.20% and intensity of 0.16.

Though the intensity of G20 interaction with the International Labour Organization (ILO) is not high, with average intensity at 0.41 and average share of references standing at 3.06%, the engagement is steady, reflecting the G20’s commitment to create jobs and implement policies consistent with the fundamental principles of the ILO.

The BRICS refers to 54 IOs, with two in the top ten being BRICS institutions — the New Development Bank (NDB) and the Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA). The forum’s mission and agenda accounts for the challenge to the UN’s precedence in its discourse in 2009 by the G20 and IMF, and in 2012 by the WTO. The 2009 deviation
is related to the support of BRIC leaders and finance ministers and central bank governors for the G20’s commitments, and the pledge by the BRIC to contribute $80 billion to supplement the resources of the IMF. The BRIC called for a shift of quota targets of 7% in the IMF and 6% in the World Bank Group to reach an equitable distribution of voting powers between advanced and developing countries [BRIC Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors, 2009b]. The BRIC also called for a detailed proposal for the reform of the IMF and WB [BRIC Finance Ministers, 2009a]. The 2012 spike reflects the conviction of the BRICS regarding the central role to be played by the WTO in safeguarding and strengthening an open and rule-based multilateral trading system, and also its commitment to help overcome the impasse in the Doha Development Round, explicitly stated by BRICS trade ministers at the meetings in New Delhi [BRICS Trade and Economic Ministers, 2012a] and Puerto Vallarta [BRICS Trade Ministers, 2012b]. Nevertheless though the share of references to the UN fluctuates from summit to summit, with an average of 28.6% it by far outstrips both the G20 (coming second with a share of 11.3%) and the WTO (ranking third with a share of 10.9%), with the World Health Organization (WHO) rising to the fourth position (with a share of 8%) and the IMF closing out the top five with a share of 6.7%.

The NDB, a BRICS institution, was first mentioned in New Delhi when the leaders directed the finance ministers to examine the feasibility and viability of setting up a development bank to mobilize resources for infrastructure and sustainable development projects in the BRICS and other emerging economies and developing countries. The intent was to supplement the existing efforts of multilateral and regional financial institutions to promote global growth and development. It has been fully operational since 2017 and has an average share of 6.4%.

UNCTAD, which comes only 14th in the G20’s discourse, is often referenced by the BRICS, which regards UNCTAD as “the focal point in the UN system dedicated to consider the interrelated issues of trade, investment, finance and technology from a development perspective” [BRICS Leaders, 2013]. The BRICS pushes for strengthening UNCTAD’s role of policy dialogue, consensus crafting and capacity building for developing countries [BRICS Leaders, 2014].

Finally, it should be noted that the African Union (AU), an outsider placing 44th in the G20’s discourse, ranks eleventh in the BRICS narrative. Not unexpectedly, its role and presence has been increasing since the Durban summit, when the leaders first made their commitment to support African countries in their industrialization process through stimulating foreign direct investment, knowledge exchange, capacity building and diversification of imports from Africa [BRICS Leaders, 2013]. The BRICS acknowledges the AU’s role in peacebuilding and development of the continent, and supports its efforts “in pursuit of its continental agenda for peace and socio economic development” [BRICS Leaders, 2016].

Of the three summit institutions considered, APEC has by far the largest number of IOs referenced in its discourse – 130 – regional and global, universal and specialized. Though 73 of these are APEC’s own cooperation mechanisms, only the long-
established APEC Education Network and Policy Partnership on Food Security (PPFS), set up in 2011 to strengthen public-private cooperation on food security, made it into the top ten.

The WTO is the front runner with an average share of 19.23% and intensity of 1.11. In some years over the study period the share was significantly higher. It leaped up to 25.15% in 2009, when the forum members marked 20 years of cooperation and progress towards free and open trade and investment in the region, the rejection all forms of protectionism, the expression of support to the WTO as a bulwark against protectionist pressures and the commitment to an ambitious and balanced conclusion to the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) in 2010 based on the achieved progress, including with regard to modalities [APEC Leaders, 2009]. In 2011 the share of APEC references to the WTO peaked at 35.53%, reflecting APEC members’ concern over the impasse confronting the DDA and the changed approach to negotiating the deal including “possibilities that involve advancing specific parts of the Doha agenda where consensus might be reached on a provisional or definitive basis” [APEC Leaders, 2011].

The WB comes second by the share (7.16%) and intensity of references (0.41) in APEC discourse with a hike of 9.23% in 2008 and another of 11.21% in 2015. APEC’s engagement with the WB is primarily focused on food security, trade facilitation, integration of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) into global value chains (GVCs), access to finance for micro, small and medium enterprises, and improved business environments with assistance of the World Bank Ease of Doing Business Survey [APEC Structural Reform Ministers, 2008]. Another area of cooperation is related to disaster reduction and emergency preparedness, in which APEC partners with the OECD, regional banks and the WB. Thus in 2015 when APEC adopted the Disaster Risk Reduction Framework the World Bank Group was tasked to conduct a study and prepare a report on options for regional disaster risk-financing mechanisms, including risk pooling, among interested APEC economies [APEC Finance Ministers, 2015].

The OECD ranks third in APEC’s narrative with an average share of references of 5.61% and intensity of 0.32 and with expanded engagement in recent years. APEC interacts with the OECD on a wide range of issues from the promotion of financial literacy and education to GVC development [APEC Trade Ministers, 2016]. APEC members rely on OECD expertise and instruments to implement structural reforms and improve business environments. In 2008 the APEC ministers pledged to ensure APEC’s implementation of the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance in the Asia-Pacific Context [APEC Ministers, 2008]. The APEC Regulatory Cooperation Action Plan adopted in 2011 provides for implementation of the APEC-OECD Integrated Checklist on Regulatory Reform [APEC Ministers, 2011]. To mobilize private sector investors, including long-term institutional investors for infrastructure development, in 2014 APEC finance ministers called on the OECD, the WB, the ADB and other IOs to identify relevant good practices for the APEC region [APEC Finance Ministers, 2014]. To tackle tax avoidance and evasion in the region, APEC economies engage with the OECD and G20 through the G20/OECD Inclusive Framework on Base Erosion and
Profit Shifting (BEPS), the OECD Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters (MAAC) and the OECD Competent Authority Agreement on the Exchange of Country by Country Reports [APEC Finance Ministers, 2016].

The G20 is present in APEC discourse from 2008 when the ministers strongly recommended that the leaders “support the G20 Washington Declaration and reinforce the commitment to refrain from raising new barriers to trade and investment” [APEC Ministers, 2008]. The leaders did not explicitly state their support in the declaration, but “endorsed in full the Joint Statement of Ministers at the 20th APEC Ministerial Meeting,” thus expressing their support for the G20’s Washington decisions [APEC Leaders, 2008]. In 2009 the leaders committed to the main goals of the G20 Framework for Strong, Sustainable and Balanced Growth, and pledged to work together to ensure that their macroeconomic, regulatory and structural policies are collectively consistent with more sustainable and balanced trajectories of growth. They also pledged to promote open trade and investment, undertake macroprudential and regulatory policies which prevent credit and asset price cycles from becoming forces of destabilization and promote development and poverty reduction as part of the rebalancing of global growth [APEC Leaders, 2009]. Since 2009 the G20’s agenda for strong, sustainable, and balanced growth [APEC Leaders, 2010] has been increasingly integrated into APEC cooperation, and even when the G20 was not referenced in APEC documents such as the Leaders’ Honolulu Declaration, their firm resolve to support the strong, sustained and balanced growth of the regional and global economy [APEC Leaders, 2011] was expressed in concrete commitments. The same year, the ministers of finance reviewed the conclusions of the Cannes summit and affirmed their determination “to take coordinated actions to strengthen the global recovery, reinforce financial sector stability, maintain open markets, and build a foundation for strong, sustainable, and balanced growth” [APEC Finance Ministers, 2011]. Moreover, as the G20 moved from three pillars of growth to four during the Turkish 2015 G20 presidency, APEC also brought inclusiveness onto its agenda for growth [APEC Leaders, 2015, 2016]. Though the G20 only comes fourth in APEC discourse with a share of 5.21%, its priorities and objectives are deeply shared by APEC. This is reflected not so much in the intensity of engagement but in the affinity of agendas and concerted efforts to achieve strong, sustainable, balanced and inclusive growth.

The UN ranks sixth in APEC’s narrative with a share of 3.65% and intensity of 0.21. Its share has been declining with the rise of the OECD and G20. However, given APEC’s commitment to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Paris agreement on climate change as well as their predecessors, the Millennium Development Goals and the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, the UN remains APEC’s key partner in achieving development and a climate resilient economy.

Regional partners – the ADB and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) – come seventh and eighth respectively in APEC discourse with average shares of 3.37% and 3.23% and an intensity of 0.19. APEC regards the ADB as a major partner in attaining the region’s three critical agendas: inclusive economic growth,
environmentally sustainable development and regional integration [APEC Finance Ministers, 2008]. The ADB, together with the IMF, OECD and World Bank Group helps promote SMEs and infrastructure financing in the APEC region [APEC Finance Ministers, 2014]. The APEC economies engage with ASEAN and the ADB, alongside regional and multilateral development banks, the G20 and the APEC Business Advisory Council (ABAC) in promoting infrastructure and connectivity development [APEC Trade Ministers, 2014]. ASEAN shares APEC’s commitment to regional and global food security and contributes to safeguarding food security through its own mechanisms such as the ASEAN + Three Cooperation on Food Security [APEC Food Security Ministers, 2010]. Through cooperation on oil and gas security, ASEAN and APEC seek to improve the region’s capacity to respond to emergencies such as disruptions in oil and gas supplies [APEC Energy Ministers, 2014]. Pursuing the Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP) APEC builds on ASEAN+3, ASEAN+6, and other regional undertakings [APEC Leaders, 2010].

Models of Engagement

The G20 employs all three engagement modes with core group engagement clearly a preferred choice. The G20 has been acting as a catalyst, building pressure for IMF and WB reform. Its engagement with the WTO to provide an impulse to a balanced and ambitious conclusion of the Doha Development Round has not yielded the expected catalytic impact so far. A more successful example of the G20’s catalyst influence is the push for a successful outcome at the WTO Ministerial Conference (MC9) on trade facilitation held in Bali in December 2013. Core group engagement with the WTO is closely related to the G20’s pledge to refrain from raising new barriers to investment or trade in goods and services, and also to the mandate given to the WTO, OECD and UNCTAD to monitor and publicly report on G20 adherence to the commitment.

The FSB is a perfect illustration of the G20’s catalytic influence, exerted through its Washington call to reform and expand the Financial Stability Forum (FSF), the London pledge to transform FSF into the FSB and the Pittsburgh endorsement of the FSB’s institutional establishment with a mandate to contribute to strengthening the international financial regulatory system. After Toronto the G20 has mostly interacted with the FSB as a core group, tasking it to develop concrete policy recommendations, standards and principles or pledging to support peer review processes.

In its engagement with the OECD, UN, ILO and the multilateral development banks the G20 mostly resorts to the core group model, relying on their expertise and delegating mandates thus providing political leadership and support, and setting the direction for new actions.

Parallel treatment is not a frequent occurrence in G20 discourse, constituting an average of about 3%. Many of the parallel treatment cases reflect a persistent gap in the supply and demand for infrastructure investment and governance leadership in this area. In Seoul the G20 set up the High-Level Panel for Infrastructure Investment
In Brisbane the leaders launched the G20 Global Infrastructure Initiative and Global Infrastructure Hub with dedicated resources to help implement the G20’s multi-year infrastructure agenda. In Hangzhou the G20 endorsed the Global Infrastructure Connectivity Alliance to enhance cooperation among various infrastructure connectivity initiatives. To make the cooperation more inclusive and effective the G20 asked the WBG to serve as the secretariat of the Alliance, working closely with the Global Infrastructure Hub (GIH), the OECD, other MDBs and interested G20 members [G20 Leaders, 2016] (For a detailed analysis of the G20 engagement with IOs see Larionova, 2017).

Thus, the G20 uses all three modes of interaction with IOs, with a preference for the core group engagement.

The BRICS’ preferred mode of engagement with IOs is catalyst influence. In BRICS engagement with the UN and G20, two completely different but most frequently referenced multilateral fora in BRICS discourse, an aspiration for catalytic engagement is clearly detected. Thus, strong commitment to the central role of the United Nations in ensuring a peaceful, equitable and democratic multipolar international order is coupled with the support of a comprehensive reform of the UN, including its Security Council, strengthening the role, capacity, effectiveness, accountability and efficiency of UN Peacekeeping, and enhancing transparency and inclusiveness in the process of selecting and appointing the UN Secretary-General [BRICS Leaders, 2016].

Stressing the central role played by the G20 in combating the economic and financial crisis, calling for implementation of the G20 decisions and fully committed to cooperation within the G20 as the premier forum for international financial and economic cooperation, BRICS members consult and coordinate on the G20 agenda, especially on issues of mutual interest [BRICS Leaders, 2015]. The BRICS countries also advocate the need for G20 to be proactive and formulate a strategy for the post-crisis period [BRIC Leaders, 2010] and appeal for broader and deepened G20 consultations with low-income countries on G20 policy recommendations that would have an impact on them [BRICS Leaders, 2015]. BRICS consistently pursues IMF reform which would ensure that the Fifteenth General Review of Quotas, including the new quota formula, results in an increased voice for the dynamic emerging and developing economies.

Pushing for comprehensive and balanced results of the WTO’s Doha Development Agenda in their first summit [BRIC Leaders, 2009], BRICS invariably prioritizes advancement of negotiations on the remaining Doha Development Agenda (DDA) issues [BRICS Leaders, 2016].

Accepting the WHO’s leadership in global health, the BRICS supports WHO reform which would improve the strategic decision-making of its governing bodies and strengthen its capacity to respond to threats to public health. At the same time the BRICS is institutionalizing intra-BRICS cooperation on health. BRICS health ministers have organized work on thematic areas through the technical working group and the BRICS technological cooperation network.
The BRICS members use the parallel-treatment approach in many policy areas. Parallel treatment cases constitute a share of 9.76%. The number of references to BRICS institutions peaked in Fortaleza reaching 20% when the BRICS concluded the Treaty for the Establishment of a BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement and the Agreement on the New Development Bank. Other examples include the BRICS Strategic Alliance for Agricultural Research and Technology Cooperation launched in Yekaterinburg, the Contact Group for Economic and Trade Issues established in 2010 and the BRICS Science, Technology and Innovation Working Group set up in 2014, to name a few. Institutionalization of BRICS cooperation continues. At their ninth summit in Xiamen the leaders agreed to explore the establishment of nine new cooperation mechanisms, including a new PPP Project Preparation Fund, the BRICS Local Currency Bond Fund, the BRICS Institute of Future Networks, the BRICS Energy Cooperation Platform and the BRICS Cultural Council [BRICS Leaders, 2017]. Despite a rapid pace of institutionalization the share and intensity of BRICS engagement with its key partners remain high.

The BRICS so far does not act as a core group in its interaction with IOs. The first and only case approximating a mandate is the request by the BRICS labour ministers that the International Social Security Association (ISSA), in collaboration with the ILO, should host the BRICS virtual liaison office for social security cooperation among the BRICS countries [BRICS Labour and Employment Ministers, 2017, Annex 3, p. 5].

The preference of the catalytic influence and parallel treatment modes is a clear confirmation that the BRICS does not want to challenge the existing system of governance, but wishes to reform its institutions in order to make the order more fair, equitable, democratic and representative.

APEC is the most densely institutionalized of the three summit institutions. Given the number of APEC’s own mechanisms in the forum’s discourse, it comes as no surprise that APEC members use parallel treatment much more frequently than the G20 and BRICS, with the share of parallel treatment cases standing at more than 30% in the documents of the study period. APEC mechanisms are present in almost all of the cooperation areas and come in different formats: forums, working groups, expert groups, networks, policy partnerships and so on. Most frequently referenced mechanisms, apart from the Education Network and Policy Partnership on Food Security mentioned earlier, include the Asia-Pacific Financial Forum (APFF) with a share of 1.54% (launched by the APEC Finance Ministers in 2013, proposed by the ABAC and entrusted to the ABAC for management), and the Asia-Pacific Platform on Food Security established in 2010, which comes fifteenth by the number of references with a share of 1.40%.

Catalytic engagement is not alien to APEC. However, it is mostly limited to the multilateral trade system. The member economies repeatedly call for an ambitious and balanced conclusion to the WTO Doha Development Agenda (DDA) negotiations and have explicitly supported the Trade Facilitation Agreement. However, they refrain from
statements underscoring the importance of IMF and WB reform typical of the G20 and BRICS. More characteristic of APEC is resort to the IMF and WB expertise. Thus APEC encouraged the IMF and the World Bank Group together with the other IOs to work with APEC economies in providing capacity building, introducing good practices and identifying effective approaches that would address key APEC priorities related to disaster risk management [APEC Finance Ministers, 2014].

Mandates to IOs are very rare. The APEC economies usually rely on IOs’ established instruments and accumulated expertise, support the IOs’ initiatives vital to APEC concerns and cooperation priorities. APEC committed to implement OECD Principles of Corporate Governance in the Asia-Pacific context [APEC Ministers, 2008]. The Asia-Pacific Food Security Information Platform (APIP) cooperates with the Agricultural Market Information System (AMIS) and the Rapid Response Forum launched by the G20 [APEC Leaders, 2012]. APEC member are encouraged to ratify the UN Conventions against Corruption and Transnational Organized Crime, and take measures to implement their provisions [APEC Ministers, 2009]. Although the WHO comes only 34th in APEC discourse, APEC supported implementation of the WHO International Health Regulations (IHR) core capacities at the economic level in order to prevent, detect and respond to global infectious disease threats [APEC Health Ministers, 2015].

Other typical examples include a request to the technical group on Measurement of APEC TiVA under GVCs to work closely with the WTO, OECD, World Bank, UNCTAD and other related international organizations with an aim to complete the construction of the APEC TiVA Database by 2018 [APEC Leaders, 2014]; encouragement of APEC economies’ use of indices for measuring the regulatory environment in services which take into account indices maintained by other institutions such as the OECD and World Bank [APEC Trade Ministers, 2016]; drawing on the expertise and knowledge of the WTO, UNCTAD, OECD, G20, World Bank, IMF and ADB for promoting GVCs’ development and cooperation in APEC [APEC Trade Ministers, 2016].

Last but not least, APEC members are committed to the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Paris Agreement and its transparent and effective implementation in order to transition towards a low-carbon, climate-resilient economy [APEC Leaders, 2016].

APEC does not engage with IOs as a core group lending political leadership or setting a course for new actions, however, the members do rely on IOs’ expertise and instruments for attaining shared objectives.

Conclusion

The commitment of the G20, BRICS and APEC to multilateralism and their embeddedness in the system of international institutions is reflected in their intensive engagement with IOs, while their unique nature and missions define the differences in the range of partner organizations, the scale and the modes of engagement.
The G20, a premier forum for consensus-based economic cooperation, seeks to fulfil the promise of facilitating greater coherence in the system across institutions [Narlikar, Kumar, 2012, p. 389] and forge a new form of institutional collectivism. The G20 exceeds the BRICS and APEC by the number of references to IOs (5749 compared to 1045 and 1425), intensity (13.31 compared to 10.61 and 5.77) and scope (100 compared to 54 and 57). It employs all three modes, engaging its key partners (the IMF, FSB, OECD, WB, WTO and ILO) mostly as a core group. With a different degree of success the G20 exerts catalytic influence over the FSB, IMF, WB and WTO. It resorts to parallel treatment sparingly in the areas where there is a demand for leadership, coordination and coherence. Most of the 3% references to the G20’s own mechanisms reflect a persistent gap in infrastructure investment. The G20 engages IOs across the full range of global governance functions from deliberation to delivery, and demonstrates a strong capability for global governance development through use of IOs and the creation of its own governance mechanisms.

The BRICS represents a new force in global governance and strives to build a better world order for humanity through a constructive contribution to defining the rules of the game [Duggan, 2015, p. 11]. BRICS members consistently support G20 decisions as the premier forum for international economic cooperation and the UN’s central role in the multipolar international order. The BRICS unwaveringly acts as a catalyst stimulating, endorsing, compelling and supporting change of the UN, IMF, WB and WTO. Despite a vast agenda and global reach, the BRICS manifestly does not engage the OECD, the think-tank and norm setter of the western powers. It increasingly uses its own institutions, initially acting with regard to such institutions (NDB, CRA) as a catalyst and subsequently as a core group. The BRICS mostly engages IOs in deliberation and direction-setting, less frequently in decision-making. The BRICS’ own mechanisms are also involved in delivery. Thus the BRICS contributes to global governance development building BRICS-centred institutional system and exerting influence over IOs “for a more just, equitable, fair, democratic and representative international and economic order” [BRICS Leaders, 2017, para 2].

APEC as regional premier economic forum and a vehicle of Asia-Pacific engagement in global issues [Morrison, 2014, p. 2] advances inclusive growth regionally and globally. This duality is explicit in APEC’s choice of partners, where the top ten positions are split between global and regional IOs, with the WTO expectedly coming first, the World Bank, OECD, G20, UN and FAO in the second, third, fourth, sixth and 10th positions. The ADB and ASEAN stand seventh and eighth and two of APEC’s own mechanisms are in the fifth and ninth places. APEC members use the expertise and instruments of global organizations and regional partners to advance their regional agenda, however in the case of the WTO they also exert catalytic influence. Parallel treatment constitutes a significant share of 34%. In creating its own mechanisms APEC acts as a catalyst, while in the subsequent engagement with these arrangements it often acts as a core group. APEC predominantly engages IOs in deliberation and direction-setting. Most importantly APEC often encourages coordination, cooperation and
concerted efforts of regional and global IOs. Sharing global challenges, integrating the
global agenda into its cooperation and committing to shared decisions, it contributes to
regional and global governance development.

Thus, the engagement of the G20, BRICS and APEC with IOs reflects their mis-
sions and roles in the system of international institutions. The G20, a hub of the global
governance network [Kirton, 2013, pp. 46–47], stimulates division of labour, mitigates
risks of fragmentation and facilitates coherence in global governance. The BRICS, a
concert of powers sharing the idea of legitimacy as a core value in building institu-
tions [Skak, 2011, p. 17], enhances legitimacy, promotes inclusiveness and advances
new principles and approaches of governance. APEC, a forum set up by its members
to enhance the prospects of an accelerated, balanced and equitable economic growth
not only in the Asia-Pacific region, but throughout the world [APEC Leaders, 1994],
expedites integration of regional and global agendas, facilitates coordination between
regional and multilateral institutions and reinforces their mutual influence. Jointly,
they contribute to more effective global policy coordination. Though there is definitely
room for improvement, this is indeed good news, raising hopes for the future of global
governance.

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«Группа двадцати», БРИКС и АТЭС в системе международных институтов.
Хорошие новости для глобального управления1

М.В. Ларионова

Ларионова Марина Владимировна — д.полит.н., директор Центра исследований международных институтов (ЦИМИ) Российской академии народного хозяйства и государственной службы при Президенте РФ (РАНХиГС); Российская Федерация, 119034, Москва, Пречистенская наб., д. 11; E-mail: larionova-mv@ranepa.ru

Возникновение новых институтов в ответ на системные уязвимости, стратегическую трансформацию влияния государств в мировой экономике и медленные темпы реформирования существующих институтов вызвало бурную дискуссию в отношении роста количества институтов и сопровождающей его фрагментации глобального управления. Однако фрагментация не означает снижения спроса на глобальное управление или его эффективности. Напротив, она может приносить выгody, будучи позитивной и креативной [Acharya, 2016].

Несмотря на существенные различия своих миссий и коллективной идентичности, «Группа двадцати», БРИКС и АТЭС играют важную роль в повышении инклюзивности, легитимности и эффективности глобального управления. Отличительными чертами трех институтов являются практика проведения встреч на высшем уровне, принцип добровольности исполнения решений, признание роли основных развивающихся стран в мировом экономическом росте, глобальном и региональном управлении, высокая интегрированность в систему международных институтов и активное взаимодействие с международными организациями.

Это взаимодействие напрямую не решает проблем, связанных с фрагментацией, но стимулирует разделение труда, которое снижает риски фрагментации и конкуренции, способствует росту координации, согласованности, подотчетности и эффективности в глобальном управлении.

В настоящей статье рассматривается взаимодействие «Группы двадцати», БРИКС и АТЭС с международными организациями в рамках выполнения ими функций глобального управления, включая обсуждение, определение направлений коллективных действий, принятие решений, их исполнение и развитие глобального/регионального управления.

Аналитической основой исследования является теория рационального выбора институционализма. Оно опирается на количественный и качественный анализ документов, принятых «Группой двадцати», БРИКС и АТЭС, для выявления динамики и определения предпочитаемых ими моделей взаимодействия с многосторонними организациями.

Статья начинается с краткого описания роли «Группы двадцати», БРИКС и АТЭС в системе международного управления. Затем представлены аналитическая парадигма и методология исследования. На основе этой методологии проверяется ключевая гипотеза о том, что неформальные институты высшего уровня могут прибегать к сочетанию моделей «катализаторского воздействия», «ядра, влияющего на систему» и «параллельного управления» при взаимодействии с международными институтами, причем выбор отражает их миссию и роль в системе этих институтов, которые могут меняться со временем. Анализ полученных результатов позволяет сделать вывод о том, что «Группа двадцати», БРИКС и АТЭС последовательно взаимодействуют с международными организациями, но спектр этих организаций, интенсивность, динамика и модели взаимодействия существенно различаются.

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«Группа двадцати», ключевой форум экономического сотрудничества, действующий на основе консенсуса, стремится «выполнить обещание содействовать большей согласованности в системе институтов глобального управления» [Narlikar, Kumar, 2012, p. 389] и создать новую форму институционального коллективизма. «Двадцатка» преодолеет БРИКС и АТЭС по количеству упоминаний международных организаций, интенсивности и масштабам взаимодействия. Она использует все три модели, взаимодействуя с ключевыми партнерами (МВФ, СФС, ОЭСР, Всемирным банком, ВТО и МОТ) в основном в качестве «ядра, влияющего на систему», по всему спектру функций глобального управления – от обсуждения до исполнения решений. БРИКС, представляющий новую силу в глобальном управлении, стремится трансформировать мировой порядок на благо людей, внося конструктивный вклад в определение правил игры [Duggan, 2015, p. 11]. БРИКС последовательно выступает в качестве катализатора, стимулирующего, одобряющего, побуждающего и поддерживающего изменения ООН, МВФ и Всемирного банка, а также ВТО и создающего собственную институциональную систему. АТЭС как главный региональный экономический форум и инструмент участия Азиатско-Тихоокеанского региона в решении глобальных проблем [Morrison, 2014, p. 2], продвигает повестку инклюзивного роста на региональном и глобальном уровнях. Эта двойственность цели проявляется в выборе партнеров для взаимодействия: десять ключевых партнеров АТЭС включают как глобальные, так и региональные международные организации. АТЭС способствует интеграции региональной и глобальной повестки дня, обеспечивает координацию между региональными и многосторонними институтами и усиливает их взаимное влияние.

«Группа двадцати», БРИКС и АТЭС, каждый по своему, способствуют росту координации в глобальном управлении. Определенно необходимо дальнейшее повышение согласованности и эффективности взаимодействия многосторонних институтов. Однако наличие предпосылок для снижения фрагментарности и конкуренции – хорошая новость, позволяющая с надеждой смотреть в будущее глобального управления.

Ключевые слова: «Группа двадцати»; БРИКС; АТЭС; глобальное управление; международные организации; модели взаимодействия


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