• Новая Зеландия (18,7%) — помощь странам, пострадавшим от цунами.
• Норвегия (13%) — помощь в ходе катастроф и чрезвычайных ситуаций в 2005 г., в том числе восстановление после цунами.
• ОПР также возросла в Австралии (5,7%) и Швейцарии (14%).

Среди стран, не являющихся членами Комитета ОЭСР по содействию развитию, только 4 страны предоставили предварительные данные по ОПР, объем которой в 2005 г. вырос:
• Чехия — объем ОПР вырос до 131 млн. долл. США благодаря существенному вкладу в бюджет развития ЕС.
• Корея — 744 млн. долл., включая рост двусторонних грантов, а также вклад в программы Всемирного банка и региональных банков развития.
• Польша — 283 млн. долл. благодаря существенному вкладу в бюджет развития ЕС.
• Словакия — 56 млн. долл. частично за счет помощи наименее развитым, в частности центральноафриканским странам.

Тем не менее, несмотря на обнадеживающие показатели ОПР по 2005 г. и на прогнозируемый «бум» ОПР в краткосрочной перспективе, по-прежнему нет уверенности в том, что будут соблюдены договоренности относительно уровня помощи на 2006 г., достигнутые в Монтеррее, а значит донорам необходимо будет резко увеличить другие формы помощи, если они хотят приблизиться к уровню, намеченному на 2010 г.

АНАЛИЗ ИСПОЛНЕНИЯ ОБЯЗАТЕЛЬСТВ, ПРИНЯТЫХ СТРАНАМИ-ЧЛЕНАМИ «ГРУППЫ ВОСЬМИ» НА САМИТЕ В ГЛЕНИГЛСЕ

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В докладе дано описание методики анализа исполнения странами-членами «Группы восьми» принятых в рамках саммитов обязательств. Представлены промежуточные результаты обязательств, принятых странами-членами на саммите в 2005 г. На основе эмпирических данных автор пытается ответить на три вопроса:

В какой степени и при каких условиях страны-члены «Группы восьми» осуществляют решения, принятые в рамках саммитов?
Каким образом изменяется модель реализации обязательств в зависимости от сферы принятия решений и времени их осуществления?
Каковы причины высокого или низкого уровня исполнения обязательств?

Результаты исследования позволяют автору сделать некоторые выводы относительно эффективности выполнения принятых обязательств. Прежде всего, прямое включение лидеров в процесс выработки и принятия решений является решающим фактором его реализации. Наличие (или создание) специальной структуры на национальном уровне и ее способность к действию также считается важным условием осуществления обязательств государствами-членами «Группы восьми». Более высокий уровень исполнения также наблюдается в тех случаях, когда страны-участницы, являясь влиятельными членами существующих международных институтов (например, Всемирного банка, Международного валютного фонда), оказывают соответствующее политическое и финансовое воздействие, включая принятые обязательства, на программы работы этих организаций. Четвертым важным фактором повышения уровня исполнения решений является работа многочисленных специальных групп и официальных структур, которые принимают на себя ответственность за подготовительную работу, что дает возможность лидерам сосредоточиться на выработке консенсуса по главным вопросам.

В докладе представлен сопоставительный анализ промежуточных итогов выполнения принятых в Глениглсе решений странами-членами «Группы восьми»: наиболее высокие результаты

1 Доклад был представлен на семинаре 3 апреля 2006 г. «Роль “Группы восьми” в глобальном развитии: основные механизмы осуществления инициатив и инструменты мониторинга реализации принятых в рамках саммитов решений, информация о котором была представлена в № 3 “Вестника международных организаций”.
2 Исследования проводятся международной группой экспертов Информационно-аналитического центра “Группы восьми” при Университете Торонто (Information Center and Research Group of Toronto: www.g8.utoronto.ca) с 1996 г.
3 Описание методики исследования и отобранные для анализа обязательства см. в № 2 “Вестника международных организаций.”
у США — 71%, Великобритании — 67%, Японии и Канады — 52%, Франции — 48%, Италии и Германии — 48% и 33% соответственно. Негативный промежуточный результат у России — 14%. Представляется, что включение в исследование российских экспертов позволит расширить базу данных источников для объективного анализа и отражения исполнения принятых обязательств Российской Федерацией.

М.В. Ларионова

Introduction

Compliance studies have been underway at the University of Toronto’s G8 Research Group since the Lyon Summit in 1996, and every year since then, the Research Group has been producing compliance studies as an important component of the analytic products produced by the University of Toronto’s G8 Research Group. Why do we embark on this task every year and what is it we and the world derive from our efforts?

The G8 Summit produces an annual communiqué every year, binding the leaders in many cases to hard commitments. Can the success of these commitments be measured once the Summit is over, the media have dispersed and the leaders have returned home? Are there limits to how much or how often the leaders can comply with their G8 commitments, particularly given that they are autonomous, sovereign states whose leaders are driven by differing domestic demands?

I argue in this paper that it does not make a lot of sense for the leaders to invest their time and resources, while potentially risking their political and personal reputations, to generate these agreements if they have absolutely no intention of ever complying with them once the Summit is over. My research therefore allows us to assess how much or how often the leaders can comply with their G8 commitments, particularly given that they are autonomous, sovereign states whose leaders are driven by differing domestic demands?

Given our definition of a commitment, what then constitutes compliance? Compliance happens when national governments change their own behavior to fulfill a Summit goal or commitment. Leaders legitimize their commitments by either:

- including them within their national agendas;
- referring to them in public speeches or press releases;
- assigning personnel to negotiate the mandates;
- forming task forces or working groups;
- launching new diplomatic initiatives;
- allocating budgetary resources towards the commitment’s fulfillment.

Compliance therefore requires new or altered efforts by national governments where leaders very actively and consciously plan to implement their G8 commitments. These actions need to be deliberate.
Measuring Compliance

What is the criteria for measuring compliance? The compliance research at the University of Toronto builds on the methodology first developed by George Von Furstenberg and Joseph Daniels in “The Meaning and Reliability of Economic Summit Undertakings, 1975—1989” and adapted it so it essentially follows a three-level measurement process:

1. Full or nearly full compliance with a commitment is assigned a score of +1.
2. A score of —1 indicates complete or nearly complete failure to implement a commitment.
3. An “inability to commit” or a “work in progress” is given a score of 0.

An “inability to commit” refers to factors outside of the executive branch that impede implementation. A “work in progress” refers to an initiative that has been launched by a government but hasn’t yet been completed by the time of the next summit, and whose results therefore cannot be effectively judged.

Time Frame

Commitments are examined from the conclusion of one Summit to the beginning of the next — the time frame therefore spans one year. Why is this the case? Essentially because commitments in the leaders’ communiqués are made on an annual basis, so the span of one full year is used to assess whether compliance has in fact occurred. Some commitments may be “re-iterated” — which means they were made at previous Summits but have not yet been completed because one year did not allow enough time for implementation to occur. These are treated as new commitments.

The one year time frame also coincides with the annual cycle of national political agendas — such as budgets and state of the union addresses — which vary from year to year. The annual Summit cycle therefore accounts for variations that happen on a yearly basis.

Charting Compliance

What do we know about summit compliance? Compliance scores from 1988 — 2005 have varied considerably, averaging approximately 43%. Compliance has been highest during this period in the political security domain (with issues including traditional east-west relations, terrorism, arms control, regional security and conflict prevention), followed by commitments in the core economic sector, then followed by global/transnational issues and global governance (focused primarily, for example, on UN reform).

Explaining Compliance

What do these compliance findings suggest? What accounts for overall positive Summit compliance patterns over time?

1. First of all, these findings suggest that the leaders’ direct involvement is important because they themselves have personally discussed and altered the agreements, and they have forged a consensus on how these agreements will be implemented domestically.

2. Second, the presence of domestic institutional structures is important, especially if they are organized in a way that allows for implementation. Some departments of government may have the resources and capacity to better or more effectively implement G8 agreements. Other less institutionally entrenched departments may lack the capacity for G8 related activity and oversight, thereby making implementation of Summit commitments more difficult.

3. Higher compliance generally happens in cases where the G8 are members of existing regimes (such as the IMF and the World Bank), where the G8 are major shareholders, and are therefore able to exert their political and financial influence, set the agendas, and secure agreements on the implementation.

4. We also find that as the number of G8 ministerials, working groups and official-level bodies have increased over time, so too has compliance. These bodies tend to take the pressure off leaders by allowing others to forge G8 consensus on these issues.

The Gleneagles Interim Compliance Report

In addition to our final compliance reports, which the G8 Research Group has issued since 1996, beginning in 2002 at the Kananaskis Summit, the G8 Research Group has also completed an Interim Compliance Report — which focuses on the extent to which the previous Summits’ com-

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mitments have been complied with by the time the G8 hosting chair passes on the G8 presidency to the next member in the hosting rotation — in this case, from the United Kingdom to Russia — which happened when Russia assumed the G8 presidency, on January 1, 2006. The interim reports therefore allow us to provide an assessment of how the commitments are evolving in the post-Summit period, up until January 1 of the following year. The final compliance study — available 2—3 weeks prior to the Summit itself — builds on the interim report in an effort to assess the extent to which compliance has evolved from January 1 till the time before the next Summit.

What do we know about the results of the Gleneagles Summit to date? Gleneagles produced 212 commitments, from which we selected a sample of 21 “core” commitments. “Core” commitments are the ones that are (1) ambitious and far-reaching; (2) timely, in that they reflect current issues of importance; and (3) they are clearly identifiable and measurable.

The 212 commitments generated at Gleneagles (the 2nd largest number of commitments ever produced — next to Sea Island in 2004), spanned 18 documents ranging from global health (HIV/AIDS and polio eradication) to African debt relief and trade, to transnational crime, terrorism, non-proliferation and Middle East reform. Each priority commitment was then surveyed across all G8 countries, plus the European Union.

The interim compliance results reveal that from the period following the conclusion of the 2005 Gleneagles Summit until January 2006, G8 members and the EU have complied with their priority commitments 47% of the time. The interim compliance score of 47 ties Evian (2003) and surpasses Sea Island (40% — 2004), and Kananaskis (25% — 2002).

Compliance by Country

Marking quite a dramatic shift from previous interim compliance reports, the highest complying G8 country across the 21 priority commitments post-Gleneagles is the United States, with a score of 71%. Although the U.S. did rank second overall in the two previous interim reports, its compliance score increased by over 20% from the 2004 Sea Island interim report the year before. Placing second and also scoring above the median is the typically high-ranking United Kingdom, with a compliance score of 67%. Moving up considerably from its lower place standings in previous reports is Japan, with a compliance score this year of 52%. Canada, traditionally one of the Summit’s highest compliers, has dropped considerably during this interim assessment, tying Japan with a score of 52%. Dropping also from third place last year to fifth place is France, with an interim compliance score of 48%. Italy and Germany follow, with scores of 43% and 33% respectively. Russia is the only country to score in the negative range with an interim score of —14%.

Compliance by Issue Area

Compliance by issue area also varies considerably at the interim point. Of the 21 priority issues assessed, commitments geared towards Middle East Reform, renewable energy and climate change rank the highest with a perfect compliance score of 100%. On the Middle East, this commitment primarily includes the stimulation of a global financial contribution of up to $3 billion per year over the coming three years for the region. On renewable energy, perfect compliance to date reflects the leaders’ commitment to develop markets for clean energy technologies, increase their availability in the developing world, and to help vulnerable communities adapt to the impact of climate change. Advancing global efforts to tackle climate change at the UN also score in the ranks of perfect compliance.

Compliance is also high with commitments to support the African Union’s mission in Sudan, as well as efforts aimed at tackling terrorism, each scoring a respectable 89%. A significant gap in compliance is detected in the next strata of scores as commitments geared towards helping build Africa’s capacity to trade and mobilize investment as well as support for UN work on post-tsunami humanitarian aid and reconstruction, each score 67%. Commitments to support the “Education for All” initiative, as well as those geared towards the development of cleaner, more efficient and low-emitting vehicles tie at 56%. Scoring slightly below the median at 44%, and tying three ways, are commitments to support the polio eradication initiative, the commitment to mobilize $20 billion over ten years for non-proliferation initiatives, and the provision of additional resources for Africa’s
peacekeeping forces. Scoring 33% are commitments to address products of interest to Least Developed Countries (LDCs) in trade negotiations. Just below this, at 25%, is the G8’s commitment to reduce Iraq’s debt by implementing the terms of the November 2004 Paris Club agreement. Tied at 22% are three commitments including one to meet the financing needs for HIV/AIDS through the replenishment of the Global Fund, another aimed at doubling aid for Africa by 2010, and the final geared towards supporting a comprehensive set of actions to raise agricultural productivity in Africa. Issues focused on transnational crime, particularly through the improvement of coordination on anti-counterfeiting and anti-piracy crime strategies, as well as commitments to reduce trade distorting domestic agricultural subsidies in Africa, score quite low on the overall compliance spectrum at 11%. The one commitment in which a “work in progress” score of “0” is logged by all G8 members and the EU is with respect to the cancellation of all debts owed by eligible highly indebted poor countries (HIPCIs) to IDA, the IMF and the African Development Fund. Good governance, particularly focused on the early ratification of the UN Convention against Corruption, is the only issue to fall within the negative range with an interim score of —11%.

These interim findings reveal some striking differences with the interim results from previous assessments. Where debt relief initiatives to the highly indebted poor countries garnered the highest compliance rate (100%) at the interim point post Sea Island, commitments in this area fall at the opposite end of the spectrum, with compliance score of 0 in the post-Gleneagles period. Another significant shift is with respect to the environment, where leaders scored a “0” post Sea Island, but jumped to 100% following Gleneagles. Transport security and polio eradication also showed significant gains with compliance scores increasing by over 40% in both cases from one year ago. Where no significant changes were made from the previous assessments were in the areas of polio eradication (44%) and transnational crime (11%). Improvements are seen, however, in overall compliance terms post Gleneagles as only one issue area falls within the negative range, contrary to the post Sea Island period, where three issues fell scored in the negative range at the interim point.

**Interim and Final Compliance Scores Compared**

Although a comprehensive analytical assessment will not be available until the final compliance scores are in, to date, these interim compliance scores compare favourably with the overall scores from previous Summits including Cologne 1999 (39%), Birmingham 1998 (45%), Denver 1997 (27%) and Lyon (36%). Scores post Gleneagles are comparable to Evian 2003 (51%) and Genoa 2001 (49.5) and only significantly surpassed by Okinawa 2000 (81.4%).

**Conclusions**

The issue of how well each of the summit members does with respect to complying with their commitments in previous years is, we believe, an important one for its answers point to areas where the G8 needs to undertake remedial action. But furthermore, it allows us to assess how much credibility the leaders bring to the summit table, and whether the products of the summits deserve to be treated with any degree of seriousness at all.

These scores are offered with an invitation for others to challenge, confirm, enrich and supplement them. We welcome contributions to this on-going empirical, methodological and analytical exercise.

We very much look forward to the Russian hosted Summit this year, as we will keenly take stock of the commitments reached in St. Petersburg and analyze their successes in the weeks and months following the Summit. We also look forward to offering our St. Petersburg interim compliance report in January 2007.