Evaluating Global Institutions’ Effectiveness

Assessing Summit Institutions Engagement with Other International Organizations in the Process of Global Governance

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Recent decades have witnessed dramatic changes all over the world. One major trend is the proliferation and diversification of actors, forums and their arrangements to address global governance challenges, which has led to fragmentation in global governance. However, such contested multilateralism has a positive dimension, as the emergence of informal multilateral institutions claiming a major role in defining the global governance agenda creates alternatives for providing common goods. New arrangements acquire their own actorness and place in the system of global governance. In certain policy areas, there is a clear trend for the new summit institutions’ leadership. The most visible recent cases include the Group of 20 (G20), the BRICS group of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, with APEC gaining importance regionally and globally. These new informal groupings work on their own agenda. They also engage with established international organizations to steer global governance processes. Taken together, the transformative trends in international relations, the emergence of new actors, tensions between exclusive and inclusive clubs, and demands for the legitimacy and effectiveness of the international institutions define the relevance of the study, systematization and comparative analysis of the effectiveness of this model of cooperation among international institutions. This article builds an analytical framework by undertaking three tasks. It first reviews the key concepts. Second, it argues for a rational choice institutionalist approach. Third, it puts forward a hypothesis for research: to compensate for their inefficiencies, summit institutions engage with other international organizations in a mode they regard most efficient for attainment of their goals. The modes of those institutions’ engagement with other international organizations as reflected in the leaders’ discourse should thus indicate the role of those institutions in the global governance architecture, which is imputed at their launch and subsequent evolution. The hypothesis further suggests that the “governing in alliance” mode enhances the effectiveness of the summit institutions; however, those institutions’ use is not mutually exclusive. The modes of engagement with international institutions coexist in the engagement of informal summit institutions with other international organizations. The choice is defined by the policy area and type of organizations. The article concludes with a case study of BRICS engagement with international institutions. The results confirm that the choice of engagement model reflects the forum’s role and place in the global governance architecture. To maximize benefits from cooperation, the BRICS engages with relevant international organizations on agenda priorities at different institutional levels. Two types of engagement are typical for the BRICS: catalytic engagement (exerting an influence for changes in international organizations through endorsement or stimulus, or compelling them to reform) and parallel treatment (creation of the institution’s own mechanisms). By establishing

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new institutions, the BRICS consistently strengthens its cooperation with other international institutions. Its choice of model depends on the policy area, where it is developing cooperation and the perception of the organization’s relevance to BRICS objectives. BRICS engagement with United Nations organizations and the World Trade Organization follows the model of catalytic influence, whereas with the G20, BRICS engagement based on the model of governance in alliance with multilateral institutions remained unrealized.

Key words: global governance, informal summit institutions, engagement models, international organizations, efficiency, legitimacy, rational choice theory, G20, BRICS, APEC

Introduction: The Context and the Challenges

The past decades have witnessed dramatic changes in the world. The bipolar world order has vanished, the unipolar period has passed and a new multipolar world order is emerging.

In this “unraveling” globalized world, geopolitical, economic, environmental, societal and technological challenges are tightly interconnected [Haass, 2014]. They “transcend borders and spheres of influence and require stakeholders to work together, yet these risks also threaten to undermine the trust and collaboration needed to adapt to the challenges of the new global context” [World Economic Forum, 2015]. The challenges and their perceptions have been driving shifts in international cooperation. One major trend is “the proliferation and diversification of actors, forums and their arrangements to address global governance challenges,” leading to a presumed fragmentation of global governance [Egel, 2015, pp. 4–5]. However, fragmentation is also often perceived positively as “contested multilateralism,” as institutional diversity can produce better outcomes than “stalled cooperation through existing venues” struggling to respond to persisting and emerging challenges [Egel, 2015, p. 5].

In spite of an increasing number of international actors, including non-state actors, both informal and informal organizations as well as governments remain key players. Responsibility for ensuring that this emerging multipolar world will be stable and contributes to global well-being rests with the states — both the established powers and the rising centres of power — as well as with the principals of global governance and their agents — international institutions, global and regional, multilateral and plurilateral.

The emergence of informal multilateral institutions claiming a major role in defining the global governance agenda creates alternatives for providing common goods. These new summity institutions, led by the Group of Seven/Eight (G7/8), and more recently Group of 20 (G20) and the BRICS group of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, stand at the centre of the galaxy of global governance institutions. This article will deal with the most visible recent cases of G20 and BRICS, and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, which is gaining importance regionally and globally.

These new informal groupings work on their own agenda. They also engage with established international organizations to steer global governance processes. Those formal organizations have “the UN system as the core of organized multilateral order” [Thakur, Job, Serrano et al., 2014, p. 1]. They are in need of reform and cannot respond on their own to the interconnected persisting and arising challenges. Inter-institutional cooperative mechanisms are being transformed, and new models of cooperation are being established.

In certain areas, a trend for the informal groupings leadership is evident. On financial regulation, the G20 has taken up the initiative for decision making since its first summit in Washington, issuing mandates for further elaboration and implementation to relevant international organizations.
The BRICS has adopted a different approach, characteristic of the G7 in the early years of its performance, transmitting signals to international organizations, treating the issues within the summit-based apparatus, or establishing their own institutions, such as the New Development Bank (NDB) [Putnam and Bayne, 1987, pp. 156–57]. If common sense is any guide, global governance would gain effectiveness from a combination of the “catalyst,” “core group” and “parallel treatment” approaches exercised by summitry institutions: influencing international organizations’ changes through endorsement or stimulus, or compelling them to reform; setting a new direction by taking a lead that the other organizations would follow; and creating the informal institutions’ own mechanisms. The first two approaches, especially in relation with the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, the World Trade Organization (WTO), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and relevant regional organizations, would undoubtedly enhance the resilience, legitimacy and effectiveness of the global governance architecture. The parallel treatment, however, could initially give rise to tensions and concerns about competition or rivalry, but fills a gap in governance and serves the needs of members and other interested stakeholders, with the new arrangements acquiring their own actorness and a place in the system of global governance.

The transformative trends in international relations, emergence of new actors, tensions between exclusive and inclusive clubs, demands for the legitimacy and effectiveness of the international institutions, put together, define the relevance of the systematization and comparative analysis of the effectiveness of the international institution cooperation model.

The Concepts and the Analytical Paradigm

To help build the analytical framework, this section undertakes three tasks. It first reviews the key concepts. Second, it argues for a rational choice institutionalist approach. Third, it puts forward the hypothesis for research.

**Concepts**

More than 15 years ago, R.O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye Jr. [2001, p. 1] defined globalization as a state of the world involving networks of interdependence at multicontinental distances, where multiple economic, military, environmental processes strengthen or “thicken” these networks. Earlier, James N. Rosenau [1995, p. 14], contemplating the prospects for global governance in the 21st century, defined governance as the process whereby an organization or society steers itself, with dynamics of communication and control being central to the process. Given increasing globalization, interdependence, disaggregation, proliferation of control mechanisms, governance is not a constant. It is a continuous process of evolution that “fluctuates between order and disorder as conditions change and emergent properties consolidate and solidify” [Rosenau, 1995, p. 18]. The combined effect of these contradictory trends leads to a lessening of the capacities for governance at the level of the national state, thus pushing governments to work out arrangements for collective governance at transnational level [Rosenau, 1995, p. 19]. Cooperative impulses driven by dissatisfaction over or frustration with existing systems and expectations that new arrangements may respond to persisting challenges meet resistance and opposition, “since any expansion of governance is bound to be detrimental to those who have a stake in the status quo” [Rosenau, 1995, p. 21]. Nevertheless, global governance systems evolve in the context of progress and hope that the new multilateral institutions will effectively address the challenges that “clutter the global agenda” [Rosenau, 1995, p. 39].
The global governance that has emerged “entails multilevel and networked relations and interactions for managing and facilitating linkages across policy areas and domains. It consists of formal and informal arrangements that provide more order and stability for a world in a constant flux than would occur naturally — the range of international cooperation without a world government ... The content of global governance embraces the totality of laws, norms, policies, and institutions that define, constitute and mediate relations between citizens, societies, markets, and states in the international system — the wielders and objects of the exercise of the international public power” [Thakur, Job, Serrano et al., 2014, p. 1].

Global governance is exercised by states, formal and informal intergovernmental institutions, transnational networks, business corporations and nongovernmental organizations. This study focuses on formal multilateral international institutions and informal summitry institutions, and their interaction in steering global governance processes.

The concept of “multilateralism” centres on the collectively agreed norms, rules and principles that guide and govern interstate behaviour. Regionalism is a particular expression of multilateralism [Renard, 2015, p. 4]. Multilateral institutions are all based on the principles of generalized reciprocity, in which states make common undertakings and agree to act cooperatively [Hampson and Heinbecker, 2011, p. 300].

“International institution” is an overarching term for international organizations, regimes and clubs that differ in their degree of institutionalization. Keohane and Nye [2001, p. 2] consider regimes to be at the core of international relations, designed to enable elites in governments to manage interdependence: “early 21st century globalism is organized around international regimes and their accompanying organizations, from the World Trade Organization to the World Tourism Organization.” Regimes were constituted by rules and norms that governed their members’ relationships in specific issue areas of international relations. Although central to international relations, regimes were weak devices for cooperation dominated by states, operated as clubs and dominated by a small number of rich countries with shared priorities [Keohane, Nye. 2001, p. 2].

Criticism of the club governance model intensified in the beginning of the 21st century, with an increasing perception of its illegitimacy in the context of the rising role of developing countries in the world economy.

There are, in fact, several definitions of club mechanisms. Some authors assert that a club does not imply a common ideological commitment of its members, whose positions can differ on policy and economics ideas [Reay, 2012]. Club mechanisms are sometimes considered flexible, non-institutionalized intergovernmental platforms for engagement [Drezner, 2007]. Other experts define a club as a group with clear rules, concrete and exclusive privileges for members, and a high degree of protection from external pressure. The concept is also applied to mechanisms bringing together high-level individuals — representatives of the public and private sectors as well as the epistemic community, such as the Group of 30, “held together by elite peer recognition, common and mutually reinforcing interests, and an ambition to provide global public goods in line with values its members consider honorable” [Tsingou, 2015, p. 226].

In recent years, with the establishment of the BRICS and G20 at the leaders’ level, there is more and more attention on summit institutions.

Informal summitry institutions are defined as international institutions with limited membership, relatively low bureaucracy, and reliance on open, flexible and voluntary approaches. Regular meetings of heads of state and government who engage on a wide range of international, regional and domestic politics stand at the pinnacle of such international arrangements, which involve many actors operating according to established procedures on two levels: domestic and international. Commitments contained in their collectively agreed documents are not legally
binding, but implementation is stimulated by peer pressure. Among such bodies engaged in
global and regional governance are the G7/8, G20, BRICS and APEC.

Informal summitry institutions, as exclusive clubs, are often accused of being illegitimate
and ineffective. There are many dimensions and definitions of legitimacy and effectiveness.
Legitimacy can be defined as acceptability of the institution and its rules, decisions and activities
to members, non-members and international institutions. The input dimension of legitimacy
includes the three indicators of decision making (decision-making mode), transparency
(openness and accountability, both external and internal, ex-ante and ex-post) and inclusiveness
(number of members, number of non-members invited, number of international organizations involved). The output dimension of legitimacy includes three criteria: commitments made (concrete and publicly agreed decisions), delivery on those commitments (compliance performance) and outcomes (policy changes at the international or national level) [see Gnath, Mildner and Schmucker, 2012]. Legitimacy, especially its output dimension, correlates closely with effectiveness. Effectiveness is understood as an institution’s capacity to agree on collective commitments, deliver on the pledges made and exert policy changes that help solve collective problems [see Gnath, Mildner and Schmucker, 2012]. The analysis here defines effectiveness as the summitry institutions’ ability to agree on collective or coordinated actions and deliver on the commitments made by the leaders engaging other institutions to attain their goals and perform the mission or functions intended by the founding members.

Analytical Paradigm

For this study, rational choice institutionalism was adopted as the analytical framework
because in terms of the institutional origins, it turns “primarily on the functions that these institutions perform and the benefits they provide” [Hall and Taylor, 1996, p. 952]. This approach can explain not only the origins, but also the institutions’ existence and evolution, as well the relationship between institutions. Institutions are thus created by the states because the states see benefits accruing to them from the functions performed by the institutions [Rosamond, 2000, p. 116].

The calculus approach fits the analysis of summitry institutions bringing together states from a wide range of cultures, continents and economic development, notably well. Its distinctive features clearly apply to the analysis of the origin and performance of the G20 and the BRICS. First, the members act in a highly strategic manner to maximize the attainment of their priorities. Second, summitry presents an arrangement where strategic interaction between leaders plays a major role in determining the political outcomes. Third, according to Peter Hall and Rosemary Taylor [1996], rational choice institutionalism offers the greatest analytical leverage to settings where consensus among actors accustomed to strategic action and of roughly equal standing is necessary to secure institutional changes — the features typical of summitry institutions. Fourth, the institutions are created by the voluntary agreement of the leaders of the respective countries to perform concrete functions and missions. Thus the leaders designated the G20 to be the premier forum for their international economic cooperation [G20, 2009, para. 19]. The BRICS came together to establish a platform for dialogue and cooperation to promote peace, security and development in a multipolar, interdependent and increasingly complex, globalizing world, on the basis of universally recognized norms of international law and multilateral decision making [BRICS, 2012, para. 3].

Any theory has its strengths and weaknesses. However, rational choice limitations do not restrict this analysis. First, the study draws on its highly functionalist approach to compare the institutions’ performance on global governance functions and identify how summitry institutions compensate for their inefficiencies through interaction with other international organizations.
Second, the analysis tracks the evolution of the G20, BRICS and APEC based on several assumptions. The intentions of the founders may not be fully understood or attained, and they may not fully perceive the effects of the institutions they establish, or have control over the course of events. However, the agenda and commitments the leaders make nevertheless reflect intentions that change in response to external and internal dynamics. The modes of the summitry institutions’ engagement with other international organizations as reflected in the leaders’ discourse indicate their place and role in the global governance architecture, attributed to them at their launch and subsequent evolution.

Third, actors create an institution to realize certain functions they value by a voluntary agreement in a world already crowded by other organizations. In order to maximize benefits from the new arrangement, the founders may choose to engage voluntarily with existing institutions in a mode they regard most efficient for attaining their goals.

Thus, the study focuses on the interaction of the G20, BRICS and APEC with other international organizations in fulfilling their global governance functions of deliberation, direction setting, decision making, delivery and global governance development [Kirton, 2013, pp. 37–39]. Deliberation is understood as face-to-face discussions of the leaders encoded in the collective communiqués. Direction setting is defined as collective affirmation of shared principles, norms and prescriptions. Decision making is regarded as credible, clear, collective commitments with sufficient precision, obligation and delegation. Delivery is understood as stated compliance with collective decisions. Global governance development is perceived as the group’s ability to use other international institutions and create its own institutions as global governance mechanisms.

To date, the debate on the relationship between summitry institutions and international organizations has centred on the G7/8’s connections with multilateral organizations. Four schools of thought offer arguments on G7/8 governance through multilateral organizations, G8 governance against multilateral organizations, G8 governance without multilateral organizations and G8 governance in alliance with the multilateral organizations [Kirton, 2010].

The first school of thought, G7/8 governance through multilateral organizations, is advanced by Ella Kokotsis [1999] in her democratic institutionalist model of G7/8 performance. She argues that the work of multilateral organizations contributes to compliance with G7/8 commitments when those organizations are directly relevant to the specific commitments and when those organizations are controlled by G7/8 members [see also Kokotsis and Daniels, 1999, pp. 74–94].

The second school, G7/8 governance against multilateral organizations, has been developed by John Kirton [2010, pp. 25–26] in his concert equality model. It emphasizes that the G7/8 was created with a strong anti-bureaucratic bias amidst the perceived failure of the multilateral organizations to meet the shocks of the early 1970s. According to Kirton, the G7/8 has increasingly moved from reinforcing and reforming to replacing the old multilateral organizations with antithetical alternatives and their order with a fundamentally different, G7/8-centred system of its own.

The third school, G7/8 governance without international organizations, has been developed by Nicholas Bayne [2000, p. 45]. It suggests that the G7/8—international institution relationship is one of mutual coexistence and non-involvement when their agendas are different, but one of tension when they are the same.

The fourth school of thought argues that the G7/8 and international organizations in their diversity serve a common cause and thus should act as allies. It builds on an assumption that, given the challenges of global governance, the G7/8 members’ choice of the mode of interaction with the international institutions will tilt rationally toward G7/8 governance “in alliance with the multilateral organizations” [Larionova, 2010, pp. 45–46].
The evidence base from the decade before the 2008 global financial crisis (1998 to 2007) of the G8 members’ interaction with the multilateral international institutions indicates that governance through international institutions remained their preferred choice of engagement model (56%), the trend gradually pushed toward the G8 governance in alliance with multilateral organizations (32%) [Larionova, 2010, p. 60]. It was especially pronounced with regard to development and health. Simultaneously, on the more sensitive issues of security and energy governance through international institutions remained predominant. A downward tendency to adopt actions without multilateral institutions was observable (6% of the overall number of actions). G8 members’ preference for the model of governance without international institutions peaked at 10% in 2002–04 and subsequently decreased significantly to a low of 4% in 2007.

Available evidence suggests that these four modes of “governing though,” “governing against,” “governing without” and “governing in alliance” are practised by the G20 and BRICS, which emerged in 2008 and 2009 respectively, as well as the older APEC.

The study undertakes to test this assumption. The modes of summitry institution engagement with other multilateral organizations are explored in their dynamics and considered indicative of the mission and evolving role of the G20, BRICS and APEC in global governance architecture. The choice of partner institutions, modes and intensity of engagement is accepted to be strategic, intentional and voluntary, aiming to maximize benefits from the arrangements and compensate for efficiency in the performance of the summitry institutions.

The hypothesis is that the governing-in-alliance mode enhances the summitry institution’s effectiveness if three conditions exist. The first condition is that summitry institutions interact with multilateral organizations across the chain of global governance functions. The second condition is that the partnership is selective, allowing for the relevance and comparative advantages of the multilateral organizations for a specific policy area. The third condition is that the summitry institution has the ability to influence the partner institutions and the political will to engage with them as allies, which can make an important contribution to the summitry institution’s functions, legitimacy and effectiveness.

The study does not deal with the issue of the other international organizations’ will to engage with the summitry institutions. However, it is hypothesized that their involvement is strategic, intentional and voluntary. It is also presumed that the connection between international organizations and the summitry institutions is “a synergistic, two-way street,” with the summitry institutions support for international organizations constituting a cause of the organizations’ help for the G20, BRICS and APEC in implementing their core functions [Kirton, 2010, p. 24].

The hypothesis further suggests that the four modes are not mutually exclusive, but coexist, and that the summitry institutions’ choice of models will differ across issues and organizations. Governance through and governance in alliance with multilateral organizations will be the two dominant models, whereas governance against and governance without will be resorted to less frequently. The comprehensive nature of many of the priority issues will be reflected in the modality of the summitry institutions’ interaction with international organizations through the engagement of several institutions in the implementation of global governance functions.

The Methodology

The study explores the G20, BRICS and APEC modes of engagement with international multilateral organizations focusing on four policy areas that are priorities for each summitry institution: macroeconomics, financial regulation, international trade and investment.
The period of analysis covers almost a decade beginning in 2008. The year was selected as the starting point as it marks the beginning of the global financial crisis, the first meeting of the G20 in Washington and the first BRICS summit on the fringes of the G8 summit in Hokkaido Toyako. The timeline allows enough compatible data to be generated for a comparative analysis and enough time to observe the dynamics of the engagement between the three informal summity institutions and international multilateral organizations.

The content of all G20, BRICS and APEC documents was analyzed to test the assumption that they resort to the four modes of governing through, governing against, governing without and governing in alliance. As the first step, all references to international multilateral organizations were identified and systematized (see Appendix A). Most such references were cases of governing through and governing in alliance. References to the summity institutions’ own mechanisms were typically cases of governing against and governing without. A list of verbal markers signalling the type of mode referred to, assembled in the course of previous research, serves as formal guidance for classifying the references (see Appendix B).

The analysis then used two parameters: the number of references to institutions and the intensity, expressed as the correlation between the number of references to institutions and the number of characters (including spaces and punctuation) in the documents as follows:

\[ D_j = \frac{M_j}{S_j}, \]

where \( D_j \) is the intensity of references to international organizations in a certain year (period), \( M_j \) is the number of references made to the institution in that year (period) and \( S_j \) is the total number of characters in the documents for that year (period). To make the findings more easily understood, \( D_j \) is multiplied by 10,000.

Thus the methodology allows the identification of the intensity and dynamics of G20, BRICS and APEC interaction with international multilateral organizations, as well as the intensity and dynamics of their preferred engagement modes with concrete organizations in the four policy areas of macroeconomic policy, financial regulation, international trade and investment. The study also reveals the intensity and dynamics of governing-against and governing-without models.

To verify if and how the summity institutions engage the international multilateral organizations across the chain of the global governance functions, all G20, BRICS and APEC documents were analyzed to single out the text units denoting the functions of deliberation, direction setting, decision making, delivery and global governance development. To enable quantification and comparative analysis, the study employed absolute and relative data. The absolute data on the number of symbols denoting a certain function in the text was translated into relative data calculated as the share of the function in the total of all texts and expressed as a percentage. A text unit can be counted as implementing only one function.

This dissection of the G20, BRICS and APEC into functional units helps reveal the intensity of references to international organizations and the preferred modes of the summity institutions engagement with the international multilateral organizations within the array of governance functions they perform. It also highlights the functions that the G20, BRICS and APEC tend to perform resorting to governing-against and governing-without models.

Findings

In the first stage of the study, the methodology was applied to assess BRICS engagement with other international organizations in the process of global governance. The results indicate that to enhance effectiveness of its collective actions, the BRICS engages with international organi-
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izations at various levels. To date, 636 references to 48 intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) have been registered in the BRICS documents. The number of the references increased from summit to summit with the exception of the second leaders’ meeting in Brasilia. The top ten IGOs in BRICS discourse were the UN with the highest share at 28%, the G20 at 10.8%, the WTO following closely at 10.4%, the IMF and the World Bank at 8.8% and 4.2% respectively, the World Health Organization (WHO) at 8.5%, and the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) rounding out the top ten at 3.5%. The BRICS institutions – the NDB and the Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) – each took a 5% share in the BRICS discourse.

Two types of engagement are characteristic for the BRICS: catalytic influence (the stimulation and support of reform and changes) and parallel treatment (the creation of the forum’s own institutions). Since 2012, the BRICS has been working toward establishing its own institutions. The NDB and CRA are often perceived as alternatives to existing institutions of the international financial system. At the same time, the BRICS almost never resorts to the “core group” model often practised by other summit institutions, particularly the G20, in leading in a new direction that other organizations would follow nor does it tend to use the governing-through model [see Shelepov, 2015].

The results of the study of BRICS engagement with international organizations confirm the hypotheses that the leaders’ choice of engagement model reflects the institution’s role and place in the global governance architecture, attributed to the forum at its launch and consolidated over its evolution. Thus, by pledging “to support a multipolar, equitable and democratic world order, based on international law, equality, mutual respect, cooperation, coordinated action and collective decision-making of all States,” the BRICS consistently engages with the UN and its organizations, simultaneously striving to stimulate their reform [BRIC, 2010, para. 2]. This catalytic influence enhances the effectiveness of both the UN and the BRICS cooperation with it. This trend was strengthened in the course of the Russian presidency in 2015.

Combating financial and economic crisis, ensuring strong, sustainable and balanced growth, facilitating development are key components of the BRICS mission. Indeed, by setting these objectives the BRICS recognizes the G20 as the premier forum for international economic coordination and cooperation and illustrates its unwavering support of G20 decisions on inclusive growth. Although the commitment to engage with the G20 weakened somewhat during the period from Sanya in 2011 to Fortaleza in 2014, the BRICS reinforced its consultations and coordination on the G20 agenda in 2015 and pledged to continue working to bring greater attention to the issues on the G20 agenda that reflect the priorities of developing countries and emerging markets.

One continued BRICS priority is the reform of the international financial institutions to increase the voice and representation of emerging markets and developing countries in decision making. The leaders’ documents promote the legitimacy, credibility and effectiveness of these institutions by consistently calling on the IMF and its members to implement the 14th General Review of Quotas without further delay. However, with catalytic influence not producing any results, the number of references to the IMF and the World Bank has declined since 2012. This trend coincides with a rise in references to the NDB, which increased in 2015.

The BRICS is committed to a strong, open, rules-based multilateral trade system with the WTO at its centre [BRICS, 2011]. This commitment is reflected in its continuous support of the Doha round of trade negotiations, the Trade Facilitation Agreement and a cautious assessment of the multilateral initiatives that go against the fundamental principles of transparency, inclusiveness and multilateralism, that distract members from striving for a collective outcome and that fail to address the development deficit inherited from previous negotiating rounds [BRICS, 2012, para. 12]. Moreover, considering UNCTAD to be the focal point in the UN system on trade,
investment, finance and technologies related to development, BRICS leaders have supported its mandate at every meeting since their New Delhi summit in 2012 [BRICS, 2015, para. 22].

The cornerstone of the BRICS mission is developing mutually enriching and beneficial cooperation and shaping the forum’s agenda on a wide range of issues. That deepened cooperation and expanded agenda are accompanied by the institutionalization of BRICS mechanisms. The formal track has grown into a constellation of 14 cooperation formats, including meetings of sherpas and sous-sherpas, central bank governors, ministers and deputy ministers, senior officials, contact groups, and working and experts groups. In 2015, the BRICS launched a dialogue on new policy areas: industrial cooperation, migration, employment, environment and energy. New mechanisms for internal coordination were also set up, such as the working group on socially important economic sectors, the working group on energy saving and energy efficiency, the Basic Agricultural Information Exchange System (BAIES), and the working group on cooperation on information and communications technologies.

The rapid pace of institutionalizing BRICS cooperation is likely to continue. However, that institutionalization does not imply that the BRICS strives to substitute new institutions for existing intergovernmental ones or set up a new fundamentally different BRICS-centred international system. Creating its own institutions consolidates engagement with the relevant IGOs. Thus, in 2015 the BRICS continued to engage with WHO, reaffirmed support for the mandate of the UN International Development Organization, started a dialogue with the International Labour Organization, welcomed the proposal for the NDB to cooperate closely with existing and new financing mechanisms including the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, and laid foundations for a dialogue between the countries of the Eurasian Economic Union and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. In its first ever reference to the OECD, the BRICS committed to continue to cooperate in relevant international forums on issues related to the G20/OECD Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Sharing, which suggests that the five BRICS members are prepared to use the OECD’s expert potential.

In conclusion, by establishing new institutions, the BRICS consolidates its cooperation with other organizations. The choice of engagement model depends on the policy area, the phase in the development of cooperation and the perception of the organization’s relevance to BRICS objectives. The preferred engagement models are catalytic influence and parallel treatment, consistent with the governing-without model. The models are not mutually exclusive, but coexist and change in the course of cooperation. With the UN organizations and the WTO, engagement follows the model of catalytic influence (exerting an influence on international organizations through endorsement or stimulus, or compelling them to reform), whereas, with the G20, the BRICS intention to engage on the governance-in-alliance model remained unfulfilled. The BRICS continues to refrain from issuing mandates to international organizations, hence there are no cases of the governing-through model. As its own institutions strengthen, the BRICS will likely apply the governance-in-alliance model in its cooperation with relevant international organizations.²

References


**Appendix A: International Multilateral Organizations Mentioned in G20, BRICS, APEC Documents**

Africa Partnership Forum

African Capacity Building Foundation

African Regional Technical Assistance Centre

African Union

Alliance for Green Revolution in Africa

Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty

Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement

ASEAN Centre for Energy

ASEAN Plus Three Cooperation on Food Security

ASEAN Plus Three Emergency Rice Reserve

ASEAN Rice Trade Forum

ASEAN University Network

Asia and South Pacific Initiative to Reduce Emissions

Asia Forest Partnership

Asia and Pacific Plant Protection Commission

Asian Nuclear Safety Network

Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation

Asia-Pacific Forestry Commission of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations

Association of Pacific Rim Universities

Association of Southeast Asian Nations

Bank for International Settlements

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
Carbon capture and storage partnership
Chemical Weapons Convention
Clean Development Mechanism
Clean Energy Investment Framework
Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources
Commission on the Status of Women and UN Women
Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems
Committee on the Global Financial System
Commonwealth of Independent States
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research
Coral Triangle Initiative on Coral Reefs, Fisheries and Food Security
Council of Europe
Counter-Terrorism Committee
Department for Safety and Security
Department of Peacekeeping Operations
East Asia Summit
Economic Community of West African States
Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia
Education for All
Education for Sustainable Development
Energy Charter Treaty
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
Fast Track Initiative
Financial Action Task Force
Financial Literacy Measurement Programme for International Students Assessments
Financial Stability Board
Financial Stability Forum
Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
G20
Gas Exporting Countries Forum
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
Global Bio-Energy Partnership
Global Business Dialogue on Electronic Commerce
Global Digital Divide Initiative
Global Earth Observation System of Systems
Global Environment Facility
Global Food Safety Fund at the World Bank
Global Forum on Agricultural Research
Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria
Global Gas Flaring Reduction Partnership
Global Green Growth Institute
Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism
Global Nuclear Energy Partnership
Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network
Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction
Global Partnership for Agriculture and Food Security
Global Partnership for Financial Inclusion
Global Partnership for Sustainable Development
Global Plan to Stop TB/Stop TB Partnership
Global Polio Eradication Initiative
Global Research Alliance on Agricultural Greenhouse Gases
Global Science Forum
Green Climate Fund
Hague Conference on Private International Law
Heiligendamm Process
Infrastructure Consortium for Africa
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
Integrated Framework for Trade-Related Technical Assistance
Intergovernmental Authority on Development
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty
International Accounting Standards Board
International Air Transport Association
International Association of Insurance Supervisors
International Atomic Energy Agency
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes
International Chamber of Commerce
International Civil Aviation Organization
International Committee of the Red Cross
International Competition Network
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
International Development Association
International Electrotechnical Commission
International Energy Agency
International Energy Forum
International Finance Corporation
International Food Policy Research Institute
International Food Safety Authorities Network
International Fund for Agricultural Development
International Health Partnership
International Labour Organization
International Maritime Organization
International Monetary Fund
International Oil Pollution Compensation Convention
International Organisation of Employers
International Organization for Standardization
International Organization of Securities Commissions
International Partnership for a Hydrogen Economy
International Partnership for Energy Efficiency Cooperation
International Renewable Energy Agency
International Smart Grid Action Network
International Strategy for Disaster Reduction
International Trade Centre
International Treaty for Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture
International Tropical Timber Agreement
International Tropical Timber Organization
International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds
International Working Group on Land Transport Security
Investment Climate Facility
Telecommunication Standardization Sector of the International Telecommunication Union
Joint United Nations Programme on HIV and AIDS
Major Economies Forum
Mediterranean Renewable Energy Partnership
Missile Technology Control Regime
Montreal Process on Criteria and Indicators for the Conservation and Sustainable Management of Temperate and Boreal Forests
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency
New Partnership for Africa’s Development
Non-Proliferation Treaty
Nuclear Energy Agency
Nuclear Safety and Security Group
Nuclear Safety Working Group
Nuclear Suppliers Group
Office for Disarmament Affairs
One Village One Product
Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
Organisation of African Unity
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
Organization of American States
Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development
Organization of the Black Sea Economic Co-operation
Pacific Alliance
Pacific Asia Travel Association
Pacific Economic Cooperation Council
Pacific Islands Forum
Proliferation Security Initiative
Providing for Health Initiative
Rapid Response Forum
Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries
Regional Fisheries Management Organizations
Regular Process for Global Reporting and Assessment of the State of the Marine Environment Including Socioeconomic Aspects (United Nations World Ocean Assessment)
Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership
Renewable Energy Policy Network
Secure and Facilitated International Travel Initiative
SME Finance Forum
SME Finance Innovation Fund
South East Asia and China Foot and Mouth Disease Campaign
South-East Europe Cooperation Initiative
Southeast Asian Ministers of Education Organization
Southern African Development Community
Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty
Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
United Nations
United Nations Children’s Emergency Fund
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs
United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development
United Nations Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
United Nations Convention Against Corruption
United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs
United Nations Development Programme
United Nations Economic and Social Council
United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
United Nations Energy Programme
United Nations Environment Programme
United Nations Forum on Forests
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
United Nations General Assembly
United Nations Global Counter Terrorism Strategy
United Nations High-Level Task Force on the Global Food Crisis
United Nations Human Settlements Programme
United Nations Industrial Development Organization
United Nations International Drug Control Program
United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
United Nations World Tourism Organization  
World Bank  
World Customs Organization  
World Economic Forum  
World Food Programme  
World Forum for Harmonization of Vehicle Standards of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe  
World Health Organization  
World Intellectual Property Organization  
World Meteorological Organization  
World Organization for Animal Health (OIE)  
World Trade Organization  
World Travel and Tourism Council

**Appendix B: Modes of Interaction between Summitry Institutions and International Organizations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>G8 governance against multilateral organizations</th>
<th>G8 governance in alliance with the multilateral organizations</th>
<th>G8 governance through the multilateral organizations</th>
<th>G8 governance without multilateral organizations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| We set up  
We convene (a conference)  
We decided to forge a new partnership  
We launched | We must (will) engage  
We remain engaged  
We commit ourselves  
With our partners  
Together with  
Partnership  
We will work with  
In (close) consultations with  
We will (jointly) cooperate  
We must ensure [implementation]  
We will implement [a multilateral organization’s initiative]  
In cooperation with  
We welcome endorsement  
We support (on a regular basis) supporting  
We reaffirm our support  
We maintain solid support  
We pledge our support  
We provide assistance  
In close collaboration with  
We will endeavour with all our partners  
We signing and ratify  
We meet with  
We make engagements  
We provide (technical and financial) assistance  
We strengthen and Assist  
We reaffirm our commitment  
We provide funding  
We have secured the entry into force  
Working under auspices  
We are working to (deliver) Working in support of | We welcome  
We urge  
We call on (for)  
We support [as an acknowledgement]  
We encourage  
We attach strong importance  
We note with approval  
We note Drawing on [experience]  
We invite  
We commend [A multilateral organization] should (must)  
We look to  
We endorse  
We will pursue … through  
We forge  
We take note of  
We back | We will ask our ministers  
Among ourselves  
In our individual and collective capacities |