Global Security Governance

G8 Regional Security Governance through Sanctions and Force

J. Kirton and J. Kulik

John J. Kirton – Professor, Political Science, Director, G8 Research Group, Co-director, G20 Research Group, Co-director, BRICS Research Group, University of Toronto, 1 Devonshire Place, Room 209N, Toronto, Ontario M5S 3K7, Canada; E-mail: john.kirton@utoronto.ca

Julia Kulik – Senior Researcher, G8 Research Group, G20 Research Group, BRICS Research Group, University of Toronto, 1 Devonshire Place, Room 209N, Toronto, Ontario M5S 3K7, Canada; E-mail: julia.kulik@utoronto.ca

Why do the Group of Seven (G7) and Group of Eight (G8) members approve its members' use of material sanctions in some regional conflicts but approve the use of military force in others? As an informal security institution composed of major democratic powers from North America, Europe and Asia, the G7/8 has often chosen sanctions, notably on Iran in 1980, Afghanistan in 1980, Sudan in 2004, North Korea in 2006 and Syria in 2011. It has increasingly chosen military force, notably in Iraq in 1990, Kosovo in 1999, the USSR over Afghanistan in 2001, Libya in 2011 and Mali in 2013. Yet the G7/8's choice, initiation, commitment, compliance, implementation and effectiveness of both sanctions and force have varied. Force was chosen and used effectively only in the post-Cold War period, primarily where the target was close to southern Europe. A high relative-capability predominance of G7/8 members over the target country strongly produces the choice of force, but a high, direct, deadly threat from the target state to G7/8 members does not. Geographic proximity and the connectivity coming from the former colonial relationship between members and the target country only weakly cause the G7/8 to choose force. Support from the most relevant regional organization – the North Atlantic Treaty Organization – and support from the United Nations in the form of an authorizing UN Security Council or General Assembly resolution have a strong, positive effect on the G7/8's choice of force. Accompanying accountability mechanisms from the G7/8 itself have a variable impact, as leaders' iteration of the issue at subsequent summits does not increase compliance with G7/8 commitments on force-related cases, but their foreign ministers' follow-up does to a substantial degree.

Key words: G8, regional security governance, sanctions, force

Introduction

Significance

Why do the Group of Seven (G7) and Group of Eight (G8) major market democracies reliably approve material sanctions in some regional conflicts but choose military force in others?[1] The G7/8 is an informal plurilateral summit institution (PSI), with seven or eight

[1] The Group of Seven (G7) includes Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United States, the United Kingdom and the European Union. As of 1998, Russia became a member and it became the G8. In 2014, when Russia's membership was suspended, and the G7 members began meeting on their own again.

country members from Europe, North America and Asia. Since its start in 1975, the G7/8 has often approved its members' use of sanctions, most notably in five major cases: Iran in 1980, Afghanistan in 1980, Sudan in 2004, North Korea in 2006 and Syria in 2011 [Kirton, 2011]. Moreover, in the post-Cold War period, the G7/8 has increasingly chosen military force, as in the five cases of Iraq in 1991, Kosovo in 1999, Afghanistan in 2001, Libya in 2011 and Mali in 2013. The G7/8's choice of where to approve military force has varied substantially, with conflicts close to Southern Europe high on the list and those in distant Asia rare, apart from Afghanistan in 2001 as the only leaders-authorized Asian case.

In intervening in regional conflicts through economic sanctions or military force, the G7/8 has sought to fulfill its distinctive foundational mission in a materially coercive form. In their 1975 Rambouillet Summit Declaration, G7 leaders [1975] proclaimed: "We came together because of shared beliefs and shared responsibilities. We are each responsible for the government of an open, democratic society, dedicated to individual liberty and social advancement. Our success will strengthen, indeed is essential to, democratic societies everywhere." The G7 thus affirmed one of its central principles, namely the promotion and protection of democracy everywhere in the world. It made clear its concern with the internal political character of its own members and its willingness to intervene in the internal affairs of those beyond. This interventionist dedication to democracy has been maintained for 40 years. Unlike the United Nations and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), G7/8 members are united by the common political principles of open democracy, human rights, the rule of law and social advance. This unity was reinforced by the original G7's addition of the newly democratically committed and democratizing Russia in 1998, thus making the old G7 collectively more powerful and geographically global [Kirton, 2002].

The G7/8 has acted as a global security governor from its start, dealing with the democratic transition in Spain in 1975 and the democratic defence of Italy in 1976, the transformation of the authoritarian Soviet Union into a democratizing Russia after 1989, the campaign against apartheid in South Africa since 1986 and the response to the Chinese government's massacre of unarmed students in Tiananmen Square in June 1989. G7/8 action has increasingly included firm commitments that members have complied with in a concerted way. After the end of the Cold War, there had been hope that deadly regional conflicts would diminish, along with the superpower rivalry that had fuelled them, and that those that remained could be safely left to a UN now able to work effectively in the way its founders had designed. However, those hopes were soon dashed by the harsh reality of new conflicts arising from Iraq in 1990, the Balkans in 1992, Somalia in 1993 and the genocide in Rwanda in 1994. After 11 September 2001, more conflicts erupted from Afghanistan in 2001, on Israel's borders in 2006, in Georgia in 2008, in Libya in 2011 and in Mali in 2013. Thus, since 1990, the G7/8 has been called on increasingly to end these deadly conflicts, and has responded, often by approving its members' use of economic sanctions or military force.

Schools of Thought

How and why the G7/8 has chosen sanctions or force is the subject of a debate among several competing schools of thought over its regional security governance as a whole.

The first school sees the G7/8 as an illegitimate substitute for the UN in governing international peace and security through either sanctions or force [Kühne, 2000; Félix-Paganon, 2000]. This school credits the G7/8's prominent role in ending the crisis in Kosovo in 1999. However, it views the G7/8 as lacking the unrivalled legalized authority and multilateral legitimacy that the UN has. To be sure, serious weakness within the UN system has made room for other players to act and the G7/8 has become more willing to do so. This poses a serious threat

to the credibility of the UNSC. However, this school considers the G8's action in Kosovo to be a one-off event and that very little should be expected from the G7/8 in the future. It suggests that the G7/8 will be more willing to choose force when it has been authorized in advance by the UNSC.

The second school views the G7/8 as a global security director rather than front-line provider [Penttilä, 2005; Fowler, 2004]. It argues that the G7/8 is not and should not become a conflict manager or conflict preventer. The G8 works best as an institution that directs the work of other international organizations by mobilizing political will and resources and by contributing to setting the agenda of the broader international community. Risto Penttilä [2005] argues that the G7/8's role will depend on the willingness of its members, above all the United States, to use the forum for policy coordination and crisis management. This school suggests that U.S. initiation, compliance and implementation is necessarily high in cases where force is chosen and ends in success.

The third school views the G7/8 as a potentially positive alternative to the UN. Gunther Pleuger [2000], inspired by the case of Kosovo, argues that the G7/8 has grasped the opportunity to take action when the UNSC has been unable or unwilling to act. Compared to the UNSC, the G7/8 has more flexibility due to the absence of a fixed structure or rules of procedure and is thus able to work with greater effectiveness. It has a more modern concept of conflict resolution than the UN and adapts better to the changing nature of international security threats. While the German government will do everything possible to prevent the authority of the UN from being diminished, without necessary reforms the UN will inevitably be rendered insignificant. This suggests that the G7/8 with German support will choose force, and will use it faithfully and successfully when the UNSC fails to authorize the use of force.

The fourth school views the G7/8 as an effective global security governor, due to its fundamental structure as a modern international concert and the massive failure of the UN-centred system [Kirton, 2000, 2002]. It notes that the G8 has been successful in its use of sanctions, achieving the globally desired outcomes that the leaders sought [Kirton, 2011]. The recurrent, successful use of sanctions by the G7/8 is in part due to the shock-activated vulnerability shared among its members and its structure as a compact, cohesive, cherished club.

Puzzles

None of these schools comprehensively and systematically identifies why the G7/8 chooses, implements and succeeds with economic sanctions in some cases but does so with military force in others. Nor does any chart the pattern of choice, causes and result over the G7/8's full four decades to describe and explain the pattern thus observed. This study is the first to do so in regard to the choice of force, building on an earlier study of the comprehensive choice of sanctions since the start [Kirton, 2011]. It examines all five cases where the G7/8 approved its members' use of military force and the five major cases where it relied on sanctions alone. It thus contributes to the literature on sanctions and force that acknowledges the relevance of intergovernmental or organizations such as the UN and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) but not global PSIs such as the G8 [Morgan, Bapat and Krustev, 2009; Lektzian and Sprecher, 2007; Cox and Drury, 2006; Drezner, 2003; Hart, 2000; Hufbauer, Schott and Elliott, 1990].

The Argument

This study first carefully charts the G7/8 members' choice of sanctions or force, members' initiation, commitment and compliance related to these choices, their implementation

of the approved measures, and the effectiveness of the intervention in achieving the intended result. To explain these patterns it then examines the relative salience of seven key causes. The first three causes are the relative-capability ratio between the G7/8 and the target country, the deadly threat from the target country to members, and the geographic proximity of the closest member to the target country. The next four causes are the connectivity arising from the former colonial relationship between members and the target; support for the G7/8-approved action from global multilateral organizations, notably the UNSC and the General Assembly (UNGA); support from proximate regional organizations, above all NATO; and the accompanying accountability mechanisms for compliance within the G7/8.

This analysis of the five major cases of the G7/8's approval of force suggests that a high relative-capability ratio between members and the target state strongly predicts the G7/8's choice, compliance, implementation and effectiveness of force, while a high, direct, deadly threat from the target state to G7/8 countries does not. Geographic proximity produces the choice of force and compliance with the relevant commitments by members. The connectivity coming from the former colonial relationship between G7/8 members and the target country only weakly causes the choice of force. Support from the UN in the form of a UNSC resolution coming in advance or afterwards or support from NATO had a strong, positive effect on the choice of force. Accompanying accountability mechanisms from the G7/8 had a variable effect, as leaders' iteration of the issue at subsequent summits did not increase compliance, but follow-up by their foreign ministers did to a substantial degree. Thus, when G7/8 members are collectively much more powerful than and proximate to the target and have the support of both the UN and NATO, the G7/8 is far more likely to approve and deliver force and secure the results it wants. Yet it can still improve its accountability mechanisms to increase the compliance, implementation and results it gets.

The Analytic Framework

The framework created to conduct this preliminary study specifies six effects of seven causes that are tested over 10 major regional security cases, five using sanctions only and five using force (see Appendix A).

The six effects are as follows.

1. Choice. The first effect is the G7/8's choice to approve economic sanctions or military force, when the G7/8 moves beyond non-coercive instruments such as diplomatic suasion, institutional socialization or shunning, and material support for the victim country or group. Here the approval of the chosen instrument is contained in a public, collective communiqué, if only in general terms, issued by the leaders.

2. Initiation. The second effect, taking place prior to the actual choice, is the initiation of the private diplomacy within the G7/8 that leads to the choice of sanctions or force. The initial candidates as initiator, from the general literature on G7/8 governance, are the most powerful member, the United States, or the most powerful European member of Germany [Putnam and Bayne, 1987; Kirton, 1999]. Determining the initiator, resistors and supporters requires a detailed process tracing of the preparations and negotiations by which the communiqué-encoded choice was reached.

3. Commitment. The third effect is the commitment of the G7/8 about the case in which sanctions or force was used. This is measured by the number of precise, politically obligatory, future-oriented, public, collective commitments made by the leaders on the case, both before and after their choice of sanctions or force was made.

4. Compliance. The fourth effect is the compliance of G7/8 members with the commitments made, including those that do not contain specific references to the instrument of choice.

5. Implementation. The fifth effect is the specific implementation by each G7/8 member of sanctions or force. Implementation more narrowly encompasses only the actual invocation of sanctions or the contribution of military forces to the collective combat mission in which at least half the members were involved.

6. Effectiveness. The sixth effect is the effectiveness of the chosen instrument in securing the intended result, as that result was initially specified in the G7/8 communiqué that first approved the instrument of choice. In some cases, earlier communiqués may be used to identify the intended result or goal, where they provide the specificity that the initial approval passage lacks.

The outcomes of these six effects are seen to depend on the value of seven causes as follows:

1. Capability. The first cause is the relative-capability ratio between the G7/8 members and the target state, as measured by the relevant countries' gross domestic product (GDP) in U.S. dollars at market exchange rates at the time when sanctions or force was first approved. A high predominance of relative capability of G7/8 members over the target country should be more likely to lead them to choose force. This is based on a prior rational calculation that with high predominance in relative capability the G7/8 is more likely easily and quickly to prevail and secure its intended aims.

2. Threat. The second cause is the threat posed by the target country to the members of the G7/8. It is measured in the first instance by the number of deaths of their citizens within G7/8 countries from acts initiated or supported by the target state. A high degree of threat, defined as an actual or anticipated attack by the target country on a member's territory resulting in the loss of life, should result in the choice of force.

3. Proximity. The third cause is proximity, or the geographic distance between the nearest G7/8 member and the target country. Greater proximity should induce the G7/8 to choose military force, induce high commitment and compliance from its members, and secure a successful result. This is due to the greater potential threat coming from the more proximate country in conflict in generating a demand for G7/8 action and to the likelihood of having nearby existing military infrastructure, such as military bases, necessary to sustain an effective military campaign. Those members geographically closest to the conflict should thus be the ones initiating the demand and diplomatic coalition building within the G7/8 for the choice of force.

4. Connectivity. The fourth cause is global connectivity flowing from a former colonial relationship between G7/8 members and the target country [Keohane and Nye, 1977]. Greater connectivity should lead to sanctions only. High political, economic and functional global connectivity among countries, intensified by globalization, should make such sanctions effective, and thus the rational choice, in producing the G7/8-intended results, without the need to escalate to the use of military force. This connectivity flows from higher rates of trade and investment, stronger diasporic communities with linguistic and cultural ties, and more similar political and legal structures.

5. Multilateral Organizational Support. The fifth cause is support from the dominant multilateral organization, namely the UN, especially the UNSC but secondarily the UNGA should the veto power immobilize the UNSC. UN support should lead to the choice of force by the G7/8. A supportive UNSC resolution either before or after the use of force indicates that the use of force is within the limits of either codified hard-law legality or normative soft-law legitimacy. The virtually universal multilateral membership of the UN increases the salience of both.

6. Regional Organizational Support. The sixth cause is support from the most relevant regional organization, namely NATO in the five force cases. NATO should produce the G7/8's selection and faithful choice of force. Force is more likely if a supportive regional organization, to which many or most G7/8 members belong, exists and has the capacity to coordinate such use. This assumes that the regional organization is geographically close to the target country, making it more likely that military infrastructure is in place to help coordinate and deliver the forceful response.

7. Accompanying Accountability Mechanisms. The seventh cause is accompanying accountability mechanisms. These can take the form of issue-specific accountability mechanisms invoked at the initial time of choice, iterated treatment by G7/8 leaders of the issue at subsequent summits and follow-up by relevant G7/8 ministerial forums and official working groups. Such accompanying accountability mechanisms should increase compliance, implementation and effectiveness of the chosen instrument.

These inferences are empirically assessed against 10 major cases of G7/8 governance of regional security from 1980 to 2013 (see Appendix B). Five cases involve the approval of sanctions only: Iran 1980, Afghanistan 1980, Sudan 2004, North Korea 2006 and Syria 2011. Five cases involve the approval of force: Iraq 1990, Kosovo 1999, Afghanistan 2001, Libya 2011 and Mali 2013. These latter five cases are the only ones in 40 years in which the G7/8 summit approved the use of force. All these five cases are from the post–Cold War years after 1989. Yet the full 10 cases together span a full 35 years of the G7/8's four-decade life (see Appendix C). They include cases arising from military aggression and invasion (Afghanistan 1980, Iraq 1990), ethnic cleansing/genocide (Kosovo 1999, Libya 2011) and terrorism (Iran 1980 Afghanistan 2001, Mali 2013). They are also some of the major cases the G7/8 addressed and the major regional security conflicts in the world during these four decades. The five force cases include all those the G7/8 leaders have approved, but not the additional two (East Timor 2000, Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham [ISIS] 2014[2]) where only foreign ministers approved the use of force.

These cases are of particular contemporary relevance. In the communiqué sections on counter-terrorism and foreign policy released at the G8 summit at Lough Erne in June 2013, the leaders referred by name to seven of these 10 cases: Mali, Syria, Libya, Afghanistan, Iran, Sudan and North Korea (in addition to Somalia, Tunisia, and Palestine and Israel). At their G7-only Brussels Summit in June 2014, leaders again referred to the seven cases of Iran, Afghanistan, Sudan, North Korea, Syria, Libya and Mali.

Effects

Choice of Instrument, Approval and Diplomatic Initiator

Sanctions Cases

Iran 1980. On 4 November 1979, 52 American diplomats and citizens were seized from the U.S. embassy in Tehran and taken hostage by a group of Iranian students [Putnam and Bayne, 1984, pp. 98-116, 130-31]. The United States immediately banned oil imports from Iran. On 6 November, Canada's House of Commons condemned Iran's actions. On 14 November, the U.S. froze all Iranian assets in the U.S. and those controlled by U.S. banks, companies and individuals abroad. On 12 December, 183 Iranian diplomats were expelled from the United States. That same month the G7 was first mobilized. High-level U.S. officials visited the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy and Japan to discuss their possible use of sanctions. On

[2] Also referred to as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).

13 January 1980, the UNSC prepared to vote for sanctions but was stopped by a veto by the Soviet Union. On 28 January, Canada suspended the operations of its embassy in Iran to facilitate the escape of six U.S. diplomats who had taken refuge there. On 7 April, the U.S. suspended diplomatic relations with Iran and imposed trade sanctions. On 17 April, it imposed additional sanctions and threatened military action. On 23 April, Canada announced mild initial sanctions and promised to consider further trade sanctions if the crisis was not resolved by 17 May. The United States carried out a unilateral but unsuccessful military rescue mission on 25 April. Other major allies introduced sanctions just days before this mission. On 22 May, during its promised second stage of sanctions, Canada placed controls on the export of goods to Iran, exempting only food, medical supplies and other humanitarian products. On 22 June, at the Venice Summit, the first G7 summit after the hostage taking, the G7 issued the "Statement on the Taking of Diplomatic Hostages." It expressed grave concern about the recent incidents of terrorism and encouraged leaders to "take appropriate measures to deny terrorists any benefits from such criminal acts" [G7, 1980]. The G7 thereby approved the use of sanctions.

Afghanistan 1980. On 27 December 1979 the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan [Kirton, 1987; Falkenheim, 1987; Paarlberg, 1987]. On 27 December, U.S. undersecretary of state Warren Christopher flew to London and Brussels to inform his allies of the intended U.S. response. After a six-hour meeting with his G7 counterparts (minus Japan) on 31 December, Christopher announced an allied review of relations with the Soviet Union and an approach to the UN. The following day, NATO agreed to take steps to show western disapproval of Soviet actions. On 3 January 1980, 43 countries called for a UN meeting. On 4 January, U.S. president Jimmy Carter announced an embargo of grain sales to the Soviet Union, which all other allies would join. A UNSC resolution condemning the invasion on 7 January was vetoed by Russia, with only East Germany voting on Russia's side. Then, under the "Uniting for Peace" procedure from the Korean War, UNGA [1980] voted on 14 January to deplore the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan call for the "immediate, unconditional and total withdrawal of the foreign troops from Afghanistan." The resolution passed, with 104 for and 18 against, for a winning margin of 85%. The non-aligned and developing countries voted 78 to 9 for the resolution, overwhelmingly backing the West. These actions were endorsed at the G7 Venice Summit in June [Kirton, 1987, p. 285]. The G7 soon followed with further sanctions against the Soviet Union for its actions in Poland in 1980 [Kirton, 1987; Marantz, 1987]. However, the United States failed to secure G7 consent for the further sanctions it imposed unilaterally, starting in December 1981, on the re-export of U.S.-originated goods designed for the Soviet gas pipeline to Europe [Wolf, 1987; Putnam and Bayne, 1984, 1987]. Strong European resistance, including at the divisive G7 summit in Versailles in 1982, led the U.S. to lift its embargo in November 1982.

Sudan 2004. In early 2003 non-governmental organizations reported widespread ethnic cleansing in the Darfur region of Sudan. At the 2004 Sea Island Summit, G8 leaders called for Sudan to respect UNSC Resolution 1593. G8 members also supported the African Union (AU) peacekeeping mission in Sudan, working through the European Union and NATO, providing $370 million and promising $2.5 billion in humanitarian relief over the following three years. The UN followed with UNSC Resolution 1564, invoking Chapter 7 on 18 September 2004. On 29 March 2005, the UN [2005] passed Resolution 1591, which imposed a travel ban and asset freeze on individuals "impeding the peace process" in Darfur. The G8 leaders and their AU partners [2005] did not authorize the use of force, nor did their members participate in the UN-approved AU peacekeeping force. In February 2010 a ceasefire agreement was signed between the warring factions, after an estimated several hundred thousand people had died.

North Korea 2006. The G7 leaders first dealt with North Korea in 1990 and have continually addressed it themselves or through their foreign ministers since that time. The G7/8 first

approved sanctions directly in 2006 when it expressed support for UNSC Resolution 1695 of 15 July 2006, which condemned North Korea's launches of ballistic missiles on 5 July [G8, 2006]. That resolution represented a compromise between the U.S., Japan and France, which sought stronger sanctions, and China and Russia, which stood opposed. The resolution banned all UN members from selling material or technology for missiles or weapons of mass destruction to North Korea or receiving from North Korea any missiles, banned weapons or technology [UNSC, 2006]. However, in deference to China and Russia, the resolution did not authorize the use of force.

Syria 2011. The G8 first addressed Syria at its Halifax Summit in 1995, when it encouraged the conclusion of peace treaties among Israel, Lebanon and Syria. Syria stayed on the summit agenda until 1999, and reappeared following the Arab Spring of 2011. In Deauville, France, in 2011, G8 leaders called on Syria's government to stop using force and intimidation against its own people, to respect their demands for freedom of expression and universal rights and to release all political prisoners. The G8 [2011] stated, "should the Syrian authorities not heed this call, we will consider further measures," thereby endorsing sanctions. The UNSC was unable to pass a resolution on Syria due to vetoes by both China and Russia. However, Canada, Japan, the United States, the United Kingdom and the European Union imposed sanctions on Syria.

Military Force Cases

Iraq 1990. After the invasion and annexation of Kuwait by Iraq in August 1990, the UNSC imposed sanctions on Iraq. On 29 November 1990, the UNSC [1990] issued Resolution 678, authorizing member states to "use all necessary means" to bring Iraq into compliance with all previous resolutions. On 16 January 1991, U.S.-led coalition forces began an air campaign, followed by a ground campaign to liberate Kuwait. G7 members Canada, France and the UK joined the U.S. in using force. The G7 first approved the use of force at its subsequent summit in London, in 1991. The diplomatic initiator for force, both before and at the summit, was Margaret Thatcher's UK.

Kosovo 1999. In 1998, after years of instability in the Balkans, war erupted in Kosovo between the Kosovo Liberation Army and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. After mass killings, forced expulsions and major human rights abuses led by Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic, the UNSC passed Resolution 1199 in September 1998. It recognized the war in Kosovo as "a threat to international peace and security," but failed to recommend the use of force [UNSC, 1998]. Lack of UN-authorized support, widespread media coverage of the conflict and the massacre of 45 Kosovo Albanian civilians in the village of Račak prompted NATO to activate Operation Allied Force on 24 March 1999. Under the umbrella of NATO, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the UK and the U.S. bombed Yugoslavia, leading to the withdrawal of Yugoslav forces from Kosovo [Manulak, 2011]. The diplomatic initiators of the move to use force were France, the UK and Canada.

Afghanistan 2001. Following the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on 11 September 2001, NATO unanimously declared war on Taliban-led Afghanistan the following day. Canadian prime minister Jean Chrétien stated that Canada was the first to suggest invoking Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty [Kirton, 2007]. That article reads: "the Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them ... will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking ... such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of

the North Atlantic area" [NATO, 1949]. On 12 September, Chrétien along with Italian prime minister Silvio Berlusconi and Russian president Vladimir Putin, looked to the G8 to define the American and allied response. Canada, France, Germany, Italy, France, the U.S. and the UK invaded Afghanistan to remove the Taliban from power [Kirton, 2007]. At Kananaskis in 2002, the first summit after the 9/11 attacks, the G8 [2002] stated: "We support the Transitional Authority of Afghanistan. We will fulfil our Tokyo Conference commitments and will work to eradicate opium production and trafficking." The move to use force, from the start, was initiated by Canada, France, the UK and the U.S.

Libya 2011. After the uprisings of civilians in Libya against the oppressive regime of Muammar al-Qaddafi in February 2011, the international community responded to protect those citizens and allow local forces to overthrow Qaddafi. After a violent crackdown by the Qaddafi government and massive civilian causalities, the UNSC imposed sanctions, an arms embargo and an asset freeze on Libya. On 17 March 2011, Resolution 1973 authorized member states to "take all necessary measures ... to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack" [UNSC, 2011]. On 19 March, NATO forces, including those of Canada, France, Italy, the UK and the U.S., began a military intervention in Libya. The diplomatic initiator was France, led by president Nicolas Sarkozy.

Mali 2013. In January 2013, French troops intervened in Northern Mali to fight armed groups with links to al Qaeda, which had taken control of Northern Mali in April 2012. The intervention was quickly supported by NATO and by the UNSC [2012] through Resolution 2085. The U.S., Canada, UK and Germany militarily supported the French intervention. Within months, the rebels were defeated. On 18 June 2013, at the Lough Erne Summit G8 leaders [2013] declared: "we support efforts to dismantle the terrorist safe haven in northern Mali. We welcome France's important contribution in this regard ... we support the swift deployment of a UN stabilisation force in Mali, and encourage the Government of Mali energetically to pursue a political process which can build long-term stability." The diplomatic initiator was France, led by President François Hollande.

The two additional cases where the G7/8 approved force, both at the foreign ministers' level, are East Timor in 1999 and ISIS in 2014.

East Timor 1999. In May 1999, Indonesia and Portugal agreed to allow the UN mission in East Timor to administer a vote so the people could choose between autonomy or independence. In the period leading up to the vote, pro-integration paramilitary groups began to threaten and commit violence around the country killing East Timorese people. The result of the election was East Timor's independence from Indonesia. Paramilitary groups began attacking civilians and massacres were reported in and around East Timor. On 10 June 1999, G8 foreign ministers [1999] welcomed "the agreement of the future of East Timor" and urged "all parties to bring about rapid end to the violence and an early deployment of UN observers." In addition, at their meeting on 13 July 2000, G8 foreign ministers [2000] commended "the assistance provided by the UN" and reiterated their "firm commitment to continue supporting the people of East Timor." On 15 September 1999, the UNSC issued Resolution 1264 to approve and deploy a peacekeeping force to East Timor, which included Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the U.S. and the UK.

ISIS 2014. In 2014, ISIS began to seize control of large parts of Iraq and Syria. After invading Iraq in June, by October ISIS had killed and injured more than 5,500 people [Cumming-Bruce, 2014]. It had declared the creation of a caliphate, which erased state borders and made it the authority over the world's 1.5 billion Muslims. The UN's Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights [2014] estimated that as of August 2014 1.8 million Iraqis had been forced from their homes. The U.S. announced that it would send an additional 300 troops to Iraq. On

25 September 2014, G7 foreign ministers [2014] stated that they "recognize that military action as taken by the US and other countries represents an important contribution to helping Iraq to defend itself against ISIL and to deprive ISIL of safe havens." The diplomatic initiator in the G7 was the United States.

Commitment

The number of decisional commitments the G7/8 made on each of the five selected sanctions and five force cases has varied widely, as Appendix D shows. In the major sanctions cases endorsed at the leaders' level, on Afghanistan 1980, between 1980 and 1988 the G7 made six commitments, four of which came in the first year. On Iran 1980, the G7 made eight commitments, one in 1984 and seven after. On Sudan, the G7/8 made 12 commitments, the first in 2002 and 11 from 2004 to 2008. On North Korea, the G7/8 made nine commitments, seven from 2006 to 2012 and two others in 1996 and 2001. On Syria the G8 made 10 commitments, one in 1998 and eight from 2010 to 2013.

Of the force cases, on Iraq, the G8 made 14 commitments, one in 1984, six from 1991 to 1997 and then seven in 2004 and 2005. On Kosovo 1999 and the broader Balkans, from 1996 to 2005 the G8 made 19 commitments, with a full 10 coming in 1996. On Afghanistan in 2001, the G8 made 30 commitments from 2002 to 2013. On Libya in 2011, the G8 made 10 commitments, its first in 1986, then five from 1993 to 1997, one in 2004 and three commitments from 2011 to 2013. And on Mali in 2013, the G8 made three commitments in 2013. This evidence suggests that the force cases received more G7/8 commitments, over a longer time, than the sanctions-only ones did.

Compliance

The compliance of G7/8 members with these commitments is assessed over the period between the summit at which the commitment was made and the next summit. It is measured on a three-point scale where each member is awarded −1, 0 or +1 for each commitment. A score of −1 indicates a failure to comply or actions taken that are opposite to the commitment's stated goal. A score of 0 indicates partial compliance or a work in progress. A score of +1 indicates full compliance with the commitment's stated goal.

In regional security, G8 members had an average compliance of +0.57 on the 16 assessed commitments from 1996 to 2011. This compliance was led by the United States at +0.81 followed in turn by Italy at +0.64, Canada and Japan at +0.63 each, the European Union at +0.62, the United Kingdom at +0.56, Germany at +0.44 and Russia at +0.29. Standing out is the high compliance of the United States and also Italy, whose compliance with G8 commitments across all issue areas is very low.

On terrorism, a closely related issue area, all of the 16 assessed commitments from 1996 to 2011 dealt with counter-terrorism in general, with no specific country or region singled out. Average compliance was +0.64. It was led by the U.S. at +0.88. Tied for second place were Italy and Russia, each with +0.79 – the two countries with the lowest compliance across all issue areas. They were followed in turn by Canada at +0.75, the EU at +0.64, Germany at +0.60, the UK at +0.56, France at +0.44 and Japan with +0.38 in last place. In both regional security and terrorism, the unusually high compliance of proximate Italy and the unusually low compliance of distant Japan stand out.

In the five major cases of sanctions only used for regional security, the seven assessed commitments averaged compliance of +0.50. On Iran's four assessed commitments, compli-

ance averaged +0.56. On Sudan's two assessed commitments, compliance averaged +0.89. On North Korea's, the score for the one assessed commitment was –0.50.

On the specific cases where force was used, in the eight assessed commitments the G7/8's average compliance was +0.61, higher than the +0.50 for cases with sanctions only (see Appendix E). In the cases of force, the distant but highly capable U.S. scored +0.97. The proximate but less powerful Italy was +0.41.

In cases where sanctions were used (including the few that ended up using force) in the 46 commitments from 1996 to 2008 G8 average compliance was +0.51. That of the U.S. was +0.62 and that of Italy was +0.35 [Kirton, 2011]. However, Italy's compliance scores on commitments relating to force were higher than on commitments relating only to sanctions.

On Iraq 1990, compliance with the two assessed commitments averaged a strong +0.67. The first commitment, from the 1996 Lyon Summit, was: "we reaffirm our determination to enforce full implementation of all UN Security Council resolutions concerning Iraq and Libya only full compliance with which could result in the lifting of all sanctions" [G7, 1996a]. It had an overall G8 compliance average of –0.44. The second commitment, from 2004, had an overall compliance score of +0.89, with all G7 members fully complying and Russia complying partially.

On Kosovo 1999, compliance with the two assessed commitments averaged a high +0.83. The first assessed commitment, from 1996 in the cognate area of conflict prevention focused on Bosnia and Herzegovina and received complete compliance. The commitment stated: "We support the High Representative in his work of preparation with the Parties of the establishment of the new institutions: the collective Presidency, the Council of Ministers, the Parliament, the Constitutional Court and the Central Bank. We shall provide the future authorities with the necessary constitutional and legal assistance" [G7, 1996b]. The second assessed commitment, which dealt with financial assistance, was complied with an average of +0.67, with full compliance coming from the U.S., Japan, France, Italy Canada, Germany and the EU, partial compliance from the UK, and no compliance from Russia.

On Afghanistan 2001, compliance with the two assessed commitments averaged +0.50. The first commitment had an overall compliance score of 0, with full compliance by the U.S., UK and Canada, partial compliance by Germany, France and Russia, and no compliance by Japan, Italy and the EU. The second commitment had complete compliance overall by all members.

On Libya 2011, the two assessed commitments had average compliance of +0.56. The first commitment was shared with Iraq, with an average compliance score of 0.44. The second commitment, with an average compliance score of +0.67, stated: "we will support the transition of Arab Spring countries across North Africa through the Deauville Partnership working for inclusive growth" [G8, 2013].

Contributor of Implementing Actions

In the sanctions-only cases, all members invoked sanctions in almost all cases, if not at the same speed and to the same degree. The greatest divergence came between a sanctioning United States and refusing Europe over the Soviet gas pipeline dispute at Versailles in 1982.

The G7/8 members contributing military force were highly similar in all five cases of force. They were the U.S., UK, France, Italy and Canada. Germany did so in Afghanistan 2001. Japan and Russia did in none.

Effectiveness

G7/8 members' effectiveness in using sanctions or military force is determined by whether it secured its intended result, as outlined in its official documents (see Appendix B). The record for the cases of force is as follows.

Iraq 1990. On Iraq 1990 to 1991, G7 members successfully secured their intended result. Saddam Hussein's armed forces were completely removed from Kuwait, which was thus restored as a sovereign, independent state. It has not been invaded again to this day. Some observers had hoped that the G7-led coalition would continue its military offensive into Iraq to destroy Saddam's armed forces and perhaps even replace his regime in Baghdad. Others had hoped that a liberated Kuwait might, as the post–Cold War years unfolded, become a more open, democratic state. Neither of these two results were realized, but neither were they among the goals for which the G7 approved the use of military force to liberate Kuwait.

Kosovo 1999. On Kosovo G8 members' choice of force met with great success. A looming genocide was prevented. Slobodan Milosevic removed his troops. His own people subsequently removed him from power and sent him to the Hague be put on trial for war crimes. Since that time, Kosovo has remained a peaceful polity. In 2008, it declared itself to be a sovereign state and was recognized by all G8 members except Russia. All of these results, save the very last one, were part or a consequence of the G7's choice of force.

Afghanistan 2001. In Afghanistan, the G8 members' use of force had mixed results. The invasion of Afghanistan led to the crippling of the al Qaeda organization. It was successful in preventing any further attacks on American or allied territory originating from Afghanistan and in overthrowing the Taliban and installing a democratic government. However, it has not been successful in bringing peace and stability to the region, which were among the initial goals of the forceful intervention.

Libya 2011. In Libya G8 members' use of force was considered highly successful and argued to be a model of intervention [Daalder and Stavridis, 2012]. It was quick to fulfill its first two tasks of policing the arms embargo and patrolling the no-fly zone. While it took longer to secure the protection of the Libyan people, by August it had successfully attacked Qaddafi strongholds in Tripoli and Sirte. In a matter of months, without any allied casualties, it had enabled the rebels to overthrow Qaddafi.

Mali 2013. In Mali, the G8-approved, UN- and NATO-supported intervention was initially successful. It halted the rebels from advancing in Northern Mali and in dismantling the terrorist safe haven there. However, rebel forces backed out of the peace agreement and the conflict resumed.

G7/8 intervention has thus been successful in four of the five cases where force was used, with mixed success only in the case of Afghanistan 2001. In contrast, in the five major sanctions only cases, the G7/8 was clearly successful in only one, but that one case was Afghanistan in 1980, where it faced the most powerful adversary of all.

Causes

What causes the G7/8's faithful choice of force as distinct from its reliance on sanctions alone? At this stage, with only ten major cases to consider, only inductive inferences can be made, using as causal candidates the contextual characteristics long thought by scholars of international relations to be central to how international institutions such as the G7/8, and the G7/8 specifically work. These are the seven key factors of relative capability, threat, geographic proximity,

political connectivity, multilateral organizational support, regional organizational support and, as an innovative addition, accompanying accountability mechanisms.

Relative Capability

A high predominance of relative capability of G7/8 members over the target country makes the choice of force more likely. Relative capability is determined by comparing the total GDP of all G7/8 members and the GDP of the target country at the time of the conflict (see Appendices F-1 and F-2). In the case of Iraq, the relative-capability ratio was 2,140:1. In the case of Kosovo, the relative-capability ratio was 469:1. In the case of Afghanistan 2001, the relative-capability ratio was 6,398:1. In the case of Libya, the relative-capability ratio was 898:1. In the case of Mali, the relative-capability ratio was 3,633:1.

For comparative purposes, the relative-capability ratios in cases of the G8 using only sanctions were generally lower. On Iran, the relative-capability ratio was 70:1. In the case of Afghanistan 1980, the relative-capability ratio was 6.85:1, by far the lowest level of superiority the G8 had over the target country in any of the five sanctions or five force cases. However, it was much lower against the target of the sanctions, the USSR. On Sudan, the relative-capability ratio was 1,229:1. In the case of North Korea, the relative-capability ratio was 2,162:1. And on Syria, the relative-capability ratio was 537:1.

Therefore, in the five cases of military force, the G7/8 was on average 2,528 times more capable than its target. In the five cases of sanctions, the G7/8 was on average 1,002 times more capable than its target (even using Afghanistan rather than the USSR as the target in 1980). Predominant relative capability thus indeed has a positive effect on the G7/8's choice of force.

Threat

A high degree of threat, defined as an attack by the target country on the territory of a G7/8 member resulting in the loss of life was present only in one of the five cases when force was chosen. In Iraq 1990 and Kosovo 1999, the threat was low as there were no attacks on G7/8 territory or citizens. In the case of Afghanistan 2001, the threat was high due to the al Qaeda terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. They originated from Afghanistan and killed almost 3,000 people. In the cases of Libya 2011 and Mali 2013, the threat was low.

In the sanctions-only case of Iran 1980, the threat was medium. There was an attack on the U.S. embassy (U.S. territory) in Tehran in which 52 hostages were taken; however, no deaths resulted. In the case of Sudan, the threat level was low, as there were no attacks on G7/8 territory. In the case of North Korea, the threat level was medium due to the earlier abductions of Japanese citizens; the official count was 13 but the actual number is unknown. In the case of Syria, the threat level was low. Thus, the G7/8's use of force, relative to sanctions, does not require a high level of deadly threat to a member's territory and citizens.

Geographic Proximity

The geographic proximity of the closest and all G7/8 members to the target is likely to encourage force to be chosen, initiated, committed to, complied with, implemented and effective. If the target is geographically closer to the members, the G7/8 will intervene because, first, the target represents a higher degree of actual or potential threat due to spillovers from regional instability and second the G7/8 is more likely to have established military infrastructure in

place close to the target (see Appendix G). Proximity is measured by the number of miles between G7/8 capital cities and the capital city of the conflict-initiating target country. In the force-approved case of Iraq, the closest capital city to Baghdad was Rome at 1,835 miles. In the case of Kosovo, the closest capital city to Belgrade was again Rome at 448 miles. In the case of Afghanistan 2001, the closest capital city to Kabul was Moscow at 2,096 miles. In the case of Libya, the closest capital city to Tripoli was Rome at 624 miles. And finally, in the case of Mali, the closest capital city to Bamako was Rome at 2,368 miles.

In the sanctions-only case of Iran, the closest capital city to Tehran was Rome at 2,124 miles. In the case of Afghanistan 1980, the closest capital city was Bonn at 1,298. In the case of Sudan, the closest capital city to Khartoum was Rome at 2,178 miles. In the case of North Korea, the closest capital city to Pyongyang was Tokyo at 799 miles. In the case of Syria, the closest capital city to Damascus was Rome at 1,420 miles.

Therefore, in the five cases of approval of military force the closest G7/8 capital was on average 1,474 miles away from the target. In the five cases of members approving sanctions, the closest G7/8 capital was on average 1,563 miles away. This suggests that proximity matters only a little. Italy, a positive complier with G7/8 commitments in cases using military force, is the closest member to the target four out of five times. It is the closest country in three of the five sanctions-only cases.

Political Connectivity

A high degree of political connectivity flowing from a former colonial relationship between G7/8 members and the target country is not more likely to produce the effective use of sanctions only. Among the cases in which only sanctions were used, two targets had a former colonial relationship: Iran, a former colony of the UK, and Syria, a former colony of France. Among the cases in which the use of force was used, three had a former colonial relationship: Iraq, a former colony of the UK, Libya, a former colony of Italy, and Mali, a former colony of France. Thus, political connectivity is not a salient cause of the use of sanctions, but it may have a positive effect on the G7/8 approval of force.

Regional Organizational Support

Support from the most relevant regional organization – NATO – is more likely to produce the G7/8's effective approval and use of force. In four out of the five cases in which the G7/8 used military force, NATO support was present. Only in the case of Iraq in 1990–91 was it absent. This suggests that the support of the most relevant regional organization has a positive effect on the G7/8's use of force.

Accompanying Accountability Mechanisms

Accompanying accountability mechanisms may make it more likely to secure the compliance of G7/8 members with their commitments in the same case. The first accountability mechanism assessed is iteration by the leaders, where the leaders return repeatedly to discuss the same issue or case at subsequent summits. In the force case of Afghanistan 2001, which averaged moderate compliance at +0.50 on the two assessed commitments, iteration was initially low but subsequently strong. The issue was absent in the communiqué in 2003 and 2006, but robustly present every other year through to 2013 (see Appendix H-1). In the force case of Libya 2011, where compliance was +0.56, iteration was high for all of the subsequent two years. Iteration

thus does seem to help cause compliance in these two cases where force was approved. In the sanctions case of Syria 2011, where compliance was a strong +0.78 in 2013, iteration was strong for the two years after 2011. Thus for the cases endorsing force and sanctions only, iteration did seem to increase compliance.

A second accountability mechanism – ministerial follow up – comes when G7/8 foreign ministers' meetings address the same case quickly following the summit where force or sanctions were endorsed. As Appendix H-2 shows, in the case of Kosovo 1999, where compliance with the two assessed commitments averaged a high +0.83, foreign ministers did not discuss Kosovo at their first follow-up meeting three months later (which dealt exclusively with Chechnya), but they did at subsequent ones 12 months and 25 months from the start. In the case of Afghanistan 2001, where average compliance with the two assessed commitments was a moderate +0.50, foreign ministers meetings followed quickly and frequently and discussed Afghanistan each time. In the case of Libya, where compliance was +0.56, G8 foreign ministers' follow-up was slow and did not address Libya. On the basis of this very limited evidence, G7/8 foreign minister follow-up may cause compliance to increase under particular conditions.

Conclusion

Since the first G7 summit in Rambouillet, the G7/8 has established itself as an institution dedicated to governing regional security around the world based on its members' shared principles of open democracy and individual liberty. While the manner in which they choose to address regional conflict has varied, on numerous and increasing occasions the G7/8 has moved beyond its reliance on the standard instruments of diplomatic suasion, institutional inclusion and isolation, and financial or other material support to victims, to approve the imposition of economic sanctions or intervention with military force.

This study confirms the earlier finding that the G7/8 leaders have approved the use of sanctions a great deal, almost since the start in 1975 [Kirton, 2011]. It adds that it began to endorse the use force in the post-Cold War years, doing so on five occasions since 1989. In these five force cases, its commitment, compliance, implementation and effectiveness have generally been strong. Force seems to work in getting the G7/8 what it wants.

This committed, faithful, effective reliance on force seems driven by four main factors. A high relative-capability ratio between members and the target state strongly leads to the G7/8's approval of force while geographic proximity helps a little. In contrast, a high, direct deadly threat from the target state to G7/8 countries does not, as such threats have been low, beyond the great exception of Afghanistan in 2001. Support from the multilateral UN or regional NATO has a strong positive effect on the approval and use of force. Yet political connectivity between G7/8 members and the target country is a weak cause. Accompanying accountability mechanisms have a mixed effect on compliance with commitments in the same case.

Suggestions for Future Research

This study points to the need for further research in several ways before more robust conclusions can be made. One is to expand the number and range of cases, by adding all of the many sanctions only cases from G7/8 governance of regional security and other fields, and the many cases where the G7/8 did not approve of sanctions but other consequential actors did [Kirton, 2011]. A second is to expand the number of cases where the G7/8 approved the use of force either in leaders' private conversations or their foreign ministers' public declarations. A third is to render more sensitive the measurement of the factors, for example by determining

how much force was used, by how many members for how long and whether the G7/8 endorsed the use of force before or after the UN, with an examination of the relationship between the two. The level of support from surrounding PSIs such as the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting and the Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie, as well as regional organizations such as the AU, should be considered. Existing international relations literature on force versus sanctions should be more fully mobilized. More detailed process tracing would permit a more reliable assessment of which member initiated, supported and initially opposed the G7/8's endorsed of the use of force.

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Appendix A: The Analytic Framework

Effects

1. **Instrument**: does G7/8 authorize or approve
a. sanction only, or b. military force?
2. **Initiation**: which G7/8 countries initiate the action?
3. **Commitment**: how many commitments did the G7/8 make on the case?
4. **Compliance:** how compliant are G7/8 members with the commitments relevant to the case, especially those relating to sanctions or force:
a. high, or b. low?
5. **Implementation**: are G7/8 members' contributions to the sanctions or force
a. high or b. low?
6. **Effectiveness**: does the G7/8 secure its initially intended, communiqué-specified result (how much? how fast?) with
a. success, or b. failure?

Causes

1. **Power**: Relative-capability ratio between target country and the G7/8
2. **Threat**: Deadly threat posed by target country to G7/8 member(s)
3. **Proximity**: Geographic distance of targets country to closest G7/8 member, initiator, complier
4. **Colonial relationship** between target and G7/8 member (political connectivity)
5. **Multilateral organizational support** (global institutional connectivity)
6. **Regional organizational support** (geographic place)
7. **Accompanying accountability mechanism** in G7/8 (leaders' iteration, implementation review, ministerial follow-up, official level follow-up)

Appendix B: Summary of Empirical Results

*Effects (*partial data)*

Case	Force	G7/8 Initiator	Commitments	Compliance	Contributor Effectiveness
FORCE					
Iraq 1990	Yes	United Kingdom		+0.48, N=2	Yes
Kosovo 1999	Yes	United Kingdom, France, Canada	19	+0.84, N=2	Yes
Afghanistan 2001	Yes	Canada, France, United Kingdom, United States		+0.42, N=3	Mixed
Libya 2011	Yes	France, United Kingdom, Canada		+0.03, N=1	Yes
Mali 2013	Yes	France	3		Yes
SANCTIONS ONLY					
Iran 1980	No	United States			Mixed
Afghanistan 1980	No	United States	5		Success by 1987
Sudan 2004	No				Yes
North Korea 2006	No	Japan			No
Syria 2011	No				Mixed

Causes

Case	Proximity	Colony	Regional	United Nations	Capability	Threat
FORCE						
Iraq 1991	1,835 (Italy)	Yes (United Kingdom)	No	Yes (UNSCR 678)	2.410	Low
Kosovo 1999	448 (Italy)	No	Yes (NATO)	Yes (UNSCR 1244)	469	Low
Afghanistan 2001	2,096 (Russia)	No	Yes (NATO)	Yes (UNSCR 1510)	6.398	High
Libya 2011	624 (Italy)	Yes (Italy)	Yes (NATO)	Yes (UNSCR 1973)	898	Low
Mali 2013	2,368	Yes (France)	Yes (NATO)	Yes (UNSCR 2085)	3.633	Low
SANCTIONS ONLY						
Iran 1980	2,124 (Italy)	Yes (United Kingdom)		No	80	Medium
Afghanistan/USSR 1980	1,298 (Germany)	No			7	
Sudan 2004	2,178 (Italy)	Yes (United Kingdom)		Yes (UNSCR 1591)	1.229	Low
North Korea 2006	799 (Japan)	No		Yes (UNSCR 1718)	2.162	Medium
Syria 2011	1,420 (Italy)	Yes (France)		No	537	Low

Note: NATO = North Atlantic Treaty Organization; UNSCR = United Nations Security Council Resolution.

Appendix C: G7/8 Conclusions on Force and Sanctions Cases, 1975–2013

Year	Iraq	Balkans-Kosovo	Afghanistan	Syria	Libya
	Total Words	Total Words	Total Words	Total Words	Total Words
1975	0	0	0	0	0
1976	0	0	0	0	0
1977	0	0	0	0	0
1978	0	0	0	0	0
1979	0	0	0	0	0
1980	0	0	254	0	0
1981	0	0	137	0	0
1982	0	0	0	0	0
1983	0	0	0	0	0
1984	195	0	0	0	0
1985	0	0	0	0	0
1986	0	0	0	0	0
1987	166	598	58	0	0
1988	168	194	0	0	0

Year	Iraq	Balkans-Kosovo	Afghanistan	Syria	Libya
	Total Words	Total Words	Total Words	Total Words	Total Words
1989	0	338	0	0	0
1990	0	61	0	0	0
1991	102	0	0	0	0
1992	0	2.418	0	0	0
1993	51	368	0	0	113
1994	37	197	0	0	37
1995	63	499	0	112	63
1996	59	1.417	0	164	59
1997	57	781	0	156	57
1998	0	367	0	166	0
1999	0	850	0	54	0
2000	0	384	0	0	0
2001	0	217	0	0	0
2002	0	0	24	0	0
2003	0	0	0	0	0
2004	504	0	15	226	0
2005	291	0	132	0	0
2006	0	0	0	88	0
2007	80	59	268	0	0
2008	115	0	273	0	0
2009	0	0	507	90	0
2010	0	60	322	323	0
2011	0	176	439	381	385
2012	69	0	269	224	307
2013	0	0	185	771	217
Total	1.957	8.984	2.883	2.755	1.238
Average	50.18	230.36	73.92	70.64	31.74

Notes: Data are drawn from all official English-language documents released by the G7/8 leaders as a group. Charts are excluded.

"# of Words" is the number of subjects related to the cases for the year specified, excluding document titles and references.

Appendix D: G7/8 Commitments on Regional Security

Year	Afghanistan	Iran	Sudan	DPRK	Syria	Iraq	Kosovo	Libya	Mali
1980	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1981	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1982	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1983	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Year	Afghanistan	Iran	Sudan	DPRK	Syria	Iraq	Kosovo	Libya	Mali
1984	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
1985	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1986	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
1987	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1988	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1989	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1990	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1991	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0
1992	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
1993	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0
1994	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0
1995	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0
1996	0	0	0	1	0	1	10	1	0
1997	0	0	0	0	0	1	8	1	0
1998	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
1999	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
2000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
2001	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0
2002	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
2003	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
2004	0	1	1	0	0	4	1	1	0
2005	0	0	3	0	0	3	0	0	0
2006	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
2007	0	1	4	1	0	0	0	0	0
2008	6	2	3	1	0	0	0	0	0
2009	3	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
2010	2	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0
2011	4	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0
2012	9	1	0	2	1	0	0	0	0
2013	5	0	0	0	7	0	0	2	3
Total	36	8	12	9	10	14	24	10	3

Appendix E: G7/8 Compliance with Force-Specific Commitments

Commitment[a]	Average[b]	Canada	France	Germany	Italy	Japan	Russia	United Kingdom	United States	European Union
Iraq 1990	+0.67	1	1	0.5	0.5	0.5	0	1	1	0.5
1996-114	+0.44	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	0
2004-C2	+0.89	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1
Kosovo 1999	+0.83/+0.72	1	1	1	1	1	–1	0.5	1	1
1996-120	+1.00	1	1	1	TBD	1	TBD	1	1	TBD
1999-45	+0.67	1	1	1	1	1	–1	0	1	1
Afghanistan 2001	+0.50	1	0.5	0.5	0	0	0.5	1	0	0
2008-248	0	1	0	0	–1	–1	0	1	1	–1
2010-51	+1.00	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Libya 2011	+0.56	0	0	–0.5	0	0	0	0	1	0

Commitment[a]	Average[b]	Canada	France	Germany	Italy	Japan	Russia	United Kingdom	United States	European Union
1996-114	0.44	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	0
2013-186	+0.67	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	1
Mali 2013	TBD									
2013-172	TBD									
2013-178	TBD									
Average	+0.61	+0.92	+0.81	+0.44	+0.41	+0.38	–0.06	+0.76	+0.97	+0.45

Notes: TBD = to be determined (excluded from averages). [a] Numbers refer to the commitments made in official documents (see http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/evaluations/index.html#commitments). [b] The first figure indicates the average of the average score per commitment; the second figure indicates the average of the individual country scores (across the rows).

Appendix F-1: Capability of G7/8 Members

	Canada	France	Germany	Italy	Japan	United Kingdom	United States	Russia	Total
1980	278.368	526.685	777.221	524.846	1.004.592	467.306	2.862.500	N/A	6.441.518
1990	552.217	1.002.531	1.472.120	1.001.122	2.377.973	919.323	5.979.600	568.900	13.878.786
1991	559.117	1.046.643	1.598.785	1.050.335	2.538.749	937.624	6.174.000	559.600	14.464.853
1999	841.313	1.424.154	2.051.700	1.385.611	3.115.999	1.437.816	9.665.700	869.766	20.792.059
2001	932.845	1.629.631	2.201.804	1.556.071	3.377.139	1.637.784	10.625.300	1.074.407	23.034.981
2004	1.076.117	1.760.498	2.447.878	1.600.738	3.753.389	1.916.836	12.277.000	1.474.055	26.306.511
2006	1.233.200	1.993.970	2.765.956	1.793.350	4.064.908	2.155.593	13.857.900	2.133.935	29.845.087
2011	1.419.474	2.369.589	3.352.099	2.056.688	4.386.151	2.201.439	15.533.800	3.216.934	34.536.174
2013	1.800.000	2.734.000	3.635.000	2.100.000	4.900.000	2.476.000	17.100.000	2.014.000	36.700.000

Note: Figures are listed in U.S. dollars, current prices, current purchasing power parity, millions.
Source: OECD.stat Extracts [2014].

Appendix F-2: Capability of Target Countries

Case	Gross Domestic Product (U.S. dollars)
FORCE	
Iraq 1990	$6 billion
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 1999*	$44.3 billion
Afghanistan 2001	$3.6 billion
Libya 2011	$38.4 billion
Mali 2013	$10.1 billion
SANCTIONS ONLY	
Iran 1980	$92 billion
Soviet Union 1980	$940 billion
Sudan 2004	$21.4 billion
North Korea 2006	$13.8 billion
Syria 2011	$64.3 billion

Note: * indicates an estimated figure.
Source: World Bank [2014].

Appendix F-3: Overall Relative Capability

Country	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000	2005	2010	2012	2013
G7									
United States	2862.48	4346.75	5979.55	7664.05	10289.73	13095.43	14958.30	16244.58	16799.70
Japan	826.14	1384.53	3102.70	5333.93	4731.20	4571.87	5495.39	5937.77	4901.53
Germany	691.26	639.70	1547.03	2525.02	1891.93	2771.06	3310.60	3427.85	3635.96
France	470.04	547.83	1247.35	1573.08	1220.22	2140.27	2569.82	2612.67	2737.36
United Kingdom	1086.99	468.96	1204.59	1181.01	1496.61	2324.18	2296.93	2484.45	2535.76
Italy	542.45	446.03	1140.24	1132.36	1107.25	1789.38	2059.19	2014.38	2071.96
Canada	274.37	362.96	594.61	602.00	729.45	1164.18	1614.07	1821.45	1825.10
Total	6753.73	8196.76	14816.06	20011.45	21466.39	27856.36	32304.30	34543.13	34507.36
BRICS									
China	303.37	307.02	390.28	727.95	1198.48	2256.92	5930.39	8229.38	9181.38
Brazil	148.92	231.76	465.01	769.74	644.73	882.04	2142.91	2247.75	2242.85
Russia	N/A	N/A	N/A	313.45	259.70	763.70	1524.92	2004.25	2118.01
India	181.42	237.62	326.61	366.60	476.64	834.22	1708.54	1858.75	1870.65
South Africa	80.55	57.27	112.00	151.12	132.97	246.95	365.17	382.34	350.78
Total	714.24	833.67	1293.89	2328.86	2712.52	4983.84	11671.92	14722.47	15763.67
Other G20									
India	181.42	237.62	326.61	366.60	476.64	834.22	1780.54	1858.75	1870.65
Australia	163.73	175.24	323.44	379.72	399.47	733.04	1249.25	1555.29	1505.28
Mexico	234.95	223.42	298.46	343.78	683.54	865.85	1050.85	1183.51	1258.54
Korea	64.39	98.50	270.41	531.14	533.39	844.87	1014.89	1129.60	1221.80
Indonesia	86.31	91.53	113.77	202.13	165.02	285.77	709.34	877.80	870.28
Turkey	94.26	90.58	202.25	227.81	266.67	482.74	731.54	788.04	827.21
Saudi Arabia	163.97	103.68	116.69	147.94	194.81	328.46	526.81	733.96	745.27
Argentina	209.03	88.19	141.35	258.22	284.41	181.36	367.56	475.21	488.21
Egypt	22.37	46.45	91.38	60.16	99.62	89.52	218.76	262.26	271.43
Total	1220.41	1155.21	1884.36	2517.50	3103.57	4645.82	7649.55	8864.41	9058.67
Other European Union									
Spain	224.37	176.59	520.42	596.94	582.05	1132.76	1387.43	1323.21	1358.69
Netherlands	177.20	133.17	295.57	419.35	386.20	639.58	778.61	770.49	800.01
Sweden	131.27	105.68	242.88	253.68	247.26	370.58	463.06	523.94	557.94
Poland	56.62	70.78	62.08	139.10	171.26	303.98	469.80	489.78	516.13
Belgium	121.98	83.44	197.71	284.79	233.25	378.01	472.03	483.22	506.56
Austria	80.11	67.93	165.17	238.80	192.63	305.51	378.38	394.68	415.37
Denmark	69.71	61.20	135.84	181.99	160.08	257.68	312.95	315.16	330.96
Finland	53.05	55.29	139.23	130.95	122.15	196.12	237.15	247.28	256.92
Greece	53.64	45.13	92.20	131.82	127.61	240.49	294.77	248.56	241.80
Portugal	32.12	26.82	78.24	116.40	117.64	192.18	229.37	212.26	219.97
Ireland	21.00	20.76	47.25	67.92	97.62	202.93	209.78	210.75	217.88
Czech Republic	N/A	N/A	N/A	57.79	58.80	130.07	198.49	196.45	198.31
Romania	45.59	47.80	38.24	35.48	37.33	99.17	164.78	169.18	189.66
Hungary	22.61	21.04	33.73	45.47	46.39	110.32	127.50	124.59	132.43
Slovakia	N/A	N/A	N/A	19.60	20.48	47.98	87.44	91.40	95.81
Luxembourg	6.47	4.57	12.70	20.69	20.33	37.71	52.15	55.17	59.84
Croatia	N/A	N/A	N/A	22.12	21.49	44.79	58.84	56.16	58.06
Bulgaria	26.68	28.05	21.12	13.42	12.94	28.97	47.84	51.33	53.05

Country	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000	2005	2010	2012	2013
Lithuania	N/A	N/A	N/A	6.73	11.50	26.10	36.71	42.34	47.56
Slovenia	N/A	N/A	N/A	20.97	20.08	35.77	47.08	45.41	46.85
Latvia	N/A	N/A	N/A	4.97	7.78	15.94	24.10	28.38	30.95
Estonia	N/A	N/A	N/A	3.78	5.70	13.93	19.08	22.39	24.48
Cyprus	2.13	2.40	5.52	9.14	9.20	16.92	23.10	23.00	21.83
Malta	N/A	N/A	N/A	3.73	4.04	6.14	8.56	8.85	9.55
Total	1.124.54	950.65	2.087.90	2.825.62	2.713.82	4.833.61	6.128.99	6.133.97	6.390.58

Notes: N/A = Data not available.
Source: World Economic Outlook Database (2014).

Appendix F-4: Relative Military Capability

Country	1990	2000	2005	2010	2013	% of United States
United States	527.174	394.155	579.831	720.282	618.681	100.0
China	19.820	37.040	71.496	136.239	171.381	27.7
Russia/USSR	62.300[a]	31.100	46.446	65.807	84.864	13.7
France	70.527	61.783	65.123	66.251	62.272	10.1
Japan	47.802	60.388	61.288	59.003	59.431	9.1
United Kingdom	58.824	48.000	58.150	62.942	56.231	9.1
Germany	71.666	50.614	46.983	49.583	49.297	8.0
Italy	36.892	43.063	42.342	38.876	32.663	5.3
Canada	20.582	15.651	17.811	20.684	18.704	3.0
Turkey	13.137	20.601	15.668	16.955	18.682	3.0
Netherlands	13.550	11.267	11.821	12.061	10.258	1.7
Poland	7.417	6.351	7.733	9.326	9.431	1.5
Iraq	N/A	N/A	2.545	3.489	7.251	1.1
Serbia (FYR)	N/A	1.633	976	1.028	919	0.1
Afghanistan	N/A	N/A	183	631	1.333	0.2
Libya	N/A	531	1.069	N/A	2.903[b]	0.5
Mali	58.5	88.7	116	158	153	0.02
Iran	2.813	9.923	15.128	11.043	9.573[b]	1.5
Russia/USSR	62.300[a]	31.100	46.446	65.807	84.864	13.7
North Korea	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Sudan	764	1.676	2.166	N/A	N/A	N/A
Syria	1.117	1.856	2.339	2.366	N/A	N/A

Notes: [a] 2002 figure. [b] 2012 figure.
Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database (2014), constant 2011 US$ millions.

Appendix G: Proximity to G7/8 Members

	Ottawa, Canada	Washington, United States	Rome, Italy	Paris, France	Berlin, Germany	Tokyo, Japan	Moscow, Russia	London, United Kingdom
Baghdad, Iraq	5.840	6.202	**1.835**	2.402	2.229[a]	5.190	1.585	2.546
Belgrade, Serbia	4.374	4.712	**448**	898	620	5.700	1.063	1.049
Kabul, Afghanistan	6.500	6.930	3.067	3.473	2.972	3.902	**2.096**	3.549
Tripoli, Libya	4.601	4.856	**624**	1.238	2.184	10.588	3.166	1.451
Bamako, Mali	4.525	4.554	**2.368**	2.573	3.002	8.495	3.845	2.723
Tehran, Iran	5.942	6.331	**2.124**	2.620	2.182	4.768	1.534	2.736
Moscow, Russia	4.452	4.865	1.479	1.546	**1.298**[a]	4.651	N/A	1.555
Khartoum, Sudan	6.306	6.553	**2.178**	2.865	2.763	6.520	2.794	3.070
Pyongyang, North Korea	6.458	6.869	5.459	5.456	4.934	**799**	3.989	5.388
Damascus, Syria	5.532	5.869	**1.420**	2.037	1.737	5.570	1.540	2.201

Notes: Distance is calculated by the number of miles between capital cities. All cases listed involved military force. The G7/8 member closest to the conflict is in bold.

[a] = Proximity is measured from Bonn, Germany, the former capital of West Germany.

Appendix H: Accompanying Accountability Mechanisms

H-1: G7/8 Leaders' Issue Iteration at Subsequent Summits

Force	Start	Words	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3	Year 4	Year 5	Year 6	Year 7
Iraq	1990								
Kosovo	1999	24	0	15	132	0	268	273	507
Afghanistan	2001								
Libya	2011	385	307	217	N/A				
Mali	2013								
Sanctions									
Syria	2011	381	224	771	N/A				

Note: N/A = Not applicable.

H-2: G7/8 Foreign Ministers' Follow-up

Force	Start	Meeting 1		Meeting 2		Meeting 3	
		Months after event	Issue discussed	Months after event	Issue discussed	Months after event	Issue discussed
Iraq	1990						
Kosovo	1999	5 months	No	12 months	Yes	25 months	Yes
Afghanistan	2001	3 months	Yes	11 months	Yes	20 months	Yes
Libya	2011	11 months	No	23 months	No	N/A	N/A
Mali	2013	N/A					

Notes: Excludes meetings without statements and statements without meeting. N/A = not available.