Russian BRICS Presidency: Models of Engagement with International Institutions

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Six years after the first summit in 2009 in Yekaterinburg, the BRICS grouping of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa has established its identity as an informal global governance forum. The members have consistently consolidated their cooperation, expanded and deepened their agenda, coordinated their efforts aimed at the recovery and growth of their economies, and developed their engagement with other international organizations. This work continued during the Russian presidency in 2015.

This article focuses on one dimension of BRICS performance: its engagement with international organizations. There are at least three reasons defining the relevance of this analysis. First, from its launch, the BRICS collectively pledged to build a multipolar, fair and democratic world order, which cannot be attained without cooperation with the key international organizations. Second, the objective of enhancing sustainability, legitimacy and effectiveness of the global governance architecture defines the need for the summit institution to rely on a flexible combination of models of engagement with other international institutions. Third, according to the concept note published by Russia on its BRICS presidency, one of its priorities was a transition to a qualitatively new level of engagement with international organizations.

The analytical framework for the study builds on the theory of rational choice institutionalism. The calculus approach fits the analysis of summit institutions bringing together states from a wide range of cultures, continents and economic development. Its distinctive features clearly apply to the analysis of the origin and performance of the BRICS. First, members act in a highly strategic manner to maximize the attainment of their priorities. Second, summity presents an arrangement for strategic interaction among leaders to determine the political outcomes. Third, rational choice institutionalism offers the greatest analytical leverage to settings where consensus among actors accustomed to strategic action and of roughly equal standing is necessary to secure institutional changes — the features typical of summit institutions. Fourth, the institutions are created by the voluntary agreement of the respective countries’ leaders to perform specific functions and missions.

In order to maximize benefits from the new arrangement, the founders may choose to engage voluntarily with existing institutions in a mode they regard as most efficient. The summit institution members’ choice of partners, modes and intensity of engagement is accepted to be strategic, intentional and voluntary, aiming to compensate for efficiency in their performance. The models of engagement are not mutually exclusive but coexist, with their choice dependent on the policy area and type of organization. The models of engagement with the other international organizations reflected in the leaders’ discourse indicate their place and role in the global governance architecture, imputed to them at their launch and subsequent evolution.

The study applies qualitative and quantitative methods. Drawing on the content analysis of the BRICS documents, the author tracks dynamics of BRICS engagement with multilateral organizations and main models of engagement, comparing them with the previous summits.

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Foundings from the study of BRICS engagement with international organizations confirm the hypotheses that the forum’s choice of engagement model reflects its role and place in global governance architecture and depends on the policy area, phase in cooperation development and perception of the organization’s relevance to the BRICS’s objectives. The models are not mutually exclusive, but coexist, and transform in the course of cooperation. By establishing new institutions, the BRICS consolidates cooperation with other organizations. With United Nations organizations and the World Trade Organization, engagement occurs based on the model of catalytic influence (exerting influence on international organizations’ changes through endorsement or stimulus, or by compelling them to reform), whereas with the BRICS’s intention to engage on the model of governance in alliance with multilateral institutions remains unrealized.

In 2015 the BRICS consolidated its preference in favour of two models: catalytic influence and parallel treatment (creation of the forum’s own institutions). The BRICS continued to establish institutions. While strengthening its own institutions, the BRICS can be assumed to apply the model of governance in alliance with multilateral institutions when cooperating with relevant international organizations.

Key words: BRICS; global governance; international organizations; United Nations; International Monetary Fund; World Bank; World Trade Organization; New Development Bank

Introduction

Six years after the first summit in Yekaterinburg in June 2009, the BRICS grouping of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa has established its identity as an informal global governance forum. BRICS members have consistently strengthened their cooperation, expanded and deepened their agenda, and coordinated their efforts aimed at the recovery and growth of their economies and the development of other countries. They have “successfully articulated their common interests and avoided discussing issues that might provoke controversy, relying on the institutional flexibility of the informal engagement model” [Modi, 2014, pp. 86–87]. Despite critical assessments, many studies have examined the causes of the establishment of the BRICS as a global governance actor, the factors of its success, the difficulties the forum faces and its institutionalization process.  

This article discusses only one aspect, namely BRICS engagement with international institutions. There are at least three reasons that make this analysis relevant. First, since the inception of the forum, BRICS members have collectively declared their commitment to “support for a more democratic and just multi-polar world order based on the rule of international law, equality, mutual respect, cooperation, coordinated action and collective decision-making of all states” [BRIC, 2009]. A multilateral world order responsive to the interests of developing countries is impossible without interaction with key multilateral organizations. The BRICS commitment to multilateralism is confirmed by a steadily growing number of references to international organizations in its documents: 670 references were registered between the BRIC foreign ministers’ first meeting in May 2008 and November 2015.

Second, multilateral summit institutions have to flexibly combine different models of engagement with other multilateral organizations in order to enhance the resilience, legitimacy and effectiveness of the global governance architecture.  

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3 See John Kirton [BRIC, 2010, para. 2] for an overview of various approaches and assessments.

4 Multilateral summitry institutions are defined as international institutions with usually limited membership, relatively little bureaucracy, flexible formats for cooperation, reliance on consensus decision making and voluntary implementation of decisions, and whose heads of governments meet regularly. The leaders’ meetings stand at the pinnacle of such international or regional arrangements, which involve many actors operating according to established procedures at both the domestic and the international levels. Commitments contained in
nation of the catalyst (exerting an influence for international organizations’ changes through endorsement or stimulus, or compelling them to reform), core group (setting a new direction that other organizations would follow) and parallel treatment (creating the institutions’ own mechanisms). Research indicates that early on the BRICS adopted an approach characteristic of the Group of Seven (G7): supporting actions, changes and reforms in international organizations; addressing collective objectives within the forum-based apparatus; or establishing its own institutions, such as the New Development Bank (NDB) [Larionova, Rakhmangulov, Sakharov et al., 2014; Larionova and Shelepov, 2015; Larionova, 2016; Shelepov, 2015; Putnam and Bayne, 1987]. However, the BRICS does not use the core-group model, i.e., setting a new direction for other organizations to follow, but does cooperate in decision making, develop of new rules and implement commitments, including through transferring mandates to international institutions.

Third, according to the concept note published by the Russian Federation when it assumed the 2015 BRICS presidency, one of the key objectives of the forum is to ensure a qualitatively new level of relations with international organizations [Russia’s BRICS Presidency, 2014]. It would achieve this new level by holding regular outreach events on the margins of BRICS summits and ministerial meetings, with the participation of the heads of international and regional organizations. It would hold regular consultations of the BRICS presidency with the heads of leading international and regional organizations including the United Nations, the Eurasian Economic Union, the African Union, the League of Arab States, the Islamic Co-operation Organisation, Latin American regional integration associations and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. It would also establish the practice of sending messages from the BRICS presidency to the heads of international organizations on the most pressing issues of the world’s political, financial and economic agenda.

Thus, the objectives of establishing the multipolar world order, enhancing global governance effectiveness and improving BRICS effectiveness determine its strategic, intentional (for the purposes of this article, as expressed in the Russian presidency’s concept note) and voluntary choice of partner institutions, models and intensity of engagement.

This study hypothesizes that to maximize benefits from cooperation within the BRICS, its leaders choose the models of engagement with existing international institutions they consider to be most efficient for attaining their goals. The models are not mutually exclusive, but coexist in informal institutions. The choice depends on the issue area and organization. The engagement models of multilateral summit institutions (in this case, the BRICS) reflect the place and role of the forums in the global governance architecture. The pace and role are imputed to forums at their launch by their founders and consolidated through their subsequent evolution, but do not remain static.

Methodology

This analytical framework for this study is rational choice institutionalism. It is suitable for the study of informal summit institutions bringing together states of different continents, cultures and economic development. Its provisions undoubtedly apply to the analysis of the origin and

the collectively agreed documents are not legally binding but their implementation is stimulated by peer pressure. Among such institutions of global and regional governance are the Group of Seven/Eight, the Group of 20, the Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation forum and the BRICS. The leaders’ dialogue on direction setting, decision making, delivery on commitments, development of global governance and domestic political management constitutes the essence of the multilateral summit institution and determines its unique character. Such institutions are also referred to as clubs.
performance of the BRICS. First, the BRICS members act strategically to maximize benefits from their joint actions and achieve their priorities. Second, summitry is a unique mechanism where strategic interaction among leaders determines the political outcomes of coordination. Third, rational choice institutionalism offers the greatest analytical advantage if applied to models where consensus among actors of roughly equal standing accustomed to strategic action is necessary to secure institutional changes – the features typical of informal summit institutions. Fourth, the institutions are created by the voluntary agreement of the countries’ leaders to perform concrete functions and missions [Hall and Taylor, 1996, pp. 936–57]. Thus, BRICS countries have made joint efforts to establish a platform for dialogue and cooperation to promote peace, security and development in a multipolar, interdependent and increasingly complex, globalizing world, based on universally recognized norms of international law and multilateral decision making [BRICS, 2011, para. 3; 2012, para. 4]. The mission, objectives and functions of the BRICS should determine its choice of international organizations and models of engagement.

The study is based on quantitative and qualitative analysis. Content analysis of documents adopted during the Russian presidency is used to trace the dynamics of BRICS engagement with multilateral institutions, identify its main models, and compare the results with the intensity and models of engagement typical of previous presidencies.

As a first step, a quantitative approach is used based on three parameters: the number of references to a particular institution made over the period, its share in the total number of references, and the intensity. The intensity is expressed as a ratio of the number of references to the institution to the number of characters (including spaces and punctuation) in the documents as follows:

\[ D_j = \frac{M_j}{S_j}, \]

where \( D_j \) is the intensity of references to a particular international institution for a given year (period), \( M_j \) is the number of references made to this institution during this year (period) and \( S_j \) is the total number of characters in the documents for this year (period). To make the findings more easily understood, \( D_j \) is multiplied by 10,000.

This quantitative approach allows a comparison between the Russian presidency and previous presidencies of the intensity and dynamics of BRICS engagement with multilateral institutions.

As a second step, a qualitative analysis makes it possible to identify the most characteristic patterns of BRICS engagement with multilateral institutions, as well as the dynamics and intensity models chosen for specific institutions and policy areas. Those areas are finance, economy and international trade, politics and security, and social issues.

The analysis was open to the possibility of the BRICS using models other than the catalyst, core-group and parallel-treatment approaches typically used by multilateral summit institutions in engaging with international organizations. Four schools of thought identify the most typical engagement models of club-type institutions: governance through multilateral organizations, governance against multilateral organizations, governance without multilateral organizations and governance in alliance with multilateral organizations [Kirton, 2010]. These models were first identified based on the analysis of interactions between the Group of Seven/Eight (G7/8) with international organizations.

Ella Kokotsis argues that governance through multilateral organizations increases summit institutions’ effectiveness, contributing to compliance with commitments made at summits, if these organizations are relevant to the specific commitments [Kokotsis, 1999; Kokotsis and Daniels, 1999].
The “governance against multilateral organizations” approach was developed by John Kirton [2010, pp. 25–26] in relation to his concert equality model of relations among G7/8 members. He argues that the G7/8 is increasingly moving from reinforcing and reforming institutions to replacing the old multilateral organizations with alternative ones and establishing a G7/8-centred system of its own that is different from the traditional order.

The third approach, “governance without international organizations,” has been developed by Nicholas Bayne [2000, p. 45]. It suggests that relations between the G7/8 and international institutions are ones of mutual coexistence and non-involvement when their agendas are different, and ones of tension when their agendas are the same.

The authors of the fourth approach believe that club-type institutions and international organizations in their diversity are established to serve common purposes of creating public goods and should act as allies. Given the challenges of global governance, summit institutions should rationally choose the governance-in-alliance model [Larionova, 2010, pp. 45–46].

The documentary base for the research used in this analysis includes BRICS documents, documents issued by BRICS members’ national authorities and the Russian BRICS presidency, press releases following BRICS meetings, interviews and statements by officials, and documents issued by social partners. The analysis focuses on the period of the Russian presidency, from February 2015 to February 2016, given that for the first time the presidency issued a concept note before assuming the presidency that explicitly reflected the objective of elevating BRICS external relations to a qualitatively new level (see Russia’s BRICS Presidency, 2014) (see [Russia’s BRICS Presidency, 2014]).

**Main Findings**

**General Trends**

In terms of the total number of references to international organizations in official documents, during the Russian presidency the BRICS outperformed all previous presidencies, with 184 references to international organizations. Given the wide range of issues on the agenda, the largest share of references was made to the United Nations (35.3% or 65). This finding is characteristic of the BRICS, except in 2009 during Russia’s first presidency (of the BRIC, as South Africa was not yet a member). At that time the priorities of fighting the global financial crisis and establishing a new economic governance architecture were defined, resulting in a higher proportion of references to the Group of 20 (G20) (26.5%), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (26.5%) and the World Bank (18.4%) than to the UN (16.3%). In 2015, the leaders’ condemnation of unilateral military interventions and economic sanctions in violation of international law and universally recognized norms should be particularly noted in the context of the BRICS engagement with the UN (BRICS, 2015d, para. 8) [1]. Their collective commitment to the principle of the indivisible nature of security, which holds that no country can strengthen its own security at the expense of the security of other states, is also undoubtedly important.

A relatively high share of references to the World Trade Organization (WTO) (10.3%) is generally typical of the BRICS. A growing number of bilateral, regional and plurilateral trade agreements is an objective reality. However, 268 trade agreements are now effective, and another 35 are under negotiation [Regional Trade Agreements Information System, 2016b, a]. Therefore, the BRICS call for its members’ compliance with the principles of transparency, inclusiveness and compatibility with WTO rules becomes even more important. Equally important is the members’ own commitment to these principles, as they account for a total of 55 agreements (Brazil – 5, China – 15, India – 17, Russia – 13, South Africa – 5) [World Trade Organization, 2016].
A specific feature of the Russian presidency is a relatively high share of references to the G20 (8.2%), which had consistently declined since 2009 and reached its historic minimum during Brazil’s presidency in 2014 (2.2%). At the Ufa Summit, the BRICS called for the coordination of macroeconomic policies among all major economies in order to restore growth. The leaders also stressed the need to strengthen the dialogue in the G20 in order to reduce risks associated with “potential spillover effects from the unconventional monetary policies of the advanced economies, which could cause disruptive volatility of exchange rates, asset prices and capital flows” [BRICS, 2015d, para. 11].

The shares of BRICS references to the IMF (2.2%) and the World Bank (1.6%) became the lowest in the history of the forum. BRICS members once again called for the completion of the long-overdue reforms of the Bretton Woods institutions, reaffirming their readiness to work on interim measures that could “deliver equivalent results to the levels agreed as a part of the 14th General Quota Review” as well as their commitment to “maintaining a strong, well-resourced and quota-based IMF” [BRICS, 2015d, para. 19].

References to the NDB, on the contrary, reached a historic maximum of 9.8%, which is not surprising given that the Ufa Summit marked the launch of the bank and the Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA). The first meeting of the NDB board of governors was held on the eve of the summit. The memorandum of understanding (MOU) on cooperation between the national development banks and institutions and the NDB was signed. The leaders stressed that they expect the NDB to approve its inaugural investment projects at the beginning of 2016. However, the launch of the NDB should not be considered as consolidation of the parallel-treatment model, given that the BRICS members, despite not having determined their engagement formats in advance, agreed on the NDB’s close cooperation with existing and new financial mechanisms, including the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) [BRICS, 2015d, para. 15].

The first ever reference to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in BRICS discourse was made at Ufa. The leaders reaffirmed their commitment to continue to cooperate on the G20/OECD Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) Action Plan and the Automatic Exchange of Information (AEOI) tax standard [BRICS, 2015d, para. 26].

The BRICS laid the foundation for a dialogue with the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). The BRICS leaders met with the heads of states and governments of the EEU and SCO members, as well as the heads of the SCO observer states on the margins of the Ufa Summit.

Expanding and deepening its cooperation agenda, the BRICS established several new mechanisms and initiatives, including the Framework for BRICS E-commerce Cooperation, the Initiative on Strengthening IPR (Intellectual Property Rights) Cooperation among the BRICS Countries, the BRICS Working Group on Anti-Corruption Cooperation, the Working Group on ICT (Information and Communications Technologies) Cooperation and the Employment Working Group. For the first time in BRICS history there were meetings of environment ministers (22 April 2015), heads of migration authorities (8 October 2015), heads of industrial authorities (20 October 2015), communications ministers (22–23 October 2015), energy ministers (19–20 November 2015), labour and employment ministers (25–26 January 2016), and heads of national emergency agencies (19–20 April 2016).

Thus, in 2015, the trends of strengthening BRICS engagement with UN institutions and greater BRICS support of the G20 and the WTO were evident. The first reference to the OECD in the BRICS history suggests that BRICS countries are ready to use that organization’s expertise. As for the EEU and the SCO, given that for 2016 the BRICS is chaired by India, which
acceded the SCO in 2015, and then for 2017 by China. BRICS engagement with the SCO may be expected to continue and consolidate. However, in the absence of catalytic influence, the number of references to the IMF and the World Bank declined, along with an increase in references to the NDB. The agreement on the NDB’s cooperation with financial mechanisms counters concerns about the bank’s potential rivalry or competition with other multilateral development banks.

In 2015, BRICS consolidated its preference in favour of two models of engagement with other international organizations: catalytic influence (endorsement or stimulus for changing and reforming international organizations) and parallel treatment (creation of BRICS institutions). New BRICS institutions have yet to develop their own identity, fill in the gaps in governance, satisfy the needs of BRICS members and potentially other actors of international relations, and find their place in the global governance system. As its own institutions strengthen, the BRICS will eventually integrate the governance-in-alliance model with multilateral organizations into its practice of cooperation with relevant international organizations.

Key Areas of Coordination

This section focuses on BRICS engagement with international organizations in various policy areas. During Russia’s BRICS presidency, 22 ministerial meetings were held within the official track. Overall, 72 meetings were organized: six on financial issues, 18 on trade and economy, three on agriculture, 21 on political issues, 18 on social policy, four on energy and environmental cooperation, and two on culture and youth cooperation. According to open data sources, representatives of international organizations took part in at least five meetings (in trade, economic, agricultural, political and social areas of coordination). At the level of leaders and heads of authorities, 37 documents were agreed. Publicly available documents, press releases and speeches help reveal the trends of BRICS engagement with other international organizations in the main areas of cooperation.

Financial Issues

Despite the fact that four of the six BRICS meetings on financial issues were held on the margins of the spring meetings of the IMF and the World Bank in Washington from 14 to 16 April 2015, participation was limited to BRICS representation only. Discussions at the meeting of the Working Group on the Establishment of the BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement (14–15 April 2015), BRICS Central Banks Experts Meeting for drafting an operating agreement on the CRA (14–15 April 2015) and the meeting of official negotiators on creating the NDB (15 April 2015) all focused on developing regulatory frameworks for the NDB and CRA. The finance ministers and central bank governors reached a consensus on all BRICS members’ ratification of the NDB agreement in the near future following Russia and the composition of the NDB management. Discussions also continued on the next steps for implementing the IMF 2010 quota and voice reforms.

5 In 2015 the Agreement on the New Development Bank and the Treaty for the Establishment of a BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement were ratified by all BRICS members. On 20 February 2015 Russia’s State Duma approved the law ratifying the NDB agreement, on 25 February it was approved by the Council of the Federation and on 9 March President Vladimir Putin signed it. In April the State Duma and the Council of the Federation ratified the CRA treaty, and on 2 May Putin signed the law on its ratification. India ratified both documents in April 2015, Brazil followed on 26 June 2015. South Africa’s parliament also ratified both documents. China was the last BRICS country to ratify the documents on 1 July 2015. Kundapur Vaman Kamath from India was elected the first NDB president, with China’s Zhu Xian and South
The drafting of the CRA operating agreement and its approval were completed at the meeting of BRICS central banks experts on 13–14 June 2015. In July 2015, after a meeting of finance ministers and central bank governors, the heads of the central banks signed the operating agreement. It details the mutual support of the five countries within the CRA and the procedures to be followed by their central banks and also defines their rights and obligations. The CRA Treaty came into force on 30 July 2015, and operations were launched on 5 September. This mechanism is aimed at maintaining financial stability in the BRICS countries through the mutual provision of funds in U.S. dollars by BRICS central banks in the event of dollar liquidity problems.6

Ratification procedures for the international agreement on the NDB were completed by 1 July 2015, and the first meeting of its board of governors was held on 7 July. The NDB started operating on 21 July 2015.7 On the eve of the launch, World Bank president Jim Yong Kim said his institution was committed to work with the NDB, including in co-financing infrastructure projects [World Bank, 2015]. Speaking at the opening ceremony, Chinese finance minister Lou Jiwei stressed the need for cooperation with the AIIB, established on China’s initiative: “These two banks should exchange experience at the initial stage. After they launch operations, they should strengthen their cooperation and jointly encourage infrastructure development in Asia and around the world” [Russia’s BRICS Presidency, 2015h]. Russian finance minister Anton Siluanov said that the NDB and the AIIB could become concession participants in China’s Silk Road initiative [Russia’s BRICS Presidency, 2015a].

The launch of the NDB was one of the important BRICS achievements of the Russian presidency. The NDB will develop and strengthen its cooperation with regional development banks and, potentially, the World Bank. Thus, in creating its own institution, the BRICS shifted from the parallel-treatment model to the governance-in-alliance and catalytic-influence models. However, given the relatively small size of the NDB’s capital, the BRICS is unlikely to resort to the core-group model in the near future.

Economic and Trade Issues

The adoption of the Strategy for BRICS Economic Partnership in Ufa can be considered as a success of the Russian presidency, although its preparation and approval were not simple. The relevant authorities coordinated the development of the strategy, which was discussed at two meetings of the High-Level Working Group on the Strategy for BRICS Economic Partnership (16 April 2015 and 4–5 June 2015) and the meeting of the BRICS Contact Group on Economic and Trade Issues (6 July 2015). In addition, it was on the agenda at the BRICS trade ministers’ meeting in Moscow on 7 July 2015. That meeting was attended by Alexey Ulyukaev, Russia’s economic development minister, Ivan Ramalho, Brazil’s first deputy minister of development, industry and foreign trade, Jagdish Saksena Deepak, India’s deputy minister of state for commerce and industry, Wang Shouwen, China’s vice minister of commerce, and Rob Davies, South Africa’s trade and industry minister. Although no representatives of international organizations were invited apart from the United Nations Industrial Development Organiza-

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6 The total resources committed to the CRA are $100 billion, as follows: China $41 billion, Brazil $18 billion, Russia $18 billion, India $18 billion and South Africa $5 billion [BRICS, 2011].
7 According to article 7 of the NDB agreement, its initial authorized capital is $100 billion, with the initial subscribed capital of $50 billion to be equally distributed among the founding members. Shares with an aggregate par value of $10 billion are paid-in shares, and shares with an aggregate value of $40 billion are callable shares [BRICS, 2012, para. 16].

Africa’s Leslie Maasdorp elected vice-presidents. Russian finance minister Anton Siluanov became the head of the board of governors. Tito Mboweni from South Africa is a non-executive director.
tion and the Eurasian Economic Commission, there was a discussion on BRICS countries’ cooperation with international institutions, including the WTO and the G20, and on the potential BRICS cooperation with the EEU [Ulyukaev, 2015].

As a result, the strategy, which identifies priorities, contains a special section on developing cooperation among the BRICS countries on various international and regional platforms. At the meeting, the BRICS ministers reaffirmed their commitment to reforming the global economic governance institutions and their willingness to advocate the interests of BRICS members, other developing countries and emerging economies. In their joint statement, they reiterated the central role of the WTO in multilateral trade, committed to coordinate efforts in developing the work programme from the WTO’s 2013 Bali ministerial conference for concluding the Doha Round and stressed the need for trade agreements to be compatible with WTO principles and rules. The ministers stressed that BRICS participation in regional integration processes, such as the EEU, the SCO and the IBSA (India, Brazil, South Africa) Dialogue Forum can contribute to strengthening BRICS cooperation [BRICS Trade Ministers, 2015].

The trade ministers also met on the sidelines of the WTO ministerial conference in Nairobi on 16 December 2015. They focused on developing the WTO further, as well as on the possibility of a common BRICS position on the WTO. Ulyukayev mentioned that the BRICS countries “have different points of view not only in the key questions of the negotiations but in a broader sense in the perspective of future multilateral trade system” [Ministry of Economic Development, 2015]. India insisted on maintaining the Doha mandate, and Indian trade minister Nirmala Sitharaman promoted the position that adding new issues to agenda would not be productive until the Doha Development Agenda is concluded [Kanth, 2015]. At the plenary session she expressed deep disappointment that the issue of restricting agricultural subsidies in developed countries, which was part of Doha, was not even a subject of discussion [Sitharaman, 2015]. Gao Hucheng, China’s minister of commerce, said: “It will not only be the shortsighted and irresponsible behavior but also the serious retrogress of the multilateral trade system if countries give up when facing with difficulties” [Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China, 2015]. However, as Ulyukayev pointed out, the mandate was adopted 15 years ago and does not meet the current conditions of economy and trade, and the BRICS countries should try to consolidate their positions [Ministry of Economic Development, 2015]. Thus, despite the agreement to coordinate their positions on the WTO agenda, the BRICS countries have a lot of work to do to develop a common platform.

In accordance with the Russian presidency’s priorities, the BRICS continued to cooperate on competition policies. Two meetings of heads of BRICS competition authorities were held. The first took place during the conference of the International Competition Network in Sydney, Australia, on 28 April 2015, and the second was in Moscow on 21–22 September 2015. Participants discussed priorities for joint work in the BRICS format, especially in the socially important sectors of national economies, including pharmaceuticals, automotive sector, housing, oil and oil products, international roaming services, and retail chains. They also approved the concept for the operation of the Working Group on the Joint Investigation of Violations of Antimonopoly Legislation in Socially Significant Markets in BRICS Countries, created as an initiative of the Russian Federal Anti-Monopoly Service in 2013. At the first meeting Russia proposed an intergovernmental agreement on competition cooperation among the BRICS countries. Participants also considered joining the BRICS countries’ efforts in antitrust investigations. They agreed to establish working groups on socially important markets, especially pharmaceutical and food, in order to conduct effective competition policies. On the sidelines of the IV International Competition Conference in Durban in November 2015, the heads of BRICS competition authorities agreed to conclude a memorandum of understanding. Coope-
ration on competition policy focused largely on establishing the BRICS’s own agenda and internal cooperation mechanisms.

The first BRICS Industrial Expert Council was held during the Russian presidency in Moscow on 26–27 August 2015. Participants discussed mechanisms for multilateral industrial cooperation and the documents for signing at the first meeting of BRICS industry ministers on 20 October 2015 in Moscow, including the draft joint declaration and the draft memorandum on mining. They also agreed on measures to expand BRICS interaction with other international organizations, in particular the UN Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO) [Russia’s BRICS Presidency, 2015f].

The first meeting of BRICS industry ministers, in Moscow on 20 October 2015, was attended by the EEU ministers (from Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan) and high-level representatives of UNIDO. Participants discussed industrial cooperation and joint implementation of projects to stimulate economic growth, and defined a short-term action plan. The key goals were defined as facilitating mutually beneficial investment cooperation to create a favourable investment climate, and promoting, attracting and protecting mutual investments in joint projects in a wide range of industries. In their declaration, the ministers stressed the commitment to “achieving the objectives of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, particularly the Sustainable Development Goal 9: Build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable industrialization and foster innovation,” as well as to expanding comprehensive cooperation with UNIDO [BRICS Industry Ministers, 2015]. Cooperation with the EEU and its members is not mentioned. Thus, the BRICS will likely strengthen its dialogue with regional partners and relevant UN organizations.

Cooperation on combating BEPS, as well as strengthening fiscal discipline, was the key issue discussed at the meeting of heads of the BRICS revenue administrations. Participants reaffirmed their commitment to the G20’s actions for a fair and modern international tax system, and supported the BEPS Action Plan adopted by the G20 finance ministers in Lima, Peru, on 8 October 2015. The heads of revenue administrations declared their intention to work closely on a bilateral and multilateral basis for implementing the Common Reporting Standard for AEOI, and reconfirmed their commitment to launch automatic information exchanges with each other and with other jurisdictions by 2017 or 2018, subject to fulfilling the necessary legal requirements [BRICS Heads of Revenue, 2015]. Despite the absence of any references to the OECD, the BEPS Action Plan — developed by the OECD and implemented with its assistance — implies BRICS members’ cooperation with the organization. All G20 members, including the BRICS countries, are participating in the BEPS project on equal terms with the OECD members. This includes participation in the work of the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs on BEPS-related issues. Brazil, China, India and South Africa have been invited to join the Bureau of the Committee for managing the project [OECD, 2014]. Although Russia has adopted the declaration on “international tax rules for the 21st century,” given the suspension of its accession to the OECD it is not a member of the bureau. Nevertheless, it is obvious that the BRICS will cooperate with the OECD on this issue.

The fifth meeting of BRICS agriculture and agrarian development ministers held in Moscow on 9 October 2015 was attended by representatives of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). Ministers reaffirmed their readiness to develop trade in agricultural products and enhance investment, and cooperate in the field of agricultural research, technologies and innovations, as well as protect the right to adequate food, especially for the most vulnerable groups of population, by strengthening family farming. Progress was noted on establishing the Basic Agricultural Information Exchange System (BAIES) of the BRICS countries since the second ministerial meeting, which is expected to start operating in 2016. Considerable attention is paid
to BRICS cooperation with key international organizations and in the framework of major multilateral platforms, such as consultations among the permanent representatives of the BRICS countries to the FAO established in 2014. The ministers reaffirmed their commitment to work toward achieving Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 2 to end hunger, achieve food security and improve nutrition, and promote sustainable agriculture.

The agriculture ministers’ declaration notes the role of the WTO and the multilateral trade system in ensuring global food security. In the areas of cooperation and coordination on sanitary and phytosanitary measures, standards, technical regulation and conformity assessment procedures the BRICS stressed the intention to work together with relevant international organizations. Given the negative impact of climate change on food security, participants expressed support for the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Green Climate Fund to assist developing countries.

Thus, in the area of agricultural cooperation, and economy and trade as a whole, the tendency to establish and strengthen the BRICS’s own coordination mechanisms, including in the framework of multilateral organizations, continued during the Russian presidency. There was increased engagement with relevant UN organizations, as well as the G20 and the WTO, on all issues except competition policy. Engagement with relevant UN organizations and the WTO developed on the catalytic-influence model (stimulus or support to international organizations’ changes and reforms), whereas with the G20, the BRICS intention to engage in the governance-in-alliance model remains unrealized. The BRICS will likely strengthen its engagement with the OECD in implementing the BEPS Action Plan.

**Political and Security Issues**

During Russia’s BRICS presidency, political and security issues were discussed during at least 21 meetings at various levels from experts to the foreign ministers. Many of the agreed decisions were reflected in the leaders’ declaration issued at the Ufa Summit. Many political formats do not imply adoption of documents, including sherpas and sous-sherpa meetings, and the BRICS dialogue on foreign policy issues. This fact complicates the analysis of models of engagement with international organizations, limiting it to indirect sources of information (namely press releases, speeches and interviews of key participants).

The political and security agenda of the Russian presidency was relatively broad: from the fight against illicit trafficking in narcotics, psychotropic substances and their precursors in BRICS countries to preventing an arms race in outer space. For the BRICS, the solutions to almost all these problems are more effective in cooperation with relevant organizations, primarily the UN. For instance, the third BRICS ministerial meeting on combating the drug threat, held on 22 April 2015, agreed to establish the BRICS Anti-Drug Working Group. Participants also stressed the need to consolidate their position at the Special Session of the UN General Assembly on the World Drug Problem in 2016 to support eliminating drug production, finding alternative forms of development for drug-producing countries and strengthening traditional control based on the relevant UN conventions [Russia’s BRICS Presidency, 2015b].

On the security of outer space activities, on 20 May 2015 the interagency representatives from the BRICS countries discussed practical measures to prevent an arms race in outer space. They focused, inter alia, on the Russian-Chinese draft international agreement on preventing the deployment of weapons in outer space, as well as the need to strengthen cooperation in the framework of the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space [Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2015].
The BRICS deputy foreign ministers issued a communiqué on the situation in the Middle East (West Asia) and North Africa that underlined the role of the UN Security Council (UNSC) as the international body bearing the main responsibility for maintaining international peace and security [BRICS Deputy Foreign Ministers, 2015]. Participants of the meeting held in Moscow on 22 May 2015 supported the Russian initiative of conducting a comprehensive analysis at the UNSC of the causes that had led to the outburst of terrorist activity in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). They positively assessed the efforts of Staffan de Mistura, special envoy of the UN secretary general, to resume the Geneva process and the efforts of Bernardino Leon, the secretary general’s special representative for Libya, to facilitate the inter-Libyan dialogue. They also supported the UNSC call on the secretary general to convene a conference of all Yemeni stakeholders, to try to broker a consensus-based political solution to the crisis in Yemen. It was decided that the BRICS deputy foreign ministers should meet once a year in the country hosting the BRICS summit and continue regular consultations on the MENA issues at various venues, including the UN [Russia’s BRICS Presidency, 2015j].

Current threats and challenges to security, as well as UN reform, were the focus of the meeting of BRICS national security advisors, which was held in Moscow on 26 May 2015. It was pointed out that one of the goals of the NDB was to strengthen security. The security advisors met with Russian president Vladimir Putin [Russia’s BRICS Presidency, 2015g].

The importance of coordinating positions on international information security issues in the UN framework was highlighted at the meeting of the BRICS Expert Working Group on Cyber-Security in Moscow on 16–18 June 2015). The Russians proposed a draft UN convention on combating cybercrime. The delegates reaffirmed their positions on the relevance of combating cybercrime and the importance of joint efforts in this area [Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2015]. Discussing the work of the UN’s Group of Governmental Experts on developments in the field of information and telecommunications and potential future activities of this group, the delegations emphasized the UN’s key role in cybersecurity, mainly in developing universal rules, regulations and principles of behaviour of countries in the digital world.

The BRICS countries coordinate their positions on other security issues as well. An example of such coordination is the Joint BRICS Statement on the Biological Weapons Convention delivered to the First Committee of the UN General Assembly on 22 October 2015. The five countries, on the one hand, supported the universal, legally binding, non-discriminatory protocol, dealing with all articles of the convention, including verification, in a balanced and comprehensive manner. On the other hand, they called for the elimination of all restrictions to peaceful biological activities, hampering the economic and technological development of the parties to the convention, in particular the exchange of equipment, materials, and scientific and technological information for the use of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for peaceful purposes [BRICS, 2015a].

The traditional meeting of the BRICS foreign ministers on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York on 29 September 2015 focused on a range of issues from the situation in the global economy and finance to the settlement of regional conflicts. The ministers reaffirmed the need for a comprehensive reform of the UN, particularly the UNSC, in order to make it more representative and efficient, and called for joint efforts to counter terrorism and resolve conflicts on a solid international legal basis under the UN auspices. Participants called for unlocking the IMF reform as a measure to reform global economic governance system in line with the interests and needs of developing countries. They also expressed support for a successful outcome of the 21st Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC in Paris in December. They called for a comprehensive, balanced and equitable agreement with legal force for the post-2020 period, which would conform to the principles and provisions of the UNFCCC, and
would be the result of an open, transparent and inclusive negotiation process [Russia’s BRICS Presidency, 2015c].

At the informal meeting of the BRICS leaders on the margins of the G20 summit in Antalya, considerable attention was paid to the fight against terrorism. The issue was particularly acute because of the terrorist attacks in Paris two days earlier and the downing of a Russian aircraft over Sinai two weeks before. At the same time, the leaders traditionally coordinated positions on many common objectives, especially the sustainable recovery of the world economy. They noted that the politicization of economic relations continues to beset economic growth and agreed on the need to develop “an inclusive, rules-based and open world economy” [BRICS, 2015b]. They also pledged to strengthen their cooperation at the G20 to prevent short-term financial risks and create the conditions for economic recovery [Xi, 2015].

The first meeting of BRICS prosecutors general, held in Sochi on 10 November 2015, marked the launch of cooperation among prosecutors’ offices on the fight against organized crime, especially terrorism and its financing, drug trafficking, corruption, the use of information and telecommunication technologies for criminal purposes and illegal migration. These officials are expected to meet at least once every two years in order to discuss key cooperation.

During the Russian presidency, the BRICS political and regional security agenda deepened to include new issues such as cybersecurity, the fight against corruption, drug trafficking and terrorism, and regional conflicts settlement, primarily in the MENA countries. The BRICS countries have consistently strengthened cooperation with the UN, along with creating and developing new internal coordination mechanisms, acting in the spirit of the catalytic-influence model.

**Social Issues**

For all BRICS countries, social policy issues, ensuring equal opportunities for citizens, including access to quality education, health care and employment, are the priority. However, the level of attention to and intensity of work on these issues varies considerably within the BRICS agenda.

The BRICS health ministers have been meeting regularly since 2011, as well as have their representatives at the World Health Organization (WHO). The fifth meeting of BRICS health ministers was held on the sidelines of the World Health Assembly in Geneva on 19 May 2015, and they met again in Moscow on 30 October [BRICS Health Ministers, 2015b, a]. The ministers discussed new objectives, the SDGs, the international community’s efforts to combat infectious and non-infectious diseases, and the efforts of the UN and other international organizations to manage pandemics.

The first meeting of the BRICS senior officials responsible for international development assistance, held in Moscow on 7 December 2015, focused on systems, institutions, priorities, best practices in international development assistance and the potential of BRICS cooperation. The participants did not adopt any document, but agreed that implementing the SDGs should be a shared priority of the BRICS countries.

The first meeting of labour and employment ministers in BRICS history was held on 25–26 January 2016 in Ufa, with participation of social partners including employers and labour unions. It was prepared with active support from the International Labour Organization (ILO), the World Bank and the International Social Security Association (ISSA). At the meeting the ministers identified priority measures to improve the quality and inclusiveness of employment and developed an approach to reducing informality in the labour market. They also agreed to establish an employment working group, which will focus prepare a strategy for labour markets
formalization. The declaration contains a decision to convene labour and employment ministerial meetings on a regular basis. The ministers expressed their gratitude for the expertise provided by the ILO, ISSA, World Bank, and other international organizations. For the first time, BRICS countries committed to continue and strengthen cooperation with international organizations “to address specific issues of common interest and provide support in working out of coordinated BRICS Strategy to promote decent work” [BRICS Labour and Employment Ministers, 2016, para. 4]. Thus, the BRICS engagement with international organizations in this area will likely evolve on the governance-in-alliance model.

BRICS education ministers held their first meeting in 2014. At their second meeting on 2 March 2015, they agreed to establish several internal mechanisms as well as the BRICS Network University and the Universities League, as an association of universities [BRICS Education Ministers, 2015a]. They also reaffirmed the commitment to inclusive and equal access to quality education for all in accordance with the SDGs. At their third meeting, on 18 November 2015, the education ministers supported UNESCO’s Education 2030 Framework for Action on SDGs and expressed their intention to expand cooperation with UNESCO [BRICS Education Ministers, 2015b]. In addition, they agreed to harmonize statistics on education in their countries taking into account international statistical standards, including the International Standard Classification of Education 2011, and, remarkably, signed the MOU to establish the BRICS Network University. The decisions of the third ministerial meeting on education similarly to the labour and employment ministers’ decisions outlined the trend of BRICS engagement with international organizations on the governance-in-alliance model.

The Council of BRICS Cooperation in Science, Technology and Innovations met on 4 August 2015 during the preparation for the second meeting of BRICS ministers of science, technology and innovation. The discussion focused on the activities of the council’s five expert groups: on the implementation of the multilateral BRICS research initiative and coordination of joint research and development projects, on global infrastructure, on innovative cooperation, on developing priorities for cooperation in science and technology, and on work within the joint research and development and innovation platform. Participants identified areas for future cooperation: the BRICS Young Scholar Forum, cooperation in the sphere of biotechnologies and human health, forming the platform for research and innovation, creation of BRICS forecasting technology for climate systems, joint studies in the field of food security, sustainable development of agriculture, energy, medicine and emergency management [Ministry of Education and Science, 2015]. Science, technology and innovation officials met on the eve of their ministers’ meeting on 28 October 2015, which resulted in the adoption of the Moscow Declaration. At the meeting, the ministers reaffirmed their willingness to implement the Strategy for BRICS Economic Partnership utilizing science, technology and innovation, and committed to developing and implementing the BRICS Framework Programme for funding multilateral joint research projects. The ministers also approved the BRICS Science, Technology and Innovation Work Plan for 2015–2018 [BRICS Science, 2015].

The first meeting of the heads of migration authorities in the BRICS history was held in Sochi on 8 October 2015. The discussion was devoted to the regulation of migration processes, increasingly affecting the geopolitical situation in the world. The event was attended by representatives of the members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan), SCO observer states (Afghanistan, Iran, Mongolia, Pakistan, Turkey and Sri Lanka) and international organizations (the EEU, the International Organization for Migration, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the UN, the UN Refugee Agency, and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime) [Russia’s BRICS Presidency, 2015d]. In their declara-
tion, the migration authorities emphasized their openness to broadening cooperation with other countries, international and regional organizations on the basis of equality and mutual respect for discussing and addressing international migration issues, including the facilitation of safe and orderly migration [BRICS Migration Authorities, 2015].

Thus, BRICS engagement with international organizations on social policy issues varies considerably depending on the area and the level of cooperation development. In health, the system of internal coordination mechanisms was established (parallel treatment). The BRICS also supports activities and reform of relevant organizations, especially WHO (catalytic influence) [Larionova, Rakhmangulov, Sakharov et al., 2014]. During Russia’s presidency, the existing model was consolidated. The first meeting of labour and employment ministers suggests that a similar model will be typical of the BRICS engagement with the ILO. Cooperation in education, as well as science, technology and innovation, currently focuses on establishing the BRICS’s own engagement mechanisms. The format and the discourse of the first BRICS migration authorities meeting laid the foundation for developing BRICS cooperation both with regional and international partners.

**Energy and Environment**

The first meeting of BRICS environment ministers was held during the Russian presidency on 22 April 2015 as declared in the presidency priorities. This new area of cooperation is particularly relevant given the growing importance of environmental issues in all BRICS countries and the impact of green technologies on the investment attractiveness of economies in general [Russia’s BRICS Presidency, 2015]. The meeting of was a certain “over-fulfilment” of the Fortaleza Action Plan, which noted the need for a “consultative meeting of BRICS Senior Officials on the margins of relevant sustainable development, environment and climate related international fora, where appropriate” [BRICS, 2014]. Participants discussed developing a green economy for the sustainability and competitiveness of the BRICS countries [Russia’s BRICS Presidency, 2015].

In their statement the ministers expressed their intention to consolidate efforts in the respective countries to develop policies and measures on mitigation and adaptation to the adverse impacts of climate change [BRICS Environment Ministers, 2015]. They also made several institutional decisions: to establish a working group on the environment, to explore the possibility of establishing a collaborative platform to share best environmental practices and facilitate the exchange of environmentally sound technologies and know-how, and to explore the potential of the NDB for funding environmental projects. The ministers agreed to hold regular meetings. They also reaffirmed their commitment to work toward the achieving the SDGs.

The first BRICS High-Level Meeting on Energy Efficiency was held in Merida, Mexico, on 26 May 2015. During the meeting, Russia’s proposal to establish a permanent working group of deputy energy ministers was supported by the other participants. This working group will allow the BRICS countries to coordinate their actions in response to increasingly unfair competition in international energy markets and artificial restrictions on the free movement of capital and energy-efficient technology trade [Russia’s BRICS Presidency, 2015].

At their first meeting in November 2015, BRICS energy ministers agreed to facilitate access to energy-efficient technologies. They decided to compile a list of such technologies in their countries and establish the Working Group on Energy Saving and Energy Efficiency. The working group will prepare proposals on developing a comprehensive cooperation programme on energy saving and energy efficiency and specify concrete joint projects [BRICS Energy Ministers, 2015]. However, the memorandum did not reflect the need to develop a coopera-
tion format for balancing the interests of consumers, producers and transit countries of energy resources to create the conditions for sustainable and predictable development of the energy market, as noted in the leaders’ declaration [BRICS, 2015d, para. 69].

The institutionalization of BRICS cooperation in environment and energy started during the Russian presidency. The BRICS countries discussed and developed internal engagement mechanisms, reflecting an emerging parallel-treatment model.

Conclusion

The analysis of BRICS engagement with existing international organizations during the Russian presidency confirms the hypothesis that the BRICS members’ choice of engagement models with international organizations reflects the place and role of the forum in the global governance architecture, as implied at its launch and consolidated over its evolution.

At their 2010 summit, BRICS leaders committed to building a multipolar, equitable and democratic world order based on international law, equality, mutual respect, cooperation, coordinated action and collective decision making of all states [BRIC, 2010, para. 2]. They systematically choose engagement with the UN and its institutions, while still stimulating their reform. Such catalytic influence is aimed at enhancing the effectiveness of both the UN activities and BRICS engagement with the organization. This trend regarding the first pillar of the BRICS mission continued during the Russian presidency.

The second pillar consists of overcoming the financial and economic crisis, facilitating sustainable, balanced and strong growth, and promoting development. In implementing this objective, the BRICS recognized the G20 as the main forum for international economic coordination and cooperation and consistently supported the decisions made at G20 summits to ensure inclusive growth. In 2015, the BRICS strengthened its support of the G20, which had weakened over the previous three years.

The third pillar of the BRICS mission is the reform of international financial institutions to ensure that the participation of developing countries and emerging economies in decision making reflects their relative weight in the global economy. References to the IMF in all the documents adopted by the BRICS leaders consistently promote reforming the Bretton Woods institutions, improving their legitimacy and effectiveness. However, in the absence of catalytic influence, the number of references to the IMF and the World Bank decreased after 2012, as the number of references to the NDB increased. This trend continued in 2015.

The BRICS remain committed to “a strong, open, rule-based multilateral trading system embodied in the World Trade Organisation” [BRICS, 2011]. This commitment is reflected in the continued support of efforts to conclude the Doha Round and to the Trade Facilitation Agreement. It is also evident in the cautious assessment of multilateral initiatives that “go against the fundamental principles of transparency, inclusiveness and multilateralism. Such initiatives not only distract members from striving for a collective outcome but also fail to address the development deficit inherited from previous negotiating rounds” [BRICS, 2012, para. 16]. In addition, considering the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) to be the central element of the UN system responsible for trade and development issues, since the New Delhi Summit in 2012, the BRICS has consistently supported strengthening UNCTAD. During the Russian presidency, it also set a long-term goal of deepening cooperation in order to create conditions for expanding and diversifying its participation in global trade, emphasizing the need to coordinate and cooperate in the WTO to develop the post-Bali work programme and conclude the Doha Round [BRICS, 2015c].
The fifth pillar of the BRICS mission is the development of mutually enriching and beneficial cooperation among its members and the formation of a positive agenda on a wide range of issues. In 2015, BRICS countries further expanded and deepened their cooperation. They launched dialogues in new policy areas: industry, migration, employment, environment and energy. The establishment of new internal coordination mechanisms continued, including the Working Group on Socially Significant Markets in the area of competition policy, the Working Group on Energy Efficiency and BAIES.

However, the establishment of BRICS institutions does not suggest the group’s desire to replace old multilateral organizations with new ones or to create a new, alternative, BRICS-centred world order fundamentally different from the traditional one. Along establishing internal coordination mechanisms, the BRICS develops cooperation with relevant international organizations. In 2015, it strengthened cooperation with WHO, launched the engagement with UNIDO and the ILO. The BRICS leaders supported the proposal for the NDB to cooperate with existing and new financial mechanisms, including the AIIB. The BRICS laid the foundation for a dialogue with the EEU and SCO. The first ever reference to the OECD signifies that the BRICS countries are ready to use OECD expertise.

Thus, while it creates its own institutions, the BRICS strengthens its cooperation with other international organizations. The choice of engagement models depends on the area and level of cooperation development, and the type of organization it considers to be most efficient for attainment of its goals. The models are not mutually exclusive but coexist and transform during the cooperation process. For instance, with the UN organizations and the WTO, BRICS engagement develops on the catalytic-influence model (endorsement or stimulus for international organizations’ changes and reforms), whereas with the G20 its intention to engage based on the governance-in-alliance model remains unfulfilled.

Overall, in 2015 the BRICS consolidated its preference in favour of two models: catalytic influence (endorsement or stimulus for international organizations’ changes and reforms) and parallel treatment (creation of the forum own institutions). The establishment of BRICS institutions continued. While the BRICS strengthens these new institutions, it will likely eventually integrate the governance-in-alliance model into its practice of cooperation with relevant international organizations.

References


