G20: Engaging with International Organizations to Generate Growth[1]

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Abstract

Born in response to an economic and financial crisis which existing institutions were unable to adequately address, the G20 has become transformed from a crisis management group into the premier forum for international economic cooperation. Like its predecessors – the G7, set up in 1975, and the BRICS grouping of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa established in 2009 – the G20 is an informal club or summit institution. To ensure continuity, legitimacy and efficiency in fulfilling their global governance functions of deliberation, direction-setting, decision-making, delivery and global governance development, G20 members engage other international organizations (IOs). It is hypothesized that to maximize benefits from this engagement, the G20 resorts to a combination of "catalyst," "core group" and "parallel treatment" approaches exercised by summit institutions: exerting an influence for international organizations' changes through endorsement or stimulus or by compelling them to reform; imparting a new direction through leadership by example; and creating its own mechanisms. This article tests this assumption. To trace the dynamics of G20 engagement with multilateral organizations and to identify preferred models across presidencies and policy areas, this analysis adopts a rational choice institutionalist perspective, drawing on quantitative and qualitative analyses of documents adopted by the G20.

Findings from this study indicate that the intensity of G20 engagement with IOs is very high and that the G20 tends to resort to a combination of the catalyst and core group approaches, although the pattern depends on the policy area, the IOs involved and the presidential agenda. Intensity of G20 engagement with the International Money Fund (IMF), the Financial Stability Board, the World Bank and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development by far exceeds the intensity of its interaction with other institutions. The United Nations (UN) comes only seventh in the G20's discourse in terms of the share and intensity of references. There are very few cases of parallel treatment and most are in the sphere of infrastructure investment. This can be interpreted as the G20's response to a persistent gap in the demand and supply for infrastructure investment and governance leadership in this area. Thus, in implementing the forum's mission and functions, the G20 prefers to engage with key international organizations acting as "a hub of a global network."

The article starts with a brief overview of the study's analytical paradigm and methodology. It then examines the dynamics and modes of G20 engagement with international organizations across a wide spectrum of policy areas. The final section provides summaries and conclusions.

Key words: Global governance; international organizations; informal summit institutions; models of engagement; efficiency; legitimacy; rational choice theory; G20; BRICS

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Introduction

Born in response to an economic and financial crisis which existing institutions were unable to adequately address [Hajnal, 2014, p. 16], the G20 transformed from a crisis management group into the premier forum for international economic cooperation [G20 Leaders, 2009a, para. 19]. Like its predecessors – the G7, set up in 1975 and the BRICS grouping of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa established in 2009 – the G20 is an informal club or summit institution.[2] However it is more representative than the G7 or the BRICS, bringing together leaders of major advanced and developing countries and the European Union (EU). Collectively the G20 represents about 90% of global domestic product (GDP), 64% of the world's population and 80% of global trade. While enhanced representation and diversity is advantage for institutional legitimacy and the capacity to deliver on agreed decisions, the downside is that coordination, consensus and follow up on commitments are harder to attain.

In the absence of a permanent secretariat or legal obligations to implement decisions, the G20 relies on the temporary secretariat and self-accountability mechanisms provided by the rotating president. Most importantly, to ensure continuity, legitimacy and efficiency G20 members engage other international organizations (IOs) to fulfil their global governance functions of deliberation, direction-setting, decision-making, delivery and global governance development. "Deliberation" is understood as face-to-face discussions between members encoded in collective communiques. "Direction-setting" is defined as collective affirmation of shared principles, norms and prescriptions. "Decision-making" is regarded as credible, clear, collective commitments with sufficient precision, obligation and delegation. "Delivery" is understood as stated compliance with collective decisions. "Global governance development" is perceived as the G20's capability to use other international institutions or create its own institutions as global governance mechanisms [Kirton, 2013, pp. 37–39].

This article explores how the G20 interacts with international organizations and what modes of engagement G20 leaders choose to compensate for inefficiencies and build on strengths to implement the forum's mission and functions. The article starts with a brief overview of the analytical paradigm and methodology informing this analysis. It then examines the dynamics and modes of G20 engagement with international organizations across a wide spectrum of policy areas. The final section offers summaries and conclusions.

[2] Informal summitry institutions are defined as international institutions with limited membership, relatively low bureaucracy and a reliance on open, flexible and voluntary approaches. Regular meetings of the heads of states and governments who engage on a wide range of international, regional and domestic politics stand at the pinnacle of such international arrangements, which involve many actors operating according to established procedures on two levels: domestic and international. Commitments contained in the collectively agreed documents are not legally-binding, but their implementation is stimulated by peer pressure. Among such bodies engaged in global and regional governance are the G7/G8, G20, BRICS, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and others.

The Analytical Paradigm and Methodology

This analysis is carried out using a rational choice institutionalist paradigm. A fundamental assertion of this paradigm is that institutions are created by states when they see benefits accruing to them from the functions performed by those institutions [Rosamond, 2000, p. 116]. Starting from this assumption, this paradigm can explain the origins of summits, their existence and evolution, as well as their relationships with international organizations. First, summit institutions are established through voluntary agreements by national leaders to perform concrete functions and missions [Hall and Tailor, 1996]. Second, club members accustomed to strategic action, with roughly equal standing and coming from a wide range of civilizations, continents and levels of economic development act in a highly strategic manner to maximize the attainment of their priorities. Third, summits are settings where strategic interaction between leaders plays a major role in determining political outcomes. Fourth, to maximize benefits from the new arrangement founders may choose to voluntarily engage with existing organizations to attain their goals most efficiently [See Larionova, 2016 for a more detailed account of this process]. Thus the G20 can resort to a combination of "catalyst," "core group" and "parallel treatment" approaches exercised by summitry institutions [Putnam and Bayne, 1987, pp. 155–157]. Acting as a catalyst the G20 can exert a powerful influence for change in international organizations through endorsement, stimulus or compellence. By engaging with IOs as a core group the G20 can impart a new direction by giving a mandate or providing the necessary political leadership to steer its course and harness the support of its members and the international community. The G20 can also create its own mechanisms working in parallel with existing institutions. This study tests the assumption that the G20 practices all three models.

The study draws on quantitative and qualitative analysis of documents adopted by the G20[3] to trace the dynamics of its engagement with multilateral organizations and identify preferred models across the presidencies and policy areas. As a first step, a quantitative approach is used based on three parameters: the number of references to a particular organization made over the period, its share in the total number of references and the intensity. Intensity is expressed as a ratio of the number of references to the institution to the number of characters (including spaces and punctuation) in the documents as follows:

$$D_1 = M_1/S_1.$$

In this formula, D_1 is the intensity of references to an international institution for a given year (period), M_1 is the number of references made to this institution during the given year (period), and S_1 is the total number of characters in the documents for the given year (period). To make the findings more easily understood, D_1 is multiplied by 10,000.

[3] The total number of documents used in the study from Washington to Antalya is 133.

As a second step, qualitative analysis is carried out to identify the most characteristic models of G20 engagement with multilateral organizations, as well as the dynamics and intensity models chosen for specific institutions and policy areas such as finance, economy, international trade, investment, energy and social issues.

Main Findings

G20 Engagement with International Institutions

Since the first summit in Washington the G20 consistently engages international organizations in crisis management and global governance, though the intensity and pattern of engagement differ across presidencies and organizations. Nevertheless, some general trends can be observed. The total number of references to international organizations in G20 discourse amounts to 4390, with the core group engagement clearly a preferred choice for most organizations. The catalytic engagement mode is frequently used in interactions with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank (WB) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) while there is a very limited number of parallel treatment cases. While the intensity of G20 engagement with the IOs has been changing, London and Pittsburg – the two summits defining the G20's mission and role in the system of global governance – stand out with the highest intensity levels of 28.7 and 30.5 respectively against the average of 12.95.



Fig. 1: Intensity of G20 Engagement with IOs across Summits

Washington, London and Seoul reveal the G20's determination to act as the core group providing the lead role for other organizations to follow. In Washington, the leaders established the principles of financial market reform and regulation, and committed to reform the Bretton Woods institutions and to increase the resources of multilateral development banks (MDBs). In London, the G20 pledged to treble resources available to the IMF to $750 billion, support an increase in lending by MDBs by at least $100 billion and to establish the Financial Stability Board (FSB) to pursue stability, openness and transparency in the financial sector as well as supervise international financial standards implementation. Seoul was marked by a breakthrough commitment to shift 6% of IMF shares to dynamic emerging markets and developing countries by the annual meetings in 2012; also significant were the agreements on an enhanced Mutual Assessment Process (MAP) and the Seoul Development Consensus and Multi-Year Action Plan on Development to be implemented in partnership with IOs. All other summits demonstrate the G20's preference for a core group engagement with IOs.

Parallel treatment is not a frequent occurrence in G20 discourse, constituting less than 2% for most of the presidencies except London, when it peaked to 8.28%. This peak is related to the project pioneered by UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown on a "new global consensus on the key values and principles that will promote sustainable economic activity." In the Statement on Global Plan for Recovery and Reform, G20 leaders agreed to discuss "such a charter for sustainable economic activity with a view to further discussion" at their next meeting [G20 Leaders, 2009, para. 21].

More than 90 organizations – universal, specialized, regional and global – are referenced in the G20 deliberations. However, the intensity of G20 engagement with the IMF, the FSB, the WB and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) by far exceeds the intensity of its interaction with the remaining institutions. Their share in G20 discourse significantly exceeds the share of other IOs as illustrated by Fig. 2.



Fig. 2: The Share of Key IOs in G20 Discourse

The G20 consistently pushed for the reform of IMF quotas and governance, supported the World Bank Group (WBG) and the efforts of regional development banks to mobilize and catalyze financing for infrastructure investment. The G20 has also relied on OECD expertise in the elaboration of decisions on a wide range of challenges, from tackling base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) to implementing structural reforms for growth. The G20's baby, the FSB, has become an indispensable partner in expediting and supervising the reform of financial markets and regulation. The United Nations (UN) is in the top ten, although it only comes seventh in G20 discourse. At their first summit in Washington leaders mentioned it twice, reaffirming the development principles agreed at the 2002 United Nations Conference on Financing for Development in Monterrey and pledging support to the efforts of the WB-UN Stolen Asset Recovery (StAR) Initiative. In London, the G20 called on the UN, working with other global institutions, to establish an effective mechanism to monitor the impact of the crisis on the poorest and most vulnerable [G20 Leaders, 2009, para. 25]. The G20 mostly engages with the UN on development (MDGs and Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and MDGs), food security and climate change. With the average share of the UN in G20 discourse standing at 4.08, Saint-Petersburg summit documents recorded a historic peak of 7.57% in the share of UN references in the total mentions of all IOs.

Rejecting protectionism and promising to promote and facilitate trade and investment, the G20 mandated the WTO to monitor and report publicly on adherence to the pledge, which the WTO does in partnership with the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the OECD. "Putting quality jobs at the heart of recovery" at their third meeting in Pittsburg, the G20 committed to implement policies consistent with the fundamental principles of the International Labour Organization (ILO) to assure that global growth is broadly beneficial. Since Pittsburg, the ILO has consistently worked to provide the G20 with a training strategy, reviews and monitoring reports. Though intensity of G20 interaction with the ILO is not high, it is steady with the average intensity at 0.33 and the average share of references standing at 2.69. Table 1 presents the number of references, the share and intensity of engagement for G20 top 15 partner organizations.

Table 1: G20 References to Top 15 Partner Organizations

Organization	Number of References	Share of References, %	Intensity
International Monetary Fund	683	15.56	2.02
Financial Stability Board + Financial Stability Forum	600	13.67	1.77
World Bank	428	9.75	1.26
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development	386	8.79	1.14
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BIS)	260	5.92	0.77
Financial Action Task Force	211	4.81	0.62
United Nations	179	4.08	0.53
Global Partnership for Financial Inclusion	157	3.58	0.46

Organization	Number of References	Share of References, %	Intensity
International Organization of Securities Commissions	152	3.46	0.45
World Trade Organization	119	2.71	0.35
International Labour Organization	118	2.69	0.35
International Accounting Standards Board	110	2.51	0.32
Bank for International Settlements	51	1.16	0.15
International Finance Corporation	50	1.14	0.15
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development	49	1.12	0.14

IMF and the WB

Since the first summit in Washington the IMF has been an important partner of the G20. As Peter Hajnal notes: "This connection predates the existence of the G20; the G7, from its earliest days, relied on and called on the IMF on various matters; for example, on the IMF's role in surveillance..." [Hajnal, 2014, p. 55]. Washington set the course for enhancing IMF resources and building its capacity for surveillance. In London the leaders promised to treble the resources available to the IMF and endorsed new lending instruments to enable it to perform its critical role in promoting global financial stability and rebalancing growth. The G20 reported delivery on the commitments at their Seoul meeting, where the leaders confirmed their agreement to a doubling of IMF members' quotas and completion by the Annual Meetings in 2012 of 6% shifts in quota shares to dynamic emerging market, developing countries and underrepresented countries. From London to Antalya the G20 consistently built pressure for the IMF reform agreed in 2010, urging the U.S. to ratify them. In Antalya leaders asked the IMF to complete its work on an interim solution that would converge quota shares to the levels agreed under the 14th General Review of Quotas and complete the review of the special drawing rights (SDR) valuation method so that the SDR basket composition reflects the role of currencies in the global trading and financial system. Following the approval of these reforms in December 2015 by the U.S. congress [Lew, 2016], the G20 continues its catalytic engagement by pushing for completion of the 15th General Review of Quotas, including new quota formula, by the 2017 Annual Meeting [G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors, 2016, para. 8].

The G20 inspired the IMF to undertake a detailed assessment of the global economic and financial situation and prospects. The IMF submitted staff notes to the G20 leaders and finance ministers for each meeting starting from March 2009. From 2009 to 2015 the IMF submitted 32 *Notes on Global Prospects and Policy Challenges*. In 2010 the IMF prepared the first Mutual Assessment Process (MAP) as requested by the G20 at their 2009 meeting in Pittsburgh, where "leaders committed to clarifying key objectives, elaborating policies aimed at meeting those objectives, and a mutual assessment process (MAP) to track progress. The Fund – with input from other international institutions – was asked to assist in analyzing how their respective national and regional frameworks fit together, and to develop a forward-looking analysis of whether policies pursued by individual G20 members are collectively consistent with strong, sustainable, and balanced trajectories for the global economy" [IMF, 2010, p. 3]. The MAP has become "an analytical backbone" of the G20 Framework for Strong, Sustainable and Balanced Growth. It is a perfect example of the G20 acting as a core group in its engagement with the IMF. Though the intensity of G20 interaction with the IMF is gradually declining, the IMF remains the G20's primary partner. This is also evidenced by a persistently high share of references to the IMF in G20 discourse, as well as the growing number of reports the IMF prepares for the G20 (second only to the OECD) on a widening range of topics.



Fig. 3: Intensity of G20 Engagement with the IMF and the WB

The World Bank stands third in terms of intensity and the share of references in G20 discourse after the IMF and the Financial Stability Board (FSB). However, G20 engagement with the WB does not demonstrate the shift of intensity characteristic of G20 interaction with the IMF and the FSB, both of which were key partners with the G20 in crisis management during the first summits, with the engagement intensity plateauing after the Cannes meeting. In Washington and London the leaders pledged to make "available resources for social protection for the poorest countries, including through investing in long-term food security and through voluntary bilateral contributions to the World Bank's Vulnerability Framework, including the Infrastructure Crisis Facility, and the Rapid Social Response Fund" [G20 Leaders, 2009, para. 25]. At Pittsburg the G20 emphasized that "additional resources must be joined to key institutional [the WB and MDBs] reforms to ensure effectiveness: greater coordination and a clearer division of labor; an increased commitment to transparency, accountability, and good corporate governance; an increased capacity to innovate and achieve demonstrable results; and greater attention to the needs of the poorest populations" [G20 Leaders, 2009a, para. 26] and a significant increase of at least 3% of voting power for developing and transition countries in the WB [G20 Leaders, 2009a, para. 27]. In Toronto the leaders endorsed the agreement by WB shareholders to increase the voting power of developing and transition countries by 4.59%. The WB called for a more inclusive growth in its first report to the G20 for the Toronto summit and became one of the key partners in implementation of the Seoul Multi-Year Action Plan on Development which would contribute to the G20's delivery and monitoring of progress on the nine development plan pillars: infrastructure, private investment and job creation, human resource development, trade, financial inclusion, growth with resilience, food security, domestic resource mobilization and knowledge sharing.

Tasked at the G20 Cannes meeting to assess and report on how the economic reform agenda under the G20 Framework contributes to job creation together with other IOs (IMF, OECD, ILO), the WB submitted the first report and recommendations on measures to accelerate the pace of the recovery in jobs and the reduction in unemployment for Los Cabos and retained focus on this strand. In Saint-Petersburg the leaders mandated the G20 Task Force on Employment to develop national employment plans and the WB became deeply involved in the task of identifying needs, best practices and policy options.

Two other significant examples of the G20 engaging with the WB as a core group are related to agriculture collaboration and the challenge of investment in infrastructure. The first of these is exemplified by AgResults, a WB multilateral initiative addressing the need for increased investment in global food security and agriculture, in particular from the private sector. AgResults originated at the June 2010 G20 Summit in Toronto, where leaders committed to exploring the potential of harnessing private sector innovations in food security and improving productivity in developing countries. This pledge culminated in the official launch of AgResults at the G20 Los Cabos summit in June 2012 with pre-commitments of $100 million.

The G20's efforts to mobilize and catalyze financing for infrastructure investment, particularly in emerging markets and developing countries (EMDEs), were structured into the G20 Study Group on Financing for Investment Work Plan endorsed by the G20 leaders in Saint-Petersburg. The WB led the strands on Practical Solutions and Models for Addressing Obstacles to Institutional Investment in Infrastructure in Developing Countries and on Project Selection, Design and Management as a Catalyst for Financing, enhancing the catalytic role of MDBs in mobilizing financing. Within the latter strand, the WBG began working on the design of a new mechanism which would "create genuine additionality and serve as an innovative model for resource mobilization and infrastructure financing in an environment of increasingly constrained official sector sources of financing" [G20 Study Group on Financing for Investment, 2013, p. 27]. On 9 October 2014, the new Global Infrastructure Facility (GIF) was launched to meet demands for investment estimated to be an additional $1 trillion a year through to 2020.[4] The GIF facilitates the preparation and structuring of complex infrastruc-

[4] World Bank Group Launches New Global Infrastructure Facility. Available at: http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2014/10/09/world-bank-group-launches-new-global-infrastructure-facility (accessed August 2016).

ture public-private partnerships (PPPs) to enable mobilization of private sector and institutional investor capital. It also coordinates and integrates the efforts of MDBs, private sector investors and financiers and governments interested in infrastructure investment in EMDEs. At the summit in Brisbane the leaders welcomed the launch of the WBG's GIF "which would complement" the G20's work tackling infrastructure shortfalls [G20 Leaders, 2014, para. 5–7]. Australian treasurer and chair of the G20's finance track, Joe Hockey, welcomed the launch of the GIF saying it complemented the work the G20 is doing to boost infrastructure investment.[5]

The president of the WB and the managing director of the IMF are regular participants of G20 summits. Both are invited to meetings of finance ministers and central bank governors. The WB has provided an increasing number of reports for the G20 meetings since the Pittsburg summit which serve to inform the leaders' deliberations and decision-making and support the G20's delivery on collective pledges.

Financial Stability Board

The FSB ranks second in G20 discourse both by intensity and the share of mentions. At the first summit in Washington the leaders called for the expansion and review of membership of the Financial Stability Forum (FSF), thus exerting catalytic influence for reform which was fully implemented in London. The G20 also acted as a core group setting the course for IMF and the FSF actions to "better identify vulnerabilities, anticipate potential stresses, and act swiftly to play a key role in crisis response" [G20 Leaders, 2008, para. 9]. The intensity of engagement is very high for London (7.13) when the FSF was transformed into the FSB, and its mission and objectives were defined. It rose even higher for Pittsburg (7.59) where the leaders endorsed the FSB's institutional establishment and mandated it to contribute to strengthening the international financial regulatory system through setting standards and monitoring and reporting progress on compensation practices, risk mitigations on the over-the-counter derivatives markets, measures to address cross-border resolutions and systemically important financial institutions, and cooperation and information exchange on noncooperative jurisdictions. The intensity of G20 engagement slumped a bit in Toronto (5.64) and fell further in Seoul (3.38). However the G20 continued to exercise its catalytic influence over the FSB, such that in Toronto the leaders reaffirmed "the FSB's principal role in the elaboration of international financial sector supervisory and regulatory policies and standards, co-ordination across various standard-setting bodies, and ensuring accountability for the reform agenda by conducting thematic and country peer reviews and fostering a level playing field through coherent implementation across sectors and jurisdictions." To that end, they encouraged the FSB to look at ways to strengthen its capacity to keep pace with growing demands and called upon the FSB to "expand upon and formalize its outreach activities beyond the membership of the G20

[5] World Bank Group Launches New Global Infrastructure Facility. Available at: http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2014/10/09/world-bank-group-launches-new-global-infrastructure-facility (accessed August 2016).

to reflect the global nature of our financial system" [G20 Leaders, 2010, para. 33–34]. However, after Toronto the G20 has mostly interacted with the FSB as a core group, tasking the FSB to develop concrete policy recommendations, standards and principles or pledging to support peer review processes. The intensity of G20 engagement with the FSB subsequently stabilized at about the average for the period (1.77), reflecting steady progress made by the G20 and FSB in tandem with the other international financial organizations (IFOs) and standard setting bodies (SSBs) on "building more resilient financial institutions and markets, using substantially strengthened common international standards that have been designed to be applicable to different national circumstances" [FSB, 2013, p. 3].



Fig. 4: Intensity of G20 Engagement with the FSB and Other Financial Institutions

The FSB chair participates in all G20 summits. The FSB recommendations and progress reports submitted to the leaders as well as the finance ministers and central bank governors provide a foundation for G20 decisions and actions. FSB mandate includes policy and standards development, implementation monitoring and peer reviews across key areas: the Basel capital and liquidity framework, derivatives market reforms, compensation practices, policy measures for global systematically important financial institutions (SIFIs), resolution frameworks and shadow banking. The FSB also monitors the effects of reforms on the real economy and on the financial system's ability to play its role as a source of financing for long-term investment. Where unintended consequences or improved methods of achieving the desired outcome are identified, the FSB and the SSBs make recommendations to the G20 to respond [FSB, 2013, p. 8].

At the G20's request, the FSB became a separate legal entity in early 2013, though it continued to be hosted and funded by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). The BIS, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS), International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), Committee on the Global Financial Systems (CGFS), Committee on Payments and Market

Infrastructure (CPMI), the IMF, the WB and the OECD are all members of the FSB. Together with the Coordination Framework for Implementation Monitoring (CFIM) and established with the relevant SSBs, the FSB ensures better coordination and the comprehensive nature of the documents that it submits to the G20. Apart from the progress reports, the FSB carries out thematic peer reviews, embarking this year on its 13th – a review of the implementation of the G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance.[6] The FSB also reaches out to 65 jurisdictions through its six regional consultative groups. Thus the FSB set up by the G20 in the early days of their anti-crisis management became the G20's indispensable partner in decision-making and delivery. This is a perfect example of the G20's influence as a core group working outward in concentric circles.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

The OECD comes fourth in G20 discourse by average share of references (8.79) and intensity (1.14). A very interesting trend is observed: the OECD's contribution is steadily rising, coming almost on par with the G20's key partner institution, the IMF, for Los Cabos and subsequent summits. It exceeds the share and intensity of G20 engagement with the FSB and the WB for Saint-Petersburg, Brisbane and Antalya (Fig. 5). This is it related to the fact that the G20 has gone "beyond its crisis firefighting role" and ad hoc multilateralism to an institutionalized multilateralism that is more structured and based on a more solid framework. Angel Gurría, OECD secretary-general said in 2011 that this transformation was crucial [Gurría, 2011]. Does it reflect the G20's expanding agenda and increasing reliance on its expertise? Is the trend the result of OECD entrepreneurship striving to exert influence beyond its membership through its relations with the G20? The answer to all three suppositions is yes.



Fig. 5: Intensity of G20 Engagement with the OECD

[6] FSB launches peer review of the G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, 8 August 2016. Available at: http://www.fsb.org/2016/08/fsb-launches-peer-review-of-the-g20oecd-principles-of-corporate-governance-and-invites-feedback-from-stakeholders/ (accessed August 2016).

The OECD secretary-general participates in all G20 summits, has a sherpa and a finance deputy who take part in the sherpas and finance ministers meetings respectively. The OECD is a member of several working groups contributing to the efforts of the G20 Framework Working Group (FWG), the Development Working Group (DWG), the Infrastructure Investment Working Group (IIWG) and others. Some of the issues have been the subject of G20 cooperation with the OECD from the G20's inception while others emerged as the G20 has pooled efforts and expertise in response to new and persisting demands for global governance.

The G20 leaders has engaged the OECD in promoting tax information exchange since their first summit. Cooperation on tax penetrated other policy areas, including development, given the role of effective tax systems for domestic resources mobilization. Tax reform was one of the key structural reforms called for in Seoul: "to boost and sustain growth we need to undertake tax reform to enhance productivity by removing distortions and improving the incentives to work, invest and innovate [G20 Leaders, 2010a, para. 10]. Thus, the G20/OECD Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) Action Plan to tackle base erosion, profit shifting and tax avoidance, and to promote tax transparency and automatic exchange of information that was endorsed by the leaders in Saint-Petersburg has become one of the major decisions since the early summits. It should be noted that the plan originated in the OECD. Together with the G20/OECD High-Level Principles on Long-Term Investment Financing by Institutional Investors developed by the OECD Task Force on Institutional Investors and Long-Term Financing, it set a precedent of G20 endorsement, implementation and promotion of documents originated and developed by the OECD as their own.

At Pittsburg the G20 asked the OECD together with the International Energy Agency (IEA) to provide an analysis of the scope of energy subsidies and suggestions for the implementation of this initiative for the Toronto summit, which was duly submitted. Since then the OECD in partnership with the IEA, Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), and the WB has contributed to the implementation of the G20's commitment to "rationalise and phase out over the medium term inefficient fossil fuel subsidies that encourage wasteful consumption" through reports, peer reviews and the regularly updated Inventory of Estimated Budgetary Support and Tax Expenditures for Fossil Fuels. The G20 set up an Energy Efficiency Finance Task Group and requested support from the OECD and other relevant IOs and initiatives (including the WB, the International Energy Forum (IEF), the Energy Efficiency Financial Institutions Group and the United Nations Environment Programme Finance Initiative).

Employment and social policy is a vital strand of the work that the OECD contributes to the G20. The OECD labour and employment ministerial meeting on the jobs crisis held right after the Pittsburg summit possibly prompted the chair to request his secretary of labour to invite G20 employment and labour ministers to meet as a group in early 2010, consulting with labour and business and building on the OECD ministerial meeting. The first meeting of the G20 employment and labour ministers was held in April 2010 and the OECD and the International Labour Organization (ILO) have been contributing to the preparation of discussions at the G20 labour and employment ministerial meetings and supporting successive presidencies through policy recommendations, evidence-based analysis and the drafting of strategic documents since then. By the time of writing almost 40 documents have been prepared to inform G20 decisions on achieving strong job growth and providing social protection to the citizens of G20 countries. Two documents stand out: *A Skilled Workforce for Strong, Sustainable and Balanced Growth* or the G20 Training Strategy endorsed by the Seoul meeting and the *G20 Skills Strategy for the 21st Century*, prepared under the Turkish presidency.

Since Pittsburgh the G20 has involved the OECD with other IOs in assessing the collective consistency of G20 individual policy frameworks and global prospects under alternative policy scenarios, and subsequently the MAP. The OECD's explicit support has been instrumental in developing, implementing and monitoring structural reforms in the G20 as part of the Framework for Strong, Sustainable and Balanced Growth and the G20 members' growth strategies intended to contribute to the goal agreed under the Australian presidency of increasing global GDP by 2.1% above the baseline by 2018.

G20 structural reforms prioritized investment in infrastructure to address bottlenecks and enhance growth potential [G20 Leaders 2010a, para. 10]. Russia put long-term financing at the core of its agenda during its 2013 G20 presidency. At the request of G20 finance ministers the OECD developed High-Level Principles of Long-Term Investment Financing by Institutional Investors, endorsed by the leaders and adopted as a joint G20/OECD document [G20 Leaders, 2013, para. 38]. To help boost investment, particularly through private sector participation, the G20 under the Turkish presidency called on the members to develop country-specific investment strategies to improve the investment ecosystem, foster efficient and quality infrastructure, support small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), and enhance knowledge sharing [G20 Leaders, 2015, para. 9]. The OECD as a member of the IIWG helped carry out a survey, compile information and data, identify trends and effective approaches to support the G20's future actions to secure productive and inclusive long-term investment [OECD, 2014]. Working together with the IIWG the OECD compiled a taxonomy of instruments and incentives for infrastructure financing that maps out the investment options available to private investors and submitted these reports under the Turkish presidency [OECD, 2015]. Unlike the G20/OECD Report on Investment Strategies, the taxonomy was not adopted by the G20 as its own and was not appended to the Leaders' Communique.

The G20/OECD High Level Principles on SMEs Financing reflects the G20 priorities on financing for investment and financial inclusion goals and the OECD's long-term work on these issues. The document adopted by the G20 in Antalya reflects both this G20 request and the ongoing work of the OECD and other IOs [G20, OECD, 2015, para. 5] and represents a case of the G20 and OECD reinforcing each other: the OECD projects its influence through the G20, while the G20 provides a political impulse and sanction to the OECD's work, setting the direction for a wider group of countries on these aspects of global governance.

Together with the UNCTAD, UNDP, WB, MDBs and ILO, the OECD has been a major partner in the implementation of the Seoul Multi-Year Action Plan on Development, especially on such pillars as infrastructure, financial inclusion, human resources development, food security and domestic resources mobilization.

Since the London summit when the G20 reaffirmed the commitments made in Washington to refrain from raising new barriers to investment or trade in goods and services, imposing new export restrictions, or implementing measures to stimulate exports that are not consistent with the WTO, as well as to rectify promptly any such measures, the leaders mandated the WTO and other relevant IOs to monitor and report publicly on G20 compliance. The OECD joined the efforts the WTO and UNCTAD in monitoring the G20's performance on fighting protectionism. Responding to the G20's Brisbane call, the OECD also developed an assessment of the economic measures adopted since the beginning of the crisis.

An OECD, WTO and WB contribution to understanding the impact of expansion of global value chains on growth, industrial structure, development and job creation was requested by the G20 leaders in Los Cabos [G20 Leaders, 2012, para. 29]. The first OECD-WTO-UNCTAD report on Implications of the Global Value Chains for Trade, Investment, Development and Jobs was delivered to leaders in Saint-Petersburg [OECD, WTO, UNCTAD, 2013]. Analysis of impediments to integration into GVCs and the search for policy to promote inclusive value chains remained an important focus of the OECD, UNCTAD and the WB, which reported their findings to G20 trade ministers in 2014 [OECD, WTO, World Bank, 2014] and 2015 [OECD, World Bank, 2015].

Given the impact of corruption on economic growth, cooperation on anti-corruption has been part of the G20's agenda since Pittsburg when the leaders committed to deal with tax havens, money laundering, proceeds of corruption, terrorist financing, and prudential standards [G20 Leaders, 2009a, para. 15]. They also called for the adoption and enforcement of laws against transnational bribery, such as the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, and the ratification by the G20 of the UN Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) Action Plan [G20 Leaders, 2009a, para. 42]. The OECD studies carried out at the G20's request for the Russian and Australian presidencies provided the foundation for the High-Level Principles on Integrity and Transparency in the Private Sector endorsed by the leaders in Antalya. Transparency is set at the heart of the G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance also adopted in Antalya to support private investment.

The OECD made a significant contribution to the formulation of the G20 Blueprint on Innovative Growth agreed at the summit in Hangzhou, an initiative China set forth as a priority of its G20 presidency to forge a new path for development [Wang, 2016]. The OECD was requested to support the G20 Task Force set up at the summit to advance the G20's agenda on innovation, new industrial revolution and the digital economy. This created for the OECD an opportunity to impact the G20's future agenda and the G20 members' national policies across the three areas [G20 Leaders, 2016; G20 Leaders, 2016a, p. 6]. To address the risks related to excess capacity in steel, the G20 called for increased information sharing and cooperation through formation of a Global Forum on Steel Excess Capacity to be facilitated by the OECD [G20 Leaders, 2016, para. 31], a mandate very much in line with the focus of the OECD Steel Committee for 2015–2016.

To sum up, the G20 summits provided political impulses and mandates to many OECD activities, from the macroeconomic to anticorruption policy areas and, acting as a core group, relied on its expertise in deliberations, directions setting, decision-making and delivery. At the same time, the OECD sought to project its influence beyond the OECD through its alliance with the G20.

UN and its Organizations

The UN comes only seventh in G20 discourse by the share and intensity of references at 4.08 and 0.53 respectively. This is almost four times lower than the IMF and twice lower than the OECD. It should be noted that these numbers take into account only the mentions of the UN as the umbrella organization, and do not include the references to the UN's specialized organizations, programmes or instruments. Put together, all the references to the UN and its bodies come to 7.5%; however, this is still lower than the IMF, the FSB or the OECD.



Fig. 6: The Intensity of G20 Engagement with the UN and its Bodies

Three simple reasons can explain this trend. First, the G20's agenda is defined by its mission as the premier forum for economic cooperation in which the IMF, OECD and FSB are the G20's natural partners; second, a mounting disappointment with the UN has undermined the G20 consensus on its capability to act as a partner in fighting the crisis; third the UN failed to act as swiftly as the informal G20 summitry members. The lines of action proposed by the UN Conference on the World Financial and Economic Crisis and its Impact on Development were issued on 18 May 2009 [UN Member States, 2009], quite quickly for an event bringing together 192 members, but not promptly enough in the wake of the crisis. Many of the actions the conference called for had already been formulated by the Washington and London G20 summits. It is not accidental that the UN conference outcome document explicitly supported commitments the leaders made at the London meeting [UN Member States, 2009, para. 19 and 25], while many of the proposed actions were aligned with the directions set and decisions made in the first G20 summits. These include fiscal stimulus if national circumstances permit, resistance to protectionism, improving regulation and reform of the international financial and economic governance. The conference also called for the establishment of a panel of experts to offer advice to the general assembly and the economic and social council on the main areas of global economic reform and coordination, several ministerial and working groups and a new global economic council as part of the UN system to provide coordination and oversight of the responses to the global challenges. The outcome document reflected recommendations of the Commission of Experts on Reform of the International Financial and Monetary System, convened by the UN president under the leadership of Chairman Joseph Stiglitz, in late November 2008, specifically to assist the member states of the general assembly in their deliberations on the world financial and economic crisis. However, the conference and the Commission of Experts' Report [UN, 2009] failed to generate a powerful response to the crisis or provide "political guidance and direction to future meetings, action and measures undertaken by the world community" [UN Member States, 2009, para. 12] the way the G20 did. This is not to say that the UN efforts were futile or have been ignored by the G20.

The G20's engagement with the UN has been consistent since the first summit in Washington where the leaders reaffirmed the importance of the MDGs and development principles agreed at the 2002 United Nations Conference on Financing for Development in Monterrey. Intensity of engagement is highest for the summits/presidencies which put development, fair recovery for all and inclusive growth at the heart of the G20 agenda. London at 0.62 called for the UN to establish an effective mechanism to monitor the impact of the crisis on the poorest and most vulnerable and promised to address the threat of irreversible climate change, reaching agreement at the UN Climate Change conference in Copenhagen in December 2009. In Seoul (0.60) the leaders promised to align G20 work on the Multi-Year Action Plan on Development with globally agreed development principles for sustainable economic, social and environmental development, and pledged to complement the outcomes of the UN High-Level Plenary Meeting on the MDGs held in September 2010 in New York [G20 Leaders 2010a, para. 53]. In Saint-Petersburg (0.63) the G20 committed to ensure that G20 development efforts are consistent with the post-2015 development agenda and reaffirmed their focus on promoting strong, sustainable, inclusive and resilient growth.

Accepting the primacy of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) for negotiating climate change the G20 has steadily supported strong and effective collective action, encouraged other parties and worked together for an agreed outcome with legal force under the UNFCCC. To address corruption the G20 leaders have committed to strengthen legislative and treaty foundations, including ratification and implementation of the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC). G20 made the commitment part of their Anti-Corruption Action Plan and at the moment of writing 19 G20 countries have ratified the Convention.

The dominant model of G20 engagement with the UN is that of a core group. The first example was the call by the leaders at the G20 London on the UN to establish an effective mechanism to monitor the impact of the crisis on the poorest and most vulnerable, working with other global institutions [G20 Leaders, 2009, para. 25]. The latest example comes from the Antalya declaration and is related to information and communications technology (ICT): the leaders noted the key role the UN played in developing norms in this sphere and welcomed the 2015 report of the UN Group of Governmental Experts in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security. Most importantly they affirmed that the UN Charter is applicable to state conduct in the use of ICTs emphasizing that all states should abide by norms of responsible state behaviour in the use of ICTs in accordance with UN resolution A/C.1/70/L.45 [G20 Leaders 2015, para. 26].

WTO and UNCTAD

The WTO and UNCTAD come the tenth and sixteenth by the share of references (2.71 and 1.12) and intensity (0.35 and 0.14) in G20 discourse. The G20 resorts both to the catalytic and core group engagement models.



Fig. 7: The Intensity of G20 Engagement with the WTO and UNCTAD

Engagement of the core-group type is closely related to the G20 commitment first made in Washington and reaffirmed in subsequent summits to refrain from raising new barriers to investment or trade in goods and services, imposing new export restrictions, or implementing WTO inconsistent measures to stimulate exports. In London the G20 pledged to promptly rectify any such measures and promised to notify the WTO. They mandated the WTO, together with UNCTAD and the OECD, within their respective spheres, to monitor and report publicly on compliance with the pledge on a quarterly basis. Despite the G20's repeated commitment and WTO/UNCTAD/OECD monitoring, G20 performance on the promise has been poor. The 15th trade monitoring report issued in June 2016 for the period of mid-October to mid-May shows the highest monthly average since the beginning of the monitoring in 2009, reflecting an increase in trade restrictive measures to an average of almost 21 new measures per month compared to 17 in the previous reporting period. Of the overall 1,583 trade-restrictive measures recorded for the G20 economies since 2008 only 387 had been removed [WTO, OECD, UNCTAD, 2016, p. 2]. Thus, although the monitoring has become an important new element of WTO and UNCTAD activities, it has not exerted a significant impact on the implementation of G20 commitments.

Since Pittsburg the G20 has engaged with the WTO to provide impulse to a balanced and ambitious conclusion of the Doha Development Round, but their steady efforts have not yielded expected catalytic influence. A more successful example of a G20 catalyst approach is the leaders' push for a successful outcome at the WTO Ministerial Conference (MC9) in Bali in December 2013 on trade facilitation [G20 Leaders, 2013, para. 42]. The Trade Facilitation Agreement concluded in Bali was subsequently welcomed at the G20 Brisbane meeting, where the leaders committed to its implementation.

The G20 supported strengthening the WTO dispute settlement system [G20 Leaders, 2012, para. 31] and encouraged WTO, UNCTAD and OECD work on analyzing the functioning of GVCs and their relationship with trade and investment flows, development and jobs [G20 Leaders, 2012, para. 29], thus imparting a lead to the WTO and UNCTAD work. In a similar spirit, in Saint-Petersburg G20 members committed to ensure that regional trade agreements (RTAs) comply with existing transparency obligations under the WTO Transparency Mechanism for Regional Trade Agreements and agreed on a shared approach for advancing transparency in RTAs [G20 Leaders, 2013]. The commitment may prove to have a catalytic influence given the promise made by ministers of trade at their latest meeting in July 2016 to work with other WTO members towards the transformation of the provisional transparency mechanism on RTAs into a permanent one and to lead by example in fulfilling related notification obligations [G20 Trade Ministers, 2016, para. 13], although the leaders documents adopted in Hangzhou were silent on the issue.

G20 engagement with the WTO and UNCTAD is central to the G20's trade agenda and the WTO director general has participated in all G20 summits since London as well as the trade ministers′ deliberations since their first meeting in Mexico in 2012.

ILO

The ILO is the G20's natural partner in its efforts to achieve strong job growth and provide social protection to the citizens. The G20 draws on ILO expertise, norms and standards and relies on its recommendations in decision-making as well as support for monitoring the delivery of agreed commitments. The ILO director general has participated in every summit since Toronto. The ILO comes eleventh in G20 discourse by the share (2.69) and the intensity (0.35) of references, which is almost equal to that of the WTO. In its engagement with the ILO the G20 mostly resorts to the core group model, delegating mandates and imparting new impulses to the ILO's work.

The ILO is first mentioned in London where the G20 leaders requested the Organization to assess actions already taken and those required for the future to build a fair and family-friendly labour market for both women and men [G20 Leaders, 2009, para. 26]. The Toronto peak is related to the first meeting of the G20 labour ministers and their resolution that decent work, inclusiveness and social sustainability are part the Framework for Strong, Sustainable and Balanced Growth and moreover that the ILO standards and the Global Jobs Pact should be considered in the G20 crisis and post-crisis analysis and policymaking activities [G20 Labour Ministers 2010]. It is also related to the endorsement of the training strategy prepared by the ILO in collaboration with the OECD at the request of leaders in Pittsburg [G20 Leaders 2010, para. 5].



Fig. 8: The Intensity of G20 Engagement with the ILO

Adopting their global strategy for growth and jobs in Cannes, the leaders reaffirmed that employment must be at the heart of the actions and policies to restore growth and confidence undertaken under the Framework for Strong, Sustainable and Balanced Growth and further committed to renew efforts to combat unemployment and promote decent jobs, especially for youth. They agreed to create a G20 Intergovernmental Task Force on Employment [G20 Leaders, 2011, para. 3] and encouraged the ILO to continue promoting ratification and implementation of the eight ILO Fundamental Conventions [G20 Leaders, 2011, para. 5]. The Task Force on Employment is supported by the ILO. In Saint-Petersburg the leaders asked the G20 Task Force on Employment to develop country-specific plans or sets of actions on employment focusing on strategies to address structural unemployment, especially among youth and the long-term unemployed, and on national social protection systems working with the ILO, OECD and the WBG [G20 Leaders, 2013, para. 34]. The G20 National Employment Plans were adopted by the leaders at the Brisbane summit in November 2014, and the ILO contributes to the monitoring of implementation. Building further on this work at their meeting in Antalya the leaders endorsed the G20 job quality framework, originally developed by the OECD in collaboration with the ILO, pledged to reduce the share of young people who are unemployed by 15% by 2025 in G20 countries and asked the ILO and OECD to assist in monitoring progress in achieving this goal.

International Energy Agency and Other Energy Forums

As the G20 leaders emphasized in Pittsburg, access to diverse, reliable, affordable and clean energy is critical for sustainable growth [G20 Leaders, 2009a, para. 28]. Energy in its multiple aspects (from the elimination of inefficient fossil fuel subsidies to energy efficiency) has been a vital part of the G20's agenda. Despite this, the IEA is not frequently referenced in G20 discourse, coming only eighteenth with the share of 0.98 and intensity of 0.13. The other fora are mentioned even less frequently. Nevertheless the G20 often acts as core group requesting contributions from IOs and relying on their expertise in deliberations, direction-setting, decision-making and delivery. The IEF, IEA and OECD have been contributing to the G20's efforts to collect data on energy production, consumption, refining and stock levels through the Joint Oil Data Initiative (JODI). In Cannes the G20 called for collaboration on gas and coal market transparency and asked the IEA, IEF and OPEC to contribute to this work with recommendations and reporting [G20 Leaders, 2011, para. 55].



Fig. 9: The Intensity of G20 Engagement with the IEA and other IOs

The IEA, WB, OECD and OPEC were requested to assess and review the G20's progress towards implementing the Pittsburgh and Toronto commitments to eliminate inefficient fossil fuel subsidies. To ensure energy security the leaders supported the IEF's efforts to strengthen the producer-consumer dialogue. In Brisbane, the G20 agreed to principles on energy collaboration and adopted the G20 Energy Efficiency Action Plan, asking the International Partnership for Energy Efficiency Cooperation

(IPEEC) to support collaboration under the plan in full cooperation with expert organizations including the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) [G20, 2014, para. 1.5]. In its engagement with energy organizations the G20 mostly resorts to the core group model, delegating mandates and imparting new impulses to their work.

Multilateral Development Banks

The core group model is characteristic of the G20's engagement with the MDBs. By intensity of references the International Finance Corporation comes fifteenth in G20 discourse, the African Development Bank comes twentieth, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the Asian Development Bank follow as the twenty-fourth and twenty-sixth, while the International Development Association and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development lag behind as the twenty-seventh and twenty-ninth.

As part of the international institutions' reform and the G20's contribution to development, the G20 committed in its first summits to support a substantial increase in lending of at least $100 billion by the MDBs, including to low-income countries (LICs), and to ensure that all MDBs have appropriate capital [G20 Leaders, 2009, para. 17]. By the Toronto summit the G20 had delivered on the promise with a $350 billion capital increase for the MDBs [G20 Leaders 2010, para. 25]. In defining the development principles in Seoul, the G20 emphasized economic growth and the priority of catalyzing action, drawing attention to key challenges and calling on international institutions such as MDBs to respond [G20 Leaders 2010b, para. 1–3]. The G20 requested the MDBs' support of the Multi-Year Action Plan on Development with a particular focus overcoming obstacles to infrastructure investment, developing project pipelines, improving capacity and facilitating increased finance for infrastructure investment in developing countries, LICs in particular.



Fig. 10: The Intensity of G20 Engagement with the MDBs

At the Cannes meeting the leaders endorsed the report by the High-Level Panel for Infrastructure Investment (HLP) they set up in Seoul to mobilize support for scaling up infrastructure financing and the MDBs' joint action plan to address bottlenecks to infrastructure development. In Saint-Petersburg the G20 noted progress under the MDBs' action plan and encouraged further actions.

Improving the investment ecosystem, fostering long-term financing and institutional investors' involvement remained G20 priorities from Saint-Petersburg to Antalya, where the leaders encouraged MDBs to mobilize their resources, optimize their balance sheets and catalyze private sector funding. The MDBs duly submitted their Action Plan to Optimize Balance Sheets for the July 2016 meeting of G20 finance ministers and central bank governors [MDBs, 2016]. More importantly responding to the G20 push for joint actions to foster infrastructure investment, and following the deliberations in the IIWG, the MDBs issued a joint declaration of aspirations on actions to support infrastructure investment. G20 finance ministers and central bank governors welcomed the declaration commitments made by 11 existing and new development banks. They also launched the Global Infrastructure Connectivity Alliance to enhance the synergy and cooperation among various infrastructure connectivity programmes, and asked the WBG to serve as a secretariat of the Alliance, working closely with the Global Infrastructure Hub, the OECD and other MDBs [G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors, 2016, para. 6]. The G20 mostly engages with the MDBs as a core group providing political leadership, support and setting direction for new actions.

Regional Organizations, Fora and Cooperation Mechanisms

G20 references to regional organizations and cooperation mechanisms are comparatively rare, with an average level of intensity of 0.05 and lower. ASEAN and the African Union are most often referred to by the G20. ASEAN and the New Partnership for Africa's Development chairs have participated in every summit since London. The chair of the African Union was first invited to Toronto and took part in all subsequent summits. This engagement indicates the G20's commitment to reach out to the non-G20 economies and to collaborate with developing countries for global growth. The principles for engagement were agreed in Seoul. To ensure G20 representativeness and effectiveness as the premier forum for international economic cooperation, the leaders reached a broad consensus for non-member invitations to summits, including that no less than five non-member countries will be invited, of which at least two will be countries in Africa [G20 Leaders 2010a, para. 74]. The peak of references in Cannes is related to the G20's commitment to cooperate with and support the African and East Asian countries on two priorities: food security and infrastructure development.



Fig. 11: The Intensity of G20 Engagement with Regional Organizations, Fora and Cooperation Mechanisms

Engagement Partners

The family of G20 outreach partners has been growing since Toronto, when the leaders first met with the CEOs of the G20 economies. The first reference to this Business 20 (B20) was made in Seoul after the G20's intensive engagement with global business leaders on the G20's priorities and the role of business for sustainable and balanced growth. The G20 welcomed the business summit outcomes and promised to continue consultations with business, civil society, trade unions and academia [G20 Leaders, 2010a, para. 72–73]. From 2011 onwards the B20, often acting together with the Labour 20 (L20), consistently worked to come up with joint recommendations to the leaders, many of which have become explicitly or implicitly integrated into G20 discourse. In Cannes the leaders welcomed B20 and L20 recommendations on employment and B20 commitments to build on G20 Action Plan for Growth and Jobs, urging them to take concrete action [G20 Leaders, 2011, para. 88].

In the Los Cabos declaration the leaders welcomed the B20's Green Growth Action Alliance and committed to continuing engagement with the B20 in the fight against corruption. They also encouraged private sector and civil society involvement in the UNCAC review process on a voluntary basis [G20 Leaders, 2012, para. 78]. The B20 and L20 contributed to the Saint-Petersburg summit deliberations on the G20's objectives of fostering growth, employment and social cohesion, and the contribution was acknowledged by the leaders [G20 Leaders, 2013, para. 33]. The G20 committed to maintain and build on the enhanced dialogue between the G20 Anti-Corruption Working Group and the B20 and Civil 20 [G20 Leaders, 2013, para. 112].

Think20, which was first convened in Mexico, was not mentioned by the G20 in the Los Cabos summit. In the G20 5th Anniversary Vision Statement the leaders promised to strengthen engagement with the Business 20, Labour 20, Civil 20, Youth 20 and Think 20 to assess the far-reaching effects of their actions [G20 Leaders, 2013a]. The Brisbane communiqué thanked all outreach partners for their important contributions to the G20's work. In a similar spirit the G20 commended the contributions of all engagement groups, including the Women 20 established during the Turkey presidency. G20 leaders welcomed the B20 and L20 joint statement on jobs, growth and decent work. In Antalya's Call for Inclusive Business the G20 committed to work closely with the private sector and civil society to promote an enabling environment that will facilitate inclusive business opportunities for low-income communities and people. Thus, the G20 had a catalytic influence over the emergence and development of the dialogue between the think tanks, business communities, trade unions, civil society and the youth and women of its members. The dialogue has become institutionalized and the voice of the engagement partners is getting stronger. However, so far the B20 remains by far the most frequently referenced member of the family.



Fig. 12: The Intensity of G20 Engagement with Outreach Partners

Conclusion

Findings from this analysis indicate that the intensity of G20 engagement with IOs is very high and that the G20 mostly resorts to a combination of the catalyst and core group approaches, though the pattern depends on the policy area, the IOs and the presidency agenda. Intensity of G20 engagement with the IMF, FSB, WB and OECD by far exceeds the intensity of its interaction with the other institutions.

Since the first summit in Washington the IMF has been the G20's most important partner, although the intensity of interaction with the IMF is gradually declining. From London to Antalya the G20 has been acting as a catalyst, building pressure for IMF reform as agreed in 2010. The G20 inspired the IMF to undertake a new detailed assessment of the global economic and financial situation and prospects. The MAP, which has become "an analytical backbone" of the G20 Framework for Strong, Sustainable and Balanced Growth, is a perfect example of the G20 acting as a core group in its engagement with the IMF. The WB stands third by intensity and share of references in G20 discourse following the IMF and the FSB. The G20 has exerted catalytic influence regarding WB reform, but mostly engages with the WB as a core group.

The FSB is the second most often referenced institution in the G20 discourse both by intensity and the share of mentions. The G20 established the FSB and defined its mission. However, as of Toronto the G20 has mostly interacted with the FSB as a core group, tasking the FSB to develop concrete policy recommendations, standards and principles or pledging to support peer review processes.

The OECD is the fourth most often referenced IO in G20 discourse. The intensity of engagement is rising steadily as the OECD's contribution to the G20's agenda grows. The trend reflects the G20's expanding agenda and increasing reliance on OECD expertise as well as entrepreneurial capability. The G20 summits provided political impulses and sanctions to many OECD activities, and acting as a core group they relied on its expertise in deliberations, directions setting, decision-making and delivery. At the same time, the OECD sought to project its influence beyond the OECD through its alliance with the G20.

The UN comes only seventh in G20 discourse by share and intensity of references. The dominating engagement model with the UN is that of a core group.

The WTO and UNCTAD come tenth and sixteenth by share of references. Core group engagement with the WTO is closely related to the G20's commitment to refrain from raising new barriers to investment or trade in goods and services, imposing new export restrictions, or implementing measures to stimulate exports that are inconsistent with the WTO. Since Pittsburg the G20 has engaged with the WTO to provide an impulse to a balanced and ambitious conclusion of the Doha Development Round, although their steady efforts have not yielded the expected catalytic influence. A better example of G20's catalyst approach is the leaders' push for a successful outcome at the WTO Ministerial Conference (MC9) in Bali in December 2013 on trade facilitation.

The ILO is the G20's natural partner in its efforts to achieve strong job growth and provide social protection to its citizens. The G20 draws on ILO expertise, norms and standards and relies on its recommendations in decision-making as well as support on monitoring the delivery of agreed commitments. In its engagement with the ILO the G20 mostly resorts to the core group model, delegating mandates and imparting new impulses to the ILO's work.

The core group model is characteristic of G20 engagement with the MDBs, energy organizations and regional organizations and cooperation mechanisms, with the G20 providing political leadership, support and setting the direction for new actions.

The G20 had a catalytic influence over the emergence of the B20, Think 20, L20, Youth 20, Civil 20 and W20. The dialogue has become institutionalized and the voice of the engagement partners is getting stronger. So far the B20 remains the most frequently referenced member of the family.

There are very few cases of parallel treatment. In fact we can count them on the fingers of one hand, and most of them are in the sphere of infrastructure investment: the High-Level Panel for Infrastructure Investment (HLP) which was set up in Seoul with a mandate to mobilize support for scaling up infrastructure financing; the G20 Global Infrastructure Initiative and Global Infrastructure Hub with dedicated resources to help implement the G20's multi-year infrastructure agenda under the Initiative launched in Brisbane; and the Global Infrastructure Connectivity Alliance announced at the Chengdu meeting of finance ministers and central bank governors. This phenomenon reflects a persistent gap in the demand and supply for infrastructure investment and governance leadership in this area.

In implementing its forum mission and functions, the G20 prefers to engage with key international organizations, rather than build a G20-centred governance system, thus acting as "a hub of a global network" [Kirton, 2013, p. 46–47].

Annexes I and II are available at: https://iorj.hse.ru/en/2017-12-2/207898787.html

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«Группа двадцати» и международные организации: взаимодействие для обеспечения сильного, устойчивого и сбалансированного роста[1]

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Созданная в ответ на экономический и финансовый кризис, с которым существующие институты не смогли справиться должным образом, «двадцатка» превратилась из института антикризисного управления в главный форум международного экономического сотрудничества. Как и ее предшественник «Группа семи», созданная в 1975 г., а также БРИКС, созданный в 2009 г., «Группа двадцати» является неформальным институтом высшего уровня, или институтом «клубного типа». Осуществляя функции глобального управления: обсуждение, определение направлений действий, принятие решений, исполнение решений и развитие глобального управления, «Группа двадцати» взаимодействует с другими международными организациями, таким образом, обеспечивая повышение последовательности, легитимности и эффективности своих действий. Предполагается, что для получения максимальных выгод от такого взаимодействия с международными институтами «двадцатка» использует комбинацию моделей «каталитического воздействия», «ядра, влияющего на систему» и «параллельного управления», т.е.: стимулирует или поддерживает изменения и реформирование международных организаций; определяет новые направления действий для других организаций; и создает собственные механизмы. В статье проверяется эта гипотеза. Для того чтобы проследить динамику взаимодействия «Группы двадцати» с многосторонними организациями и определить предпочитаемые модели взаимодействия в рамках отдельных председательств и сфер политики, анализ осуществлялся на основе теории рационального выбора институционализма с использованием количественного и качественного анализа документов, принятых «двадцаткой».

Результаты исследования показывают, что интенсивность взаимодействия «Группы двадцати» с международными организациями очень высока и в основном «двадцатка» использует комбинацию моделей «каталитического воздействия» и «ядра, влияющего на систему», хотя выбор зависит от сферы политики, организации, с которой осуществляется взаимодействие, и повестки дня председательства. Интенсивность взаимодействия «Группы двадцати» с МВФ, Советом по финансовой стабильности, Всемирным банком и Организацией экономического сотрудничества и развития значительно превосходит интенсивность взаимодействия с другими институтами. ООН занимает только седьмое место по доле и интенсивности упоминаний в дискурсе «двадцатки». Зафиксировано очень мало случаев «параллельного управления», и большинство из них приходится на сферу инвестиций в инфраструктуру, что может быть интерпретировано как ответ «Группы двадцати» на сохраняющийся разрыв между спросом на инвестиции в инфраструктуру и существующим предложением и ее лидирующей роли в этой сфере. Таким образом, при реализации своей миссии и функций

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«двадцатка» предпочитает взаимодействовать с ключевыми международными организациями, выступая в качестве «хаба глобальной сети».

Статья начинается с краткого обзора аналитической парадигмы исследования и методологии. Затем рассматриваются динамика и модели взаимодействия «Группы двадцати» с международными организациями по широкому спектру приоритетов. В заключительном разделе представлены результаты и выводы.

Ключевые слова: глобальное управление; международные организации; неформальные институты высшего уровня; модели взаимодействия; эффективность; легитимность; теория рационального выбора; «Группа двадцати»; БРИКС

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