РОЛЬ МЕЖДУНАРОДНЫХ ОРГАНИЗАЦИЙ В РЕАЛИЗАЦИИ ЭКОНОМИЧЕСКИХ ОБЯЗАТЕЛЬСТВ «ГРУППЫ ВОСЬМИ»*

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IMPLEMENTING G8 ECONOMIC COMMITMENTS: HOW INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTION HELP

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В статье представлен анализ деятельности международных организаций (МО) в процессе подготовки саммитов «Группы восьми» и реализации принятых в рамках саммитов решений. Рассматривается ряд гипотез относительно того, какие аспекты взаимодействия являются (или могут быть) наиболее эффективными для решения задач глобального управления. Автор выделяет 15 основных типов «вклада» международных организаций в реализацию обязательств «Группы восьми». На этапе подготовки саммита – информационная, аналитическая и экспертная поддержка, а также внесение предложений по вопросам повестки дня и содействие в процессе формирования консенсуса. Во время саммита – повышение уровня осведомленности, понимания и восприятия проблем, обсуждаемых на саммите, национальным и международным сообществом; повышение уровня доверия, принятия и легитимности решений. После саммита – соучастие в реализации принятых обязательств, выполнение функций секретариата, подготовка специалистов и мониторинг исполнения принятых решений.

Кроме того, определены факторы, влияющие на повышение уровня принятия международными организациями решений «Группы восьми». Прежде всего, соучастие в выработке решений, включение конкретных упоминаний о МО в текст документов саммита, членство стран-участниц «Группы восьми» в международных организациях и возможность контроля их деятельности, взаимный опыт, совмещение председательства, раннее вовлечение в подготовку саммитов, тесная координация в рамках национальных ведомств структур, ответственных за подготовку саммита и структур, ответственных за взаимодействие с МО, специфические характеристики стран. В Заключении автор формулирует некоторые вопросы для дальнейшего обсуждения и исследования, в частности, насколько полное членство России в ОЭСР, ВТО и других институтах будет способствовать повышению уровня исполнения обязательств «Группы восьми»?

Могут ли международные институты (например, ОЭСР) выполнять функции секретариата «Группы восьми»? Может ли создание секретариата «Группы восьми» содействовать повышению уровня координации с международными институтами и повышению уровня исполнения обязательств «Группы восьми»?

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Paper prepared for a 2006 G8 Pre-Summit Seminar “On the Road to St. Petersburg: The Role of International Organizations in Implementing G8 Commitments,” co-sponsored by the State University Higher School of Economics (SU-HSE), Moscow and the G8 Research Group, University of Toronto, Toronto, Moscow, June 30, 2006. Version of June 22. I am grateful for the contribution of Laura Sunderland, Senior Researcher of the G8 Research Group.

Introduction

How do international institutions help the Group of Eight (G8) change the world? More specifically, how have and can the world’s other international institutions assist the G8 in enhancing its member’s compliance with, and the effective implementation of, the commitments made and directions set by G8 leader’s at their annual summit and by the broader G8 system as a whole?

These questions are becoming more important. The current G8 has been making an

* Материал подготовлен директором Исследовательского центра «Группы восьми» университета Торонто профессором Дж. Киртоном для международного семинара о роли международных организаций в реализации обязательств «Группы восьми», проведенного совместно ГУ ВШЭ и Исследовательским центром «Группы восьми» университета Торонто.

increasing number of commitments, of a more ambitious kind, over a broader range of issues. G8 governors have been assigning to the world's major established international institutions as well as those in their own G8-centric system responsibility for implementing the decisions that G8 leaders collectively make. In preparing and producing the 2006 St. Petersburg Summit Russia, hosting a regular G8 summit for the first time but without full membership in all parts of the G8-centered system, is relying on other international institutions to an unusually high degree to make its first summit a success. It has invited as participants to the St. Petersburg summit an abnormally large number of leaders of the international institutions most relevant to the summit's work.

Yet little is known about how well, how, where, when and why these international institutions help or harm compliance with, and implementation of G8 commitments, and which institutions can be counted on in particular situations to help the most. There is thus a very slender foundation for judging which international institutions should be invited to a summit, and how they should be involved in the overall summit process and system throughout the year. There is also little to guide outside analysts and G8 governors in assessing, selecting from, and innovatively expanding the diverse array of recommendations about how the G8-international institutional connection can be improved to more effectively solve the many major global problems the G8 and its sister international institutions take up.

To help build the analytical foundations required for improving G8 compliance and implementation, this study undertakes in a preliminary fashion five essential tasks. First, it briefly reviews the existing debate and evidence about how international institutions improve G8 compliance. Second, it offers an analytical framework for assessing the many ways in which international institutions can help and harm G8 implementation. Third, it presents a set of hypotheses about why international institutions help the G8 with compliance and implementation in an effective way. Fourth, it offers new evidence and analysis from the G8's recent compliance record to test some of these hypotheses. Fifth it identifies the major policy questions that have arisen in regard to the way international institutions might better assist with G8 implementation, notes what the existing evidence and analysis can say about them, and what further research is required before more innovative recommendations can be confidently put forth.

Throughout this study, the emphasis is on decisional commitments within the broader array of governance functions the G8 summit and system perform. It is also on the first order compliance of the members, rather than extended implementation through to solving the problem addressed. It is also on the one way relationship flowing from G8 governance to international institutional responsiveness and support. The study does not deal with the equally important reciprocal relationship in which the G8 helps implement international institutional commitments and governance. However it is hypothesized that the connection between two is a synergistic two way street in which G8 support for international institutions constitutes a cause of the institutions' help for the G8 in its compliance, implementation and other tasks in return, in a relationship of both specific and diffuse reciprocity. Thus a full temporal spectrum is included in this analysis, running from the start of an annual G8 summit's preparatory process through to its implementation end and how other international institutions are involved at every stage. Such involvement should, it is hypothesized, produce superior results to the alternative of the G8 involving international institutions only immediately after the summit commitments are publicly produced, as a *fait accompli* from a *deus ex machina* directoire that then asks other institutions out of the blue to help implement what the G8 has already decided all on its own.

1. An Assessment of Existing Arguments and Evidence

A. The Debate Among Competing Schools of Thought

To date, the debate on the link between the G8 and other international institutions in regard to compliance and implementation has centered on three major competing schools of thought.

i. G8 Governance through Multilateral Organizations. The first school, pioneered by Ella Kokotsis in her 1999 democratic institutionalist model of G8 performance, presents a vision of effective G8 governance through multilateral or-

ganizations[1]. It argues that the work of multilateral organizations controlled by G7 members is an important cause of compliance with G8 commitments when those organizations are directly relevant to the particular G8 commitments in question (Kokotsis 1999, Daniels and Kokotsis 1999). Thus, from 1988 to 1995 compliance with G7 commitments by the United States and Canada was higher in those areas – assistance to the former Soviet Union and debt relief for the poorest – most relevant to the long established, most powerful multilateral organizations – the 1944 International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank that were employed by the G7 as an implementing instrument, and controlled by the G7 members through their dominance of the institutions' executive boards. In contrast, compliance was less in those fields – climate change and biodiversity – where the relevant institutions – the 1973 United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) and the 1992 secretariats of the United Nations Framework Conventions on Climate Change and Biodiversity – were more recent, more fragmented, less organizationally powerful, and less controlled by the G7.

Also relevant in causing compliance were institutional factors at the informal G7-centered plurilateral, and national level. For in the finance fields there was a G7 ministerial forum since 1973 (which Canada and Italy joined in 1986) and strong co-ordinative centres within the Treasury Department and Department of Finance, while in the environmental field, a G7 ministerial meeting emerged only in 1992, and national co-ordinative centres remained relatively weak. In all cases, however, compliance for both countries improved from 1992 on, when new multilateral and G7-centered institutions arose in finance and especially in the environment fields.

ii. G8 Governance against Multilateral Organizations. The second, sharply contrasting school, developed by John Kirton in his concert equality model, argues for effective G8 governance against multilateral organizations[2]. It argues that the G8, born of the great failure and its founding leaders' dislike of the old multilateral organizations during the crises of the early 1970's, has increasingly moved from reinforcing, through reforming, to replacing with antithetical alternatives the old multilateral organizations and their order with a fundamentally different G8-centred system of its own. This evolution was first seen in newer "transnational/global" issues areas, such as energy, the environment, information technology, terrorism, and transnational crime where the old multilateral order had no organizations of its own. Yet after the great failure of the G7 to reform the 1944 Bretton Woods and broader 1940's functional UN system at the 1995 Halifax summit where institutional reform was the defining focus, the G7 moved to create a new generation of G8-centered institutions to govern the traditional economic fields, notably the Group of Twenty (G20) and Financial Stability Forum (FSF) for finance in a now globalized world, and the African Personal Representatives, African Partnership Forum and a G8 meeting of development ministers for development in a now rapidly democratizing one. This G8-led great transformation in global governance subsequently extended into the political-security field, with the G8's liberation of Kosovo and development of its conflict prevention agenda and forums in 1999 (Kirton 2002).

Across all domains the established international organizations are not allies but adversaries in the G8's effort to ensure effective compliance and implementation. For these organizations have at least obsolete and often antithetical mandates, management and governance arrangements, cultures, and a record and reputation of failure, and have proven impervious to change by a deter-

[1] In the seminal work prior to that of Kokotsis, George Von Furstenberg and Jospeh Daniels' conjectures ruled out the structural factor of member countries' relative capability as a relevant cause of compliance. Quan Li's (2001) subsequent analysis of their data set found that compliance with inflation control commitments were correlated positively with the interstate level variable of reciprocating behaviour and negatively with the domestic level variables of divided/coalition governments and uncertainty. International institutional variables were not accessed.

[2] Kirton's concert equality model, developed to explain the G8's governance performance overall, highlighted member countries' relative vulnerability and capability, along with poor UN-based multilateral organizational performance, the common purpose and constricted participation within the G8 summit, and the domestic political capital and control of G8 leaders at home. The model worked well almost everywhere, but failed to account for G8 compliance overall or in the trade and finance fields (Kirton 2004). Its failure in explaining compliance may have flowed from its neglect of the striking growth and operation of G8 sub-summit institutions in reinforcing compliance and of the way the leaders themselves mobilize their political capacities at the summit consciously to craft commitments that will bind their own and their partners' polities to comply for a longer time.

mined G7 at its most self confident post cold war height. The failure of the UN to change its charter and Security Council at its September 2005 World Summit and that of the IMF and World Bank to transform itself for the twenty-first century in ways that the now finance-surplus superpowers of Japan, China and other Asian want strongly suggests that the G8 will be able to count even less on the old multilateral organizations in the years ahead.

iii. G8 Governance without International Organizations. The third school of thought, lying between the first two but with a tilt toward the second, points to G8 governance without international organizations. Developed most explicitly by Nicholas Bayne, and elaborated in a detailed look at the G8's relationship with the OECD, this view begins with the original frustration of G7 leaders with the inherited multilateral organizations and their poor performance during the crisis ridden world of 1970–75 (Bayne 2000). As Bayne (2000: 45) put it "The OECD covered all the economic subjects of concern to the summits and included all the summit participants. But the political objectives of the leaders and their reaction against bureaucratic procedures made it difficult for the summits and the OECD to work together. Their relations were often tense or distant. The OECD, instead of being encouraged by the summits, at times came to feel threatened by them. While these tensions did not endure, the end of the Cold War and the advance of globalization shifted the summits' attention to institutions of wider membership." He added that as the G7's fourth cycle began, the connection between the G8 and the OECD withered too. His analysis suggests the relationship between the G8 and institutions is one of mutual co-existence and non-involvement when their agendas are different, but one of tension when they are the same. In the latter case, the central cause is the seminal anti-bureaucratic convictions of the leaders-driven G8, and implicitly the failure of most institutions to have an annual leaders-driven centrepiece similar to that of the G8.

B. The Available Evidence

The most recent attempts to analyze the course and causes of effective compliance with, and implementation of G8 commitments across a wide array of issues areas and countries has yielded a rich repertoire of evidence for developing hypotheses and guiding future empirical research (Kirton 2006, Kokotsis 2006, Panova 2006, Savic 2006, Scherrer 2006, Stephens 2006, Ullrich 2006). But it has produced no compelling analysis to suggest which of the three basic competing visions is most likely to be more correct.

The most recent systematic research, assessing G8 compliance since 1996 in the field of health and especially finance has focused on how G8 leaders themselves as autonomous agents can improve compliance by embedding eight different "compliance catalysts" in the commitments they craft or approve at the summit, and whether these are in turn assisted or driven by the work of their own G7/8 ministerial bodies or structural forces in the world as a whole. Here it seems that when leaders at their summit embed their finance commitment with a specific timetable to be met, and with a priority placement in their declaration, greater compliance comes (Kirton 2006). Moreover, when their G7/8 finance ministers remember and repeat the same commitment in the year before and in the year after the summit, compliance rises as well. A combination of increasingly equal vulnerability and capability among the G8 members inspire finance ministers to remember and repeat such commitments, but does not directly increase compliance itself. These findings offer some support for the argument of "G8 governance against multilateral organizations." But they did not include an examination of the impact of international institutions beyond the G8 in the ensuing actions taken by member countries to put these commitments into effect (as distinct from their presence in the commitment itself).

2. An Analytic Framework of the G8-International Institutional Connection

In order to explore this largely missing ingredient of outside international institutional involvement as a cause of compliance, the first task is to develop an analytic framework that identifies in some systematic fashion the multiple ways in which international institutions are connected to the G8 system of governance, and how they help or harm the G8's compliance and implementation tasks.

Here three dimensions stand out[3]. The first is the level of connection. On the G8 system side, this ranges from the leaders summit and their personal representatives or "sherpas", through the many ministerial G8 and G8 centric bodies, to the three dozen or more official level and increasingly multi-stakeholders bodies that that G8 has created since 1975 to assist with and implement its work. A similar hierarchical range applies to the international institutions, with the important addition that they often have permanent secretariats and thus the full time international civil servants (at many levels) that the G8 system entirely lacks. For this initial study, where the focus is on compliance with the commitments made or approved by G8 leaders at their annual summit, the framework is confined to contributions the international institutions make to the G8 summit level, although the framework developed for this purpose may also apply to levels below.

However here, a basic structural imbalance between the two sides should be noted, beyond the important material reality that the institutions overwhelmingly have secretariats that the G8 has always completely lacked. This is that the G8 reliably meets face-to-face at the leaders' level at least once a year, whereas the institutions usually do not. The one institution that reliably beats the G8 in this regard, and has a vast international secretariat of its own as well – the European Union – is also a member of the G8. Together with the relatively small size and combined power of the G8, it is thus analytically sensible, if politically insensitive, to begin the analysis in the first instance by conceiving of the G8 as the world's inner cabinet or "directoire" for global governance, with the international institutions constituting the civil servants required to implement what their all popularly and democratically elected G8 political masters direct them too[4].

The second dimension is the timing of the connection. Again with the G8 and its core institutional process as the referent, the relevant time period extends from the pre-summit "preparatory" phase, which starts immediately after the previous years' summit is done, through the intra-summit "on-site" stage at the summit itself, to the post-summit "implementation" phase that starts immediately after the summit its over when its decisions have just been released in its public documents and the task of compliance and implementation begins to continue for at least the following year. While the contributions international institutions make for each phase may extend into the others, each contribution can be best considered as making its greatest contribution at, a single stage.

A third dimension is the intentionality of the international institutions' contribution, on the part of the G8 and the relevant institution(s) alike. Taken together, in broadest terms, the combination of the two sides revolves around the "reinforce, reform, replace" trilogy familiar from Kirton's work. That is, are the two sides pulling together as allies (with support flowing both ways if not in equal degrees)? Or are they competitive colleagues, each trying to do the same things differently and better to the same end, reforming the other to this same end, or each doing different things for the common cause, even as ships passing in the night, with one serving, consciously or not and in a co-ordinated fashion or not, as the global governance gap filler for issue areas or functions that the other cannot do? Or are they adversaries, each acting against the other to govern the same fields through the same functions on a foundation of antithetical values and to essentially different ends to realize the very different vision of global order each holds dear?

Within this larger framework, the dimension of intentionality embraces three components on both the G8's and institutions' side. The first is awareness of what the other is doing, intends to do, or wants done. The second is the willingness of each side to support, co-exist or compete

[3] Other analytic dimensions to be developed and incorporated are scope (issues of intra G8 or global concern, following Bayne's analysis) and function (especially given the inherent comprehensiveness and interconnectedness of the G8).

[4] The use of the term "directoire" will immediately inspire the objection, usually voiced by G8 cofounder France, that the G8 is not a directoire. It clearly is in the English language sense of a board of directors for global governance. It has arguably become so in the seminal French-language sense of the directoire that decided who would live or die during the terror of the French revolution. The G8 has often done so by omission, in such cases as Darfur. It also has started doing so by commission, by initiating the war to liberate Kosovo in 1999, using the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as is implementing international institution of choice.

with the other. The third is the ability of each side to put its will (including that elusive substance of "political will") into effect, with the resources it has at hand or can readily raise. On the G8 side, the G8 may deliberately be aware of the institutions' work, seek to not duplicate, respond to, and support it, and craft its commitments to be compatible with those of the institutions or easily be put into effect by them.

Within this analytic framework it is possible to construct the following list of the fifteen major contributions international institutions make to G8 compliance, implementation and governance in general, arranged along the temporal dimension identified above. While specific contribution can run throughout and beyond all stages in the summit's year, each is considered to be most relevant to a particular stage, as identified below. In all cases a premium is placed on critical resources the international institutions can offer that the G8 lacks entirely or has in short supply, and that its member national governments (and even the quasi-national/quasi-international institutional European Union) cannot easily provide.

A. At the Summit: The Commitment Stage

At and around the time of the summit, international institutions can provide six crucial resources. This is especially the case if they are involved in the leaders' discussions on site but can also be done by communication or public and private endorsements from afar. These six resources are:

1. Visibility. The institutions can create greater awareness for G8 governance around the world in new constituencies. They carry awareness of G8 governance out through international institutions out to their own constituents and stakeholders and the wider world.

2. Sensitivity. International institutions can provide superior information about the problem being addressed, work already being done by others including themselves, and the likely reaction of their broader membership to the G8's proposed deliberations, directions, decisions, and development of new institutions, in ways that can improve what the G8 leaders do on site. They can thus generate G8 commitments that are inherently more appealing to and absorbable by the outside world, even in the absence of further action on the institutions' part.

3. Understanding. The involvement of international institutions at or during the summit can provide them with a better understanding of the intentions, context and political considerations behind G8 actions and thus enable the institutions to better implement them, assuming this enriched awareness is accompanied by a willingness to assist on the institutions part.

4. Buy In. Involvement in the shaping of G8 actions can allow the institutions to "buy in" to them, by adopting them as their own, and taking ownership of them. This moves the institutions from mere awareness to an embedded willingness to assist.

5. Credibility. Involvement by the institutions can give G8 actions greater credibility, in that inside and outside constituencies will know that these actions are grounded in and backed by the intellectual, bureaucratic, financial and legal resources that the institutions bring. For example, at Gleneagles, the G8 leaders in their communiqué explicitly relied on the OECD to define the figures for how much their ODA pledge would be worth to give it greater credibility in the eyes of a world skeptical of the G8 itself. This extends the institutions' contribution from awareness and willingness to the ability to assist.

6. Legitimacy. Involvement by the institutions can confer greater legitimacy on G8 actions, regardless of their content, by having them approved by or associated with bodies with a much broader membership (in number of members and across all diversity dimensions such as region and class). Moreover to the extent that the executive heads of international organizations, such as Kofi Anan as Secretary General of the UN, have legitimacy in their own right, their involvement with the G8 can reinforce the legitimizing effect.

B. After the Summit: The Implementation Stage

After the summit, G8-aware institutions which are willing and able to assist can make further contributions in specific valuable ways, largely by bringing their critical resources of money, staff, secretariats and stakeholders, and legal authority

to bear. Among their many contributions, the following stand out.

7. Burden-Sharing. The first is broadened burden sharing, as institutions add the money of the institution itself or its non-G8 members to that mobilized by the G8 to put G8 decisions into effect. Cases in point include donations to the G8-created global funds and projects of the Global Fund Against AIDS, TB and Malaria, assistance packages to the former Soviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe, and debt cancellation for the poorest countries at Gleneagles in 2005.

8. Substitute Secretariat. International institutions can serve as substitute secretariats for a G8 system that ahs none of its own and that is adamantly against creating any for the particular G8-centered processes and institutions it creates. One case is the WHO assuming the accounting and associated responsibilities for the Global Fund which the G8 created along with the UN in 2001. One prospective case is the recent offer by the new head of the OECD to have no organization formally assume the role of serving as the secretariat for the G8.

9. Training. Institutions with their experience, permanent professional staff and associated resources can provide training to those the G8 wants trained. One recent case is the role of the OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC) in training Africans about the process of peer review.

10. Compliance Monitoring. With their permanent professional staff, international institutions could perform compliance monitoring of or for the G8, by systematically assessing how much and how G8 members are complying with G8 commitments. They could do so with or without the G8's permission, co-operation or even knowledge. They could extend this contribution to include evaluations of the effectiveness of G8 actions in solving the problems they address.

C. Before the Summit: the Preparation Stage

Prior to the summit, during the preparation stage, institutions can also make an important contribution. Their involvement can range from providing services that routinely as a public good that the G8 can freely access, through to lobbying for G8 action on initiatives and resources preferred by the institutions (notably raising more money for them) through to adopting a full component of the G8's agenda and action plan on the G8's behalf (as with the World Bank and energy poverty for St. Petersburg in 2006). Whatever the directness and direction of the connection, several critical institutional contributions stand out.

11. Information. The first is information, starting with the provision of statistics that provide reliable information on the state of global problems, causes and responsive actions, including on the part of members of the G8. Here the IMF's and OECD's regular forecasts of global and comparative country growth stand out as forming the foundation for the G8's treatment of its "world economy" agenda. Such reliable information can form the foundation for G8 agenda-setting (what problems need to be addressed now), direction-setting (what new principles and norms are needed) and decision-making of several kinds (for example, by forming the base from which G8 commitments are calculated, as in doubling official development assistance (ODA) to Africa by 2010). Institutions also serve as a permanent repository for information, and a convenient meeting place for facilitating the work of G8 bodies, such as the Financial Action Task Force.

12. Analysis. International institutions can assemble various stream of information into analysis that further helps the G8 identify what problems need to be addressed, by whom, and how soon. A classic case is the OECD's creation in the 1980s of a producer subsidy equivalent formula to measure agricultural subsidies, a formula used by the G7 summit in its effort to control such subsidies and thus liberalize agricultural trade. The findings of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, for example, catalyse and shape the G8's work on climate change.

14. Consensus. International institutions can also generate analytically based policy and political consensus that forms a foundation for G8 commitments to be created, complied with and implemented. They provide a continuous meeting place for contact and communication among members, especially when the institutions have G7/8 caucus groups, as do the IMF and OECD. The institutions can share, compare, and chose best practices, facilitate the application of peer pressure and moral suasion, and promote or con-

duct more active forms of policy co-ordination as a foundation for or on behalf of the G8.

15. Catalytic Support. International institutions can provide the pressure or support required to get the G8 to agree to create a commitment in a certain way, with sufficient force to propel compliance with the commitment soon after it is announced. These are the commitments created by the institutions and adopted by the G8 and thus the ones the institutions best understand, have bought into for the longest time, and are thus more likely to actively help put into effect.

3. Hypotheses to Explain International Institutional Assistance with G8 Compliance

Under what conditions will international institutions make these contributions and improve compliance with G8 commitments as a result. The relevant conditions come from a wide range of domains, embracing the nature of the institution, the G8 and the relationship between the two. Among the rich array of hypotheses than arise across this wide range, the following stand out.

1. Participation. The more the institutions participate at and in the G8 summit, ministerial meetings, and official level bodies, the greater the contribution the institutions will make in assisting with compliance and implantation, across all the components noted above (See Appendix A).

2. Communiqуй Incorporation. The more G8 summit communiquйs and their commitments explicitly reference institutions and different institutions, the more likely the institutions will do what the G8 directs (See Appendices B, C, D).

3. Mission Compatibility. The more the charter-encoded core, constitutional mission of the institution coincides with the G8's seminal values of globally promoting open democracy, individual liberty and social advance, the more the institution will effectively assist in G8 compliance and implementation.

4. Membership Overlap. The more G8 members (and their partners participating in their meetings) dominate the membership of the institution, the more the institution will effectively assist in G8 compliance and implementation. Thus the old OECD should help more than the new OECD with its expanded membership, and much more than the virtually universal UN (See Appendix E, F).

5. Managerial Control. When G8 members and their participating partners dominate the management structure of the international institution, through voting shares, decision-rules and membership on the inner management core or Executive Board, greater compliance assistance will arise[5].

6. Mutual Experience. The more experience G8 leaders and sherpas (and their ministers and officials) have had or simultaneously have with institutions, and the more the institutions have had with the G8, the more the institutions will assist in the G8 compliance and implementation task (See Appendix G).

7. Co-hosting Responsibility. When the G8 host simultaneously serves as the head of another international institution (such as the EU within the G8 system), then grater compliance assistance from that institution will arise, as the host tries to co-ordinate its approach to global governance between the two. One case is Canada's hosting of the Commonwealth and La Francophone summits in the fall of 1987, in the lead-up to the G7 summit it hosted in Toronto in June 1988.

8. Early Involvement. The more the international institutions are involved in G8 governance and commitment creation at an early stage and ideally from the very start, the more the institutions will effectively assist in G8 compliance and implementation.

9. Government Organizational Co-ordination. When responsibility for G8 and other international institutions are combined in a single division/bureaucratic centre in a G8 member's home government, implementation assistance increases, as co-ordinated strategies can more easily be mounted by the member states.

[5] Financial contributions from G8 members may not have the same effect, as the difference between a high financial contribution and low managerial control may lead to unresponsiveness and frustrations, as with UNESCO and the US and UK.

10. Country Specific Hypothesis. In addition, a further series of country specific hypotheses, building on hypothesis 9 above, can be devised, along the following lines (See Appendix H). A country's compliance with commitments that are assisted by an international institution is likely to be greater when that country is an institutional member, founder, or board member (as all G7 members are in the IMF and World Bank's Executive Board but Japan, Germany, Italy and Canada are not in the UN's Security Council Permanent Five).

4. The Evidence from the G8 Compliance Record

An initial empirical assessment of how international institutions enhance G8 compliance can be made, following Hypothesis 1 above, by seeing if the summits where the institutions participate generate priority commitments with higher compliance scores Appendix B suggests they do, especially when they participate in summit sessions themselves.

A second assessment, following Hypothesis 2 above, can be made by considering the record on compliance with G8 priority commitments from 1996 to 2005 to determine if high compliance is associated with the relevance and relationship of international institutions in the commitment itself and in the compliance behaviour which follows. In the commitment itself, attention is directed to the explicit presence or absence of a notation to a non-G8-centered international institution, the number of such institutions, and the number of different institutions, and the number of particular institutions noted. In the later case, the same dimensions would be measured for the behaviour of all (and each) member countries that constitute compliance, as identified in the research reports of G8 Research Group analysts who have assessed compliance with that commitment each year. On this foundation, attention can be then directed at particular combinations of issues, G8 members and international institutions where compliance is particularly high (or low).

A. Gleneagles 2005-6

This analysis begins with the preliminary final compliance results for the 21 priority commitments assessed from the July 6-8, 2005 Gleneagles summit, through the ensuring eleven months just prior to the St. Petersburg Summit on July 15-17th, 2006. This set of 21 assessed commitments from the summit's total of 212 constitutes the largest annual sample to date, and arguably the most thorough reports on members' compliant behaviour with each. As Appendices I and J indicate, compliance tend to be higher when the commitments contain more references to international institutions, mention a wider variety of institutions, and (more tentatively) offer the institutions support rather than guidance. Those institutions featured uniquely in the high compliance commitments – the Quartet, the Paris Club, and the African Development Bank – are those dominated by the G7 in membership and management (and financial contribution in the last case).

B. Sea Island, 2004-5

These results only partly emerge at the 2004 Sea Island Summit (Appendix K). More reference to institutions and to different institutions does not increase compliance. perhaps this is because of the particular institutions and G8 relationship selected. The G8 in its lowest complying commitments relied heavily on the virtually universal UN and on instructing (leading) it in what to do, rather than offering support. This approach came at a summit where, for the first time in four years, not a single international institution (including the most frequent favorite, the UN) was invited to participate.

C. Okinawa, 2000-1

At Okinawa in 2000 however, the highest complying summit in G7/8 history, the Sea Island pattern was reversed. More references to institutions and to different institutions did increase compliance. The commitments with the highest compliance contained the most references to the UN and the WTO, and to leading them without offering and support even though no institutions were there to participate. This striking difference in the two summits hosted by the G8's two most powerful countries may be explained by systemic factors such as the 911 terrorist attacks that struck after Japan's hosting but before that of America under George W. Bush. However it may also point to particular compliance-inducing combinations of the G8 host country and the institutions specified as compliance instruments, with a multilateralist, UN-committed Japan is juxtaposed against a unilateralist, UN-skeptical U.S.

5. The Analytic Case for Policy Innovation

Further analysis along these lines should yield a richer empirical foundation for assessing the wisdom of the major policy recommendations offered to improve summit performance in the compliance and other domains. The major questions in regard to these recommendations are as follows:

1. Would making Russia a greater participant in and full member of the OECD, IEA, WTO and similar institutions (as all other G8 members are) help in the implementation of G8 commitments?

2. Should the OECD assume a stronger and more formal role of a particular sort as a "secretariat" for the G8, in some functions or overall?

3. Should the OECD meet at the summit level, perhaps first to celebrate its 50th anniversary in 2010/11 and combine this summit with the work of the G8 summit that and each year? Should other international institutions move to match the G8 by having summits every year?

4. Can international institutions assist more directly in the systematic monitoring of G8 compliance and implementation?

5. Would the greater involvement of civil society representatives in, and more openness, transparency and answerability from, the G8 and the international institutions help?

6. Would the creation of a G8 Secretariat, to match and co-ordinate continuously with those of most other institutions, help compliance?

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Appendix A:
International Organizations at the Annual G7/8 Summit

1996 Lyon

United Nations: Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Secretary-General
International Monetary Fund: Michel Camdessus, Managing Director
World Bank: James Wolfensohn, President
World Trade Organization: Renato Ruggiero, Director-General

2001 Genoa

United Nations: Kofi Annan, Secretary-General
World Bank: James Wolfensohn, President
World Trade Organization: Renato Ruggiero, Director-General World Health Organization: Gro Harlem Brundtland, Director-General

2002 Kananaskis

United Nations: Kofi Annan, Secretary-General

2003 Evian

United Nations: Kofi Annan, Secretary-General
World Bank: James Wolfensohn, President
International Monetary Fund: Horst Köhler, Managing Director
World Trade Organization: Supachai Panitchpakdi, Director-General

2005 Gleneagles

Commission of the African Union: Alpha Oumar Konare, Chair
International Energy Agency: Claude Mandil, Executive Director
International Monetary Fund: Rodrigo de Rato y Figaredo, Managing Director
United Nations: Kofi Annan, Secretary-General
World Bank: Paul Wolfowitz, President
World Trade Organization: Supachai Panitchpakdi, Director-General

2006 St. Petersburg

Commission of the African Union: Alpha Oumar Konare, Chair
CIS: Nursultan Nazarbayev, Chairman-in-office
International Energy Agency: Claude Mandil, Executive Director
International Atomic Energy Agency: Mohammed ElBaradei, Director-General
UNESCO: Koichiro Matsuura, Director-General
World Health Organization: Dr. Anders Nordström, Acting Director-General
United Nations: Kofi Annan, Secretary-General

Appendix B:
Analysis of International Institutions at the G8 Summit, 1989–2005

Year	Final compliance score	Interim compliance score	No. IOs present	UN present	IMF	WB	WTO	NAM	WHO	IEA	AU
Overall Ave.	**47.2**	**41.1**	**3**	**71%**	**43%**	**57%**	**57%**	**29%**	**14%**	**14%**	**14%**
Overall Ave. with IOs	**47.8**	**41.4**									
Overall Ave. without IOs	**46.8**	**40.0**									
1996–2005 Ave. with IOs	**50.3**	**41.4**									
1996–2005 Ave. without IOs	**43.6**	**40.0**									
1989	*+07.8*		*1***					*Yes*			
1990	–14.0										
1991	00.0										
1992	+64.0										
1993	*+75.0*		*1**					*Yes*			
1994	+100.0										
1995	+100.0										
1996	*+36.2*		*4***	*Yes*	*Yes*	*Yes*	*Yes*				
1997	+12.8										
1998	+31.8										
1999	+38.2										
2000	+81.4										
2001	*+49.5*		*4****	*Yes*		*Yes*	*Yes*		*Yes*		
2002	+35.0	+29.8	1***	Yes							
2003	+65.8	+47.1	4***	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes				
2004	+54.0	+40.0									
2005	*+65.0*	*+47.4*	*6****	*Yes*	*Yes*	*Yes*	*Yes*			*Yes*	*Yes*

* met with host only (proximity presence)
** met with all G7/8 leaders before or after summit (margins presence)
*** met with all G7/8 leaders during summit (integral presence)

Compliance scores from 1990 to 1995 measure compliance with commitments selected by Ella Kokotsis. Compliance scores from 1996 to 2005 measure compliance with G8 Research Group's selected commitments. The 2005 final compliance score is the preliminary (June 20, 2005) score.

Note: The NAM met with the G8 Foreign Ministers met in Cologne on June 10, 1999, before the leaders' summit from 18–20, 1999. They met again on July 13, 2000, before the July 20–23, 2000 leaders' summit.

Appendix C:
A Model of Agency, Institutionalization and Structure

A. Agency: Compliance Catalysts

1. Priority placement
2. Target
3. Timetable
4. Remit mandate
5. Money mobilized
6. Agent
7. G8 body
8. International Institution

B. Institutionalization

1. Re-mentions by the G7/8 Finance Ministers
2. Pre-mentions by the G7/8 Finance Ministers
3. Post-mentions by G7-centred Finance Ministerial Bodies
4. Recommitment by G7/8 Finance Ministers
5. Pre-commitment by G7/8 Finance Ministers
6. Post-affirmation by G7/8 Finance Ministers

Structure

Vulnerabilities

1. Percent change in price of Brent Crude Oil barrel (London)
2. Percent change in price of gold (London)
3. Percent change in global stock markets index
4. Average annual change in G7 economic confidence indicators

Capabilities

5. Average G7 real GDP growth
6. US real GDP growth minus average G7 GDP growth
7. Average appreciation of USD vs. other G7 currencies

Appendix D:
Finance Compliance Scores and Catalysts, 1996–2004

Comm't	Issue Area	Issue	Priority Place-ment	Target	Time-table	Remit Mandate	Money	Agent	G8-Cen-tered Body	Int'l Insti-tution	TTL	Score
1996-1/2	Macro-eco.	Macro-eco.s	yes	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	+1.00
1996-35/36	Micro-eco.	Micro-eco.	yes	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	+0.29
1996-39	Dev't	ODA	-	-				-			0	0.00
1996-48	IFI Reform	UNCTAD	yes	-	-	-	-	-	-	yes	2	+0.29
1996-70	UN Reform I	$ Obligations	yes	-	-	-	-	-	-	yes	2	+0.14
1996-116/117	UN Reform II	Dev't Agenda	-	-	-	-	-	yes	-	yes	2	+0.14
1997-55	Dev't	Africa	yes	-	-	-	-	yes	-	-	2	0.00
1997-S146	Micro-eco.	Employment	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	+0.38
1998-20	Debt	HIPC	-	-	-	-	-	yes	-	yes	2	0.00
1998-42/47	Micro-eco.	Employment	yes	-	-	-	-	-	-	yes	2	0.00
1999-1/2	Debt	HIPC	-	yes	-	-	-	yes	-		2	+0.86
1999-S53	Macro-eco.	Macro-eco.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	+1.00
1999-S54	Exch- Rate	Exch- Rate	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	0.00
1999-S55	Crime	FATF	-	-	-	-	-	-	yes	-	1	0.00
2000-31	Debt	HIPC	-	-				yes	yes	-	2	0.00
2000-32/33	Debt	Decision Points	-	yes	yes	-	-	yes	yes	-	4	–1.00
2000-34	Debt	HIPC	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	0.00
2001-5/6	IFI Reform	IFI Reform	-	-	-	-	-	yes	yes	-	2	–1.00
2001-9	Debt	HIPC	-	(d)	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	+1.00
2001-26	Health	Global Fund	-	-	yes	-	yes	-	yes	yes	4	+0.75
2001-S59	Terrorism	Terrorism	-	-	-	-	-	yes	-	-	1	+1.00
2001-S60	Env't	GEF	yes	-	-	-	-	-	yes	-	2	–0.13

Comm't	Issue Area	Issue	Priority Place-ment	Target	Time-table	Remit Mandate	Money	Agent	G8-Centered Body	Int'l Institution	TTL	Score
2002-10	Africa	ODA	yes	yes	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	+0.50
2002-11	Health	Polio	Yes	yes	yes	-	-	-	-	-	3	0.00
2002-69	Eco.growth	Agri. Trade	yes	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	+0.13
2002-90	Debt	HIPC	yes	-	-	-	yes	-	yes	-	3	+0.25
2003-5	World Eco.	World Eco.	yes	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	+0.25
2003-10	Health	Global Fund	yes	-	yes	-	-	yes	yes	-	4	+0.88
2003-13	Health	Polio	yes	yes	yes	-	-	-	-	-	3	+1.00
2003-15	Dev't	ODA	yes	-	yes	-	-	yes	yes	-	4	+0.88
2003-16	Debt	HIPC	yes	-	yes	-	-	yes	-	-	3	+0.38
2003-36	Crime	Finance	yes	-	-	-	-	-	-	yes	2	-0.50
2003-150	Terrorism	Finance	yes	-	yes	-	-	-	yes	yes	4	+1.00
2004(1)-3-4	Dev't	Doha	yes	-	yes	-	-	yes	-	-	3	+1.00
2004(2)-30	Dev't	Private Entrepreneur	-	-	-	-	-	yes	yes		2	–1.00
2004(7)-1	Africa	Darfur	yes	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	+0.88
2004(11)-3	Health	Polio	yes	-	yes	-	-	yes	-	-	3	+0.44
2004(12)-5/6/7/8/9/10/11	Crime	Finance	-	-	yes	-	-	yes	yes	-	3	+0.11
2004(12)-16	Crime	Finance	yes	-	-	-	-	yes	-	yes	3	+0.44
2004(13)-1/2/3	Debt	HIPC	yes	yes	yes			yes	yes	-	5	+1.00
2004(14)-24	Africa	Famine	yes	-	-	-	-	yes	-	-	2	+0.67
2004(S)-1	World Eco.	World Eco.	yes	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	+0.22
TOTAL			**25/42**	**07/42**	**12/42**	**00/42**	**02/42**	**18/42**	**13/42**	**09/42**	**86**	
Average			**60%**	**17%**	**29%**	**00%**	**05%**	**43%**	**31%**	**21%**	**02**	

Appendix E:
Membership Overlap in the OECD

Year	EU members represented at G7/8 (excluding G7/8 members)	Compliance score	No. members in OECD	% of OECD held by G7/8 countries	% of OECD held by G7/8 countries + EU members
1975 (**G6**)	0	+57.1	24	25%	25%
1976 (**G7**)	0	+08.9	24	29%	29%
1977 (**EU**)	5[6]	+08.4	24	29%	50%
1978	5	+36.3	24	29%	50%
1979	5	+82.3	24	29%	50%
1980	5	+07.6	24	29%	50%
1981	6[7]	+26.6	24	29%	54.2%
1982	6	+84.0	24	29%	54.2%
1983	6	–10.9	24	29%	54.2%
1984	6	+48.8	24	29%	54.2%
1985	6	+01.0	24	29%	54.2%
1986	8[8]	+58.3	24	29%	62.5%
1987	8	+93.3	24	29%	62.5%
1988	8	–47.8	24	29%	62.5%
1989	8	+07.8	24	29%	62.5%
1990	8	–14.0	24	29%	62.5%
1991	8	00.0	24	29%	62.5%
1992	8	+64.0	24	29%	62.5%
1993	8	+75.0	24	29%	62.5%
1994	8	+100.0	25[9]	28%	60%
1995	11[10]	+100.0	26[11]	27%	69.2%
1996	11	+36.2	29[12]	24%	62.1%
1997 (**G8**)*	11	+12.8	29	24%	62.1%
1998	11	+31.8	29	24%	62.1%
1999	11	+38.2	29	24%	62.1%
2000	11	+81.4	30[13]	23%	60%
2001	11	+49.5	30	23%	60%
2002	11	+35.0	30	23%	60%
2003	11	+65.8	30	23%	60%
2004	16[14]	+54.0	30	23%	76.7%
2005	16	+65.0	30	23%	76.7%

* Russia is not a member of the OECD and therefore the addition of Russia does not affect the overall percentage the G8 holds within the OECD.

[6] Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands.
[7] Greece.
[8] Portugal, Spain.
[9] Mexico.
[10] Austria, Finland, Sweden.
[11] Czech Republic.
[12] Hungary, Korea, Poland.
[13] Slovak Republic
[14] Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia.

Appendix F:
Membership Overlap in the United Nations

Year	EU members represented at G7/8 (excluding G7/8 members)	Compliance score	No. members in UN	% of UN held by G7/8 countries	% of UN held by G7/8 countries + EU members	% UNSC P5 held by G7/8 countries
1975 **(G6)**	5[15]	+57.1	144	4.2%	7.6%	60%
1976 **(G7)**	5	+08.9	147	4.7%	8.2%	60%
1977	5	+08.4	149	4.6%	8.1%	60%
1978	5	+36.3	151	4.6%	7.9%	60%
1979	5	+82.3	152	4.6%	7.9%	60%
1980	5	+07.6	154	4.5%	7.8%	60%
1981	6[16]	+26.6	157	4.5%	8.3%	60%
1982	6	+84.0	157	4.5%	8.3%	60%
1983	6	–10.9	158	4.4%	8.2%	60%
1984	6	+48.8	159	4.4%	8.2%	60%
1985	6	+01.0	159	4.4%	8.2%	60%
1986	8[17]	+58.3	159	4.4%	9.4%	60%
1987	8	+93.3	159	4.4%	9.4%	60%
1988	8	–47.8	159	4.4%	9.4%	60%
1989	8	+07.8	159	4.4%	9.4%	60%
1990	8	–14.0	159	4.4%	9.4%	60%
1991	8	00.0	166	4.2%	9.0%	60%
1992	8	+64.0	179	3.9%	8.4%	60%
1993	8	+75.0	184	3.8%	8.2%	60%
1994	8	+100.0	185	3.8%	8.1%	60%
1995	11[18]	+100.0	185	3.8%	9.7%	60%
1996	11	+36.2	185	3.8%	9.7%	60%
1997 **(G8)**	11	+12.8	185	4.3%	10.3%	80%
1998	11	+31.8	185	4.3%	10.3%	80%
1999	11	+38.2	188	4.3%	10.1%	80%
2000	11	+81.4	189	4.2%	10.1%	80%
2001	11	+49.5	189	4.2%	10.1%	80%
2002	11	+35.0	191	4.2%	9.9%	80%
2003	11	+65.8	191	4.2%	9.9%	80%
2004	21[19]	+54.0	191	4.2%	15.2%	80%
2005	21	+65.0	191	4.2%	15.2%	80%

[15] Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands.
[16] Greece.
[17] Portugal, Spain.
[18] Austria, Finland, Sweden.
[19] Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia.

Appendix G:
International Institutional Experience of the Host Sherpa

Year	Compliance score	Sherpa	International Institutional Experience before hosting	International Institutional Experience after hosting
1975	+57.1	Raymond Barre		Prime Minister of France (1976–1981)
1976	+08.9	George P. Shultz		
1977	+08.4	John Hunt		
1978	+36.3	Manfred Lahnstein		
1979	+82.3	Hiromichi Miyazaki		
1980	+07.6	Renato Ruggiero	Italian Mission to the European Community (1969–1970s), spokesman for the President of the European Commission (1977–1978)	WTO Director-General (1995–1999)
1981	+26.6	Allan Gotlieb	delegate to the United Nations' General Assembly (1967–1968)	
1982	+84.0	Jacques Attali		President of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (1991–1993)
1983	–10.9	W. Allen Wallis		
1984	+48.8	Robert Armstrong		
1985	+01.0	Hans Tietmeyer		Chairman of the Bank for International Settlements (2003–2005), Governor of the Fund for Germany at the IMF (1998)
1986	+58.3	Reishi Teshima		
1987	+93.3	Renato Ruggiero	Italian Mission to the European Community (1969–1970s), spokesman for the President of the European Commission (1977–1978)	WTO Director-General (1995–1999)
1988	–47.8	Sylvia Ostry	Head of the Economics and Statistics Department of the OECD (1979–1983)	
1989	+07.8	Jacques Attali		President of European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (1991–1993)
1990	–14.0	Richard T. McCormack		2001–2003
1991	00.0	Nigel Wicks	Executive Director at the World Bank and the IMF (at some point between 1983 and 1985)	
1992	+64.0	Horst Köhler		

Year	Compliance score	Sherpa	International Institutional Experience before hosting	International Institutional Experience after hosting
1993	+75.0	Koichiro Matsuura		Chairperson of UNESCO's World Heritage Committee (1998–1999); Director-General of UNESCO (1999–2005)
1994	+100.0	Pietro Calamia		
1995	+100.0	Gordon Smith	Delegation to NATO (1968); Permanent Representative and Ambassador to NATO (1985–1990)	
1996	+36.2	Jean-David Levitte	Counsellor at the Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations (1982-1985); Permanent Representative to the United Nations Office in Geneva (1988–1990)	Permanent Representative to the United Nations (2000–2002)
1997	+12.8	Daniel K. Tarullo		
1998	+31.8	John Holmes	temporary duty at the British Mission to the UN (early 1970s)	
1999	+38.2	Klaus Gretschmann		Director-General, Economic Policy Directorate, Council of the European Union (2001–present)
2000	+81.4	Yoshiji Nogami	Ambassador to the OECD (1997–1999)	
2001	+49.5	Francesco Olivieri		Permanent Representative to the OECD (??–2005)
2002	+35.0	Robert Fowler	Ambassador to the UN (1995–2000)	
2003	+65.8	Maurice Gourdault-Montagne		
2004	+54.0	Gary Edson		
2005	+65.0	Michael Jay		
2006		Igor Shuvalov		

Notes: excludes all positions in the sherpa's national department of foreign or external affairs relating to international relations, trade, ambassadors to countries, etc. that are not explicitly involved with an international institution. This list of experience is preliminary and may not include all international institutional experience.

Appendix H:
G8 Compliance Scores, 1996–2005

	Lyon 1996–97[20]	Den-ver 1997–98[21]	Birmingham 1998–99[22]	Cologne 1999–00[23]	Okinawa 2000–01[24]	Genoa 2001–02[25]	Kanan-askis 2002–03 (interim)[26]	Kanan-askis 2002–03 (final)[27]	Evian 2003–04 (interim)[28]	Evian 2003–04 (final)	Sea Island 2004–05 (interim)[29]	Sea Island 2004–05 (final)	Glen-eagles 2005–06 (interim)[30]	Glen-Eagles 2005–06 (final)	Ave. (final scores only)
France	0.26	0	0.25	0.34	0.92	0.69	0.38	0.64	0.50	0.75	0.39	0.50	0.48	0.57	49.2%
United States	0.42	0.34	0.60	0.50	0.67	0.35	0.25	0.36	0.50	0.50	0.44	0.72	0.71	0.90	53.6%
United Kingdom	0.42	0.50	0.75	0.50	1.0	0.69	0.42	0.55	0.58	0.50	0.50	0.67	0.67	0.95	65.3%
Germany	0.58	0.17	0.25	0.17	1.0	0.59	0.08	0.18	0.42	0.50	0.50	0.67	0.33	0.90	50.1%
Japan	0.21	0.50	0.20	0.67	0.82	0.44	0.10	0.18	0.42	0.42	0.33	0.39	0.52	0.62	44.5%
Italy	0.16	0.50	0.67	0.34	0.89	0.57	0.00	–0.11	0.38	0.25	0.39	0.44	0.43	0.24	39.5%
Canada	0.47	0.17	0.50	0.67	0.83	0.82	0.77	0.82	0.58	0.83	0.50	0.72	0.52	0.76	65.9%
Russia	N/A	0	0.34	0.17	0.14	0.11	0.14	0.00	0.42	0.33	0	0.06	-0.14	0.05	13.3%
European Union	N/A	N/A	N/A	0.17	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	0.50	0.72	0.75	0.90	59.7%
Average	0.36	0.27	0.45	0.39	0.80	0.53	0.27	0.33	0.47	0.51	0.40	0.55	0.47	0.65	64.5%

[20] Applies to 19 priority issues, embracing the economic, transnational and political security domains.
[21] Applies to six priority issues, embracing the economic, transnational and political security domains.
[22] Applies to seven priority issues, embracing the economic, transnational and political security domains (human trafficking).
[23] Applies to six priority issues, embracing the economic, transnational and political security domains (terrorism).
[24] Applies to 12 priority issues, embracing economic, transnational, and political security domains (conflict prevention, arms control and terrorism).
[25] Applies to nine priority issues, embracing economic, transnational, and political security domains (terrorism).
[26] Applies to the 13 priority issues assessed in the first interim compliance report, embracing economic, transnational, and political security domains (arms control, conflict prevention and terrorism).
[27] Applies to the 11 priority issues assessed in the final report, embracing economic, transnational and political security domains (arms control, conflict prevention and terrorism). Excluded in the final report, which were assessed in the interim are debt of the poorest (HIPC) and ODA.
[28] Applies to the 12 priority issues, embracing economic, transnational and political security domains (WMD, transport security and terrorism).
[29] Applies to the 18 priority issues embracing world economy, energy, the environment, debt relief and infectious diseases.
[30] Applies to the 21 priority issues, embracing peacekeeping, ODA, infectious diseases, renewable energy, climate change and Middle East reform.

Appendix I:
Gleneagles Analysis

International Institutions in 2005 Gleneagles Commitments, highest 10 scores

Issue	Compliance Score	Total number of institutions mentioned	Number of different institutions mentioned	Institutions mentioned	Distribution		
					Support	*Lead*	*Note*
Debt Relief: Africa	1.00	3	3	World Bank IDA, IMF, African Development Fund	0	yes	0
Middle East Reform	1.00	2	1	Quartet's Wolfensohn (x2)	yes	0	0
Debt Relief: Iraq	0.75	2	1	Paris Club (x2)	0	yes	0
Sudan	0.89	2	2	African Union, UNAMIS	yes	0	0
Terrorism	1.00	0	0	0	0	0	0
Non-proliferation	0.89	0	0	0	0	0	0
Transnational Crime	1.00	0	0	0	0	0	0
Renewable Energy	1.00	0	0	0	0	0	0
Climate Change	0.78	1	1	UN Climate Change Conference	0	yes	0
Tsunami	1.00	1	1	UN	yes	0	0
TOTAL		11	9		**3**	**3**	**0**
AVE.	**93.1%**	**1.1**	**0.9**		**0.3**	**0.3**	**0**
Institutions				Quartet = 2 Paris Club = 2 UN = 3 WB = 1 IMF = 1 ADF = 1 AU = 1			

International Institutions in 2005 Gleneagles Commitments, lowest 11 scores

Issue	Compliance Score	Total number of institutions mentioned	Number of different institutions mentioned	Institutions mentioned	Distribution		
					Support	*Lead*	*Note*
Peacekeeping	0.67	0	0	0	0	0	0
Good Governance	0.44	1	1	UN	0	yes	0
Health: HIV/AIDS	0.33	1	1	UN Global Fund	0	yes	0
Health: Polio Eradication	0.11	1	1	WHO Polio Eradication Initiative	yes	0	0
ODA	0.22	1	1	OECD	0	0	yes
Promoting Growth: Africa	0.56	1	1	African Union	0	yes	0

Issue	Compliance Score	Total number of institutions mentioned	Number of different institutions mentioned	Institutions mentioned	Distribution		
					Support	*Lead*	*Note*
Education: Africa	0.67	3	2	UNESCO Education for All, World Bank Fast Track Initiative (x2)	yes	0	0
Trade: Africa	0.33	0	0	0	0	0	0
Trade: Export Subsidies	0.11	0	0	0	0	0	0
Trade: LDCs	0.33	0	0	0	0	0	0
Surface Transportation	0.67	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL		**8**	**7**		**2**	**3**	**1**
AVE.	**40.4%**	**0.7**	**0.6**		**0.2**	**0.3**	**0.1**
Institutions				UN = 3 WB = 2 WHO = 1 OECD = 1 AU = 1			

Summary (all 21 commitments)

Total number of institutions mentioned	19
Total number of distinct institutions mentioned	16
Ave. number of institutions mentioned	0.9
Ave. number of distinct institutions mentioned	0.8
Rank of institutions (based on number of institutions mentioned)	UN = 6 (3+3) WB = 3 (1+2) Quartet = 2 (2+0) Paris Club = 2 (2+0) AU = 2 (1+1) IMF = 1 (1+0) ADF = 1 (1+0) WHO = 1 (0+1) OECD = 1 (0+1)

Appendix J:
International Institutions in 2005 Gleneagles Commitments, highest 6 scores

Issue	Compliance Score	Total number of institutions mentioned	Number of different institutions mentioned	Institutions mentioned	Distribution		
					Support	*Lead*	*Note*
Debt Relief: Africa	1.00	3	3	World Bank IDA, IMF, African Development Fund	0	yes	0
Middle East Reform	1.00	2	1	Quartet's Wolfensohn (x2)	yes	0	0

Issue	Compliance Score	Total number of institutions mentioned	Number of different institutions mentioned	Institutions mentioned	Distribution		
					Support	*Lead*	*Note*
Terrorism	1.00	0	0	0	0	0	0
Transnational Crime	1.00	0	0	0	0	0	0
Renewable Energy	1.00	0	0	0	0	0	0
Tsunami	1.00	1	1	UN	yes	0	0
TOTAL		6	5		**2**	**1**	**0**
AVE.	**100%**	**1**	0.8		**0.3**	**0.2**	**0**
Institutions				Quartet = 2 WB = 1 IMF = 1 ADF = 1 UN = 1			

International Institutions in 2005 Gleneagles Commitments, lowest 6 scores

Issue	Compliance Score	Total number of institutions mentioned	Number of different institutions mentioned	Institutions mentioned	Distribution		
					Support	*Lead*	*Note*
Health: Polio Eradication	0.11	1	1	WHO Polio Eradication Initiative	yes	0	0
Trade: Export Subsidies	0.11	0	0	0	0	0	0
ODA	0.22	1	1	OECD	0	0	yes
Health: HIV/AIDS	0.33	1	1	UN Global Fund	0	yes	0
Trade: Africa	0.33	0	0	0	0	0	0
Trade: LDCs	0.33	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL		**3**	**3**		**1**	**1**	**1**
AVE.	**23.8%**	**0.5**	**0.5**		**0.2**	**0.2**	**0.2**
Institutions				WHO = 1 OECD = 1 UN = 1			

Appendix K: Sea Island Analysis

International Institutions in 2004 Sea Island Commitments, highest 8 scores

Issue	Compliance Score	Total number of institutions mentioned	Number of different institutions mentioned	Institutions mentioned	Distribution		
					Support	*Lead*	*Note*
BMENA: Democracy Assistance	1.00	0	0	0	0	0	0
BMENA: Iraqi Elections	0.89	0	0	0	0	0	0
Trade: Doha	0.88	0	0	0	0	0	0
Environment	1.00	0	0	0	0	0	0

Issue	Compliance Score	Total number of institutions mentioned	Number of different institutions mentioned	Institutions mentioned	Distribution		
					Support	*Lead*	*Note*
Debt Relief / HIPC	1.00	2	1	WB (HIPC x2)	0	yes	0
Regional Security: Darfur	0.89	0	0	0	0	0	0
Energy	0.78	0	0	0	0	0	0
WMD	0.78	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL		**2**	**1**		**0**	**1**	**0**
AVE.	**90.3%**	**0.3**	**0.1**		**0**	**0.1**	**0**
Institutions				WB = 2			

International Institutions in 2004 Sea Island Commitments, lowest 10 scores

Issue	Compliance Score	Total number of institutions mentioned	Number of different institutions mentioned	Institutions mentioned	Distribution		
					Support	*Lead*	*Note*
World Economy	0.22	0	0	0	0	0	0
Trade: Technical Assistance	0.56	0	0	0	0	0	0
Terrorist Financing	0.44	3	1	UN (TOC x2, Office on Drugs)	0	yes	0
Transnational Crime	0.11	0	0	0	0	0	0
Transport Security	0.00	0	0	0	0	0	0
Financing Development	-1.00	2	2	UN, WB	0	yes	0
Infectious Diseases: HIV/AIDS	0.56	0	0	0	0	0	0
Infectious Diseases: Polio	0.44	0	0	0	0	0	0
Peacebuilding in Africa	0.67	0	0	0	0	0	0
Famine & Food Security in Africa	0.67	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL		**5**	**3**		**0**	**2**	**0**
AVE.	**26.7%**	**0.5**	**0.3**		**0**	**0.2**	**0**
Institutions				UN = 4 WB = 1			

Summary (all 11 commitments)

Total number of institutions mentioned	7
Total number of distinct institutions mentioned	4
Ave. number of institutions mentioned	0.4
Ave. number of distinct institutions mentioned	0.2
Rank of institutions (based on number of institutions mentioned)	UN = 4 (0+4) WB = 3 (2+1)

Appendix L:
Okinawa Analysis

International Institutions in 2000 Okinawa Commitments, highest 5 scores

Issue	Compliance Score	Total number of institutions mentioned	Number of different institutions mentioned	Institutions mentioned	Distribution		
					Support	*Lead*	*Note*
ICT / DOT Force	1.00	0	0	0	0	0	0
Health	1.00	2	2	WHO, UN	0	yes	0
Trade	1.00	4	1	WTO (x4)	0	yes	0
Crime and Drugs	0.88	2	1	UN (x2)	0	yes	0
Arms Control	0.88	1	1	UN NPT	0	yes	0
TOTAL		**9**	**5**		**0**	**4**	**0**
AVE.	**95.2%**	**1.8**	**1.0**		**0**	**0.8**	**0**
Institutions				UN = 4 WTO = 4 WHO = 1			

International Institutions in 2000 Okinawa Commitments, Lowest 6 scores

Issue	Compliance Score	Total number of institutions mentioned	Number of different institutions mentioned	Institutions mentioned	Distribution		
					Support	*Lead*	*Note*
Cultural Diversity	0.63	0	0	0	0	0	0
Biotech	0.75	2	1	CODEX alimentarius (FAO/WHO)	0	0	yes
Conflict Prevention	0.63	2	1	UN	0	yes	0
Terrorism	0.40	0	0	0	0	0	0
World Economy	0.86	0	0	0	0	0	0
Aging	0.86	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL		**4**	**2**		**0**	**1**	**1**
AVE.	**68.8%**	**0.7**	0.3		**0**	**0.2**	**0.2**
Institutions				FAO/WHO =1 UN = 1			

Summary (all 11 commitments)

Total number of institutions mentioned	13
Total number of distinct institutions mentioned	7
Ave. number of institutions mentioned	1.2
Ave. number of distinct institutions mentioned	0.6
Rank of institutions (based on number of institutions mentioned)	UN = 5 (4+1) WTO = 4 (4+0) WHO = 2 (1+1)

General Notes:

- This data uses the G8RG final compliance scores.
- A mention of an international institution includes direct references to that institution and references to its programs, initiatives, conferences, special envoy representatives, etc. It does not include references to G8-centred institutions or bodies (such as the Global Partnership against the spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction). It does include references to G8+international institution-created bodies (such as the Global Fund to fight AIDS, TB and Malaria).
- If the same institution is mentioned twice in the same commitment, it is counted twice.
- Support means the G8 offers its support or endorsement of programs, initiatives, etc. already developed and generally led by the international institution.
- Lead means the G8 will move forward or call on others to move forward on something along with an international institution or that an international institution has set out.
- Note means the G8 simply mentions or refers to the international institution.

ПРОГРАММА МЕЖДУНАРОДНОЙ ОЦЕНКИ ОБРАЗОВАТЕЛЬНЫХ ДОСТИЖЕНИЙ УЧАЩИХСЯ PISA: ОБРАЗОВАНИЕ КАК КРИТЕРИЙ МЕЖСТРАНОВОЙ И ВНУТРИСТРАНОВОЙ ДИФФЕРЕНЦИАЦИИ

О.В. Перфильева

Для российской системы образования результаты Программы международной оценки образовательных достижений учащихся PISA имеют большое значение. Начиная с 2000 г., Россия приняла участие в двух этапах программы: PISA-2000 и PISA-2003. Результаты участия России получили широкое распространение в материалах отечественных экспертных организаций, прежде всего Центра оценки качества образования Института содержания и методов обучения Российской академии образования[1,2] и Информационно-координационного центра по сотрудничеству с ОЭСР ГУ ВШЭ[3,4].

В период начала реализации очередного этапа программы PISA-2006 еще раз обратиться к результатам прошедших этапов программы (главным образом, PISA-2003) представляется актуальным с точки зрения их качественного анализа и попытки осмысления на основании имеющихся материалов, а также комментариев и мнений международных экспертов ОЭСР.

Введение

Программа международной оценки образовательных достижений учащихся PISA направлена на оценку и последующее изучение уровня приобретаемых знаний и навыков 15-летних школьников в ведущих индустриальных странах мира. Являясь инструментом тесного международного сотрудничества, программа ОЭСР PISA выступает основой не только для приращения экспертного и научного знания о качестве образования в странах-членах и странах-партнерах ОЭСР, но также источником развития междисциплинарных исследований и совершенствования образовательной политики как на национальном, так и между-

[1] Основные результаты международного исследования образовательных достижений учащихся PISA-2000 (полный отчет). Центр оценки качества образования ИОСО РАО, 2004.

[2] Отчет «Основные результаты международного исследования образовательных достижений учащихся ПИЗА-2003». Центр оценки качества образования ИОСО РАО, Национальный фонд подготовки кадров, 2004.

[3] Соответствует ли уровень знаний сегодняшних школьников профессиональным требованиям завтрашнего дня? Программа международной оценки умений школьников (PISA): результаты PISA-2003 и рекомендации для PISA-2006 // Новости ОЭСР: образование, наука, новая экономика. 2004. № 7.

[4] PISA-2003 Post Scriptum // Новости ОЭСР: образование, наука, новая экономика. 2005. № 3(10).